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Abstract 
Since the mid-1980s, both Shanghai and Hong Kong have implemented health 
insurance reform to contain healthcare costs. But the reform result in these two places 
represents polar extremes. While Shanghai witnessed a revolution in healthcare 
financing in 2000, Hong Kong remains status quo on healthcare financing. Using the 
theory of historical institutionalism, this study examines how the complex interplay of 
forces affects health insurance reform implementation in these two places. It finds that 
Shanghai succeeded in implementing health insurance reform because of contextual 
influences, ideological shift, policy feedback, the authoritative political institutions, 
the dominance of key bureaucratic stakeholders in health insurance reform process, 
the endorsement of new ideas, and the decentralization power given to local 
governments. On the other hand, it finds that Hong Kong failed to implement any 
health insurance reforms in 1993 because of a more democratic political system, 
policy feedback, the persistence of old ideas, and a robust economy. Besides, it finds 
that the government failed to implement healthcare financing reforms in 1999 and 
2000 because of a disjointed political system, difficult economic circumstances, the 
new idea lacking public acceptance, policy feedback, and the institutionalization of 
old ideas.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past two decades, healthcare has become a major international concern 
(Lassey et al., 1997, p.xi) and a primary political, economic, social, ideological, and 
ethical issue (Field, 1989, p.1; Lassey et al., 1997, p.xi). Ageing populations, rapid 
developments of new medical technologies, and heightened demands and expectations 
of citizens (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.1) have compelled the governments in different 
welfare states to review and reform their healthcare systems (Figueras et al., 1998, p.1) 
in order to organize, finance and deliver healthcare in a better way. In the aspect of 
healthcare financing, the governments driven by the need to contain costs desire to 
find alternative options for generating financial resources for healthcare (Lee and 
Goodman, 2002, p.97). However, their policy choices are not easy to make. 
Healthcare is “about maintaining life, preventing death and keeping people 
comfortable” (Gauld, 2005a, p.6). It is not simply an economic issue, but very much 
an issue surrounded by questions of equity and justice (Gauld, 2005a, p.6). Hence, 
governments face a major challenge in balancing sustainable and equitable funding 
for healthcare with available resources (Figueras et al., 1998, p.7) when making 
healthcare decisions.   
 
 2 
The 1990s was “a decade of major health system reform” (Saltman, 1994, p.287). 
Healthcare reforms were widespread among Western welfare states although they 
varied in terms of the pace and scope because of cross-national differences in 
healthcare systems. In the aspect of healthcare financing reform, governments in 
Western welfare states made efforts to effectively use their financial resources and 
contain healthcare costs by introducing elements of market and competition to their 
healthcare systems, albeit to varying degrees and by different methods. Like their 
western counterparts, both Shanghai and Hong Kong were under great pressure to 
reform their healthcare systems because of limited funding and rapid healthcare cost 
escalation caused by ageing populations, increasing healthcare demand, and 
technological advancement (Gauld, 2005a, pp.4-5). Shanghai, which is a 
market-Leninist welfare regime in the East, established a free healthcare system 
containing the dual Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS) and the Government-funded 
Healthcare Scheme (GHS) in the early 1950s. Before the establishment of the free 
healthcare system, more than 96 per cent of Shanghai residents had to pay medical 
expenses from their own pocket when seeking medical care at hospitals which began 
to charge medical fees in the early twentieth century (Nakajima, 2004, pp.36-50; 
Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.114). Only the poor could receive free medical treatment 
provided by limited hospitals, clinics and charitable organizations (Zhang and Shao, 
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1998, p.114). When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in China in 
1949, it implemented free healthcare for certain employees of the work units and 
social groups as a welfare benefit, which alleviated the financial burden of those who 
enjoyed the benefit when seeking medical treatment. In 1951, the CCP implemented 
the LIS, which provided employees in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the 
collective enterprises with free outpatient and inpatient services financed by the work 
units (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.114). Although the CCP used the term ‘insurance’ to 
describe free healthcare it provided for employees of SOES and the collective 
enterprises, the LIS was not actually an insurance scheme in the real sense because it 
involved no premium contributions and no insurance institutions to manage the 
Schemes (Gu, 2001a, pp.200-201). In 1952, the CCP implemented the GHS, which 
provided free healthcare for government employees and retirees, army veterans, 
university and college students, staff in the cultural, education, health and science 
sectors, and retirees from these sectors (Grogan, 1995, p. 1074; Cheung, 2001, p.65; 
Gu, 2001a, p.200) that was financed by the state budget. Meanwhile, non-workers still 
had to pay medical expenses from their own pocket (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.114). 
 
Hong Kong, which is a productivist welfare regime, established a national 
healthcare system heavily subsidized by taxation in the early 1960s. Before the 
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establishment of the national healthcare system, the colonial government played a 
negligible role in healthcare provision and left the tasks of building hospitals and 
offering free medical services to churches, missionaries and benefactors (Gauld and 
Gould, 2002a, p.39; Scott, 2010, p.121) in order to save public expenditure and avoid 
tax increases (Scott, 1989; Scott, 2010). However, the importance in providing a 
healthy workforce for the expansion of industrializing economy (Wong, 1999, p.87) 
triggered by the change in geopolitical environment in the 1950s motivated the 
colonial government to become more directly involved in healthcare provision. The 
national healthcare system provided free medical services for its population. Patients 
only needed to pay a nominal charge when they received medical treatment at public 
hospitals. The pressures induced by changes in demography, demand for medical 
services and medical technology drove Shanghai and Hong Kong to embark upon a 
sustained process of reform. Both the places opted for health insurance reform. But 
the reform result in these two places represents polar extremes. While Shanghai 
witnessed a revolution in healthcare financing in 2000, Hong Kong retains the status 
quo on healthcare financing.  
 
This study finds that health insurance reform in Shanghai was implemented in a 
gradual and peaceful manner. In the mid-1980s, Shanghai entered the exploration 
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phase (1984-1988) to experiment with co-payment schemes to contain healthcare 
costs. In the mid-1990s, it entered the experimental phase (1994-1996) to reform its 
healthcare financing system by implementing a pilot hospitalization insurance scheme 
coupled with a hospital revenue cap policy. And finally in 2000, it officially reformed 
its healthcare financing system by implementing a mandatory cost-sharing health 
insurance system which required contributions from both the work units and 
employees. The new health insurance scheme contained an individual medical savings 
account (MSA) and a social pooling fund (SPF), which respectively covered the 
outpatient and inpatient charges.  
 
On the other hand, this study finds that health insurance reform in Hong Kong 
was implemented in a slow and winding process. The government’s proposals for a 
coordinated voluntary insurance in 1993, a two-tier mandatory health insurance 
scheme in 1999 and a mandatory medical savings scheme in 2000 were shelved due to 
severe political and public oppositions. At the time of this study, the government is 
analyzing citizens’ views on a regulated voluntary private health insurance scheme 
proposed in October 2010 after the public consultation came to an end in January 
2011. If implemented successfully, the proposed voluntary private health insurance 
scheme, as a supplementary financing option, will not affect “tax-based public 
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funding as the major financing source for healthcare services” (Food and Health 
Bureau, 2008a, p.2). It means that Hong Kong will still stick to its original path of 
funding the universal healthcare system through taxation.  
 
Therefore, the divergent reform results in Shanghai and Hong Kong suggests the 
main research question of this thesis: why has Shanghai been able to implement 
health insurance reform from the mid-1980s onwards while Hong Kong has failed to 
do so? This further raises a sub-question: How does the complex historical interplay 
of forces, namely contextual conditions, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
sequences, path dependency and policy feedback, respectively affect the success and 
failure of health insurance reform implementation in Shanghai and Hong Kong over 
time? The implementation of health insurance reform would affect stakeholders in 
many aspects: citizens’ access to, affordability of and demand for healthcare, 
healthcare providers’ capacity of and efficiency in healthcare delivery, insurers’ 
profits and their freedom of action. Since different stakeholders had different interests 
and expectations toward health insurance reform, they would respond differently to 
the proposed or actual changes. This raises another sub-question: How do elites and 
different stakeholders in Shanghai and Hong Kong respectively respond to the 
changes brought or proposed by health insurance reform? 
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1.1 Literature Review, Research Gaps and Research Contributions 
Over the past two decades, the implementation of healthcare financing reforms in 
Western welfare states has triggered an intellectual debate on the convergence or 
divergence of healthcare systems (Hurst, 1991; Immergut, 1992; Ham and Brommels, 
1994; Wilsford, 1994; Wilsford, 1995; Freeman, 1998; Hacker, 1998; Giaimo and 
Manow, 1999; Giaimo, 2001; Wendt and Thompson, 2004; Blank and Burau, 2006; 
Bandelow, 2007; Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007; Cacace and Schmid, 2008; Wendt 
and Kohl, 2010). Convergence suggests that the structure and policies of national 
healthcare system become more alike (Saltman, 1997, p.449; Blank and Burau, 2006, 
p.266) when welfare states facing similar pressures or problems adopt similar reform 
strategies or solutions (Wendt et al., 2004, p.1). Conversely, divergence emphasizes 
the extent to which the structure and policies of national healthcare system “reflect 
deeply rooted values and norms which differ between societies” (Saltman, 1997, 
p.449) and thus lead to welfare states adopting different reform strategies or solutions 
(Saltman, 1997, p.449). A review of the available literature in the West shows that 
there is an observed diversity of research findings, which argues for the convergence 
(Cacace and Schmid, 2008), divergence (Immergut, 1992; Ham and Brommels, 1994; 
Wilsford, 1994; Wilsford, 1995; Freeman, 1998; Hacker, 1998; Giaimo and Manow, 
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1999; Giaimo, 2001; Bandelow, 2007; Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007; Wendt and 
Thompson, 2004; Wendt and Kohl, 2010) or a convergence-divergence mix of 
healthcare systems (Hurst, 1991; Blank and Burau, 2006). But the balance and 
strength of the evidence suggests most support for the divergence of healthcare 
systems.  
 
 A review of the available literature about health insurance reform in China and 
Hong Kong, on the other hand, shows that the intellectual debate on the convergence 
or divergence of healthcare systems in these two places has yet to exist. Besides, it 
shows that health insurance reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong are understudied. 
Also, most of the existing studies reviewed are descriptive studies lacking explanatory 
power. The empirical puzzle about why Shanghai being able to implement health 
insurance reform since the mid-1980s while Hong Kong failing to do so has not been 
studied before. Since the few studies that base their research upon theories tend to 
adopt the theory of historical institutionalism to explain the divergent healthcare 
reform paths in Western welfare state, this study fills the research gap by adopting the 
theory of historical institutionalism to examine this empirical puzzle and contribute to 
Western scholarly debate over convergence and divergence of healthcare systems. 
Qualitative research is chosen as the research methodology of this study. The case 
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study is used as the research strategy to respectively examine health insurance reform 
in Shanghai and Hong Kong in detail. Multiple sources are used to collect data. 
Semi-structured interviews in these two places are supplemented and cross-checked 
with existing literature, research reports, government documents, archival records, as 
well as newspaper articles. 
 
1.2 The Rationale of This Study 
This study examines why Shanghai and Hong Kong offer a contrasting situation when 
it comes to the implementation of health insurance reform. Shanghai and Hong Kong 
are interesting case studies because they “are very much like blood sisters” (Wong and 
Gui, 2004, p.1). They “share a common history as two of the five trading ports along 
the coast of China forcibly opened by the West under the Treaty of Nanking in 1842” 
(Sung, 2009, p.2) after China’s defeat in the First Opium War (1839-1842). Under the 
Treaty of Nanking, “Hong Kong was ceded to Britain as a colony, a status that was to 
last until 1997” (Wong and Gui, 2004, p.1). Shanghai, on the other hand, was turned 
into a semi-colony, “when the principle of extra-territoriality took the physical form 
of the international settlements” (Wong and Gui, 2004, p.1). Hong Kong, which “was 
then a mere fishing village” (Sung, 2009, p.2), and Shanghai, which “was then a small 
local town” (Sung, 2009, p.2), simultaneously took over “Guangzhou’s prestigious 
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status as China’s window for foreign trade” (Hong Kong Museum of History, 2009, 
p.11) and “served as prime stops along the route for missionaries, merchants and 
travelers who ventured into China” (Hong Kong Museum of History, 2009, p.11).  
 
The opening of Shanghai and Hong Kong as treaty ports marked the start of the 
cities’ modernization (Hong Kong Museum of History, 2009, p.17), leading to a 
chapter of economic and social changes (Yeung, 2001, p.2). “In the following one 
hundred years, Shanghai and Hong Kong led the rest of China with their urban 
development” (Hong Kong Museum of History, 2009, p.17) and “developed into 
thriving metropolises” (Hong Kong Museum of History, 2009, p.19) over the course 
of time. They “developed rapidly under western influence” (Sung, 2009, p.2). There 
were public utilities, such as power stations, water plants, fire stations, post offices 
and hospitals (Hong Kong Museum of History, 2009, p.45). Besides, there was the 
establishment of new management structures, the prosperity of the industrial and 
commercial sectors, and the practice of urban planning (Hong Kong Museum of 
History, 2009, p.19). All of these “served as hallmarks of the cities’ modernization” 
(Hong Kong Museum of History, 2009, p.19). During the modernization process, both 
Shanghai and Hong Kong “evolved into the great hubs of trade and industry 
unmatched by any other Chinese city” (Wong and Gui, 2004, p.1). While “Hong Kong 
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became the entrepôt of South China” (Sung, 2009, p.2), Shanghai became China’s 
largest city and “the hub of the Yangzi River Delta” (Sung, 2009, p.2), epitomizing 
“cosmopolitanism, enterprise and urbanism” (Cheung, 1996, p.50).  
 
During the Second World War (1939-1945), both Shanghai and Hong Kong 
shared the same fate of falling to the Japanese occupation (Bergère,1981; Tsang, 
2004). After the end of the Second World War, the CCP came into power in China. It 
soon transformed Shanghai “from a glamorous financial and commercial centre into a 
leading socialist industrial base” (Cheung, 1996, p.50) after establishing the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949. In the following three decades, Shanghai 
“was cut off from the world market” (Sung, 2009, p.2). It “was no longer a global 
city” (Sung, 2009, p.2) but “a key industrial city in the [PRC], supplying industrial 
products, skilled personnel, as well as a huge amount of revenue” (Cheung, 1996, 
p.52). Meanwhile, Hong Kong rapidly transformed its economy after the Second 
World War (Yeung, 2001, p.2). The PRC’s “national policy that discouraged 
commerce and foreign trade” (Cheung, 1996, p.53) led to Hong Kong losing its 
entrepôt trade (Sung, 2009, p.2). But the influx of Shanghai capital, skills, and people 
sped up Hong Kong’s export-oriented industrialization (Wong and Gui, 2004, p.2), 
which in turn “stimulated the development of banking and business services” (Sung, 
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2009, p.2). In the 1970s, Hong Kong emerged as “an international financial centre” 
(Sung, 2009, p.2) and became one of the Four Asian Dragons, which also included 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (Castells, 1992, p.33). 
 
By the 1980s, “the opening of the [PRC] and the lure of its cheap land and labor” 
(Wong and Gui, 2004, p.2) led to the manufacturing industries of Hong Kong moving 
to the PRC. Deindustrialization in Hong Kong “gave way to a vast expansion of the 
financial, real estate, and tertiary sectors” (Wong and Gui, 2004, pp.2-3) and 
“propelled Hong Kong into an unprecedented period of growth and prosperity” (Wong 
and Gui, 2004, p.3). In 1990, Shanghai re-emerged as a financial centre when Pudong 
(former eastern suburb of the city) was opened as the biggest special economic area in 
the PRC (Cai and Sit, 2003, pp.436-7). In the following 10 years, Shanghai “recorded 
two-digit annual economic growth” (Cai and Sit, 2003, p.437), which increased both 
“its economic strength and economic controlling power in [the PRC]” (Cai and Sit, 
2003, p.437). The rapid economic growth of Shanghai raised “the question of whether 
and when Shanghai will overtake Hong Kong” (Yeung, 2001, p.4).  
 
Both Shanghai and Hong Kong have undergone rapid, deep, and wide-ranging 
transformation (Wong and Gui, 2004, p.4). The economic transformation is 
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accompanied by social development in these places. Both Shanghai and Hong Kong 
provide housing, education, healthcare and other welfare support for their citizens. 
When they becomes prosperous, however, they also face a series of problems such as 
ageing populations, increasing citizens’ demand for social services, increasing social 
inequality, and fiscal strains (Yeung, 1985; Wong and Gui, 2004). The fiscal strain 
calls for “ingenuity in adjusting and improving the system of social protection” 
(Wong and Gui, 2004, p.7) and concurrently raises the policy dilemma of whether the 
government or the people is responsible for service provision (Yeung, 1985, p.39). 
Both Shanghai and Hong Kong have made efforts to review their social policies in 
order to improve their systems of housing, education, social security, and healthcare 
(Wong and Gui, 2004, p.7). In the aspect of healthcare, both of them desire to utilize 
their financial resources and contain healthcare costs in a better way through the 
implementation of health insurance reform. However, the reform result of Shanghai is 
significantly different from that of Hong Kong. While Shanghai has been able to 
implement health insurance reform since the mid-1980s, Hong Kong has failed to do 
so. What are the reasons behind these divergent reform paths?  
 
Implementing healthcare financing reform is not an easy task. Healthcare 
funding itself is “more than the technicalities of raising and allocating financial 
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resources” (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.63). In fact, it is “also a pointer to power, and 
control of funding is a major resource in health policy” (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.63). 
Healthcare can be funded through four major sources: (1) taxation; (2) social 
insurance; (3) private insurance; and (4) out-of-pocket payment (Doorslaer and 
Wagstaff, 1993, p.20; Chinitz et al., 1998, p.56; Blank and Burau, 2007, p.13). While 
taxation and social insurance belong to public expenditure, private insurance and 
out-of-pocket payment belong to private expenditure (Abel-Smith, 1994, p.149). 
Different methods of healthcare financing reflect different principles and they “differ 
in the extent of control that they give to the financing agency” (Wessen, 1999, p.19).  
 
Taxation devoted to healthcare is general revenues collected “by local, provincial, 
or national government authority on incomes, land, sales, corporation profits, and the 
like” (Roemer, 1976, p.15). National healthcare systems financed by taxation are 
committed to the principle of universal access to healthcare (Blank and Burau, 2007, 
p.75; Roemer, 1976) and have the strongest public control resided primarily with the 
government (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.75). The government, as the payer of 
healthcare, is likely to prioritize cost efficiency and containment when raising and 
allocating healthcare funding (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.76).  
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Social insurance is hypothecated taxation levied through the payroll (Leung and 
Bacon-Shone, 2006, p.343) that requires employers and employees to “pay mandatory 
contributions towards health care costs” (Leung and Bacon-Shone, 2006, p.343). 
Contribution rates “are often a flat percentage of salaries” (Chinitz et al., 1998, p.59) 
and a ceiling is imposed on the salary to calculate premiums (Chinitz et al., 1998, 
p.59). Healthcare systems funded by social insurance are “based on the principle of 
social solidarity” (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.75). It has a weaker public control of 
funding because healthcare resources are allocated from bottom up.  The government 
is limited to “setting (and altering) the framework in which the insurance funds and 
providers operated” (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.76). 
 
Private insurance is funds voluntarily “raised through periodic contributions” 
(Roemer, 1976, p.15) “by individuals or by groups in such forms as corporate 
insurance coverage for employees” (Leung and Bacon-Shone, 2006, p.344). Private 
insurance schemes are “usually offered by competing insurers that charge different 
premiums for different coverage packages based on the baseline health risk of the 
insured” (Leung and Bacon-Shone, 2006, p.344). Healthcare funding raised from 
private insurance emphasizes individual responsibility (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.75). 
It has the weakest public control of funding because of “the predominance of private 
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funding” (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.77), and “the fragmentation of insurance funds 
and provider organizations” (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.77).  
 
Out-of-pocket payment is money drawn “from the individual’s personal 
resources, including those he may have borrowed or received from another source (a 
relative, friend, loan company, and so on)” (Roemer, 1976, p.15). It is “the simplest 
method of financing” (Wessen, 1999, p.19) which “entails direct, non-reimbursable 
payment at the point of service” (Leung and Bacon-Shone, 2006, p.346). Besides, it is 
the least problematic and most commonly used “when costs are trivial or low” 
(Wessen, 1999, p.19). However, it is “the most regressive form of financing for health 
care” (Chinitz et al., 1998, p.61) because it constitutes “a much greater share of 
income for the sick and poor than for those who are healthy and better off” (Chinitz et 
al., 1998, p.61). Similar to private insurance, out-of-pocket emphasizes individual 
responsibility and has the weakest public control of funding because the money rests 
in the hands of individuals. 
  
From the above, it shows that different methods of healthcare financing --- 
taxation, social insurance, private insurance and out-of-pocket payment --- reflect 
different principles and different types of control. In reality, there is a wide variety of 
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combinations of these funding methods within a single healthcare system (Blank and 
Burau, 2007, p.13). All healthcare systems in different countries adopt pluralistic 
financing “with tendencies to one method rather than another” (Blank and Burau, 
2007, p.13). The efforts to find alternative or complementary ways to generate 
financial resources for healthcare is a challenge to policy makers when implementing 
healthcare finance reform. It requires careful and detailed examination before the 
policy makers can determine which financing option should be chosen to reform the 
healthcare financing system. Since there is the lack of study on health insurance 
reform in both Shanghai and Hong Kong, this study fills this research gap by 
examining this issue.  
 
1.3 The Structure of This Thesis 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Chapter Two reviews the current 
literature of welfare states and healthcare financing reforms in detail and identifies the 
research gaps. Chapter Three introduces the theory of historical institutionalism which 
is adopted by this study to examine health insurance reforms in both Shanghai and 
Hong Kong. Chapter Four outlines the research methodology and the methods of data 
collection. Chapter Five briefly examines the historical development of the healthcare 
system in Shanghai in the pre-reform era before 1980. Chapter Six thoroughly 
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examines health insurance reform in Shanghai and presents the research results. 
Chapter Seven briefly examines the historical development of the healthcare system 
in Hong Kong in the pre-reform era before 1990. Chapter Eight thoroughly examines 
healthcare financing reforms in Hong Kong and presents the research results. Chapter 
Nine is a conclusion chapter presenting the cross-case analysis and major findings of 
this study by placing materials from the preceding chapters in a comparative context”. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the current literature of healthcare financing reforms in detail. It 
is divided into five sections. Section 2.2 defines what welfare states are, gives an 
overview of the welfare state development and introduces typologies of welfare 
regimes in the West and in the East. Section 2.3 examines the relationship between 
welfare states and healthcare, the scholarly debate over the convergence or divergence 
of healthcare systems in the West and healthcare financing reforms in China and Hong 
Kong. Section 2.4 examines the importance of applying theories into health policy 
studies. Section 2.5 offers a conclusion. 
 
This study uses the theory of historical institutionalism to solve a real world 
puzzle about health insurance reform: why has Shanghai been able to implement 
health insurance reform from the mid-1980s onwards while Hong Kong has failed to 
do so? In order to locate the study “in the context of what has been done before” 
(Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007, p.47), the author conducted a literature review on 
health insurance reform. As Neuman (2003) argued, it was best to review the 
accumulated knowledge about a question before one tried to answer it (p.96). By 
conducting a literature review, as Neuman (2003) argued, one could fulfill one or 
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another of four goals: to “demonstrate a familiarity with a body of knowledge and 
establish credibility”; to “show the path of prior research and how a current project is 
linked to it”; to “integrate and summarize what is known in an area”; and to “learn 
from others and stimulate new ideas” (p.96).1  
 
2.2 Welfare States and Healthcare Reforms 
Healthcare is a major component of the welfare state (Moran, 2000, p.135). However, 
“the literature on health-care policy is often semi-detached from the wider literature 
on the welfare states, being immersed instead in its own specialist controversies” as 
noted by Moran (2000, p.135). This study contributes to addressing this gap by 
providing a background about the development of welfare states and linking it to the 
debate about healthcare reform.  
 
                                                 
1 When conducting a literature survey, this study adopted a search strategy which located relevant 
published materials in three ways. Firstly, the author made use of the online university library 
catalogue system to locate the scholarly books or book chapters by title and by keywords. Important 
terms such as healthcare reform, health insurance reform, medical insurance, healthcare finance, 
healthcare financing reform, and historical institutionalism were used to search the relevant books 
and book chapters. Secondly, the author made use of the e-journal portal of the online library system 
and the Social Science Citation Index ® subscribed by the university libraries to locate relevant 
academic journals which may contain articles useful to this study. Once the relevant journals were 
located, the author used the search or advanced search engine to search the contents of the journal in 
order to locate relevant journal articles by typing keywords. The list of relevant journals included 
Health Affairs, Health Care Analysis, Health Economics, Health Policy, Health Policy and Planning, 
International Journal of Health Planning and Management, International Journal of Health Services, 
Journal of Health Economics, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Social Science & 
Medicine, International Journal of Social Welfare, Journal of European Social Policy, Critical 
Social Policy, Journal of Social Policy, and Social Policy & Administration. Thirdly, the author 
examined the bibliography of books, book chapters and journal articles to find additional published 
materials related to the research topic. 
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2.2.1 Defining the Welfare State 
According to Briggs (1961), a welfare state was a state deliberately using political or 
administrative means to modify the play of market forces in three directions---first, by 
guaranteeing the poor a minimum income; second, by reducing the extent of 
insecurity felt by those in distress when facing social contingencies such as sickness, 
unemployment and old age; and third, by ensuring the provision of an agreed range of 
social services well above the minimum standard for all citizens regardless of their 
social status (p.228). As Cochrane et al. (2001) noted, the use of the term welfare state 
suggested that “the state plays a role in shaping the context within which welfare is 
provided” (p.12). 
 
2.2.2 Four-Stage Development of Welfare States in the West: the Generic Trend 
The development trajectory of welfare states in the West, according to Pierson (1998), 
could be divided into four stages: (1) the epoch of legislative innovation (1880-1920); 
(2) the epoch of consolidation (1920-1940); (3) the ‘Golden Age of the Welfare State’ 
(1945-1975); and (4) the retrenchment of welfare states in the post-1975 era. The 
epoch of legislative innovation from 1880 to 1920 marked the birth of welfare states 
when states implemented legislation covering industrial accidents, health, 
unemployment and old age (Pinch, 1997; Pierson, 1998). (See Table 1). Originally, 
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the general prevalence of laissez-faire beliefs, as formulated in Adam Smith’s Wealth 
of Nations (1776), favored a free market and disfavored the state’s regulation of the 
economy, which was obstructive to the development of welfare services. Nevertheless, 
states which attempted to preserve social order and solve the problems stemming from 
the growth of industrial capitalism “implemented various acts of legislation to 
regulate factory hours, improve the quality of housing and to deal with the problems 
affecting public health” (Pinch, 1997, p.9). 
 
Then, the epoch of consolidation from 1920 to 1940 was the decisive epoch in 
the development of the post-war welfare states when the government actively 
established welfare institutions, extended welfare coverage and increased welfare 
spending (Pierson, 1998, pp.112-114) after the First World War (1914-1918) to meet 
“a major expansion of pension, health, housing and rehabilitation demands from those 
millions incapacitated or bereaved” (Pierson, 1998, p.113). According to Pierson 
(1998), the social expenditure levels in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries rose from three per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 1914 to more than five per cent in 1940 (p.107) (See Table 2).  
 
The period from 1945 to 1975 was ‘Golden Age of the Welfare State’ in which 
 23 
welfare states experienced a fantastic pace of growth after the Second World War 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). During this period, most of the developed states made a 
quantitative and qualitative leap in the public provision of welfare (Pierson, 1998, 
p.99). States subscribing to the post-war consensus were committed to maintaining a 
comprehensive welfare state and sustaining economic growth (Pierson, 1998, p.125). 
They “[went] beyond the provision of a bare minimum towards ensuring that all [had] 
equal opportunity, so far as the country’s resources [allowed]” (Sleeman, 1973, p.5). 
And by 1975, the social expenditure levels in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Sweden exceeded 25 per cent of their GDP (Pierson,1998, 
p.133). 
 
After the 1975, welfare states entered the era of retrenchment. The unsustainable 
burden of ageing population, the ‘stagflation’--- a combination of high unemployment 
and high inflation--- caused by the oil crisis of 1973 (Pinch, 1997, p.26) and ensuing 
times of financial stringency led to the sustainability of welfare states being 
questioned (Wessen, 1999, p.10). This drove national governments of both left and 
right to implement a wave of economic reforms such as privatizations, tax cuts and 
opening of national boundaries (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002, pp. 533-534). 
Concurrently, they dismantled social welfare apparatuses (Fourcade-Gourinchas and 
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Babb, 2002, p. 533) and adopted a series of retrenchment measures such as reducing 
the eligibility, level and the duration of welfare benefits (Pierson, 1998, p.164) (See 
Table 3). However, radical welfare retrenchment was far more difficult to achieve in 
reality. Pierson (1994) argued that both Thatcher and Reagan’s efforts to roll back the 
welfare state did not lead to “a marked curtailment of social expenditure or a radical 
shift toward residualization” (p.131) in the UK and the U.S. because policy feedback 
acted as a crucial determinant of retrenchment results in two ways (Pierson, 1994, 
p.47). On one hand, previous social policy choices in both countries “generated 
resources and incentives that helped structure the development of relevant interest 
groups” (Pierson, 1994, p.47) to defend social programmes. On the other hand, past 
policy commitments produced lock-in effects that they “sharply circumscribed 
options for radical reform” (Pierson, 1994, p.48) and “retrenchment advocates [found] 
existing policies hard to reverse” (Pierson, 1994, p.47). In another study, Pierson 
(1996) argued that welfare retrenchment in the UK, the U.S., Germany and Sweden 
had been pursued cautiously that changes had been incremental (pp.173-4) and “the 
evidence of continuity [was] even more apparent” (Pierson, 1996, p.173) because of 
“conservative characteristics of democratic political institutions” (Pierson, 1996, 
p.174), “high electoral costs” (Pierson, 1996, p.174), and organized interested 
produced by maturing social programmes to defend the welfare state (Pierson, 1996, 
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p.175).  
 
An overview of the development trajectory of welfare states shows that the role 
of the state in welfare provision has changed over time due to changes in attitude 
towards the role of the state in the community over time. From the 18th to 20th century, 
the drastic economic transformation “from essentially agrarian, localized and 
traditional to definitely industrialized, (inter)national and modern societies” (Pierson, 
1998, p.12) led to the government playing a more important role than the family, the 
church and mutual aid in welfare provision. During the period of laissez faire, the 
state was “merely the policeman who kept law and order, or the arbiter who settled 
disputes” (Sleeman, 1973, p.1). But in the years after 1945 when the term ‘welfare 
state’ came into general use, the state was seen “as a positive agent for the promotion 
of social welfare” (Sleeman, 1973, p.4) and an actor who was obligated to steer the 
operation of the market economy in a socially desirable direction (Sleeman, 1973, 
p.5). Significantly, welfare states emerged in places where the nation state and 
capitalism were already well-established (Pierson, 1998, p.100). And these 
pre-existing state and economic formations “prescribed the limits of subsequent 
welfare state development” (Pierson, 1998, p.100).  
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In fact, Stewart (2007), who examines historical dimensions of welfare provision, 
argues that there has always been a mixed economy of welfare comprising the state, 
the market, the family which is the informal sector, and charitable bodies which are 
the voluntary sector (p.37). However, the role and the extent of each of these 
components in delivering welfare has changed and will continue to change over time 
(Stewart, 2007, p.24). Besides, the relationship and boundaries between these 
components of the mixed economy of welfare have “[shifted] over time as well as 
being porous and overlapping, rather than rigidly fixed and delineated” (Stewart, 2007, 
p.36). Stewart (2007) argues that the role of the state varies “according to particular 
historical circumstances” (p.37). Its role is not homogeneous that it “can be that of 
direct provider, or funder, or enabler of welfare” (Stewart, 2007, p.37). The change in 
the role of the state would also lead to the changes in the roles of other components of 
the mixed economy of welfare. In the last quarter of the 20th century, a shift away 
from support for the state being the direct provider of key welfare services led to a 
reemphasis on the importance of the market, the family, and charitable bodies in 
welfare provision (Stewart, 2007, p.28). The study of Stewart (2007) shows that the 
mixed economy is characteristic of welfare states (p.24). Alcock and Powell (2011) 
also argue that the concept of mixed economy of welfare is “a useful reminder that 
welfare can be supplied from various sources, and that the welfare mix can change 
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over time and between countries” (p.3).  
 
2.2.3 Typologies of Welfare Regimes 
There are many welfare states across the world. They vary in terms of their sizes, their 
funding bases, “their patterns of entitlement, their forms of delivery and their 
redistributive capacity” (Pierson, 1998, p.178). Since the late 1980s, they have been 
categorized into different ‘welfare regimes’ which conceptualize “the welfare 
programs, outcomes, and effects of those capitalist societies that have been 
transformed into welfare states” (Gough, 2002, p.50).  
 
The assumption of path dependency is attached to the notion of ‘regime’ that 
“outcomes from political economy and the deliberate interventions of state and 
non-state actors reproduce stratification, inequalities and power differences” (Wood 
and Gough, 2006, p.1698) over time. Welfare regimes “owe their origins to different 
historical forces, and they follow qualitatively different development trajectories” 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.3). In the West, there are liberal, conservative and social 
democratic welfare regimes identified by Esping-Andersen (1990) and the ‘Latin rim’ 
rudimentary welfare regime identified by Leibfried (1993, 2000). In the East, the 
situation is rather complicated. Different typologies are adopted to identify welfare 
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regimes in East Asia, including the Oikonomic or Confucian welfare states by Jones 
(1990, 1993), the East Asian welfare model by Kwon (1997), the conservative welfare 
state system by Aspalter (2001), the productivist welfare capitalism by Holliday 
(2000), and the market-Leninist welfare regime by London (2008). As illustrated 
below, the adoption of different typologies are due to advocates of the East Asian 
welfare regime using different perspectives to examine welfare development in East 
Asia. 
 
2.2.3.1 Welfare Regimes in the West 
(a) Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: ‘Liberal’, 
‘Conservative/Corporatist’, and ‘Social Democratic’ Welfare Regimes 
Esping-Andersen (1990) famously develops a tripartite typology of liberal, 
conservative and social democratic regimes to demonstrate the clustering of advanced 
capitalist countries in the West. He uses three salient characteristics of welfare states 
--- de-commodification, social stratification and the public-private mix--- to 
distinguish these three welfare regime types (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp.3-4). 
De-commodification refers to the degree to which an individual can maintain a 
livelihood without relying on market forces (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.37). Social 
stratification refers to the degree to which a welfare state differentiates different social 
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classes in relation to equality (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp.76-7). The public-private 
mix refers to the interplay of state and market in pension provision (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, p.79).  
 
 In the liberal welfare regime, the state upholds the market principles and only 
plays a minimal role in welfare provision. Citizens are expected to be self-reliant. 
Social assistant programmes characterized by stigma and strict eligibility rules only 
provide modest benefits to those most in need. Liberal welfare regimes have a low 
degree of de-commodification and a high degree of social stratification. They exist in 
the United States (U.S.), Canada, and Australia (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.27). Then 
in the corporatist welfare regime, the Church-shaped state upholds status differences 
and preserves traditional familyhood (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.27). Rights are 
“attached to class and status” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.27). The state emphasizes 
the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ that it would only interfere when the family is incapable 
of servicing its members (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.27). The degrees of 
de-commodification and social stratification induced by corporatist welfare regimes 
lie between that of the liberal and social democratic welfare regimes. Corporatist 
welfare regimes exist in “Austria, France, Germany, and Italy” (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, p.27). And finally in the social democratic welfare regime, the state is strongly 
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committed to the principles of egalitarianism and universalism (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, p.27) that it plays a leading role in providing comprehensive and universal 
welfare for its citizens. Welfare eligibility is not tied to work records or family status 
but citizenship. Social democratic welfare regimes have a high degree of 
de-commodification and a low degree of social stratification. They exist in 
Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Norway. In brief, the liberal welfare 
regime prioritizes the market, the conservative welfare regime preserves the status, 
and the social democratic welfare regime emphasizes equality. The characteristics of 
liberal, corporatist, and social democratic regimes are summarized in Table 4.  
 
 Esping-Andersen’s (1999) later work shows that his criteria of distinguishing 
welfare regime types have changed. He adds the concept of de-familisation parallel to 
de-commodification as a new measure of welfare outcomes to capture policies which 
reduce an individual’s welfare dependence on the family (Esping-Andersen, 1999, 
p.51). Besides, the idea of social risks is emphasized and the role of households is 
added to form the welfare mix which refers to the articulation of the state, the market 
and the family in the production of welfare and managing social risks 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999, pp.33-5).  
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 However, Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) welfare regime approach is criticized 
by Powell and Barrientos (2011) for having inconsistent terminology and definitions 
and shifts in these concepts and measures over time (p.74) that “leads to the problem 
of operationalizing welfare regimes” (Powell and Barrientos, 2011, p.76). Besides, 
Powell and Barrientos (2011) argue that both de-commodification and de-familisation 
are uni-dimensional indices to identify welfare regimes that these measures fail to 
reflect Esping-Andersen’s (1999) new conceptual primacy of the welfare mix (Powell 
and Barrientos, 2011, p.79).  
 
(b) ‘Latin rim’ Rudimentary Welfare Regime 
Leibfried (1993, 2000), who thinks that another category should be added to 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) tripartite typology, develops the ‘Latin rim’ rudimentary 
welfare regime to identify underdeveloped welfare states in the southern countries of 
Western Europe. States in this regime rely on a subsistence economy with “a strong 
agricultural bias” (Leibfried, 1993, p.142) and “do not have a full employment 
tradition” (Leibfried, 1993, p.142), especially for women. They emphasize 
residualism and give no rights to welfare (Leibfried, 1993, p.141). They try to catch 
up with more developed northern counterparts2. They make “strong promises pointing 
                                                 
2 The ‘Latin rim’ rudimentary regime, together with the Scandinavian regime, the ‘Bismarck’ regime, 
and the Anglo-Saxon regime, are four worlds of welfare capitalism in the European Union developed 
by Leibfried (1993, 2000). However, the Scandinavian regime, the ‘Bismarck’ regime, the 
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towards a ‘modern welfare state’ in their constitutions” (Leibfried, 1993, p.142) but 
lack “the legal, institutional, and social implementation” (Leibfried, 1993, p.142) in 
reality. They exist in Spain, Portugal and Greece.  
 
2.2.3.2 Welfare Regimes in the East  
(a) The Oikonomic or Confucian Welfare States 
Jones (1990, 1993), who thinks that the western-centric framework of 
Esping-Andersen (1990) is inapplicable in the Asian context, becomes a pioneer to 
develop the Oikonomic (Jones, 1990, p.446) or Confucian welfare states (Jones, 1993, 
p.204) to collectively characterize welfare states in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan. Confucianism is placed at the heart of these welfare states 
(Jones, 1990, p.450), which contains the values of compliance, consensus, duty, 
hierarchy, harmony, order, stability and staying power (Jones, 1993, p.202).  
 
However, Jone’s (1990, 1993) cultural approach is challenged by White and 
Goodman (1998), who argue that this is an unhelpful approach and has residual 
explanatory value because political, economic and demographic factors play a more 
important role in explaining welfare development in East Asia (p.15). It is also 
                                                                                                                                            
Anglo-Saxon regime adopted by Leibfried (1993, 2000) are like Esping-Andersen’s social 
democratic, conservative/corporatist, and liberal welfare regime respectively. 
 33 
challenged by Kwon (1998), who argues that political, institutional and economic 
factors play a more a more important role than Confucian ethics in structuring welfare 
states in East Asia. Aspalter (2005) argues that the Confucian approach is not 
convincing or representative enough to examine welfare development in East Asia 
because there is no causal linkage between Confucian values and welfare policy 
proposals or implementation, especially when the Confucian heritage is not shared by 
some East Asian countries at all or is just shared by Southeast Asian countries to a 
very limited extent (p.6). And Walker and Wong (2005a, 2005b) argue that the 
Confucian welfare state label is neither a helpful or very precise classification. They 
only regard Confucianism as an adjunct to political ideology (Walker and Wong, 
2005a, p.16; Walker and Wong, 2005b, p. 218), which provides “powerful backing to 
the conservatism of East Asian governments in the formative stages of social policy” 
(Walker and Wong, 2005b, p. 218). They argue that each country in East Asia has its 
own path of development in welfare, being influenced by different situational factors 
such as geopolitical size, location, economic development, migration and ethnicity 
(Walker and Wong, 2005a, p.9; Walker and Wong, 2005b, pp. 216-9). In their view, 
“the explanatory power of Confucianism has been overemphasized with reference to 
both the past and the present of welfare regimes in East Asia” (Walker and Wong, 
2005b, p.214). 
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(b) The East Asian Welfare Model  
Following Jones (1990, 1993), Kwon (1997) finds that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
conservative welfare regime type fails to capture the salient characteristics of welfare 
systems in Japan and Korea (p.476). On one hand, he finds that welfare systems in 
Japan and Korea share three characteristics of Esping-Andersen’s conservative 
welfare regime, including the structure of social policy being organized “mainly 
according to the principle of compulsory insurance with the idea of public assistance 
for the poor” (Kwon, 1997, p.477), the family playing “a central role in guaranteeing 
minimum welfare provision” (Kwon, 1997, p.477), and the emphasis on maintaining 
prevailing order (Kwon, 1997, p.477). On the other hand, he finds that welfare 
systems in Japan and Korea are different from Esping-Andersen’s conservative 
welfare regime for three reasons, including little public intervention “in the area 
where the family is supposed to be responsible” (Kwon, 1997, p.478), having lower 
level of welfare provision than conservative welfare regime in the West, and the 
inapplicability of class politics to explain the welfare development in these two 
countries. Hence, he suggests an East Asian welfare model, at least regarding these 
two countries (p.467). Kwon’s (1997) recognition of the role of the family in welfare 
provision shows that he is aware of the mixed economy of welfare in Japan and Korea. 
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Although he does not mention what criteria should be used to establish the East Asian 
welfare model, he argues that “it is necessary to pay attention to the role of the state” 
(p.479) in order to understand the politics of social policy in Japan and Korea. He 
argues that the state plays “a major role in introducing and expanding welfare” (p.479) 
in Japan and Korea. It implies that he takes a political or an institutional perspective 
when suggesting the East Asian welfare model. The merit of Kwon’s (1997) East 
Asian welfare model is that it goes beyond a one-dimensional account of provision to 
a three-dimensional account of provision, finance and regulation to examine the role 
of the state in social welfare. Kwon (1997) argues that the role of the state in social 
welfare in Japan and Korea “is predominantly that of regulator” (p.471). As Powell 
(2007) argues, “a one-dimensional view of provision alone is inadequate, and it is 
necessary to also examine the dimensions of finance and regulation” (p.15). 
 
(c) The Conservative Welfare State System 
Aspalter (2001), who argues for the existence of an East Asian welfare model, adopts 
a political approach to examine welfare development in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and China (p.2). He argues that the analysis of the political 
determinants of these six places --- political systems, party systems, state structures, 
elections, party politics, the impact of constitutions, the politics of legitimization, and 
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social movements (Aspalter, 2001, pp.2-3) --- reveals that it is political parties 
pursuing a conservative social policy characterized by a social insurance system being 
divided into occupational classes (Aspalter, 2001, p.4). Besides, these places have a 
highly stigmatized social assistance, with the state’s “strong disapproval of 
government financed social welfare policies” (Aspalter, 2001, p.4). Hence, he uses the 
conservative welfare state system to collectively characterize the welfare states of 
these places (Aspalter, 2001, p.2).  
 
 However, Aspalter’s (2001) use of the conservative welfare state system to 
characterize welfare states in East Asia contains three problems. Firstly, his adoption 
of the term ‘the conservative welfare state system’ can be easily confused with 
Esping-Andersen’s conservative welfare regime. Since his original purpose is to 
distinguish welfare states in the East from that of the West and the criteria he uses to 
identify welfare states in East Asia are different from that of Esping-Andersen, 
another term should be used to show the uniqueness of the East Asian welfare model. 
Secondly, it is inappropriate to put China and the rest of five states together. It is 
because China is a communist state with a developing economy while Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are capitalist states with a developed 
economy. It is misleading to show that there is a homogeneous conservative welfare 
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state system without diversity. Thirdly, the contention of Aspalter (2001) that it is 
political parties pursuing a conservative social policy is incorrect and does not apply 
to the case studies of Hong Kong and China. In Hong Kong, there is no social 
insurance system. Besides, there is no causal linkage between the Democratic Party 
and the social policy pursued. In China, there was a comprehensive welfare benefits 
financed by the government before the late 1970s. The state did not disapprove 
government’s financed social welfare policies before the late 1970s because the 
comprehensive welfare benefits served the political purpose of state building and the 
economic purpose of maintaining a healthy production force. The government 
transformed the government-financed welfare system to a cost-sharing welfare system 
financed by work units’ and employees’ contributions in the 1980s. However, this 
should be regarded as a pragmatic rather than a conservative action taken by the 
Chinese government in order to adapt to the changing economic environment.   
 
(d) Productivist Welfare Capitalism 
Holliday (2000), who argues for the existence of an East Asian welfare model, 
develops a productivist welfare regime which stands alongside Esping-Andersen’s 
three types of welfare regimes (Holliday, 2000, p.706). States in the productivist 
welfare regime share with states from Esping-Andersen’s three regimes “an ultimate 
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objective of social solidarity and regime legitimation” (Holliday, 2000, p.716). 
However, it is “the ways in which they pursue that objective that set them apart” 
(Holliday, 2000, p.716). The productivist welfare regime has two salient 
characteristics of assigning priority to production and economic growth and 
subordinating social policy to economic policy (Holliday, 2000, p.709). Within the 
productivist welfare regime, three distinct sub-sets known as facilitative, 
developmental-universalist and developmental-particularist can be identified. Each 
sub-set “addresses the central issues of growth orientation and subordination of 
non-economic policy in different ways” (Holliday, 2000, p.710), leading to 
differences in terms of social rights, stratification effects, and state-market-family 
relationship (See Table 5). According to Holliday (2000), Hong Kong belongs to a 
facilitative state. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan belong to developmental-universalist 
states. Singapore belongs to a developmental-particularist state.  
 
 Holliday’s (2000) productivist welfare regime is the most comprehensive 
framework to examine welfare development in East Asia. The term ‘productivism’ is 
“a key unifying theme” (Wilding, 2011, p.19) bringing East Asian countries together 
to make up its own brand of welfare regime. At the same time, three distinct sub-sets 
within the productivist welfare regime shows that Holliday (2000) recognizes the 
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social policy differences among East Asian countries and does not blindly pursue a 
homogeneous East Asian welfare model. Wilding (2011), who uses Holliday’s notion 
of ‘productivism’ to examine recent welfare development in East Asia, argues that it is 
more useful to divide the welfare states examined into two clusters, with Hong Kong 
Singapore and Taiwan still being productivist states, and Korea being “more of a 
[welfare] hybrid” (Wilding, 2011, p.29). While the findings of Wilding (2011) show 
that welfare development in Korea does not stay fixed in one shape over the past 
decade due to political and economic changes, it shows that Holliday’s framework is 
still helpful in analyzing welfare development in East Asia. The argument for the 
existence of a productivist welfare regime in East Asia prevails. 
 
(e) Market-Leninist Welfare Regime 
Recently, London (2008) has developed a market-Leninist welfare regime to 
characterize welfare states in formerly state-socialist settings that can be found in 
Vietnam and China. The market-Leninist welfare regime has two salient 
characteristics of subordinating social policy to developmentalist economic policies 
(London, 2008, p.21) and being ruled by the communist party that professes 
“commitment to universalism and --- more importantly--- feature polities that have 
been steeped in market-Leninism” (London, 2008, p.21). It uses the market to 
 40 
promote political imperatives including eternal one party rule, legitimacy, social order, 
economic accumulation, and social welfare (London, 2008, p.10). It commodifies 
most essential services under the authority of this regime that is committed to 
achieving a ‘socialist oriented’ market economy (London, 2008, p.13). It has a dual 
and overlapping stratification outcome, with the inequalities generated by the 
communist party’s “exercise of arbitrary power and the political allocation of 
economic resources” (London, 2008, p.13) on one hand, and the inequalities 
generated by the market on the other hand (London, 2008, p.13). London’s (2008) 
market-Leninist welfare regime shows that there is another distinct welfare cluster in 
East Asia apart from Holliday’s (2000) productivist welfare regime. It helps extend 
one’s understanding and perception to welfare development in East Asia and enriches 
the welfare regime studies.   
 
In brief, there are different welfare regimes across the world, each of which has 
its own historical forces, institutional arrangements, social stratification effects and 
path of development.  
 
2.3 Welfare States and Healthcare Systems  
No matter which welfare regime the welfare states belong to, they all face the 
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problem of fiscal sustainability when entering the era of retrenchment. The 
sustainability problem has put policy makers in different welfare states under great 
pressure to review their healthcare systems and in particular how healthcare should be 
financed (Chinitz et al., 1998, p.64) because healthcare system is “an integral part of 
the creation of the welfare state” (Chinitz et al., 1998, p.63). As Moran (2000) points 
out, 
 
“…in the welfare state, health care is a major component--- whether we measure by resources 
consumed, numbers employed in creating and delivering health-care goods and services, historical 
importance in the statecraft that built welfare states, or the subjective attachment of citizens to the 
services of health-care institutions” (p.135). 
 
In the OECD countries, special attention was paid to reviewing the healthcare 
financing system because of the oil crisis of 1973 and ensuing times of fiscal strain on 
one hand, and the drastic increase in healthcare expenditures on the other hand. The 
drastic increase in healthcare expenditures was caused by a number of reasons, 
including ageing population, chronic diseases and disability, the proliferation of 
advanced medical technologies, and heightened public expectations and demands for 
better healthcare services (Wessen, 1999, p.9; Blank and Burau, 2007, p.1). In 1992, 
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the total healthcare expenditure accounted for between 6.5 and 14 per cent of GDP in 
all but two of the OECD countries as compared with 1.5 to 5.5 per cent of GDP in 
1960 (OECD, 1996, p.18) (See Table 6). Besides, public healthcare expenditure in 
OECD countries accounted for between 1.4 and 7.8 per cent of GDP in 1992 as 
compared with 0.9 to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1960 (OECD, 1996, p.18) (See Table 7). 
Governments in the OECD countries were under great pressure to constrain 
healthcare costs. Since the early 1990s, they had introduced different market-derived 
mechanisms which were believed to be more efficient and effective “in differing 
combinations and with differing emphasis on the finance, production, and/or 
allocative components of their healthcare systems” (Saltman, 1994, p.288) (See Table 
8).  
 
2.3.1 The Convergence or Divergence of Healthcare Systems in the West 
Over the past two decades, the implementation of healthcare financing reforms in 
welfare states has triggered an intellectual debate on the convergence or divergence of 
healthcare systems. Convergence suggests that the structure and policies of national 
healthcare system become more alike (Saltman, 1997, p.449; Blank and Burau, 2006, 
p.266) when welfare states facing similar pressures or problems adopt similar reform 
strategies or solutions (Wendt et al., 2004, p.1). Conversely, divergence emphasizes 
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the extent to which the structure and policies of national healthcare system “reflect 
deeply rooted values and norms which differ between societies” (Saltman, 1997, 
p.449) and thus lead to welfare states adopting different reform strategies or solutions 
(Saltman, 1997, p.449). A review of the available literature in the West shows that 
different approaches are adopted to examine this issue, including a descriptive 
approach, the actor-based approach, the institutional or political approach, and the 
path dependence approach. Besides, it shows that there is observed diversity of 
research findings, which argues for the convergence, divergence or 
convergence-divergence mix of healthcare systems. However, as illustrated below, the 
balance and strength of the evidence suggests most support for the divergence of 
healthcare systems.  
 
(a) The Descriptive Approach 
Hurst (1991) examined the impact of healthcare reforms implemented in the 1980s on 
the healthcare systems in seven West European countries, including “Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom [UK]” (p.8). He 
had an interesting finding that on one hand, healthcare systems of these seven 
countries show “some signs of convergence on the public contract model” (Hurst, 
1991, p.19) which involved public payers contracting with private health-care 
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providers and “increased reliance on market or quasi-market relationships that permit 
governments to regulate at arms length” (Hurst, 1991, p.19). On the other hand, they 
diverged from each other in terms of the methods of paying providers and regulations 
(Hurst, 1991, p.19). It is very ambitious for Hurst (1991) to examine seven healthcare 
systems in his study. However, he does not employ any theoretical lens to stringently 
and systematically examine the issue. His descriptive approach leads to his finding 
lacking theoretical basis and explanatory power. 
 
Blank and Burau (2006) used Bennett’s (1991) three-part framework---policy 
goals, policy content, and policy instruments--- to systematically examine whether 
health priority setting policy converges in nine developed capitalist countries, 
including Germany, the UK, the U.S., Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Sweden, Japan and Singapore. They found that there were signs of a convergence at 
conceptual level when the countries examined shared the common goals of rationing, 
cost containment and introducing market mechanism to healthcare systems. But 
divergence continued in policy content and the preferred policy instruments across the 
countries examined (Blank and Burau, 2006, p.279).  
 
There is no doubt that the study of Blank and Burau (2006) is more systematic 
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than that of Hurst (1991) when convergence is examined from three phases of policy 
process. However, the study of Blank and Burau (2006) contains the problem of 
unclear and inconsistent time frame that when the policy content and instruments 
were implemented in the countries examined are mostly unknown except mentioning 
that diagnosis-related groups was implemented in the U.S. in the 1980s (Blank and 
Burau, 2006, p.277) and strong market reforms were implemented by New Zealand in 
the early 1990s (Blank and Burau, 2006, p.279). Healthcare reform has been 
implemented since the 1980s that different kinds of reform instruments have been 
adopted in different time periods. The ambition of Blank and Burau (2006) to 
examine nine countries without clearly setting a time frame affects country 
comparison and risks producing inconsistent results which reduce the analytical 
power of their study.  
 
(b) The Actor-based Approach 
Hassenteufel and Palier (2007) took an actor-based view to explain why France, 
Germany and the Netherlands followed different health insurance reform trajectories 
since the 1980s. They argued that the main reason was “differences between the 
emergent new policy elites in health policy” (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, p.592). In 
France, a group of senior servants who specialized in health insurance policies and 
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occupied strong position played a growing role in the decision-making process 
(Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, p.592). Since these policy elites thought that the 
strengthening of the state could increase the efficiency of the health insurance system, 
they favored implementing reforms with regulatory elements, such as global budgets 
for hospitals, therapeutic norms for ambulatory care and hospital management 
(Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, p.592). As to Germany and the Netherlands, it was 
academic expertise playing a growing role in the decision-making process 
(Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, p.592). The expertise who was more internationalized 
and “inspired by foreign examples” (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, p.592), favored 
“more policy transfer of competition mechanisms”(Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, 
p.592) when reforming the health insurance systems.  
 
While Hassenteufel and Palier (2007) show that there is a causal linkage between 
new policy elites and the types of reform strategies adopted, they only provide a 
partial answer to explain the differences in health insurance reform trajectories. In fact, 
their study unavoidably raises the question of structure-agency problem that has been 
longstanding in political science. Their emphasis on the importance of new policy 
elites reflects their excessively voluntaristic view of agency, which overstates the role 
of new policy elites in determining the health insurance reform outcomes while 
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downplaying the structural influences or constraints on their goals, choices and 
behavior. 
 
(c) The Institutional or Political Approach 
(i) Healthcare Systems as the Main Explanatory Factor 
In fact, most of the available research on healthcare financing reforms shows that 
institutional or political approach is largely adopted by scholars to examine healthcare 
trajectories on a comparative basis. The institutional or political approach emphasizes 
the role of healthcare systems and political institutions in defining the interests of key 
actors and structuring their behavior when implementing healthcare financing reform. 
Freeman (1998) examined how different types of healthcare systems led to different 
patterns of reform to contain healthcare costs in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and 
the UK in the 1980s. He found that governments in Italy, Sweden and the UK with 
national health systems were “much more disposed to radical, pro-competitive 
reform” (Freeman, 1998, p.395) which increased “elements of management and 
competition, albeit to different degrees and in different ways” (Freeman, 1998, p.396). 
They thought that competition was conducive to “managing resource constraint in an 
increasing complex and demanding political environment” (Freeman, 1998, p.396). In 
France and Germany, however, governments with social insurance health systems 
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adopted “more assertive central regulation” (Freeman, 1998, p.396) to contain 
healthcare costs. 
 
Like Freeman (1998), Giaimo and Manow (1999) examined how the structure of 
healthcare systems led to the UK, Germany, and the U.S. under severe financial strain 
pursuing a distinctive reform response since the late 1980s. However, unlike Freeman 
(1998), who classified the healthcare systems examined based on the funding 
dimension, Giaimo and Manow (1999) classified the healthcare systems examined 
based on different modes of regulation or governance: the state-led, 
corporate-governed and market-driven healthcare systems. They found that the UK 
having a state-led healthcare system adopted a market-plus-state strategy by 
introducing an internal market accompanied by centralized state control to the 
National Health Service (NHS) (Giaimo and Manow, 1999, pp.971-4). Then, they 
found that Germany having a corporatist-governed healthcare system adopted “a more 
mixed menu of cost containment policies, including a cautious market forces and 
greater state intervention” through regulation (Giaimo and Manow, 1999, p.968). And 
finally, they found that the U.S. having a market-driven healthcare system failed to 
implement government-regulated market competition within a framework of national 
health insurance (Giaimo and Manow, 1999, p.985). However, its failed attempt was 
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replaced by an “employer-led reform through unregulated market competition” 
(Giaimo and Manow, 1999, p.990). As a result, cost containment reforms in the U.K. 
and Germany were more successful than that of the U.S. in “safeguarding solidarity 
and equitable access to care” (Giaimo and Manow, 1999, p.969). 
 
Wendt and Kohl (2010) also examined the impact of healthcare systems on 
healthcare financing in the UK, Germany and the U.S. since the 1980s. Like Giaimo 
and Manow (1999), they used the modes of regulatory mechanisms to classify three 
healthcare systems examined although they refer healthcare systems to ‘the mode of 
public policies’: direct public control, self-regulation by non-government actors 
(including doctors), and market mechanisms (Wendt and Kohl, 2010, p.12). They 
found that the UK with public policies favoring direct state control had “below 
average health expenditure” (Wendt and Kohl, 2010, p.11). Then, they found that 
Germany with public policies favoring “a high level of self regulation” (Wendt and 
Kohl, 2010, p.15) had “above OECD average health expenditure” (Wendt and Kohl, 
2010, p.11) due to “high levels of health care providers” (Wendt and Kohl, 2010, 
p.11). And finally, they found that the U.S. with public policies favoring market 
mechanisms had “comparatively high total health care costs” (Wendt and Kohl, 2010, 
p.11). 
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 The studies of Freeman (1998), Giaimo and Manow (1999), and Wendt and Kohl 
(2010) showed that different healthcare systems led to different reform patterns in the 
countries examined because they are embedded in different political and economic 
contexts, embrace different values, have different funding structure and medical 
coverage, being affected by different political legacies, and have different 
stakeholders having different levels of influence in healthcare systems. Hence, the 
countries examined adopted different strategies to reform their healthcare systems.  
 
 Like Freeman (1998) and Giaimo and Manow (1999), Wendt and Thompson 
(2004) examined the impact of structural specifics of the healthcare systems on 
cost-containment effort in the UK, Denmark, Germany and Austria since the 1980s 
(Wendt and Thompson, 2004, p.418). However, they differed from Freeman (1998) 
and Giaimo and Manow (1999) in terms of the cost-containment strategies studied. 
While Freeman (1998) and Giaimo and Manow (1999) predominantly focused on 
studying “the cost dimension of the health care demand-supply equation” (Wendt and 
Thompson, 2004, p.416), Wendt and Thompson (2004) focused on studying structural 
reform strategies targeting both ambulatory and inpatient care (p.418). They found 
that the national healthcare systems of the UK and Demark were more successful than 
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the legally enacted health insurance systems of Germany and Austria in containing 
costs (Wendt and Thompson, 2004, p.417). It was because the national healthcare 
systems of the UK and Demark had lower density of both physicians and 
non-physician healthcare personnel in ambulatory care contributing to providing 
lower volume of medical services, heavily relied on general practitioners as 
gatekeepers to significantly reduce drug consumption, had greater coordination 
between inpatient and community care, had greater integration between ambulatory 
and inpatient care, and enhanced the continuity of care through greater reliance on 
primary care providers (Wendt and Thompson, 2004, pp.421-6).  
 
On the other hand, the study of Cacace and Schmid (2008) generated a different 
result which supported convergence caused by different healthcare systems. Cacace 
and Schmid (2008) argued that “the healthcare system itself, its deficiencies and 
functional requirements” (p.396) was the “most influential explanatory factor” (p.396) 
to explain why the healthcare systems of the U.S. and Canada that “once differed 
largely with respect to spending pattern” (p.412) in the1960s had converged in the 
financing dimension over the past 15 years (Cacace and Schmid, 2008, p.411). They 
found that the private healthcare system in the U.S. had “incorporated many public 
elements, while the public healthcare system in Canada [had] increasingly [relied] on 
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a private supplementary scheme” (Cacace and Schmid, 2008, p.411) that both 
healthcare systems become mixed types. It was the U.S. and Canada systematically 
introducing non-system-specific elements “which were originally less developed or 
completely missing” (Cacace and Schmid, 2008, p.398) to their healthcare systems 
that the funding structure of both healthcare systems became more similar and thus 
led to convergence.  
 
The problem of the study of Cacace and Schmid (2008) is that they wrongly 
regarded the mixed sources of healthcare funding as convergence. The funding 
dimension has repeatedly been used as a central distinguishing factor to establish 
healthcare typologies or conceptual models that differentiate healthcare systems 
across the world (Wendt et al., 2009, p.78). Healthcare typologies or conceptual 
models are known as ideal types because healthcare systems in reality are funded 
through different sources such as taxation, social health insurance, private 
contributions and out-of-pocket payment. Nevertheless, healthcare systems 
“demonstrate a leaning in one direction or another, making it possible to distinguish 
among predominant funding types” (Wendt et al., 2009, p.78). Mixed types of funding 
is a common practice among different healthcare systems in reality. Therefore, the 
argument made by Cacace and Schmid (2008) that mixed types of healthcare funding 
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is a sign of convergence is weak. In fact, the data of sources of funding in percentages 
of total expenditure in the U.S. and Canada from 1990 to 2005 showed that taxation 
continued to be the predominant source of funding in the Canadian healthcare system 
although its financial share decreased from 73.5 per cent in 1990 to 68.8 per cent in 
2005 (Cacace and Schmid, 2008, p.402). As to the U.S. healthcare system, private 
insurance financing continued to be the predominant source of funding, with its 
financial share increasing from 34.2 per cent in 1990 to 36.6 per cent in 2005 (Cacace 
and Schmid, 2008, p.402). The Canadian healthcare system remains tax-based while 
that of the U.S. remains market-based. Therefore, the healthcare systems of the U.S. 
and Canada have not converged over the past 15 years, which is opposite to the 
contention of Cacace and Schmid (2008). 
 
(ii) Political Systems as the Main Explanatory Factor 
Ham and Brommels (1994) argued that a country’s political process greatly affected 
the pace and scope of healthcare reform to contain costs and raise efficiency in 
resource use in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden since the late 1980s. They 
argued that the UK benefited from a unitary political system with governments 
enjoying legislative majorities and being committed to change (Ham and Brommels, 
1994, p.118) and thereby having the quickest pace and the widest scope of healthcare 
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reforms. Then in the Netherlands, they argued that the succession of coalition 
government led to the revision of the original healthcare reform proposals (Ham and 
Brommels, 1994, p.118) that it had the slowest pace and the narrowest scope of 
healthcare reform. And finally in Sweden, they argued that the elected county councils 
were able to implement healthcare reform in a decentralized manner “within the 
context of national legislation” (Ham and Brommels, 1994, p.119) that its pace and 
scope of healthcare reform lied between that of the UK and the Netherlands (Ham and 
Brommels, 1994, p.108).  
 
The problem of the study of Ham and Brommels (1994) is that it fails to 
establish the causal linkage between the political process and the pace and scope of 
healthcare reform because Ham and Brommels (1994) only used a short paragraph in 
the concluding comment section to make their contention that a country’s political 
process greatly affected the pace and scope of healthcare reform without exactly using 
the political approach to examine the issue. Instead, much space was used to cover the 
reform contents of three countries studied. One can only see the descriptive 
information of each reform strategy and what kind of healthcare reform was 
implemented in each country. However, how the political process affects the actors’ 
reform options and the speed of reform in the countries examined was unknown.  
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Wilsford (1995) used a political approach to empirically examine how different 
patterns of interaction between the state’s autonomy in healthcare and providers’ 
political mobilization led to a cross-national difference in the reform strategies 
adopted to restrain healthcare costs in Germany, Japan, Canada and the UK since the 
1980s. He found that in Germany, the state having moderate autonomy in healthcare 
succeeded in restraining the growth of healthcare expenditures by diminishing the 
structural strength of medical interests through establishing new regulations, 
implementing strict budgetary measures and a system to monitor doctors’ treatment 
pattern (Wilsford, 1995, p.584). Then in Japan, he found that the state having high 
autonomy in healthcare and being coupled with business and insurance societies as its 
capable allies was able to contain healthcare costs through fee negotiations when 
doctors originally having high interest mobilization lost their internal cohesiveness 
since the 1980s (Wilsford, 1995, p.590). Also in Canada, he found that the state 
having high autonomy in healthcare was able to contain healthcare costs because it 
reduced the political effectiveness of doctors originally having high interest 
mobilization by passing regulations which imposed tighter controls on doctors’ 
prerogatives in policy formulation and implementation (Wilsford, 1995, p.595). And 
finally in the UK, he found that the state having high autonomy in healthcare was able 
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to implement reforms which favored market elements because it made the perception 
of a ‘crisis’ in the healthcare system become widespread (Wilsford, 1995, p.602) 
while at the same time weakening the political effectiveness of the medical profession 
which had already become “a more heterogeneous, fragmented interest” (Wilsford, 
1995, p.602) since the early 1980s by excluding the medical profession from the 
reform process (Wilsford, 1995, p.602).  
 
The study of Wilsford (1995) shows that the states examined strategically 
increased their reform capacities at the expense of the interests of the medical 
profession. It shows that since healthcare policy in each county has its own 
development path, it led to the healthcare system established embracing its own 
values, granting the state different degrees of autonomy in healthcare and granting the 
medical profession different levels of political mobilization. Therefore, the healthcare 
systems examined diverged in methods of restraining the growth of healthcare 
expenditures. 
 
(iii) Healthcare and Political Systems as the Main Explanatory Factors 
Giaimo (2001) examined how the joint effects of existing healthcare and political 
systems provide the state and stakeholders with different opportunities or constraints 
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to pursue cost containment reforms in the UK, the U.S. and Germany since the 1980s. 
She found that in the UK, the tax-funded healthcare system granted “the state [which 
was the single payer] unlimited freedom to decide health policy” (Giaimo, 2001, 
p.340) while the centralized political system coupled with parliamentary majority 
helped the state implemented healthcare reform more easily. However, since the 
healthcare system emphasized universalism and “the state must answer to taxpayers 
who ultimately finance the health care budget” (Giaimo, 2001, p.340), 
cost-containment reform implemented in the UK “had the best record on cost 
containment while preserving equity at the same time (Giaimo, 2001, p.335). Then in 
the U.S., she found that the fragmented political system which provided different 
actors with veto points hampered the government’s effort to implement healthcare 
reform (Giaimo, 2001, p.341) while the healthcare system characterized by private 
and voluntary fringe benefits “encouraged employers and insurers to take cost-cutting 
actions that worked in the direction of desolidarity” (Giaimo, 2001, p.335). And 
finally in Germany, she found that the statutory national health insurance system 
which stressed equal responsibility between employers and employees to finance 
healthcare required the coalition governments having “the legal authority and the 
institutional means” (Giaimo, 2001, p.356) to balance “the goals of cost control with 
equity” (Giaimo, 2001, p.355). Germany represented an intermediate case between 
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the UK and the U.S., “spending more than the former but without resorting to the 
gaping inequities of the latter” (Giaimo, 2001, p.335). 
 
(iv) The Path Dependence Approach or the Theory of Historical Institutionalism 
Bandelow (2007) used the path-dependent perspective to explain why the UK and 
Germany diverged in healthcare reform strategies and outcomes from 1997 to 2005. 
He argued that different healthcare systems, different starting points, governments’ 
different perceptions of the main healthcare policy problems, and the past reform 
direction “determined by the action of the previous government” (Bandelow, 2007, 
p.162) were the main reasons for explaining divergent reform paths in these two 
places. In the UK, the New Labour government’s healthcare policy “started with the 
results from the ‘internal market’ that the Conservatives had introduced in 1991” 
(Bandelow, 2007, p.153). It concerned with increasing the quality and quantity of the 
tax-funded healthcare system (Bandelow, 2007, p.153). It followed a similar reform 
direction of its Conservative predecessor by increasing “patient choice and provider 
competition” (Bandelow, 2007, p.153). As to Germany, he found that healthcare 
policy had “traditionally been seen as a central element of employment policy” 
(Bandelow, 2007, p.153) that the SPD-Green government faced the problem of rising 
healthcare costs which led to “rising contribution rates and ultimately higher 
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non-wage labour costs” (Bandelow, 2007, p.157). It could only implement 
incremental reforms which limited the global size of budget and increased patient 
co-payments (Bandelow, 2007, p.158) because healthcare providers who benefited 
from a corporatist healthcare system acted as “highly effective veto players” 
(Bandelow, 2007, p.157). Path-dependent studies mainly focus on how the 
pre-existing institutions create strong inertial tendencies that restrain the policy 
options key actors can choose and thus make the implementation of revolutionary 
reforms extremely difficult. However, the study of Bandelow (2007) lacked 
institutional analysis. Although Bandelow (2007) mentioned that healthcare policy in 
the UK and Germany “remain dominated by national political institutions, interests 
and ideas” (p.162), his main focus was key political actors’ reaction to previous 
reform decision made by the previous government without seriously examining the 
impact of healthcare and political institutions on political actors’ policy preferences. 
 
The studies of Wilsford (1994), Immergut (1992), and Hacker (1998) also used 
the theory of historical institutionalism or path dependency theory to examine how 
established political institutions generate inertia and impose constraints on the options 
that can be chosen by political actors to reform their healthcare systems. Since these 
studies will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter to illustrate some important 
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concepts of historical institutionalism, they would only be briefly discussed in this 
section.  
 
Wilsford (1994) used a path-dependent perspective to examine how the structure 
of political institutions enacted or blocked healthcare reforms in Germany, France, the 
UK and the U.S. since the 1980s. But his understanding of the impact of political 
institutions on healthcare reform in the countries examined except the US was 
contradictory. On one hand, he argued that the political structure of Germany, France 
and the UK acted as institutional impediments to implement policy changes. On the 
other hand, he argued that the centralization of decision process and hierarchical 
ordering commonly shared by the political institutions of Germany, France and the 
UK facilitated policy changes. His inconsistent interpretation of political institutions 
significantly reduces the explanatory power of his study. 
 
Immergut (1992) examined how the number and locations of institutional veto 
points created by constitutional rules and electoral results provided different 
opportunities for the medical profession to block the national health insurance 
legislation in Sweden, France and Switzerland before 1970. She showed that the 
legislation could be passed in Sweden where veto points did not exist and in France 
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where veto point no longer existed after changes in constitutional rules. On the other 
hand, the legislation was blocked in Switzerland where there were many veto points. 
The study of Immergut (1992) implies that states have greater opportunities to pass 
their legislations or reform policies when they operate in political systems with fewer 
veto points than those operating in political systems with more or multiple veto points. 
However, there is reservation about the explanatory power of veto points because veto 
points can change over time when changes occur in constitutional rules or electoral 
results. Besides, veto points are limited to explain the political processes of 
parliamentary system or parliamentary democracies that they cannot be applied in 
authoritarian political systems or developing countries. 
 
Compared with that of Immergut (1992), the study of Hacker (1998) used a 
broader perspective to examine the development of health insurance programmes in 
advanced industrial democracies. Hacker (1998) employed the theory of historical 
institutionalism to examine how “the sequence and timing of major government 
interventions in the medical sector” (p.59) and policy legacies affected the emergence 
of national health insurance programmes in the UK, Canada, and the U.S.. Instead of 
a single force, Hacker (1998) argued that it was the “complex historical interplay of 
forces that leads countries to adopt particular national health policies” (p.58). He 
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identified and explained how the larger political, economic and ideological climate 
surrounding healthcare policies, “a number of sequential historical moments” (Hacker, 
1998, p.83), “the distinctive matrix of incentives and constraints created by [different] 
political institutions” (Hacker, 1998, p.81), the way in which political institutions 
articulated political demands for policy reform (Hacker, 1998, p.60), and “the 
important turning points in the development of each country’s national health 
policies” (Hacker, 1998, p.77) led to the establishment of NHS in the UK in 1946, 
Medicare in Canada in 1966, and Medicare and Medicaid in the U.S. in 1965. The 
study of Hacker (1998) provides a more comprehensive view and makes stronger 
arguments about the cross-national difference in healthcare development than studies 
which only give descriptive, atheoretical or monocausal accounts. 
 
In brief, the review of the available literature in the West shows that the 
intellectual debate mainly focuses on whether healthcare reform implemented since 
1980s has led to healthcare systems in different welfare states moving towards 
convergence. Although a review of the available literature in the West shows that 
there is an observed diversity of research findings, which argues for the convergence, 
divergence or convergence-divergence mix of healthcare system, the balance and 
strength of the evidence suggests most support for the divergence of healthcare 
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systems. Besides, it shows that most of the studies on healthcare reform give 
descriptive, atheoretical or monocausal accounts. Studies which really adopt the 
theory of historical institutionalism to stringently examine how the complex historical 
interplay of sequence, timing, political institutions and contextual pressures affects the 
healthcare reform path in welfare states are rare.  
 
2.3.2 Urban Health Insurance Reform in China 
Like its western counterparts, China as the market-Leninist welfare regime also 
implemented urban health insurance reform in 1998.3 It established a compulsory, 
employment-based and cost-sharing health insurance system consisting of an 
individual MSA and a SPF to replace the non-contributory LIS and GIS that were 
                                                 
3 China also implemented rural healthcare financing reform in 2003. In China, the establishment of the 
people’s commune in 1958 as the highest level of a collectively owned economic organization in 
rural areas (Sun, 1980, pp.24-5; Saich, 2004, p.245) was followed by the establishment of the 
Cooperative Medical System in rural areas. The people’s communes could only establish the 
Cooperative Medical System “on the basis of voluntary participation and mutual assistance” (Chen, 
1984, p.129) to provide medical services for rural population. The System was financed by 
individual contributions and collective welfare funds from brigades and production teams (Cheung, 
2001, p.65) to cover the cost of treatment and medicine received by commune members and to build 
and maintain healthcare facilities (China Health Care Study Group, 1974, p.42). Its capacity to 
provide healthcare services mainly depended on “the productivity and stability of the local economic 
base” (Lampton, 1977, p.237). Deng’s economic reform which used farming households to replace 
the people’s commune as an autonomous agricultural production unit (Jackson et al., 1996, p.409) 
led to the dismantling of the commune system in the early 1980s (Grogan, 1995, p.1073; Pearson, 
1995, p.93; Hsü, 2000, p.846). The abolition of the commune system led to “the end of collective 
funding for rural health care” (Jackson et al., 1996, p.416). The Cooperative Medical System 
collapsed in the 1980s. The participation rate of the Cooperative Medical System sharply dropped 
from 90 per cent in 1980 to 5 per cent in 1985 (Liu and Cao, 1992, p.504). Most of the participants 
of the Cooperative Medical System “transferred to fee-for-service” (Liu and Cao, 1992, p.505). In 
2003, the Chinese government implemented the New Rural Cooperative Medical System, which 
focused on “serious diseases planning, mutual aid and fraternity among rural residents in health 
care” (Wang, 2007, p.67). The new System is based on voluntary participation (Wang, 2007, p.71). It 
is financed by “individuals, collectives and the government” (Wang, 2007, p.67) to insure rural 
participants against serious diseases (Wang, 2007, p.69).  
 64 
collapsed in the 1980s. To China, this national health insurance reform which 
implemented a completely new health insurance model represents a big policy change 
because it significantly departs from the original path it has followed for almost four 
decades. The implementation of urban health insurance reform has drawn scholarly 
interest. A review of the available literature shows that different approaches are 
adopted to examine this issue, including a descriptive approach, a quantitative 
approach, an economic approach, an actor-based approach, and the institutional or 
political approach. However, as illustrated below, none of the available studies 
reviewed adopts the theory of historical institutionalism to examine how the complex 
historical interplay of sequence, timing, political institutions and contextual pressure 
shapes the healthcare reform path in China. 
 
(a) A Descriptive Approach 
The studies of Cheung (2001), Liu (2002), Rösner (2004), Tang and Meng (2004), Liu 
et al. (2004), and Dong (2009) used a descriptive approach to review the evolution of 
urban health insurance system since the founding of PRC in 1949. They traced the 
historical development of the urban health insurance system in different periods, 
described how the system functioned, reviewed the reform process, analyzed the 
major problems and challenges of the new health insurance model. The problem of 
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these studies is that they do not employ any theoretical lens to stringently and 
systematically examine what and how major forces shaped the development trajectory 
of health insurance reform in China. The studies of Tang and Meng (2004) and Liu et 
al. (2004) briefly mentioned that the lack of risk pooling of the traditional health 
insurance system, China’s transition to the market economy since 1978, and hospitals’ 
profit-seeking behavior after the economic reform were the major drivers for rapid 
escalation of healthcare expenditures and the major reasons for urban insurance 
reform. But they are not useful enough to understand about the healthcare reform 
development path, especially when they do not examine the role of political 
institutions in shaping the urban health insurance reform. Studies adopting the 
descriptive approach lack explanatory power. 
 
The studies of Dong (2003, 2008) used a descriptive approach to review the 
health insurance reform in Shanghai since the 1980s. They briefly talked about the 
urban health insurance system in the pre-reform era, the economic pressure for reform, 
the institutional design of the new health insurance model and the problems created 
by the new health insurance model in Shanghai. Like the aforementioned studies, the 
studies of Dong (2003, 2008) lack explanatory power and are unhelpful in providing 
an insight to understand what forces shape the development trajectory of health 
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insurance in Shanghai.  
 
(b) A Quantitative Approach  
Another type of studies uses a quantitative approach to analyze the impact of urban 
health insurance reform on a particular set of issues, including public and private 
enterprises (Wu et al., 2005), hospital charges (Meng et al., 2004), out-of-pocket 
payment (Liu and Zhao, 2006), equity in healthcare access (Liu et al., 2002), and 
access to essential medicines (Zhu et al., 2008). This approach collected data through 
different sources, including a household survey at a district level (Wu et al., 2005), a 
multiyear survey collected at the city level (Liu et al., 2002; Liu and Zhao, 2006), a 
database within the community health service management center (Zhu et al., 2008), 
and patient medical records in hospitals (Meng et al., 2004).  
 
This type of study contains three problems. Firstly, most of the studies reviewed 
in this category do not base the research upon theories. Apart from the study of Liu et 
al. (2002) and that of Liu and Zhou (2006) which respectively used an economic 
model and the Anderson Behavior model to examine urban health insurance reform, 
the studies of Meng et al.(2004), Wu et al. (2005) and Zhu et al. (2008) do not apply 
any theories to examine the issue. Studies lacking theoretical basis is unhelpful for 
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understanding and explaining the causal linkage between urban health insurance 
reform which is the independent variable and the dependent variables examined.  
 
Secondly, it fails to give a full picture about the development trajectory of health 
insurance reform in China. This type of study examines urban health insurance reform 
in a specific locality in China such as Zhenjiang city (Liu et al., 2002; Liu and Zhao, 
2006), Nantong and Zibo cities (Meng et al., 2004), Shenzhen (Zhu et al., 2008), and 
Beijing (Wu et al., 2005). Besides, it only studies urban health insurance reform in a 
particular year (Wu et al., 2005; Zhu et al., 2008) or specific short period of time 
ranging from two to five years (Meng et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2002; Liu and Zhao, 
2006). Since the development trajectory of health insurance reform in China is not a 
one-time event but rather an ongoing historical process shaped by complex interplay 
of forces, this type of study is not conducive to understanding about the shifting of 
reform path in China.  
 
Thirdly, it treats urban health insurance reform as an independent variable in 
order to examine the impact of urban health insurance reform. But the study of the 
development trajectory of health insurance reform would treat health insurance reform 
as a dependent variable in order to see how its content or implementation is shaped by 
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political institutions or other independent variables. Therefore, this study is irrelevant 
to study the development trajectory of health insurance reform in China.   
 
(c) An Economic Approach 
The studies of Gu (2001a) and Gu and Zhao (2006) used an economic perspective to 
examine how China’s transition from a planned to a market economy since 1978 led 
to an institutional transformation of the urban health insurance system in China. Both 
studies argued that the rapid process of marketization led to the non-contributory 
health insurance system which functioned well in the institutional configuration of a 
planned economy falling into a serious financial crisis in the late 1980s, which 
imposed an unbearable financial burden on the enterprises and ultimately on the state 
and concurrently became an institutional impediment for further economic reform. 
This drove the state to implement the urban health insurance reform by establishing a 
contribution-based health insurance system to replace the non-contributory health 
insurance system in the 1990s. The problem of the studies of Gu (2001a) and Gu and 
Zhao (2006) is that their economy centered approach under-emphasizes the role of the 
state or political institution in shaping the economic reform, especially when China 
was an authoritarian state with the CCP enjoying the monopolistic power to control 
the territory and people. Although it is true that the economic reform caused the 
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collapse of the traditional health insurance system, it only acted as a turning point or a 
critical juncture for the healthcare system to move to a new path. Instead, it was the 
state shaping the reform path of healthcare by deciding how and when the health 
insurance reform should take place, which institutional design of the new health 
insurance reform should be adopted and how the new health insurance model should 
function. It is unable to provide a full picture about the evolution of urban health 
insurance system without emphasizing the role of the state or political institutions. 
 
(d) An Actor-based Approach  
Duckett (2001) used an actor-based approach to examine the impact of different 
political interests on the implementation of urban health insurance reform in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Suzhou between 1997 and 2000. She argued that the vested 
interests of enterprise managers, state enterprise employees, healthcare providers, 
medicine producers and government officials created by the pre-reform health 
insurance system resisted change and led to slow implementation of the urban health 
insurance reform and created “two main problems of poor participation and balancing 
the income and expenditures of the social [health insurance] funds” (Duckett, 2001, 
p.297). While she showed that how different actors took actions to defend their 
interests during the reform implementation stage, she also recognized that their 
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capacity of hindering health insurance reform was due to “weak local government 
capacity that [was] in turn founded on the weak rule of law and poor government 
accountability” (Duckett, 2001, p.302). It shows that actually it was the institutional 
weakness of the legislative and political systems giving opportunities for actors to 
influence the implementation of urban health insurance reform. In fact, institutions 
matter in structuring the interests of different actors who in turn affect the urban 
health insurance reform.  
 
(e) A Political or Institutional Approach 
In another study, Duckett (2003) used a political approach to examine how political 
institutions and state bureaucratic interests shaped the urban health insurance reform 
policy since the mid-1980s. She found that urban health insurance programme was a 
product of compromise because the healthcare reform process was “the protracted and 
incremental policy process” (Duckett, 2003, p.212) involving complex interaction and 
bargaining among top leaders and multi-institutions such as four government 
ministries (Finance, Health, Labor, Personnel), the Economic System Reform 
Commission, and four bureaus (Health Insurance, Drug Administration, Medicine, 
Material Pricing) (Duckett, 2003, p.219) with competing interests operated within 
vertical functional structures and bureaucratic rank (Duckett, 2003, p.212). Besides, 
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she found that the reform being implemented in a decentralized manner allowed local 
governments to influence the design of the local health insurance schemes (Duckett, 
2003, p.227). Also, she found that the vested interests of enterprises, hospitals and 
civil servants created by the pre-reform health insurance system were able to hinder 
the implementation of the health insurance reform (Duckett, 2003, p.227).  
 
The study of Duckett (2003) shows that how key bureaucratic actors within the 
context of political institutions affected the development of the urban health insurance 
reform. It is a more comprehensive study because it recognized that both political 
institutions and bureaucratic actors were closely intertwined and jointly shaped the 
urban health insurance reform. However, this study could have been better if it could 
also mention the reform background in China. By mentioning what factors or 
contextual pressures drove China to implement health insurance reform, the study 
could help justify why the urban health insurance reform was needed in the first place 
and help the audience, in particular those who were not familiar with China, 
understand why different key actors pursue different interests during the 
policy-making and implementation processes.  
 
In her recent work, Duckett (2011) uses a political approach to examine how and 
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why the Chinese state has retreated from its role in funding healthcare since 1978. 
Using “an analytical framework drawn from studies of state retrenchment in 
industrialized democracies and in post-communist Eastern Europe” (Duckett, 2011, 
p.3), Duckett (2011) argues that health retrenchment in China is not simply the 
product of economic reforms and domestic fiscal constraints (pp.8-9). Instead, she 
argues that politics is “central to both catalyzing and shaping retrenchment” (Duckett, 
2011, p.16). Centrally, “governmental and ideological change and political struggles 
among stakeholders in a health policy arena shaped by China’s political institutions” 
(Duckett, 2011, p.99) thoroughly explain why the Chinese state has retreated from 
health since 1978. The merits of Duckett’s (2011) work are that research on 
retrenchment politics has been extended to a major authoritarian state and a more 
complete picture of the transformation of Chinese healthcare system over the past 
three decades has been given through a systematic and thorough political analysis of 
the three dimensions of the Chinese state’s health retreat. 
 
 In brief, a review of the available literature shows that different approaches are 
adopted to examine urban health insurance reform in China, including the descriptive, 
quantitative, economic, actor-based, and the institutional or political approaches. 
These approaches have merits of their own. But none of them can provide a complete 
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picture about the development trajectory of the urban health insurance reform in 
China. Studies which adopt the theory of historical institutionalism to examine the 
urban healthcare reform in China are yet to exist. 
 
2.3.3 Health Insurance Reform in Hong Kong  
Like the western countries, Hong Kong as a productivist welfare regime has been 
under pressure for reforming its healthcare financing system since the early 1990s due 
to ageing population, rising healthcare expenditures, heightened public expectations 
and changing medical needs. However, the government’s repeated attempts to reform 
the tax-funded healthcare system have not been successful. Its proposals for a 
coordinated voluntary insurance in 1993, a two-tier mandatory health insurance 
scheme in 1999 and a mandatory medical savings scheme in 2000 were shelved due to 
severe political and public opposition. At the time of this study, the government is 
analyzing citizens’ views on a regulated voluntary private health insurance scheme 
proposed in October 2010 after the public consultation came to an end in January 
2011. Hong Kong represents a case of the status quo without any fundamental 
changes to its healthcare financing system “despite the loud rhetoric about the need to 
reform” (Cheung, 1994, p.352). It still sticks to its original path of funding the 
universal healthcare system through taxation. Hong Kong is an interesting case study. 
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However, a review of the available literature shows that there is a lack of theoretically 
grounded work on examining the development trajectory of health insurance reform 
in Hong Kong. As illustrated below, most of the studies reviewed are historical or 
descriptive studies that they are less helpful in understanding about the development 
trajectory of health insurance reform in Hong Kong.  
 
(a) A Historical Approach  
The studies of Chao (1999), Gauld (1997, 1998) and Gould (2005, 2006) gave a 
historical overview of the development of healthcare policy in Hong Kong from the 
colonial era (since 1841) to the post-colonial era (since 1997). Their reviews showed 
that the free healthcare system implemented since 1964 had remained unchanged after 
the government’s failed attempts to reform the healthcare financing system. While 
these studies provide rich information and a clear historical timeline of healthcare 
development in Hong Kong, they are far too descriptive and fail to explain why the 
mode of healthcare funding remains unchanged. 
 
(b) A Descriptive Approach  
The studies of Leung (1993), Cheung (1994) and Wong (1996) were descriptive 
studies giving a brief review of the financing options proposed in the 1993 healthcare 
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financing reform. They respectively claimed that the failure in implementing this 
healthcare financing reform was due to “increasing politicization of the society” 
(Leung, 1993, p.233), “the absence of demand for reform from the society at large” 
(Cheung, 1994, p.353), and the emergence of more elected legislator who were more 
critical of government proposal (Wong, 1996, p.450). The study of Gauld and Gould 
(2002a) reviewed the proposed financing options of and public reaction to the 1993 
and 1999 healthcare financing reforms and found that the reform failure was due to 
the lack of community acceptability (p.139). The study of Cheng (2007) which briefly 
gave an overview of healthcare development in Hong Kong from 1997 to 2007 argued 
that the lack of major progress in healthcare financing reforms during this period was 
attributed to “professional dominance in policy decisions, the power imbalance 
between professionals and the community, as well as the difference in perceptions and 
community values” (p.812). The study of Low and Lo (2006) briefly reviewed the 
reform strategies proposed in the 1999 and 2000 healthcare financing reform and 
argued that the government should devise an appropriate reform by taking “its tax 
regime, economic development, demographic trends and social values” (p.468) into 
account. The problem of these studies is that they do not apply any theoretical lens to 
stringently examine what were the main explanatory determinant(s) of healthcare 
reform failures. Their arguments are too vague and they fail to introduce substantial 
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evidence in support of their contention through thorough investigation. 
 
(c) An Economic Approach 
The studies of Hay (1992) and Ho (1997, 2001) used an economic perspective to 
examine the healthcare system in Hong Kong. Hay (1992), who was a health 
economist, argued that the Hong Kong healthcare system was outdated and inefficient. 
He suggested the creation of a competitive market for healthcare service by 
implementing a voluntary publicly subsidized insurance scheme called ChoiceCare, 
which allowed the insured family to obtain healthcare services either from the public 
or private hospitals. Ho (1997, 2001), another economist, argued that the efficiency of 
healthcare delivery and financing in Hong Kong could be improved by implementing 
Universal Excess Burden Health Insurance Plan (UEBHIP), which combined 
tax-funded payment and a uniform yearly spending limit paid by the insured 
participants. At the same time, fees for medical services at public hospitals would be 
sharply increased to “reflect the direct costs of providing these services” (Ho, 2001, 
p.159).  
 
The problem of these studies is that they ignore the complex nature of healthcare 
which cannot be solely examined from a purely economic perspective. Although the 
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“issue of financing health services is strongly associated with ever increasing health 
care costs and ever tighter budgetary constraints” (Kanavos, 1999, p.11), healthcare is 
not simply a consumer good which can be easily calculated by cost-benefit analysis. 
As Lessard (2007) argued, economic evaluation in healthcare oversimplifies complex 
healthcare decision because it ignores “important health consequences, contextual 
elements, relationships or other relevant modifying factors” (p.1754). Healthcare 
financing reform is an issue involving multi-objectives and multi-stakeholders 
(Lessard, 2007, p.1754). It is not simply an economic issue but a political, social and 
moral issue as well. Therefore, studies based on an economic analysis are unhelpful in 
understanding about the development trajectory of healthcare finance system in Hong 
Kong when the development path of healthcare is shaped by complex interplay of 
forces.  
 
(d) A Political Economy Approach 
The study of Wong (1999) used the political economy perspective to examine then 
financing options proposed in the 1993 healthcare financing reform. Wong (1999)  
argued that the reasons why the colonial government preferred voluntary health 
insurance to compulsory social health insurance was due to the fact that the latter was 
perceived as an hypothecated health tax which threatened the government’s “freedom 
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to allocate resources and to its commitment to maintain the low-tax policy in Hong 
Kong” (p.205), being “at odds with the government’s policy of ‘positive 
non-intervention’ in private health care” (p.210), and became a undesirable move 
towards collectivism which was against Hong Kong’s mode of capitalism (p.212). 
Since this study was limited to reviewing health insurance reform of a particular year, 
it does not provide a clear and complete picture about the development trajectory of 
health insurance reform in Hong Kong.  
 
In brief, a review of the available literature shows that there is a lack of studies 
on the development trajectories of healthcare financing reform in Hong Kong. 
Different approaches are adopted to examine healthcare financing reform in Hong 
Kong, including the historical, descriptive, economic and political economy 
approaches. However, while studies based on the historical or descriptive approach 
are unhelpful in explaining how the development trajectory of healthcare financing 
reform is shaped over time, studies based on economic approach oversimplify 
complex healthcare decisions. And studies based on political economy approach to 
examine healthcare financing reform in a particular year can only provide a partial 
answer to the development trajectory of health insurance reform in Hong Kong.  
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2.3.4 Comparative Studies of Healthcare Policy in China and Hong Kong  
A review of the available literature also shows that there are studies examining the 
healthcare system of China and Hong Kong on a comparative basis (Cheung and Gu, 
2004; Fitzner et al., 2000; Yu, 2006). The study of Fitzner et al. (2000) compared the 
health status, healthcare policy, and the efficiency of healthcare system of Hong Kong 
with that of China. But it contains three problems. Firstly, Hong Kong and China is 
incomparable in terms of the unit of analysis because the former is a city of 6.5 
million while the latter is a country of 1.3 billion. Secondly, the study is a descriptive 
study lacking explanatory power because it does not apply any theoretical framework 
to stringently examine the issue. And thirdly, it only briefly described its use of four 
criteria---demand barriers, technical efficiency, adequacy of supply, and allocative 
efficiency (Fitzner et al., 2000, p.152) --- to assess the efficiency of healthcare system 
in Hong Kong and China. Without substantial data support, it quickly jumped to the 
conclusion that both Hong Kong and China required “structural reform to increase the 
efficiency of their respective health systems” (Fitzner et al., 2000, p.152) and “contain 
the growth of health care expenditure” (p.153). The contention made by Fitzner et al. 
(2000) is not convincing.  
 
 The study of Yu (2006) used a path dependence perspective to examine the 
 80 
causes and key features of healthcare financing reforms and the difficulties in 
launching the reforms in urban China and Hong Kong in the late 1990s. It argued that 
the governments in both places shared the common intention of using healthcare 
financing reform as a means to secure “more compatible (but not necessarily equal) 
relationship between the development of social welfare and the operation of the 
private market” (Yu, 2006, p.847). However, their healthcare financing reform options 
differed because of the influence of “previous policies on social welfare” (Yu, 2006, 
p.860). The Chinese government, which did not give up “its practice developed in the 
pre-market-reform period of relying on state-owned enterprise to provide welfare for 
their workers” (Yu, 2006, p.860), implemented a mandatory cost-sharing health 
insurance system requiring “state-owned enterprises to fulfill their welfare 
commitment to their workers” (Yu, 2006, p.860). The Hong Kong government, which 
upheld the time-honored low-tax policy, proposed a mandatory savings scheme. The 
study of Yu (2006) contains three problems. Firstly, urban China with Hong Kong is 
incomparable in terms of the unit of analysis. Secondly, the term ‘urban China’ is very 
ambiguous, giving the audience no idea of which part of China the study refers to. 
And thirdly, Yu (2006) does not apply the path dependence notion well into his study 
because the causal linkage between previous policies and current reform strategies is 
missing in his study when much space was used to describe the contents of reform 
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strategies.  
 
 The study of Cheung and Gu (2004) gave an overview of the healthcare 
financing reform trajectories in Shanghai and Hong Kong since the 1980s and found 
that the current healthcare financing reforms in both cities were “triggered by 
financial constraints” (p.23) and their reform processes illustrated “conflicts among 
objectives of financial viability, equitable coverage, and citizens’ affordability to pay 
for their health care” (p.23). This study is descriptive in nature without theoretical 
basis. 
 
 In brief, a review of available literature shows that previous comparative studies 
on the healthcare systems in Hong and China contain the methodological problem of 
being incomparable in terms of the unit of analysis and the problem of lacking 
explanatory power. It also shows that the empirical puzzle about why Shanghai being 
able to implement health insurance reform since the mid-1980s while Hong Kong 
failing to do so has not been studied before. 
 
2.4 The Importance of Applying Theory into Health Policy Studies  
A review of the available literature on healthcare finance reveals the problem of 
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lacking studies which adopt theories to examine the issue. Most of the studies 
examined are descriptive studies without a theoretical foundation. There are studies 
which adopt certain approaches or perspectives without really applying a theory. This 
type of study still has explanatory power but can only provide a partial answer to the 
issue it examines. In fact, the use of theory is important when conducting research, in 
particular health policy. As Neuman (2003) argued, the primary purpose of a theory is 
to explain (p.54) “why specific events and patterns of events occur as they do” 
(Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007, p.37). It provides researchers with different 
‘lenses’ to look at complicated problems (Reeves at el., 2008, p.631), helps them 
understand and “translate for policy makers and healthcare providers, the processes 
that occur beneath the visible surface and so to develop knowledge of underlying 
(generating) principles (Reeves at el., 2008, p.634)”. As Parson (1938) argued, theory 
has the advantages of providing researchers with “selective criteria as to which are 
important and which can safely be neglected” (p.20), “a basis for coherent 
organization of the factual material” (p.20), “a crucially important guide to the 
direction of fruitful research” (p.20), and “a source of cross fertilization of related 
fields of the utmost importance” (p.20).  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
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To conclude, the literature review of the available studies shows that the empirical 
puzzle about why Shanghai being able to implement health insurance reform since the 
mid-1980s while Hong Kong failing to do so has not been studied before. None of the 
available studied adopts the theory of historical institutionalism to stringently examine 
why the healthcare financing reform trajectory of Shanghai is divergent from that of 
Hong Kong. In order to fill this research gap, this study uses the theory of historical 
institutionalism to solve this real world puzzle. Besides, it contributes to Western 
scholarly debate over convergence and divergence of healthcare reform. The next 
chapter will introduce and discuss the theory of historical institutionalism in detail. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the theory of historical institutionalism which will be adopted 
to examine healthcare financing reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong. It is divided into 
five sections. Section 3.2 briefly introduces the historical development of institutional 
theories in political science. Section 3.3 highlights six key features of historical 
institutionalism. Section 3.4 examines the limitations of historical institutionalism to 
explain change and evaluates the existing approaches that are adopted by historical 
institutionalists to explain institutional change. Section 3.5 discusses how this study is 
going to refine the theory of historical institutionalism before it is applied into the 
case studies of Shanghai and Hong Kong to explain their divergent reform paths in 
healthcare. Section 3.6 give a conclusion. 
 
3.2 Historical Development of Institutional Theories in Political Science 
(a) Old Institutionalism 
The study of political institutions constituted the basis of political science which 
professionalized as a modern academic discipline in the late 19th and early 20th 
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century (Almond, 1996, p.64; Rhodes, 1995, p.43; Rothstein, 1996, p.137).4 The 
original institutionalism or old institutionalism studied the formal government 
institutions and “defined the state in terms of its political, administrative, and legal 
arrangements” (Schmidt, 2006, p.99). It dominated the discipline from 1880 to 1930, 
finding the pillars of order in politics and facilitating the routine operation of the 
polity (Orren and Skowronek, 1995, p.298). According to Peters (1999), old 
institutionalism had five characteristics, including: legalism, which was concerned 
with the central role of law in governing; structuralism, which emphasized that 
political systems determined political behavior; holism, which compared the whole 
political systems instead of examining individual institutions; historicism, which 
examined how history influenced the development of contemporary political systems; 
and normative analysis that ascertained which political institutions produced good 
government (pp. 6-10). However, it was criticized for four reasons, including: being 
atheoretical and descriptive when explaining the relations among branches of 
government; being unscientific when its concern with norms and values failed to 
distinguish facts from values; being ethnocentric when it failed to function well in 
developing countries with less formalized institutional arrangements; and disregarding 
                                                 
4 According to Almond (1996), American political science professionalized in the late 19 th and early 
20th century when the corruption of local and national political processes caused by the rapid growth 
of industry and the proliferation of large cities in the U.S. became a subject of deep concern (p.64). It 
was founded by political scientists including Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow and Charles 
Merriam, who linked their scholarly concerns with the needs to improve government (Almond, 1996, 
p.76).    
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the influence of informal features of politics and the calculations of individual utility 
on political behavior (Peters, 1999, pp.6-10).   
 
(b) Behavioralism and Rational Choice Theory 
During the 1950s and 1970s, behavioralism and rational choice theory that focused on 
individuals and their behavior became the predominant approach in political science 
(Schmidt, 2006, p.100). Both behavioralism and rational choice theory put emphasis 
on making political science a true science by developing theory and using systematic 
and rigorous scientific methods to collect and analyze data (Hay, 2002, pp.8-13; 
Peters, 1999, pp.12-3). They “came to be seen as more likely to yield generalization 
and enable comparison” (Lecours, 2005, p.3). The primacy of behavioralism was to 
produce an inductive and predictive science based upon “extrapolation and 
generalization from observed empirical regularities” of political behavior (Hay, 2002, 
p.10). The primacy of rational choice theory was to produce a deductive and 
predictive science based on the simplifying assumption that political actors were 
rational, instrumental, and self-serving utility maximizers who engaged in “a 
cost-benefit analysis of each and every choice available to them” (Hay, 2002, p.8). 
The reductionist tendency adopted by behavioralism and rational choice theory to 
reduce the explanation of political processes to social and economic attributes 
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(Rothstein, 1996, p.139) and its emphasis on input from society such as voting to 
explain political outcomes (Peters, 1999, p.14) meant that political institutions played 
little or no roles in influencing political behavior (Rothstein, 1996, p.139) but was 
portrayed simply as arenas within which political behavior occurred (March and 
Olsen, 1984, p.734).  
 
The tendency of behavioralism and rational choice theory to deny the central role 
played by political institutions to determine political outcomes provoked severe 
criticism from institutionalists because the society- and economy-centered analysis of 
political behavior advocated by these two theories assumed that political science lost 
its original explanatory power (Héritier, 1996, p.27). March and Olson (1984) were 
the first to criticize behavioralism and rational choice theory for five reasons. They 
included being contextual by subordinating politics to contextual forces such as class 
structure and economic conditions; being reductionist by ascribing the political 
outcomes to the aggregate consequences of individual actors; being utilitarian by 
seeing political action solely as the product of calculated self-interest rather than 
political actors’ response to obligations; being functionalist by assuming that 
institutions was independent of the historical path and rapidly moved to an 
equilibrium; and being instrumentalism that defined decision making and resource 
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allocation as the major concerns of political life rather than recognizing the meaning 
of political life through ceremonies, rituals, and symbols (pp.735-8).  
 
In fact, the main problem of behavioralism and rational choice theory was that 
their focus on the attitudes and behaviors of individuals and groups to explain 
political outcomes failed to answer the question of why individuals and groups with 
similar attitudes, preferences, and strength “could not always influence policy in the 
same way or to the same extent in different national contexts” (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992, p.5). Since behavioralism and rational choice theory had theoretical limitation 
on explaining these cross-national differences, there was a renewed interest in 
reviving an institution-centered analysis of political behavior (Héritier, 1996, p.27).  
 
(c) New Institutionalism 
On the basis of their criticisms of behavioralism and rational choice theory, March 
and Olson in 1984 became the initial advocates of new institutionalism which was a 
new theoretical framework in political science blending elements of old 
institutionalism into new theoretical and empirical directions (March and Olson, 1984, 
pp.742-7). New institutionalists argued that “theorizing in political science must take 
into account that action does not occur in an institutional vacuum” (Lecours, 2005, p.6) 
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and political analysis was “best conducted through a focus on institutions” (Lecours, 
2005, p.6). They rejected “the input-weighted political analysis of behavioralism and 
rational choice theory” (Hay, 2002, p.11) and emphasized the relative autonomy of 
political institutions, the complexity of political processes and systems, historical 
inefficiency and the importance of symbolic action to understand politics (March and 
Olson, 1984, p.738). New institutionalism did not constitute a unified body of thought 
but contained three disparate analytical approaches: rational choice, sociological, and 
historical institutionalisms (Koelble, 1995; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998; 
Thelen, 1999; Lecours, 2000; Lecours, 2005; Oliver and Mossialos, 2005; Steinmo, 
2008).5 While these three analytical approaches did not share a generally accepted 
definition of an institution (Immergut, 1998, p.5), they were united by rejecting 
                                                 
5 The list of new institutionalism goes longer nowadays when other strands of new institutionalism are 
added to the list. For example, Peters (1999) argued that there were seven strands of new 
institutionalism, including: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, normative institutionalism, societal institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, and 
international institutionalism. Normative institutionalism examined how the norms of political 
institutions determined political behavior (Peters, 1999, p.19). However, it overlapped sociological 
institutionalism which regarded institution as interest representation and examined the structuring of 
interactions between state and society. Besides, it overlapped historical institutionalism which talked 
about asymmetry of power. Empirical institutionalism was closer to old institutionalism and argued 
that the structure of government affected the way policies were processed and the choices made by 
governments. It conducted empirical research on the impact of structure (e.g. presidential and 
parliamentary government) on the policy outcomes of government. International institutionalism 
emphasized ‘the theoretical place assigned to structure in explaining the behavior of states and 
individuals’ (Peters, 1999, p.20). Schmidt (2006) used the term ‘discursive institutionalism’ for the 
fourth strand of new institutionalism that focused on ideas to explain change, emphasized the use of 
ideas in the mass process of public persuasion in the political sphere, and it largely avoided the 
economic, historical or cultural determinism of the other three strands of new institutionalism. She 
said that this ideational approach followed from the historical institutionalism tradition, although the 
dividing line is admittedly fuzzy. Since this chapter examines how new institutionalism arose in the 
early 1980s as a response to behavioralism and rational choice theory, it only discusses rational 
choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism that arose during 
that period. 
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observable behavior as the basic datum of political analysis and by sharing a 
theoretical core that institutions within which political behavior occurred played an 
important role in affecting political behavior (Immergut, 1998, p.6).  
 
Rational choice institutionalism defined institutions as the rules of the game 
which established the conditions for bounded rationality with political actors 
strategically following those rules in order to achieve their most preferred outcome 
(Koelble, 1995, p.241; Immergut, 1998, p.13; Lecours, 2000, p.512; Peters, 1999, 
p.47). Institutions which set parameters to choice provided certainty under conditions 
of uncertainty, thereby fostering cooperative, habitual, and predictive political 
behavior (Koelble, 1995, p.241; Peters, 1999, pp.47-8). In short, institutions either 
imposed constraints on political actors or offered them chances for action (Lecours, 
2000, p.512).  
 
Sociological institutionalism broadly defined institutions to include not only 
formal rules or procedures, but also cognitive frames, moral templates, symbol 
systems, and systems of meaning that guided the behavior of political actors (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996, p.947; Schmidt, 2006, p.107). Institutions influenced behavior by 
simultaneously specifying what one should do and what one could imagine oneself 
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doing in a given context (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.948). They affected the strategic 
calculations, the underlying preferences and the identities of political actors that 
rational action was itself socially constituted (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.948) and 
purposive, goal-oriented action was deemed acceptable according to the logic of 
appropriateness (Schmidt, 2006, p.107). Sociological institutionalism posited a 
process of institutional isomorphism when institutions became more homogeneous 
due to the adoption of formal rules promulgated by coercive authority, normative 
standards promoted by professionals, and legitimated practices of prominent 
institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, pp.150-3).  
 
 Historical institutionalism which built on old institutionalism “assigned 
importance to formal political institutions” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.937) but it also 
enriched the concept of institutions by talking about which institutions mattered and 
how they mattered (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.937). It defined institutions as “formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions intrinsic to the organizational 
structure of the polity” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.938) that shaped the goals political 
actors pursued and structured power relations that favored some groups while 
demobilizing others (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.2; Oliver and Massialos, 2005, 
p.10). Institutions were seen as “relatively persistent features of the historical 
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landscape” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941) and one of the central forces structuring 
interactions and pushing policy development along a set of paths (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, p.941). In brief, rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalisms 
diverged on the definitions of institutions but were united on the importance of 
institutions in affecting political behavior (Koelble, 1995, p.232; Immergut, 1998, 
pp.5-6; Schmidt, 2006, p.101).  
 
Among these three main strands of new institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism is chosen for examining healthcare financing reform in Shanghai and 
Hong Kong. Rational choice institutionalism is irrelevant because this study is not 
concerned with how political actors used institutions to maximize their utilities. 
Sociological institutionalism is not directly relevant because this study is not 
concerned with why the healthcare systems of Shanghai and Hong Kong become 
similar but why these two places follow distinct paths of health insurance reform. 
Historical institutionalism which primarily focuses on solving “empirically directed 
research questions relating to differences in outcomes through time and/or space” 
(Lecours, 2005, p.14) is the most appropriate theory to examine how institutions in 
Shanghai and Hong Kong respectively structure interactions and generate distinctive 
national trajectories of health insurance reforms over time. 
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3.3 Historical Institutionalism: Key Features 
(a) Institutions Matter 
Historical institutionalism has six distinctive features. Firstly, it emphasizes that 
institutions matter. All institutions “have organizational biases that channel the 
representation of interests” (Tuohy, 1999, p.108). They play a determinant role in 
distributing power among political actors in a given polity and shaping their strategies 
and goals in the decision-making process that in turn shape the political outcomes 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). Since institutions distribute 
power unevenly among different groups of political actors, they influence how 
political actors interpret and pursue their self-interests, define their goals, policy 
preferences and strategies based on their institutional position, institutional 
responsibilities and relationships with others (Koelble, 1995, p.236; Immergut, 1998, 
p.21). Institutions constrain or facilitate the structure of political opportunities for 
political actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941; Immergut, 1998, p.21) and create the 
vested interests (Béland, 2005b, p.34) by acting as filters that selectively favor 
particular goals political actors strive for or strategies to achieve these ends (Immergut, 
1998, p.20). The asymmetries of political power caused by institutions privilege some 
groups of political actors at the expense of others, leading to some groups win while 
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others lose (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.2; Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941).  
 
For example, Immergut (1992) examined how a nation’s constitutional rules and 
electoral results produced different institutional constraints on the ability of executive 
governments to introduce the health insurance legislation in Switzerland, France and 
Sweden. She found that in Switzerland, “the constitutional right of voters to challenge 
legislation through referenda” (Immergut, 1992, p.68) led to decision-making moving 
from the executive and parliamentary arenas into the electoral arena (Immergut, 1992, 
p.74). This provided Swiss doctors with strategic opportunities to veto the health 
insurance legislation through referendum. In France, unstable parliamentary coalitions 
and the lack of party discipline impeded the executive government of the Fourth 
Republic from enacting the health insurance legislation (Immergut, 1992, p.74). 
However, the constitutional change which “allowed the executive to impose 
legislation without parliamentary ratification” (Immergut, 1992, p.72) led to the locus 
of decision-making shifting from the parliament to the executive that the executive 
government of the Fifth Republic was able to enact the health insurance legislation 
(Immergut, 1992, p.70). In Sweden, the executive dominance with stable 
parliamentary majorities “effectively constrained decision-making to the executive 
arena” (Immergut, 1992, p.67) that doctors had no veto points to block the health 
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insurance legislation. In brief, institutions play a crucial role in distributing power 
among political actors in a given polity and shaping their strategies and goals in the 
decision-making process that in turn shape the political outcomes (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). 
 
(b) The Use of Calculus and Cultural Approaches to Affect Political Behaviors 
Secondly, historical institutionalism assumes that institutions affect the behavior of 
political actors as mentioned in the calculus and cultural approaches (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, p.940). The calculus approach assumes that institutions frame the actors’ 
strategic behavior and reduce uncertainty by providing political actors with 
“information about the expected behavior of others” (Oliver and Mossialos, 2005, p. 
10) through the existence of rules, “enforcement mechanisms for agreements, [and] 
penalties for defection” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.939). Political actors who are utility 
maximizer follow rules in order to maximize their personal gains (Steinmo, 2008, 
p.126). For example, the study of Immergut (1992) showed that institutions in 
Switzerland, France and Sweden respectively established different rules of the game 
for political actors to enact or to block policies (pp.58-9). Her study showed that 
different institutions provided political actors with different veto opportunities to 
influence political decisions (Immergut, 1992, pp.65-6). In Switzerland, direct 
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democracy provided veto points for doctors to use the referendum to block the health 
insurance legislation. In France, the constitutional change allowed the executive 
government to circumvent the parliamentary veto point and consequently enact the 
health insurance legislation. In Sweden, the executive dominance with stable 
parliamentary majorities provided no veto points for doctors to block the health 
insurance legislation.  
 
As to the cultural approach, it assumes that institutions frame the ways in which 
actors see their world by providing “moral or cognitive templates for interpretations 
and action” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.939). Political actors follow the logic of 
appropriateness, established norms, routines, rules of thumbs or existing values when 
choosing their course of action (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.939; Oliver and Mossialos, 
2005, p. 11; Steinmo, 2008, p.126). In brief, historical institutionalism assumes that 
political outcome is best understood as a product of both interest maximizing and rule 
following (Steinmo, 2008, p.126). 
 
(c) History Matters 
Thirdly, historical institutionalism emphasizes that history matters. It takes history or 
time seriously, specifying sequences, tracing and analyzing processes over substantial 
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stretch of years to explain important political outcomes or real-world puzzles (Pierson 
and Skocpol, 2002, pp.695-8).  History is not just a marker in time or a chain of 
independent events located in the past (Steinmo, 2008, p.128), but rather the 
contingent product of the interactions of multiple political actors and institutions 
operating in and influenced by broader political, economic and social contexts over 
time (Lecours, 2000, p.514; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p.706). Institutions are 
located in a causal chain that accommodates a role for other variables such as 
socioeconomic development and the diffusion of ideas (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.942). 
As a result, political outcomes are attributed to the interaction of multiple variables 
that reflect the complex political situations in reality (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.13; 
Immergut, 1998, p.19; Steinmo, 2008, p.128). Causal processes and outcomes in the 
social world occur slowly due to incrementalism and hence take a long time to add up 
to anything (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p.703). Casual processes involving chains 
with several links also require a longer time to work themselves out (Pierson and 
Skocpol, 2002, p.704). Therefore, by extending the time frame of social inquiry, 
historical institutionalism has the methodological advantages of increasing the 
number of observations available for examination, making more data available, 
contributing to causal inference by testing the arrow of causality through historical 
process tracing that cannot be achieved by simple correlation of analysis, sensitizing 
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researchers to period effects or temporal boundary conditions and allowing them to 
place particular events in a particular time without missing the overarching patterns 
(Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp. 698-9; Steinmo, 2008, p.135). In brief, historical 
institutionalism is able to “offer more accurate explanations for the specific events” it 
explores (Steinmo, 2008, p.127) through historical investigation on a broad time 
scale.   
 
(d) The Emphasis on Path Dependency 
Fourthly, historical institutionalism emphasizes path dependence that “preceding steps 
in a particular direction induce further movement along the same direction” (Pierson, 
2000a, p.252). Self-reinforcing processes in institutions that “act as mechanisms of 
reproduction” (Lecours, 2005, p.10) make established institutions and their policies 
difficult to change once a path is established (Pierson, 2000b, p.75; Peters et al., 2005, 
p.1276). It means that established institutions favor the status quo and policy inertia. 
They “generate powerful inducements that reinforce their own stability and further 
development” (Pierson, 2000a, p. 255) and at the same time “find ways of defending 
existing patterns of policy” (Peters et al., 2005, p.1276). Policies also create feedback 
effects. They encourage political actors to “adapt in ways that lock in a particular path 
of policy development” (Pierson, 1994, p.42). The lock-in effects mean that policies 
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induce the emergence of elaborate economic and social networks that “greatly 
increase the cost of adopting once-possible alternatives and inhibit exit from a current 
policy path” (Pierson, 1994, p.42). Policies encourage political actors to make 
significant investments which are difficult to reverse (Pierson, 1994, p.45) or create 
strong incentives for political actors to “coordinate their activities with other social 
actors and adopt prevailing or anticipated standards” (Pierson, 1994, p.45). Important 
commitments made by political actors in response to certain types of government 
action greatly limit options for radical reforms or major policy changes in future 
(Pierson, 1994, p.43). As a result, individuals lock in previous policy decisions. 
According to Pierson (2000a), the high set-up costs of established institutions and 
policies, the learning effects which lead to investment in specialized skills, the 
coordination effects which deepen the relationships of individuals and institutions 
with others, the adaptive expectations which develop political and social identities, 
power asymmetries in which one set of political actors achieving a position of 
influence impose rules and preferences on another set, and the complexity and opacity 
of politics are reasons generating self-reinforcing processes that make the exit option 
increasingly unattractive over time (pp. 257-260).  
 
For example, Wilsford (1994) argued that there was strong path dependency in 
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the U.S. to reform its healthcare system in a big way (p.251). The fragmented political 
institutions characterized by decentralized decision networks, vested interests that 
were well embedded in the current healthcare system, and the traditional 
philosophical underpinning of American healthcare system that healthcare was a 
private good acted as structural impediments to big and radically new changes 
proposed by the Clinton Plan (Wilsford, 1994, pp.271-4). 
 
Besides, the conception of path dependence shows that the timing and sequence 
of particular event, process, choice or decision are crucial (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, 
p.700; Oliver and Mossialos, 2005, p. 11) because the same event, process, choice or 
decision does not necessarily have the same impact at different stages of the path 
(Oliver and Mossialos, 2005, p. 11). Initial steps affect the outcomes of events 
occurring at a later point in time through self-reinforcement (Pierson, 2000a, p. 252; 
Pierson, 2000b, p.84; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp.700-1). Self-reinforcement 
creates strong incentives for actors to stick to a specific path (Pierson, 2000a, p. 254) 
and generates irreversibility that plausible alternatives become increasingly distant 
and unreachable over time (Pierson, 2000b, pp.74-5; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, 
p.701).  When present-day political actors implement new policy, they have to “take 
into account the institutionalized policy legacy of decisions” (Béland, 2005b, p.34) 
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made by their predecessors decades or even centuries ago.  
 
For example, Hacker (1998) emphasized the roles of “historical sequence, timing, 
and policy legacies” (p.80) in explaining the divergent trajectories of national health 
insurance programs in the UK, Canada, and the U.S. He argues that in the UK, the 
legacies of 1911 National Insurance Act which provided health insurance and sickness 
benefits to the wage-earners “forestalled the emergence of physician-friendly private 
[health] insurance” (Hacker, 1998, p.95) and “acclimated the public to state 
intervention in medicine” (Hacker, 1998, p.95) that subsequently led to the 
establishment of the NHS in 1948, which provided the public with free and universal 
healthcare services based on public provision.  
 
In Canada, Hacker (1998) argued that the collapse of the Dominion-Provincial 
Conference of 1945 without agreeing upon the proposal for national health insurance 
led to the rapid growth of private health insurance plans and the efforts of federal 
government to subsidize the development of a technologically sophisticated private 
hospital system through postwar grants to the provinces (pp.96-7). Nevertheless, the 
federal aid fostered the passage of the provincial health insurance program in 
Saskatchewan in 1946 that provided the “government guarantee of medical insurance 
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to all its citizens” (Hacker, 1998, p.100). This spurred neighboring provinces to follow 
suit and eventually paved the way for passing a national health insurance legislation 
in 1966 with the establishment of “a provincially administered system of government 
health insurance based primarily on private provision” (Hacker, 1998, p.58).  
 
In the U.S., Hacker (1998) found that the majority of population enrolling in 
physician-dominated private insurance plans, the building up of medical industry 
preceding the universal access to healthcare when the Hospital Construction Act was 
passed in 1946, and the initial implementation of health insurance programs of 
Medicare in 1965 for the elderly and disabled and Medicaid in 1966 for the poor that 
greatly increased the fiscal strains on public finance were three important reasons 
making the government incapable of enacting national health insurance legislation 
(pp.111-9). In brief, the study of Hacker (1998) shows that the complex interplay of 
forces --- historical sequence, timing and policy legacies--- play a crucial role in 
shaping subsequent healthcare policy developments in the UK, Canada and the U.S. 
and leading to lasting cross-national differences. 
 
(e) The Importance of Policy Feedback from Previous Policy Choices 
Fifthly, historical institutionalism emphasizes the role of policy feedback. Policy 
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feedback can be understood from three aspects: first, how resources and incentives 
provided by previous policies shape the formation of interest groups (Pierson, 1994, 
p.41); second, how information and meanings conveyed by previous policies shape 
the views and attitudes of citizens towards public policies (Pierson, 1994, p.45; 
Gusmano et al., 2002, p.734); and third, how the positive or negative feedback effect 
of previous policies shapes the development trajectory of policies. For the first aspect 
of policy feedback, this points to political feedback effects. Policy feedback creates 
vested interests. It provides resources and creates incentives that can facilitate, 
strengthen or inhibit the formation or expansion of interest groups (Pierson, 1994, 
pp.40-1). It gives interest groups “a reason to exit, facilitate or impede efforts to 
overcome collective-action problems, or provide access to considerable political 
resources” (Pierson, 1994, p.41). And it provides information for interest groups and 
affects their mind-sets and cognitive processes (Pierson, 1994, p.42). Interest groups 
which are beneficiaries of previous policies have strong motivation to mobilize in 
favor of the maintenance or expansion of the policies (Pierson, 1993, p. 599). Their 
activities would be easier if previous policies provide them with resources such as 
funding or having formal access to decision makers (Pierson, 1993, pp.601-2). For 
example, Pierson (1994) found that the fragmented and underdeveloped pension 
policy in the UK led to “a similarly fragmented and underdeveloped structure of 
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pensioner-interest representation” (p.47) that “were easily outmaneuvered by the 
Thatcher government in the struggle over pension retrenchment” (Pierson, 1994, p.47). 
On the other hand, the single and mature public pension programme in the U.S. 
“generated a strong and coherent base of political support” (Pierson, 1994, p.53) that 
the American elderly were easily mobilized to oppose the proposal for pension 
retrenchment (Pierson, 1994, p.71). 
 
As to the second aspect of policy feedback, this points to the interpretive effects 
of previous policies (Pierson, 1993, p.610). Previous policies affect the cognitive 
processes of citizens (Pierson, 1993, p.610) through the conveyance of information 
and meanings. They affect how citizens perceive and interpret current policies and 
government’s policy choice (Pierson, 1994; Gusmano et al., 2002). Gusmano et al. 
(2002) identify three effects of public policies on public attitudes: “exposure, 
signaling, and experience” (p.734). The exposure model of policy feedback suggests 
that “the longer [the] citizens interact with a particular policy or institutions, the more 
‘comfortable’ they become with that policy” (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.734). Emotional 
reactions play a particularly important role in shaping public attitudes toward public 
policies when “the public lacks detailed information about policy matters” (Gusmano 
et al., 2002, p.734). The signaling model of policy feedback refers to “elite influence 
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over public opinion” (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.735). It means that the public would 
“be most supportive of public policies in domains where there has been the most 
sustained set of elite messages favoring these policies” (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.735). 
And the experience model of policy feedback suggest that public support for a 
particular public policy is “based on [previous] personal experience with the relevant 
institutions” (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.749). Lessons drawn from personal experience 
are “interpreted through the lenses of conceptual frames and constructs that are most 
accessible through cultural experience” (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.735).  
 
 For example, Gusmano et al. (2002) argued that “the legitimizing effects of past 
public policy [were] rather narrow” (p.733) that public support for employer 
responsibility was limited to mainstream medical care (hospital and physician services) 
(Gusmano et al., 2002, p.733). Public support for employer responsibility did not 
extend to long-term care because there was little relevant public experience and no 
elite messages (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.761). And public support for employer 
responsibility in the treatment of substance abuse “was undermined by past evidence 
of threats to job security and civil liberties due to employer involvement” (Gusmano 
et al., 2002, p.761). 
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  As to the third aspect of policy feedback, this points to the policy continuity or 
policy change. The positive or negative feedback effect of previous policies can shape 
the policy trajectory. While positive feedback effects emphasize how the 
self-reinforcing dynamics generated by past policies create path dependence and 
policy continuity (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 2000), negative feedback effects 
emphasize how negative socio-economic consequences induced by policies 
undermine “the political, fiscal or social sustainability of a particular set of policies” 
(Weaver, 2010, p.137). 
 
(f) Using In-depth Case Studies as the Research Strategy 
Sixthly, historical institutionalism uses small- to medium-n comparisons or in-depth 
case studies as the research strategy (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p.714; Steinmo, 
2008, p.135) to “find interesting patterns to explain and to test the plausibility of 
causal hypotheses” (Skocpol, 1995, p.104). While its focus on important cases and big 
puzzles can “potentially suffer from the obvious dangers of selection bias” (Steinmo, 
2008, p.135), historical institutionalism applies alternative strategies of causal 
inference to rigorously test the hypotheses in order to make good historical analysis 
(Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p.714). By juxtaposing regions, time periods, and policy 
sectors, historical analyses turn “what appear to be one or a few national instances 
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into settings for many carefully compared cases” (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p.715). 
And even within single case studies, historical analyses engage the case “at multiple 
[observation] points, thereby confronting explanatory propositions with multiple data 
points” (Steinmo, 2008, p.135). Historical institutionalism “seeks to establish 
historically grounded generalizations leading to middle-range theorizing” that explain 
particular phenomena (Lecours, 2000, p.515). The strength of historical 
institutionalism lies in its ability to explain policy continuities over time and policy 
variations and irregularities across countries (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.10; 
Lecours, 2000, p.521). Features of historical institutionalism are summarized in Table 
9.  
 
3.4 The Approaches of Historical Institutionalism to Explain Change 
While historical institutionalism is helpful in explaining different policy trajectories 
across countries and policy continuities within countries over times, it is criticized for 
being unable to deal with the question of institutional change (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992, p.14). Since historical institutionalism is “premised upon the enduring effects of 
institutional and policy choices made at the initiation of a structure” (Peters, 1999, 
p.68), it is more conducive to explaining institutional stability and policy persistence 
over time than to explaining institutional and policy change (Thelen and Steinmo, 
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1992, p.15; Peters, 1999, p.68; Peters et al., 2005, p.1278; Steinmo, 2008, p.129). 
Besides, historical institutionalism is more structuralist because it conceives of 
institutions as sustained by and representing “systems of values, norms, and practices 
in society” (Peters et al., 2005, p.1278). Structures and norms tend to reinforce each 
other, resulting in strengthening the image of structural rigidity (Peters et al., 2005, 
pp.1278-9) that institutions are biased toward continuity.  
 
But a review of available studies on historical institutionalism shows that 
historical institutionalism adopts some concepts or approaches to explain change, 
including punctuated equilibrium by Krasner (1984), the interplay of structure and 
conjuncture by Wilsford (1994), the accidental logic of history by Tuohy (1999), and 
institutional dynamism Thelen and Steinmo (1992). As illustrated below, the review of 
these concepts or approaches shows that the notion of institutional dynamism is more 
helpful in explaining change. 
 
(a) Punctuated equilibrium and Critiques 
In the mid-1980s, historical institutionalism explained change through punctuated 
equilibrium, a concept borrowed from evolutionary biology for politics by Krasner 
(1984). Punctuated equilibrium assumes that institutions remain in stability 
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(equilibrium) for a long period of time until they are punctuated by crises that bring 
about rapid institutional change and new policy trajectories, after which institutional 
consolidation and stasis set in again (Krasner, 1984, pp. 240-3). It means that the 
institutional equilibrium is not necessarily permanent because external shock can be 
the trigger of institutional change (Peters, 1999, p.68). It is the external shock causing 
the breakdown of old institutions and the creation of new ones (Krasner, 1984, p. 
240).  
 
Although the conception of punctuated equilibrium offers an explanation for 
institutional change, it fails to offer any priori criteria for determining when there is 
sufficient environmental pressure to generate an institutional change (Peters, 1999, 
p.69). As a result, the use of punctuated equilibrium to explain change risks being an 
explanation after the fact or being a tautological explanation which treats institutions 
as an independent variable to explain political outcomes during the period of stability 
and as a dependent variable when they break down because of external shock (Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992, p.15; Peters, 1999, pp.68-9). It makes institutional change become 
“a product of fate” (Steinmo, 2008, p.129). 
 
(b) The Interplay of Structure and Conjuncture and Critiques 
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In the early 1990s, Wilsford (1994) used the notions of structure and conjuncture to 
explain how their interplay facilitated or constrained healthcare reform in Germany, 
France, the UK, and the U.S. He argued that path dependence was not strictly about 
historical determinism but about historical contingency (Wilsford, 1994, p.275) 
because powerful and compelling conjunctures was a critical variable enabling 
political actor to override the inertia of the structural impediments to non-incremental 
change in policy path (Wilsford, 1994, pp.261-9). In his study, Germany, France and 
the UK were cases of changes in policy path while the U.S. was the case of path 
dependency because of the absence of a powerful conjuncture. Unfortunately, 
Wilsford (1994) vaguely defines the notion of conjunctures as “the fleeting comings 
together of a number of diverse elements into a new, single combination” (p.257) that 
raise the question of what the diverse elements are, what the composition of the 
diverse elements should be and when these diverse elements occur in order to create a 
conjuncture that is powerful and compelling enough for political actors to override the 
structural impediments to bring about big change.  
 
In fact, his study showed that the conjunctural elements that allowed political 
actors to deviate from the original policy path varied among Germany, France and the 
UK. Wilsford (1994) found that in Germany, the conjunctural elements of high 
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healthcare spending, the fiscal crisis of German unification, the new, determined and 
dynamic Federal Minister of Health, and the party coalition on healthcare reform 
enabled the government to implement the Seehofer reform of 1992 that reduced 
prescription drug prices, extended the co-payment on prescription drugs and changed 
the hospital financing system from a per-bed, per-day basis to a global budget basis 
(pp.259-261). In France, he found that the conjunctural elements of the new austerity 
policy of 1983 and a new Director of Hospitals enabled the government to implement 
hospital financing reform in 1984 by introducing a system of anticipatory global 
budgeting (Wilsford, 1994, pp.263-4). In the UK, he found that the conjunctural 
elements of the strong leadership of Thatcher who centrally directed the reform 
process, the diffusion of the perception of a crisis in the hospital system and the new 
idea of introducing market forces into the healthcare system, the lack of unity in the 
medical profession, hospital managers who wanted to play a greater role in the 
decision-making of market players, and the absence of patients’ opposition enabled 
the Thatcher government to implement National Health Service reform in 1991 that 
introduced the provider-purchaser split in healthcare (Wilsford, 1994, pp.268-9).  
 
In brief, the study of Wilsford (1994) shows that a conjuncture can be the 
combination of political, economic, and ideational elements that leads to policy 
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change. He does not emphasize the importance of external shock like Krasner (1984) 
did in order to make change possible. However, the cross-national differences in the 
combination of the conjunctural elements without identifying a common set of 
conjunctural elements which bring about change reduce the explanatory power of 
Wilsford’s (1994) approach. Other countries which are not examined by Wilsford 
(1994) can have a different combination of the conjunctural elements which make 
policy change possible. The vague definition of conjuncture is not helpful in 
understanding policy change.  
 
Besides, it is problematic for Wilsford (1994) to argue that a conjuncture has to 
be powerful and compelling enough to bring about big change. As his empirical 
country case study shows, two conjunctural elements are powerful and compelling 
enough for the French government to implement healthcare reform while four and six 
conjunctural elements are respectively needed by the German and British government 
to implement healthcare reform. It shows that how powerful the conjuncture is does 
not depend on the sum of the number of diverse conjunctural elements. Also, it is 
difficult and problematic to argue that the conjuncture of France is more powerful 
than that of Germany and the UK to bring about policy change because there is no 
way one can measure the conjuncture.   
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Finally, Wilsford (1994) had a contradictory understanding of the functions of 
political institutions. On one hand, he argued that the conjunctures in Germany, 
France and the UK were powerful for political actors to override structural 
impediments to implement policy changes. On the other hand, he argued in the 
conclusion section that the centralization of decision process and hierarchical ordering 
commonly shared by the political institutions of Germany, France and the UK placed 
the top-most decision-agents in these countries in a more advantageous position to 
enforce healthcare reform (Wilsford, 1994, p.276). It means that instead of being an 
impediment, the institutional structures of Germany, France and the UK actually 
facilitated the change in healthcare policy path in face of conjuncture. The analysis of 
Wilsford’s (1994) notions of structure and conjuncture shows that the approach is full 
of conceptual flaws and it is problematic to adopt these notions to explain institutional 
change.  
 
(c) The Accidental Logic of History and Critiques 
In the late 1990s, Tuohy (1999) used the accidental logic of history that referred to 
windows of opportunity created by broad political forces at critical moments in time 
to examine why major changes in healthcare policy took place in the UK but not in 
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the U.S. and Canada in the 1990s (p.6). She argued that a consolidated base of 
political authority for policy action and the commitments and willingness of key 
political actors to elevate the issue were two conditions necessary for creating a 
window of opportunity for policy change (Tuohy, 1999, pp.11-2). She also argued that 
“the timing of the opening of windows of opportunity for change” (Tuohy, 1999, 
p.123) is important.  
 
Tuohy (1999) argued that the UK had major policy change in healthcare because 
the Thatcher government was a majority government in its third successive terms 
having both the mobilization of authority and political will to implement the internal 
market reforms that substantially changed the decision-making systems in healthcare 
from state-hierarchical to market-type mechanism (pp.241-2). She argued that the U.S. 
failed to implement universal health insurance reform in 1993 because the Clinton 
administration only had the political will but lacked the ability to mobilize authority 
on an extraordinary scale (Tuohy, 1999, p.106). The inability to mobilize authority 
was due to President Clinton lacking a strong popular mandate, his party’s lack of 
seats in the Senate to guard against the procedural maneuvers by the Republicans, and 
his inability to capitalize a bandwagon effect when the momentum behind the 
healthcare reform was strong due to his need to “address the mounting crisis over his 
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budgetary proposals” (Tuohy, 1999, p.79). Tuohy (1999) argued that both the federal 
and provincial government in Canada solidly endorsed and reaffirmed the prevailing 
“single payer system of national health insurance” (p.90) because federal-provincial 
relations being “dominated by the contentious debate about the appropriate degree of 
centralization/decentralization within the federation” (Tuohy, 1999, p.246) made the 
governments impossible to mobilize authority while the high political risk of 
tampering with the healthcare system which had major public support also prevented 
the governments from having political will to implements any healthcare reform 
(Tuohy, 1999, p.102). 
 
 Tuohy’s (1999) accidental logic of history is better than Krasner’s (1984) 
punctuated equilibrium and Wilsford’s (1994) notions of structure and conjuncture 
because it clearly and explicitly pointed out that the windows of opportunity for 
policy change were triggered by two political conditions--- the mobilization of 
political authority and the willingness of political actors to enact policy change--- and 
that the timing of opening these windows of opportunities is important to explain 
policy change. However, Tuohy (1999) fails to choose the right countries to apply the 
accidental logic of history to explain policy change because except the UK, both the 
U.S. and Canada represent the cases of path dependency when implementing 
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healthcare reform in the 1990s. She should have chosen countries which successfully 
implemented policy change in healthcare and then examined whether her use of 
accidental logic of history can offer a reasonable explanation of policy change in such 
countries. Besides, Tuohy (1999) fails to show that when the timing of opening the 
windows of opportunities would occur and excludes the possibilities that other 
contextual conditions or crises can open the windows of opportunities for policy 
changes. She limits the explanatory power of the accidental logic of history by solely 
regarding two political conditions as forces that create the windows of opportunity for 
change.  
 
(d) Institutional Dynamism  
The analyses of Krasner’s (1984) punctuated equilibrium, Wilsford’s (1994) notions 
of structure and conjuncture, and Tuohy’s (1999) accidental logic of history show that 
these approaches fail to offer a clear and convincing explanation of institutional 
change. On the other hand, the analysis of ‘institutional dynamism’ developed by 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992) shows that this approach is conducive to providing a 
clearer way to understand about institutional and policy changes. Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992) use ‘institutional dynamism’ to identify four sources of institutional change 
that describe situations in which one “can observe variability in the impact of 
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institutions over time but within countries” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.16). 
‘Institutional dynamism’ explains institutional and policy changes as an interaction 
between institutions and the broader political and socioeconomic context in which 
they operate. It examines how institutions mediate and filter politics in response to 
changes in broader political and socioeconomic context over time (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992, p.16).  
 
According to Thelen and Steinmo (1992), the first source of institutional 
dynamism describes how the change in the political or socioeconomic context 
suddenly transforms previously latent institutions into salient arena of conflict and 
cooperation among political actors (p.16). The second source of institutional 
dynamism describes how the change in the political or socioeconomic context leads to 
existing institutions performing new tasks because new political actors emerge to 
pursue new goals through the existing institutions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.16). 
The third source of institutional dynamism describes how the change in the political 
or socioeconomic context leads to changes in political outcomes because existing 
actors pursue new ideas, goals or strategies within the existing institutions (Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992, pp.16-7). While the first three sources of institutional dynamism 
describe how the existing institutions produce different political outcomes in response 
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to shifting contextual conditions, the fourth source of institutional dynamism 
describes how the changes in the institutions lead to political actors adjusting their 
strategies to accommodate such institutional changes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, 
p.17). Drastic institutional changes such as the breakdown of old institutions and the 
creation of new institutions resulting from exogenous changes, and changes in 
institutional parameters resulting from political struggles or strategic maneuvering by 
political actors to enhance their own positions alter the institutional constraints in 
which political actors make their decisions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.17). It 
shows that how the changes in institutions reshape the perceived ideas and goals of 
political actors over time that political actors come to adjust their strategies to achieve 
those ideas and goals.  
 
Although ‘institutional dynamism’ is not a theory of institutional change, it helps 
extend institutional analysis by identifying four sources of institutional change. 
Unlike Krasner’s (1984) punctuated equilibrium which regards institutional change 
simply as institutional breakdown and the creation of new institutions caused by the 
external shock and unlike Tuohy’s (1999) accidental logic of history which regards 
the political forces as the solely forces to open windows of opportunities, 
‘institutional dynamism’ enriches the conception and understanding of institutional 
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change by showing how the changes in political or socioeconomic context reshape the 
meaning and functioning of existing institutions that policy changes can take place 
within existing institutions. Besides, it is clearer than Wilsford’s (1994) notion of 
conjuncture which ambiguously says that the combination of a number of diverse 
elements can bring about policy change by telling researchers how to locate the 
sources of institutional change. Also, unlike Krasner’s (1984) punctuated equilibrium 
which gives human agency no roles to play in institutional change, ‘institutional 
dynamism’ captures the dialectical interplay between institutions and agency. And it 
also explores the relationship between ideas and institutions. It shows that institutions 
are not the sole determinant of changes in political outcomes. Instead, it is the 
dynamic interaction of contextual conditions, ideas, actors, and institutions that 
structure particular political outcomes.  
 
 The dynamic interaction of contextual conditions, ideas, actors, and institutions 
that structure particular political outcomes deserve further illustration here. 
‘Institutional dynamism’ shows that Thelen and Steinmo (1992) bring ideas and actors 
into institutional analyses to explain institutional change without undermining the 
important role played by institutions in affecting political outcomes. According to 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992), ideas cannot be discussed without pointing to actors 
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because ideas are articulated by actors and translated by actors into “language and 
slogans appropriate for political decision making” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 24). 
Institutional structures define the channels and mechanisms for absorbing and 
diffusing new policy ideas and shaping “the interpretation and meaning behind those 
ideas” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.25). They can either facilitate or impede political 
actors in favor of new ideas to bring about policy switch. For example, political actors 
were institutionally better positioned in the UK than in the U.S. to promote New Right 
ideas that in turn led to policy change in work-welfare programs. It is because the 
centralized state with the government’s parliamentary majorities in the UK enabled 
the Thatcher government to make the new ideas go through the legislative process 
smoothly while the fragmented political system in the U.S. diluted new ideas through 
the need to forge compromise (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, pp. 24-5). When there are 
changes in political or socioeconomic contexts, the important sources of support for 
old ideas can be eroded and the new ideas can become fully articulated to confront 
and challenge the old ideas that facilitate political actors to implement policy changes 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.23). Nevertheless, the weakness of ‘institutional 
dynamism’ is that Thelen and Steinmo (1992) neither define the terms “ideas” and 
“actors” nor explain in any detail about how the roles of ideas and actors affect 
institutional change. 
 121 
 
 In recent years, Steinmo (2008) reasserts the importance of bringing ideas and 
actors into institutional analyses to understand institutional change because he argued 
that “institutional change is the product of changes in ideas held by [political] actors” 
(p.130). He does not propose any theory or model of institutional change in his recent 
study but seeks to briefly define what ideas are and identify what kinds of political 
actors have potentials to initiate institutional change. Steinmo (2008) defines ideas as 
“creative solutions to collective action problems” (p.131) and argues that institutional 
change can take place “when powerful actors have the will and ability to change 
institutions in favor of new ideas” (p.131). Steinmo (2008) does not elaborate further 
on who the powerful actors are or what criteria are adopted to determine whether the 
political actors have the will or ability to change institutions. But power is usually 
equated with position. Political actors who are in higher positions obtain more power. 
Besides, their power can come from legitimacy and majority support from society. 
Steinmo (2008) implies that powerful actors who have strong determination and 
ability can become promoters of new ideas and actors of policy change.     
 
In similar fashion, Peters et al. (2005) argue for bringing ideas and actors into 
institutional analyses to understand institutional change more broadly. They argue that 
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two factors related to ideas appear to have interacted to make changes in policy or 
political outcomes possible (Peters, 2005, p.1291). The first factor is the perceived 
failure of the ideological basis of the existing policies (Peters, 2005, p.1291). The 
second factor is “the availability of new ideas to implement in place of those that were 
being questioned” (Peters, 2005, p.1293). Old ideas can be deeply entrenched in the 
existing institution that they have framing effects and consequently become “basic 
templates upon which other political decisions were made” (Steinmo, 2008, p.130). 
However, the equilibrium of existing institutions can be punctuated sharply by 
changes in political or socioeconomic conditions which provide the windows of 
opportunity for political actors to dismiss their core belief in existing institutions and 
pursue new ideas.  
 
Besides, Peters et al. (2005) argue that while institutions “provide the structures 
and resources necessary for [new] ideas to change the course of policy” (p.1296), 
political actors are needed to become some form of agency to initiate change (Peters, 
2005, p.1293). They argue that “powerful political leaders such as Reagan and 
Thatcher who challenged the existing order and offered alternatives” (Peters, 2005, 
p.1293) play an important role in initiating changes in political outcome. In brief, 
institutional change is a dynamic interaction in which contextual conditions, ideas, 
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and actors intersect with political institutions to produce changes in political 
outcomes.  
 
3.5 Applying a Refined Theory of Historical Institutionalism into the Case 
Studies of Shanghai and Hong Kong 
From the above, it shows that historical institutionalism contains six key features. 
They include: institutions matter; the use of both calculus and cultural approach to 
affect political behavior; history matters; the emphasis of path dependency; the 
importance of policy feedback from previous policy choices; and the use of in-depth 
case studies as the research strategy. But it shows that historical institutionalism is 
weak in explaining institutional and policy change. The existing approaches of 
Krasner’s (1984) punctuated equilibrium, Wilsford’s (1994) notions of structure and 
conjuncture, and Tuohy’s (1999) accidental logic of history fail to offer a satisfactory 
explanation of institutional change. On the other hand, Thelen’s and Steinmo’s (1992) 
institutional dynamism can be a useful approach to explain institutional and policy 
change by identifying four sources of institutional changes and paying attention to the 
dynamic interaction among contextual conditions, ideas, actors and political 
institutions to produce such policy changes. Institutional dynamism shows that 
institutional studies are no longer restricted to explain status quo and institutional 
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stasis.   
 
 This study uses the theory of historical institutionalism to solve a real world 
puzzle about health insurance reform: why has Shanghai been able to implement 
health insurance reform from the mid-1980s onwards while Hong Kong has failed to 
do so? While Shanghai witnessed a revolution in healthcare financing in 2000, Hong 
Kong remains the status quo on healthcare financing. Recognizing that historical 
institutionalism itself is weak in explaining changes in policy path and pays 
insufficient attention to the roles of ideas and actors in shaping policy, this study has 
to refine historical institutionalism before it can be applied into the case studies of 
Shanghai and Hong Kong to respectively explain change in policy path and path 
dependency. This study argues that the dynamic interplay between contextual 
conditions, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and sequences, path dependency, 
and policy feedback affect changes in healthcare policy path. In order to strengthen 
the analytical foundation and the explanatory power of historical institutionalism, this 
study refines historical institutionalism by bringing the approach of institutional 
dynamism, the roles of ideas and actors into the theory.  
 
 In this study, a refined theory of historical institutionalism will be adopted to 
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examine health insurance reforms in Shanghai and Hong Kong. This study will refine 
the theory of historical institutionalism by developing further from Thelen and 
Steinmo’s (1992) version. On one hand, the researcher thinks that Thelen and 
Steinmo’s (1992) ‘institutional dynamism’ can be helpful in explaining path change 
because it provides a clearer and more comprehensive perspective on identifying 
conditions under which path change can occur. She also agrees with Thelen and 
Steinmo (1992) that the roles of ideas and actors in ‘institutional dynamism’ can affect 
policy or path change. On the other hand, she finds that Thelen and Steinmo (1992) 
neither define the terms “ideas” and “political actors” nor explain in any detail about 
how the roles of ideas and political actors affect institutional change. Recognizing that 
the meaning of the term “ideas” is too loose, the researcher finds it necessary to 
sharpen the concept of ideas when refining the theory of historical institutionalism. As 
regards the roles of actors, the researcher thinks that healthcare financing reform is a 
complicated issue involving different political actors and stakeholders. She thinks that 
the refined version of historical institutionalism should identify different types of 
political actors and stakeholders and their roles in affecting the implementation of 
health insurance reform. As illustrated below, the researcher will develop further from 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992) by defining more clearly the term “ideas”, highlighting 
five conditions under which new ideas can gain political prominences in detail, and 
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emphasizing the importance of idenifying different types of political actors and 
stakeholders and examining their views on health insurance reform.  
 
  The refined theory of historical institutionalism will comprise seven explanatory 
elements: contextual conditions, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
sequences, path dependency, and policy feedback. While contextual conditions, ideas 
and actors are three new elements adding to the theory of historical institutionalism, 
the rest are elements belonging to the traditional historical institutionalism. Although 
the researcher has added contextual conditions, ideas and actors into the theory, she 
argues that political institutions and history are the most important elements of the 
refined theory of historical institutionalism. Besides, she argues that adding these 
elements into the theory would not undermine the role of institutions in affecting 
policy outcomes. Instead, adding these elements into the theory only make the role of 
institutions in affecting policy outcomes more distinct. She argues that the 
relationship among contextual conditions, ideas, actors and institutions is closely 
linked. Firstly, the structure of political institutions can either facilitate or offset the 
contextual conditions. Secondly, political institutions play a determinant role in 
defining the channels and mechanisms for absorbing and diffusing ideas. Thirdly, 
political institutions play a determinant role in distributing power among political 
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actors and shaping their goals and strategies in the decision-making process. 
Therefore, the impact of contextual conditions, the role of ideas and actors on the 
health insurance reform process cannot be understood without linking them to the 
impact of political institutions.  
 
  The refined theory of historical institutionalism is helpful in examining health 
insurance reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong in more detail. Firstly, the approach of 
institutional dynamism identifies a range of contextual conditions which can generate 
the sources of institutional and policy changes. This study will examine whether 
broad changes in contextual conditions, namely political, economic or social context, 
occur when health insurance reform was respectively implemented and proposed in 
Shanghai and Hong Kong. It hypothesizes that Shanghai succeeds in implementing 
health insurance reform because there were changes in contextual conditions that 
created a window of opportunity for political institutions to deviate from the original 
path and set healthcare financing policy upon a new trajectory. On the other hand, it 
hypothesizes that Hong Kong fails to implement health insurance reform because of 
the absence of aforementioned contextual influences. 
 
 Secondly, the role of ideas is brought into the theory of historical institutionalism 
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to examine how it shapes health insurance reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong. 
Recognizing that the term “ideas” is poorly conceptualized in Thelen and Steinmo’s 
(1992) ‘institutional dynamism’, this study sharpens the concept of ideas by 
borrowing from the study of Campell (1998) and Hwang (2006), which identifies and 
clearly defines three types of ideational forces, namely programmatic ideas, policy 
paradigms and societal beliefs. Ideas matter in policy making (Campbell, 1998) 
because ideational forces either “favor significant policy change or reinforce existing 
institutional paths” (Hwang, 2006, p.16) through reproducing a dominant paradigm 
and producing frames which justify existing policy arrangements (Hwang, 2006, p.16). 
Ideas can range from programmatic ideas through policy paradigms to societal beliefs 
(Campbell, 1998; Hwang, 2006). Programmatic ideas are “technical and professional 
ideas that specify cause-and-effect relationships” (Campbell, 1998, p.386) and 
prescribe “precise, concrete, and policy-specific courses of action” (Campbell, 1998, 
p.389) to policy problems. Policy paradigms are “broad cognitive constraints on the 
range of solutions that actors perceive and deem useful for solving problems” 
(Campbell, 1998, p.389). Examples include the paradigmatic principles of 
neoclassical economics embraced by the major economics department in the U.S. 
during the 1970s and the early 1980s (Campbell, 1998, p.390). Societal beliefs are 
“assumptions held by large segments of the general public” (Campbell, 1998, p.390) 
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about “what is desirable or not” (Campbell, 1998, p.392). They constrain the 
normative range of solutions that policy makers view as politically acceptable and 
legitimate to the public (Campbell, 1998, p.385). In brief, programmatic ideas and 
policy paradigms are ideas at the cognitive level while societal beliefs are ideas at the 
normative level consisting of values and attitudes (Campbell, 1998, p.384).  
 
 Further, this study, by drawing insights from the study of Berman (2001) and 
Béland (2005a), highlights five conditions under which new ideas can achieve 
political prominence and in turn trigger path or policy change. Firstly, formal political 
institutions determine which actors are in a stronger position to promote a new idea or 
a policy alternative (Béland, 2005a, p.10). Secondly, new ideas must be championed 
by political actors who are “capable of persuading others to reconsider the way they 
think” (Berman, 2001, p.235) and “whose resources, power, and political longevity 
can enable an idea to get a better, longer, or more respectful hearing” (Berman, 2001, 
p.235). Thirdly, the time at which a political actor promotes a new idea or a policy 
alternative “is crucial in determining its level of political influence” (Béland, 2005a, 
p.10). Fourthly, “the fit or articulation between the idea and environment from which 
it emerges deserve attention” (Berman, 2001, p.236). Whether consolidation occurs 
depends on how the new idea or policy alternative fits with existing institutional 
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structures occupied by historically formed ideologies (Berman, 2001, p.236). Fifthly, 
the wide acceptance of a new idea or a policy alternative depends on its 
responsiveness to particular problems (Berman, 2001, p.236). If a new idea does not 
rise to political prominence and lead to policy change, it means that there is the 
persistence or institutionalization of old ideas (Berman, 2001, p.238). Ideas are 
institutionalized when they “have become accepted or instinctual parts of the social 
world” (Berman, 2001, p.239) and hence are simply viewed or accepted as natural or 
as part of objective reality (Berman, 2001, p.239).  
 
This study will examine the role of ideas in shaping health insurance reform in 
Shanghai and Hong Kong. It hypothesizes that Shanghai succeeds in implementing 
health insurance reform because new idea(s) achieved political prominence. On the 
other hand, it hypothesizes that Hong Kong fails to implement health insurance 
reform because there were no favorable conditions giving new idea(s) wide political 
and public resonance. 
 
 Thirdly, the role of actors is brought into the theory of historical institutionalism 
to examine how different actors are engaged in the health insurance reform process in 
Shanghai and Hong Kong. This study will identify key actors involved in the 
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decision-making processes of health insurance reforms in Shanghai and Hong Kong. 
Besides, it will respectively examine how government officials, politicians, different 
stakeholders such as medical professionals, insurers and pharmaceutical companies, 
policy experts, scholars, and ordinary citizens view on health insurance reforms 
implemented in Shanghai and proposed in Hong Kong. 
 
 Fourthly, key political institutions creating “constraints and opportunities for 
those involved in policy-making” (Béland, 2005a, p.3) will be examined in Shanghai 
and Hong Kong. In this study, it will examine whether the design of political 
institutions in Shanghai and Hong Kong provide veto opportunities for interest groups 
to overturn political decisions in the health insurance reform process. It will examine 
whether the absence or presence of veto opportunities facilitate or impede the 
implementation of health insurance reforms in Shanghai and Hong Kong.  
 
Finally, the importance of timing, path dependency, and policy feedback in 
shaping health insurance reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong will also be examined in 
this study. In brief, the refined theory of historical institutionalism will have stronger 
analytical and explanatory power after bringing the approach of institutional 
dynamism, the roles of ideas and actors into the theory. When presenting the 
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cross-case analysis in the conclusion chapter, the researcher will weigh up the 
importance of seven explanatory elements of the refined version of historical 
institutionalism.  
 
 No existing empirical studies have refined historical institutionalism before by 
bringing the approach of institutional dynamism, the roles of ideas and actors into the 
theory. Therefore, the current literature is not able to provide enough reference and 
data for this study. Interviews are conducted to collect data. The next chapter on 
research methodology and data collection will explain the methods of data collection 
in detail. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter briefly introduces the historical development of institutional 
theories in political science. It discusses the key features of historical institutionalism, 
its weakness in explaining institutional and policy changes, and its insufficient 
attention to the roles of ideas and actors in shaping policy. It examines how historical 
institutionalism is refined to increase its analytical and explanatory power to examine 
health insurance reforms in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The next chapter will outline 
the research methodology and data collection.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND  
DATA COLLECTION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research methodology and the methods of data collection 
adopted in this study. It is divided into five sections. Section 4.2 examines the 
epistemological and ontological positions for choosing qualitative research and the 
case study method as the preferred research strategy in this study. Section 4.3 
discusses three methods of data collection adopted in this study, including 
semi-structured interviews, documents and archival records. Sector 4.4 talks about the 
methods adopted in analyzing data. Section 4.5 respectively reports fieldwork 
activities in Shanghai and Hong Kong. Section 4.6 gives a conclusion.   
 
4.2 Research Strategy: Case Studies 
Research methodology is the strategy governing “the choice and use of particular 
methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desire outcomes” (Crotty, 
1998, p.3). In social research, there are two representative research methodologies: 
quantitative and qualitative research (Sarantakos, 1993, pp.26-7). As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, this study uses historical institutionalism to examine health 
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insurance reforms in Shanghai and Hong Kong. Using case study as the research 
strategy is a key feature of historical institutionalism. The case study is a form of 
qualitative research. Qualitative research takes an inductive approach in which theory 
is generated out of research (Bryman, 2008, p.366). It holds an interpretivist 
epistemological position that the social world is understood through examining the 
interpretation of that world by individuals (Bryman, 2008, p.366). And it holds a 
constructionist ontological position that social meanings are outcomes of the 
interactions among individuals (Bryman, 2008, p.366). It puts emphasis on “the 
qualities of entities and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally 
examined or measured (if measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or 
frequency” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p.8). It can give a holistic account to 
intellectual puzzles (Mason, 1996, p.6) by “reporting multiple perspectives, 
identifying the many factors involved in a situation, and generally sketching the larger 
picture that emerges” (Creswell, 2007, p.39). 
 
Case study is the analysis of “persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, 
policies, institutions or other systems which are studied holistically by one or more 
methods” (Thomas, 2011, p.23). It is the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” 
questions are being asked about the subject of the inquiry (Thomas, 2011, p.4) and 
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when the researcher wants to cover contextual conditions which are believed to be 
highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study (Yin, 2003, p.13). The utility of the case 
study lies in studying process (Stoecker, 2006, p.330) and dealing with “the subtleties 
and intricacies of complex situation” (Denscombe, 2003, p.38) that “cannot easily be 
reduced to simple causal models or statistical tests” (David, 2006, p.XXVII). Yin 
(2003) argues that the case study focuses on “a contemporary set of events over which 
the investigator has little or no control” (p.9). However, Powell (2012) disagrees with 
Yin’s argument that case study cannot be historical and a focus should be on a 
contemporary set of events, “given that all case studies are historical because, the 
moment after an event occurs, it becomes ‘historical’” (p.43). The case which is the 
subject of the inquiry would be an instance of a class of phenomena providing “an 
analytical frame – an object – within which the study is conducted and which the case 
illuminates and explicates” (Thomas, 2011, p.23). According to Exworthy and Powell 
(2012), the scale of case study research in health policy has been significantly 
increased over the past 30 years, especially since the mid-1990s (p.8), based on “the 
results of a search of the databases Zetoc and Google Scholar using the term ‘case 
study health policy’” (Exworthy and Powell, 2012, p.8) (See Table 10).  
 
The strength of the case study lies in its ability to develop “a more rounded, 
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richer, more balanced picture of [the] subject” (Thomas, 2011, p.4) “with many kinds 
of insights coming from different angles, [and] from different kinds of information” 
(Thomas, 2011, p.21). It pays attention to empirical details (Stoecker, 2006, p.331) 
and “allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood” 
(Baxter and Jack, 2008, p.544) “within its context using a variety of data sources” 
(Baxter and Jack, 2008, p.544). Data collected from multiple sources facilitates data 
validation (Denscombe, 2003, p.38) and “enhances data credibility” (Baxter and Jack, 
2008, p.554). 
 
Given the above considerations, the case study method is the best research 
strategy for this study because this study poses a question of why Shanghai has been 
able to implement health insurance reform from the mid-1980s onwards while Hong 
Kong has failed to do so. The implementation of health insurance reforms is a 
contemporary phenomenon over which the researcher has little or no control. In this 
study, Shanghai and Hong Kong represent two contrasting cases. It would be difficult 
to have a formal qualitative comparison between these two cases because they belong 
to diverse political and economic regime. In order to circumvent this problem, this 
study adopts the interpretive case study approach, which uses a theoretcial lens as a 
unifying logic to compare these two cases. The theory of hisotrical institutionalism is 
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used as the basis of case interpretation or a template with which to compare the 
empirical results of these two case studies. Through the lens of historical 
institutionalism, the researcher aims toward analytical generalization of the case study 
results. With a fundamental theoretical orientation, this study respectively presents a 
detailed case study analysis for Shanghai in Chapter Five and Six and for Hong Kong 
in Chapter Seven and Eight. In the conclusion chapter, this study uses a comparative 
perspective to present a cross-case analysis in order to gain insight into how and why 
these two places vary in the process, contexts and outcomes of health insurance 
reform. The process of implementing health insurance reform is complicated in these 
two places that each place respectively involves the dynamic interplay of forces, 
namely contextual conditions, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
sequences, path dependency, and policy feedback. It requires the researcher to collect 
data from multiple sources in order to have a holistic account to the research questions 
examined.  
 
4.3 Data Collection  
Data collection “is an attempt to streamline a complex set of events into a set of 
manageable things for the researcher to analyze” (David and Sutton, 2004, p.203). 
According to Yin (2003), data for case studies can come from six sources: 
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“documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, 
and physical artifacts” (p.83). Since each data source has no complete advantages 
over the others but is highly complementary, a good case study would collect data 
from as many sources as possible (Yin, 2003, p.85). The “multiple sources of 
evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon” (Yin, 2003, 
p.99). As Baxter and Jack (2008) argue, each data source represents one piece of the 
puzzle “contributing to the researcher’s understanding of the whole phenomenon” 
(p.554). This convergence can achieve data triangulation which ensures completeness 
of findings and confirms the validity of the findings (Carpenter and Jenks, 2003, 
p.300). “Completeness provides breadth and depth to an investigation” (Carpenter and 
Jenks, 2003, p.300), offering the researcher “more rounded and complete accounts of 
social issues and processes” (Hakim, 1987, p.63) and “a more accurate picture of the 
phenomenon” (Carpenter and Jenks, 2003, p.300). There would be “less chance of 
making errors, or of drawing inappropriate conclusions” (Arksey and Knight, 1999, 
p.21). Confirmation occurs when the researcher uncovers the same information from 
more than one source (Carpenter and Jenks, 2003, p.300). The case study using 
multiple data sources is rated more highly in terms of its overall quality than that of 
using a single data source (Yin, 2003, p.99) because multiple data sources add rigor, 
richness, breadth and depth to the case examined (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p.5). In 
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order to provide more comprehensive and convincing research findings, this study 
uses multiple sources to collect data, in particular: (i) semi-structured interviews, (ii) 
documents and (iii) archival records. 
 
(a) Semi-structured Interviews 
An interview is “a purposeful conversation” (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, p.103). It is 
“an interaction between the interviewer and interview subject in which both 
participants create and construct narrative versions of the social world” (Miller and 
Glassner, 1997, p.99). In this study, the researcher uses interviews as a data source 
because her ontological position suggests that “people’s knowledge, views, 
understandings, interpretations, experiences, and interactions are meaningful 
properties of the social reality” (Mason, 1996, p.39) while her epistemological 
position suggests that “a legitimate way to generate data on these ontological 
properties is to interact with people” (Mason, 1996, pp.39-40), accessing their 
accounts and articulations by talking and listening to them (Mason , 1996, pp.39-40).  
 
There are three types of interviews: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured 
(Berg, 2007, p.92). Structured interview asks questions that are “predetermined both 
in content and in form” (Corbetta, 2003, p.271). Semi-structured interview asks 
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questions that are predetermined in the content but not in the form (Corbetta, 2003, 
p.272). Unstructured interview asks questions that are not predetermined in the 
content or the form (Corbetta, 2003, p.272). This study does not conduct structured 
interview because pre-established questions place “serious limitations on the objective 
of flexibility and adaptability to the specific situation analyzed” (Corbetta, 2003, 
p.269). This study also does not conduct unstructured interview because the 
interviewing process can be time-consuming and susceptible to digression. This study 
conducts semi-structured interviews because they provide the researcher with 
flexibility “in terms of the order in which the topics are considered” (Denscombe, 
2003, p.167) and let her approach the world from the interview subject’s perspective 
“by adjusting the level of language of given scheduled questions or through 
unscheduled probes” (Berg, 2007, p.95). At the same time, semi-structured interviews 
let the interviewees develop their ideas, elaborate points of interests, speak more 
widely on the issues raised by the researcher and give open-ended answers 
(Denscombe, 2003, p.167). In brief, conducting semi-structured interviews has the 
advantages of giving both the researcher and interviewees ample flexibility and 
freedom to interact with each other, “while at the same time ensuring that all the 
relevant themes are dealt with and all the necessary information collected” (Corbetta, 
2003, p.270). 
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This study adopts two types of sampling in order to choose prospective 
interviewees: purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling is used 
to choose prospective interviewees whom “have some special contribution to make” 
(Denscombe, 2003, p.172) and “have some unique insight [due to] the position they 
hold” (Denscombe, 2003, p.172). Snowball sampling is also used to locate interview 
subjects “with certain attributes or characteristics [of interest] necessary in the study” 
(Berg, 2007, p.44) by asking initial contacts if they can introduce other people 
possessing similar attributes or characteristics to the researcher to conduct interviews 
(Berg, 2007, p.44; Lofland et al., 2006, p.43).  
 
In this study, the researcher conducted interviews with both elites and ordinary 
citizens in Shanghai and Hong Kong. Elites are people “exercising power and 
influence” (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p.122) and “held in high esteem” (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999, p.122). They include government officials, policy makers, legislators, 
and experts. Interviewing elites has three advantages. Firstly, elites “have special 
insight into the causal processes of politics, and interviewing them permits in-depth 
exploration of specific policies and political issues” (Beamer, 2002, p.87). The 
resulting information gathered from elite interviews offers the researcher “more 
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reliable and valid data for inferential purposes” (Beamer, 2002, p.87). Secondly, elite 
interviews “can shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear 
from an analysis of political outcomes” (Tansey, 2007, p.767) or other sources. By 
interviewing elites, the researcher “can gain data about the political debates and 
deliberations that preceded decision making and action taking” (Tansey, 2007, p.767). 
Thirdly, elite interviews can “compensate for both the lack and limitations of 
documentary evidence” (Tansey, 2007, p.767) or help the researcher “distinguish the 
most significant or accurate documents from those that may be marginal or may 
present a selective accounts of events” (Tansey, 2007, p.767) if there is substantial 
documentation. Therefore, it is important to interview elites in order to gather rich 
detail about their attitudes and thoughts on specific policies or political issues (Tansey, 
2007, p.766). The researcher also interviewed ordinary people because they are the 
users of medical services. They are directly affected by healthcare financing reforms 
implemented by the government. Therefore, it is important to understand about their 
attitudes and thoughts on healthcare financing reforms. Ordinary people are too large 
in number for the researcher to individually interview all of them. The researcher did 
not have enough time and money to get a representative sample. However, she could 
make use of the data collected from ordinary people interviewed to make inferences. 
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In this study, the researcher follows three key ethical principles when conducting 
interviews in order to avoid any harm to the interviewees: informed consent, right to 
privacy and protection from physical and emotional harm (Fontana and Frey, 2000, 
p.662). Informed consent “is a mechanism to show respect for the rights and welfare 
of research participants” (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p.130). In order to let the 
prospective interviewees make an informed decision about whether they agreed to be 
interviewed, the researcher sent them emails to introduce herself and clearly explain 
the nature, purpose and duration of the research to them. Besides, in order to protect 
the identity of the interviewees, the researcher ensured the confidentiality and 
anonymity of the interviewees by promising that their real names would not be used 
in the research report (Mason, 1996, p.56; Lofland et al., 2006, pp. 51-2). As Lofland 
et al. (2006) argue, the guarantee of confidentiality to the interviewees is “viewed 
both as an essential techniques for ‘getting in’, and once entrée has been 
accomplished, as a sacred trust” (pp.51-2). Another advantage of guaranteeing 
confidentiality to the interviewees is that “responses to [interview] questions may well 
be more frank” (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p.132). Also, the researcher did not use any 
tape or digital recorders to record interviews. Although she recognized that audio 
recording “aids the listening process and gives the opportunity of an unbiased record 
of the conversation” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p.92), she did not use it because 
 144 
audio recording would lead to interviewees’ anxiety about confidentiality and the 
possibility of declining the research interview. As Bogdan and Biklen (2007) argue, 
some interviewees would worry that the recordings which contain their words “could 
come back to haunt them” (p.112) or “get them in trouble if, for example, they 
revealed something illegal they did” (p.112). Therefore, instead of tape recording any 
interviews, the researcher had note taking in order to capture the discussion happened 
during the interviews (Denscombe, 2003, p.175). The advantage of note taking is that 
it can cover the relevant information that audio recording would miss, including “the 
context of the location, the climate and atmosphere under which the interview was 
conducted…and comments on aspects of non-verbal communication” (Denscombe, 
2003, p.175). In brief, the researcher follows these three key ethical principles in 
order to safeguard the proper interests of the interviewees who agreed to be 
interviewed. 
 
In this study, the researcher recognized that sample of interviews in Shanghai 
and Hong Kong were not large and representative enough for quantitative analysis. 
Therefore, she did not claim that the semi-structured interviews in these two places 
were representative in that sense. The interviews were qualitative and revealed the 
opinions of key agents. Since the researcher recognized that the reliability of data 
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collected from interviews would be subject to the likely biases, knowledge and 
memory of informants, she cross-checked the data collected from semi-structured 
interviews with data collected from documents and archival records.  
 
(b) Documents 
A document is any material produced by individuals or institutions for providing 
information on a given social phenomenon (Corbetta, 2003, p.287). It “exists 
independently of the researcher’s action” (Corbetta, 2003, p.287) but the researcher 
can utilize it for cognitive purposes (Corbetta, 2003, p.287). In this study, the 
researcher also uses documents as a data source because her ontological position 
suggests that documents “act as some form of expression or representation of relevant 
elements of the social world” (Mason, 1996, p.72) that one “can trace or ‘read’ aspects 
of the social world through them” (Mason, 1996, p.72) while her epistemological 
position suggests that reading and interpreting documents “can provide or count as 
evidence” (Mason, 1996, p.73).  
 
There are different kinds of documents, including books and journals, 
government publications, written reports of events, agendas, minutes of meetings, and 
newspaper articles (Denscombe, 2003, p.213-8; Yin, 2003, pp.85-6). They are “most 
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often available as texts (in a printed form), but they also have the form of an 
electronic file” (Flick, 2006, p.246). Denscombe (2003) argues that books and 
journals “should be the first port of call” (p.212) because they “contain the 
accumulated wisdom on which the research project should build, and also the latest 
cutting-edge ideas which shape the direction of the research” (Denscombe, 2003, 
p.212). Government publications provide a key source of documentary information, 
data and statistics which are authoritative, factual and objective because they are 
produced by the state with large resources and expert professionals (Denscombe, 2003, 
pp.216-7). Minutes of meetings in an organization are also useful documents because 
they record “issues raised at the meeting; the discussion of those issues; views of the 
participants; and actions to be taken” (Bryman, 2008, p.527). And newspaper articles 
can provide up-to-date information (Denscombe, 2003, p.214). In brief, documents 
provide an access to a set of events or processes, which the researcher cannot observe 
“(for example because they have already occurred, because they take place in private) 
without recourse to verbal descriptions and reconstructions” (Mason, 1996c, p.73). 
Although this study focuses on collecting qualitative data, it will also use quantitative 
data collected from documents as evidence to interpret, strengthen and support the 
arguments, and supplement information when qualitative accounts are lacking or 
incomplete (Gill and Popp, 2009). Some numerical data will be presented in the text 
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of this study. Tables of grouped numerical data will be placed in the appendices. 
 
(c) Archival Records 
Archival records are “non-current and inactive [records]” (University of Rochester, 
2012) that are “not required to be retained in the office in which [they] originated or 
[were] received” (University of Rochester, 2012). However, they are permanently 
retained and preserved for their historical value (University of Rochester, 2012). 
Archival records contain “information of enduring administrative, legal, fiscal, or 
cultural value to the creating institutions or to researchers” (Penn State University 
Libraries, 2011). They are generally seen by academic users and society as “passive 
resources to be exploited for various historical and cultural purposes” (Schwartz and 
Cook, 2002, p.1). Archival records can be letters, diaries, reports, service records, 
organizational records, survey data and other types of written documents as well as 
audiotapes, videotapes, computer tapes or disks, maps, drawings and photographs 
(Penn State University Libraries, 2011; The Massachusetts Historical Society, 2003; 
Yin, 2003, p.89). They can be obtained through open channels such at libraries free of 
charge and help save the time of the researcher to collect data. Most archival records 
are “produced for a specific purpose and a specific audience (other than the case study 
investigation)” (Yin, 2003, p.89). Nevertheless, they contain relevant elements of the 
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social world that can be utilized by the researcher for cognitive purposes. In this study, 
the researcher also uses archival records as a data source because like documents, 
archival records are available data providing the author with the opportunity to “study 
the past” (Corbetta, 2003, p.288; Singleton and Straits, 2005, p.355) and understand 
about social change (Singleton and Straits, 2005, p.356). Besides, it can provide 
useful figures in the past that cannot be accurately obtained from the interviewees 
who can only give an estimation of figures. In brief, this study makes use of 
semi-structured interviews, documents and archival records to collect data and to 
facilitate data validation.  
 
4.4 Data Analysis: Coding 
After data has been collected, it has to be analyzed. Data analysis is a transformative 
process that turns the raw data into findings or results (Lofland et al., 2006, p.195) by 
identifying “the presence or absence of meaningful themes, common and/or divergent 
ideas, beliefs and practices” (David and Sutton, 2004, p.191). In this study, the author 
uses coding to analyze data. Coding “organizes and conceptualizes the detailed 
components of data into patterns by use of symbols and labels” (Payne and Payne, 
2004, p.36). It includes “two simultaneous activities: mechanical data reduction and 
analytic categorization of data into themes” (Neuman, 2003, p.442). According to 
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Basit (2003), coding “can be carried out by selecting segments of text using line 
numbering in the document, or by highlighting the specific quotation to be coded” 
(p.149). Symbols and labels used in coding are called codes that “are attached to 
chunks of varying-sized words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or 
unconnected to a specific setting” (Basit, 2003, p.144). The use of coding in data 
analysis has four advantages. Firstly, it reduces “mountains of raw data into 
manageable piles” (Neuman, 2003, p.442) so that a researcher can “quickly retrieve 
relevant parts of it” (Neuman, 2003, p.442). Secondly, it sorts the data “into various 
categories that organize it and render it meaningful from the vantage point of one or 
more frameworks or sets of ideas” (Lofland et al., 2006, p.200). Thirdly, it allows 
links to be made and highlights “key points within the vast of the overall data”(David 
and Sutton, 2004, p.195) in order to “find commonalities, differences, patterns and 
structures” (Basit, 2003, p.144). Fourthly, it allows the researcher to “communicate 
and connect with the data to facilitate the comprehension of the emerging 
phenomena” (Basit, 2003, p.152).  
 
In this study, the researcher carries out coding manually. Based on the research 
questions of this study, the researcher identified several categories for coding. These 
categories include: (i) characteristics of healthcare financing system; (ii) reasons for 
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and purposes of healthcare financing reforms; (iii) contexts or pressures (e.g. political, 
economic, social, institutional, and ideological) which shape healthcare financing 
reforms; (iv) contents of healthcare financing reforms; (v) different views about 
healthcare financing reforms (e.g. positive/negative/both; happy/worried; 
advantages/disadvantages of the health insurance reform; and suggestions) from 
different groupings (e.g. government officials, former Legco member , scholars, 
members from medical profession or health-related organizations, social workers, 
insurance consultants and citizens).  
 
4.5 Report on Fieldwork Activities 
Fieldwork means how a researcher collects data “in a social setting that tries to reflect 
the naturally occurring order of events and subjective meanings of those being 
studied” (Payne and Payne, 2004, p.94). In order to collect data about health 
insurance reforms in Shanghai and Hong Kong, the researcher conducted fieldwork in 
these two places. Data was collected through doing interviews, looking at documents 
and archival records at libraries, on online database systems, and on the Internet.   
 
(a) Fieldwork Activity about Shanghai Health Insurance Reform 
The researcher conducted two rounds of fieldwork in Shanghai. The first round was 
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carried out from June 25, 2010 to July 8, 2010 while the second round was carried out 
from July 15, 2010 to August 4, 2010. Before conducting fieldwork in Shanghai, the 
researcher contacted some of the prospective interviewees either through personal 
contacts she had already established or by sending emails to them from April to May 
2010 when she was still in Birmingham. As Denscombe (2003) argues, contacting the 
prospective interviewees in advance “allows both parties to arrange a mutually 
convenient time for the interview” (p.173). Some of the prospective interviewees 
were contacted by the researcher after arriving Shanghai through making personal 
calls and through personal contacts. In total, the researcher was able to interview 25 
persons, including a government official, insurance consultants, pharmaceutical 
company workers, medical personnel, academic researchers and citizens. Table 11 is 
a list of Shanghai interviewees containing information about a simple description of 
the interviewees, the date, time, and places of the interviews taking place.   
 
Having good personal ties or guanxi in China can help increase the possibility of 
having more interview opportunities. The Chinese term guanxi refers to “an informal, 
particularistic personal connection between two individuals who are bounded by an 
implicit psychological contract to…[maintain] a long-term relationship, mutual 
commitment, loyalty, and obligation” (Chen and Chen, 2004, p.306). As an outsider, 
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the researcher had to made use of her guanxi with personal contacts in order to gain 
access to some prospective interviewees who are well-known scholars on healthcare 
financing reforms and who know about the operation of health insurance systems well. 
After getting informed consent from the prospective interviewees, the researcher 
called or emailed them to arrange a convenient time and place to have interviews with 
them. As Denscombe (2003) argues, the researcher needs to get a location for the 
interview that avoids disturbance and offers privacy (p.173). 
 
The researcher was able to conduct face-to-face interviews with 23 interviewees. 
One of the face-to-face interviews was conducted in Hong Kong when a Hong Kong 
citizen who worked in Shanghai was unable to meet the researcher because he was not 
in Shanghai when the researcher was conducting fieldwork in Shanghai. The 
researcher had two telephone interviews because one of the interviewees was on a 
business trip in other part of China while another interviewee who was a government 
official was too busy to come out to meet the researcher. Telephone interviews have 
the advantages of saving time and money to set up individual meetings (Gillham, 
2000, p.77) while offering “some of the virtues of the face-to-face interview…[such 
as] responsiveness and reflexivity” (Gillham, 2000, p.77). 
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 In this study, 10 out of 25 interviewees in Shanghai were found through 
purposive sampling. The rest were introduced through snowball sampling which 
asked the subject interviewed to recommend people with a similar trait of interest. 
However, some of the interviewees which had the personal network were against the 
idea of snowball sampling. They refused to give the researcher any names because of 
different reasons. For example, Government Official 1 said that it was inappropriate 
for her to introduce any names because “medical insurance is a sensitive topic that 
involves many vested interests”.6 Professor 2 interviewed had good connection with 
government officials in healthcare related departments and bureau. However, he said 
that it was “politically incorrect” to introduce the researcher to meet them because he 
had already said enough.7 He also said that he would not have talked to the researcher 
if he did not have the title of professor.8 Doctor 1 interviewed said that health 
insurance was a sensitive topic involving unethical practices that he was suspicious of 
being stalked already and that he risked his life to be interviewed.9 He said that he did 
not want to get himself into trouble because asking his friends to be interviewed by 
the researcher was equal to telling his friends that he had already been interviewed by 
the researcher.10 Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and 2 interviewed also refused 
                                                 
6 Government Official 1 was interviewed on July 6, 2010 by phone.   
7 Professor 2 was interviewed on July 1, 2010. 
8 Professor 2 was interviewed on July 1, 2010. 
9 Doctor 1 was interviewed on July 1, 2010. 
10 Doctor 1 was interviewed on July 1, 2010. 
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to give any names who may agree to be interviewed because they said that they had 
answered every question raised by the researcher.11 Asking them to introduce other 
names was equal to the researcher having unreasonable requests and showing sign of 
disrespect.12 
 
Judging from the fact that health insurance is a sensitive topic to discuss in 
Shanghai, the researcher promised the interviewees not to disclose their real names in 
the study and would only had note taking during the interviews in order to erase the 
interviewees’ anxiety, maintain trust and protect them from harm. The interviewees 
appreciated the researcher’s ethical considerations. Knowing that the researcher 
would have note taking during the interviews, the interviewees were willing to speak 
slower so that the researcher could capture the discussion happened during the 
interviews in detail. They also promised the researcher that they were willing to have 
follow-up interviews or welcomed the researcher to contact them through phone calls 
or emails any time if the researcher had further questions to ask when tidying up the 
notes in future. 20 out of 25 interviews lasted for two to three hours. The researcher 
used Mandarin to communicate with the interviewees. She translated the interview 
                                                 
11 Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and 2 was respectively interviewed on July 21, 2010 and 
August 1, 2010. 
12 Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and 2 was respectively interviewed on July 21, 2010 and 
August 1, 2010. 
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contents from Chinese into English. Interview notes were typed and stored in the 
notebook and backed up on a USB. There were also hardcopies of them for safe 
keeping. But the researcher made sure that the notebook, the USB and the storage 
space where the hardcopies were kept were secure and could not be accessed by other 
people. The researcher used at least one to two hours to type the note of every 
interview.  
 
Apart from having interviews, the researcher also collected documents and 
archival records related to Shanghai health insurance. The researcher went to the 
library in Shanghai to borrow books related to Shanghai health insurance. The 
researcher also went to the university bookshops in Shanghai to buy books containing 
studies or surveys related to health insurance and healthcare system in Shanghai that 
were not available in the Shanghai library or Hong Kong university libraries. 
Documents and books about Shanghai health insurance that were available in Hong 
Kong were looked at and photocopied by the researcher when she had fieldwork in 
Hong Kong. 
 
“Systematic searches for relevant documents are important in any data collection 
plan” (Yin, 2003, p.87). Documents related to health insurance reform in Shanghai 
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could be found in open channels, including university libraries in Hong Kong, public 
library in Shanghai, the Universities Service Centre for China Studies (USC) at the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK),13 the websites of Shanghai Municipal 
Government (http://www.shanghai.gov.cn), Shanghai Municipal Human Resources 
and Social Security Bureau (http://www.12333sh.gov.cn), Shanghai Municipal 
Statistics Bureau (http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn), National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn), and Shanghai Bureau of China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (http://www.circ.gov.cn). Newspaper articles on health insurance reform 
in Shanghai and useful articles or reports about health insurance reform in Shanghai 
could be found by searching Google website (www.google.com). Archival records 
related to health insurance reform in Shanghai could be found in the USC at the 
CUHK. Both the documents and archival records were able to provide useful facts 
and figures about health insurance reform in Shanghai, in particular figures from 
decade past, when the interviewees fail to provide figures or could only give an 
estimation of some figures due to poor memories.  
 
                                                 
13 The USC at the CUHK is “one of the most extensive and accessible Collection of a great variety of 
materials on contemporary China” (http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Eng/Default.aspx), including 
complete runs of “more than 250 provincial and national newspapers and close to 1,500 periodicals 
from the early 1950s; over 1300 constantly updated regional and statistical yearbooks” 
(http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Eng/Default.aspx). Besides, it also has a “large collection of provincial, 
city, county and village annals, including volumes on special topics” 
(http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Eng/Default.aspx) and books “with a focus on regional research data” 
(http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Eng/Default.aspx). 
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(b) Fieldwork Activity abut Hong Kong Health Insurance Reform 
The researcher conducted fieldwork in Hong Kong from mid-August 2010 to March 
2011. Before conducting fieldwork in Hong Kong, the researcher contacted some of 
the prospective interviewees either through personal contacts she had already 
established or by sending emails to them from May to early June 2010 when she was 
still in Birmingham. Some of the prospective interviewees were contacted by the 
researcher after arriving Hong Kong through making personal calls and through 
sending emails. The researcher mainly relied on purposive sampling to find the 
prospective interviewees. The data collected in Hong Kong mainly through purposive 
sampling does not mean that they were better than that of Shanghai collected through 
purposive and snowball sampling. It is because using purposive or snowball sampling 
only means that the way to contact the prospective interviewees are different. Whether 
the data is better or not depends on the researcher asking the right and good questions 
and the interaction process between the researcher and the interviewees. Since the 
researcher grows up in Hong Kong, she is familiar with the context of Hong Kong and 
knows who can be the prospective interviewees. In total, the researcher was able to 
interview 25 persons, including a government official, civil servants, famous public 
figures who used to handle healthcare or health insurance issues, medical personnel, 
social workers, insurance consultants, scholars and citizens. Table 12 is a list of Hong 
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Kong interviewees containing information about a simple description of the 
interviewees, the date, time, and places of the interviews taking place.   
 
The researcher conducted two rounds of interviews. The reason for conducting the 
second round of interviews is due to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) governments’ release of a new health insurance public consultation 
document in October 2010. The researcher conducted follow-up interviews with 
interviewees being interviewed before the release of the new health insurance public 
consultation document. She conducted follow-up interviews with 11 interviewees. 
However, eight out of 11 follow-up interviews were conducted from February to 
March 2011 because the interviewees needed more time to digest the new health 
insurance consultation document before they had follow-up interviews. That is one of 
the main reasons why the researcher needed a longer time to conduct fieldwork in 
Hong Kong.  
 
For the first round of the interview, the researcher was able to conduct face-to-face 
interviews with 24 interviewees. She had to conduct a telephone interview with a 
citizen who was too busy to meet the researcher. For the second round of interviews, 
the researcher conducted face-to-face interviews with four interviewees and telephone 
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interviews with seven interviewees. As Berg (2007) argues, telephone interviews are 
“quite productive when they are conducted among people with whom the researcher 
has already conducted face-to-face interviews” (p.108).  
 
Although health insurance is not a sensitive topic to discuss in Hong Kong but a 
widely debated topic and widely covered by the mass media, the researcher promised 
the interviewees not to disclose their real names in the study and would only have 
note taking during the interviews in order to erase the interviewees’ anxiety, maintain 
trust and protect them from harm. These ethical considerations are particularly 
important to some of the interviewees who are well-known public figures and scholars 
and those who work as the think tanks of the HKSAR governments. All the 
interviewees welcomed the researcher to contact them again if the researcher had 
further questions to ask in future. The researcher used Cantonese to communicate 
with the interviewees. She translated the interview contents from Chinese into English. 
Interview notes were typed and stored in the notebook and backed up on a USB. 
There were also hardcopies of them for safe keeping. But the researcher made sure 
that the notebook, the USB and the storage space where the hardcopies were kept 
were secure and could not be accessed by other people. The researcher used at least 
one to two hours to type the note of every interview.  
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Apart from having interviews, the researcher also collected documents and 
archival records related to Hong Kong health insurance. Documents related to 
healthcare financing reform in Hong Kong such as healthcare consultation documents, 
discussion paper, minutes of meetings related to healthcare financing reform can be 
found in open channels, including university libraries, the websites of the HKSAR 
government (www.gov.hk), Food and Health Bureau of the HKSAR 
(www.fhb.gov.hk), and the Legislative Council (www.legco.gov.hk). Newspaper 
articles on healthcare financing reform in Hong Kong could be collected from 
WiseNews (http://libwisenews.wisers.net/wisenews/index.do?new-login=true), which 
was a database providing access to local Chinese and English newspapers since 1998. 
The author could get access to WiseNews through the online library system of the 
CUHK. Since the database was large, keys words in Chinese and English characters 
were inserted to narrow down the search. For example, key words such as “healthcare 
financing reform”, “health insurance”, “mandatory health insurance”, “health 
protection scheme”, and “voluntary health insurance” were inserted to narrow down 
the search in WiseNews.  Archival records related to healthcare financing policy in 
Hong Kong could be found in university libraries.  
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Overall, the data collected through multiple sources which include 
semi-structured interviews, documents and archival records are rich and useful. 
Different sources of data are complementary to each other. Data triangulation not only 
helps facilitate data validation, but also helps form a more complete picture of the 
development of health insurance reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong and comes up 
with a more convincing research finding.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter provides an overview of the research methodology adopted 
in this study. It explains why qualitative research is adopted in this study by using 
case study research to respectively examine health insurance reform in Shanghai and 
Hong Kong in detail. Besides, it discusses the methods used to collect and analyze 
data. And it reported the fieldwork activities in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The next 
chapter will examine the healthcare system in Shanghai in the pre-reform era (1842 to 
1976). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SHANGHAI CASE STUDY: THE HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter briefly examines the historical development of the healthcare system in 
Shanghai and traces the performance of the institutional mechanisms established in 
the pre-reform era from 1842 to 1976. It provides important historical context 
necessary for understanding urban health insurance reform in Shanghai by showing 
that the establishment and institutionalization of public health and healthcare systems 
in Shanghai were the products of Western presence in China in the nineteenth century 
and by looking at the political and economic institutions in which the healthcare 
system was embedded in the pre-reform era (1949-1976). It is divided into four 
sections. Section 5.2 examines the governing institutions, the public health and 
healthcare systems in Shanghai in early years (1842-1937). Section 5.3 examines the 
political, economic, and healthcare systems in urban Shanghai during Mao’s era 
(1949-1976). Section 5.4 discusses how the contextual conditions and political 
institutions shaped the development trajectory of healthcare in Shanghai. Section 5.5 
gives a conclusion.  
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An overview of the development trajectory of public health and healthcare 
systems in Shanghai before 1976 shows that during the early years (1842-1937), the 
pace and scope of developing public health and healthcare in the foreign concessions 
was faster and better than that of the Chinese-administrated area. In the 1850s, the 
authorities in the foreign concessions emphasized the development of public health in 
order to turn Shanghai into a healthy place for economic growth. On the other hand, 
the Chinese authority of the old Chinese city in Shanghai did not start developing 
public health until 1905 when it regarded the development of public health as a way 
to counteract “the growth of foreign power” (Elvin, 1974, p.249). However, the 
Chinese authority lagged behind the foreign counterparts in developing public health 
because of the political turmoil, insufficient capital and the lack of well-trained 
personnel (Hsü, 2000; Nakajima, 2004; Peng, 2007).  
 
Both the foreign and Chinese authorities in Shanghai played a negligible role in 
healthcare provision and left the tasks of building hospitals and offering medical 
treatment to missionaries, local elites and businessmen, Chinese-style practitioners 
and later private practitioners (Nakajima, 2004). It was not until the 1870s that the 
foreign authorities involved in healthcare provision by providing medical treatment 
for patients infected by venereal disease. Besides, they subsidized missionary 
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hospitals and financed summer disease hospitals because the medical treatment 
provided by these hospitals significantly reduced the financial burden on the foreign 
authorities (Nakajima, 2004, p.54). On the other hand, the Chinese authority did not 
involve in healthcare provision and financing until the early 1930s when the 
Nationalist government, which regarded foreign powers of the settlements as rivals, 
established hospitals to provide the general public with free or inexpensive medical 
care (Nakajima, 2004, p.147). 
 
“After the Second World War, the foreign concessions were closed and Shanghai 
was returned to Chinese administration” (Wei, 1987, p.4). During Mao’s era, the 
state-run healthcare system in Shanghai performed well in the institutional 
configuration of the socialist planned economy. The work units in urban Shanghai 
were crucial institutions representing the CCP’s power to finance the healthcare of the 
population.14 They implemented the LIS and the GHS to provide urban employees 
with free healthcare financed by the state budget. The three-tiered medical institution 
network established in urban Shanghai was an efficient network making healthcare 
services more accessible to the majority of population. However, the state-run 
healthcare system in Shanghai came to malfunction after the PRC’s economic 
                                                 
14 The PRC’s administrative divisions include 22 provinces, five autonomous regions and four directly 
controlled municipalities (Beijing, Tianjing, Shanghai, Chongqing). Shanghai is the largest city in 
the PRC. It has 16 districts and one county. Each district consists of urban and rural areas. 
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transition to the market economy. The CCP was under great pressure to reform the 
healthcare financing system.  
 
5.2 Early Years (1842-1937) 
Shanghai is located at the mouth of Yangzi River, lying midway along the China coast 
(Yeung, 1996, pp.3-4). From the period 1842 to 1937, Shanghai was a semi-colony of 
the Western power opened to foreign settlements because of China’s defeat in the First 
Opium War. The signing of the Land Regulations led to Britain, the U.S. and France 
obtaining settlement rights in 1845, 1848 and 1849 respectively (Lu, 1999, p.29). 
These foreign parties had the rights to buy, sell and lease properties, and the right to 
provide basic infrastructure conducive to international commerce in designated areas 
(MacPherson, 2002b, p.38). Under the principle of extraterritoriality, “foreign 
nationals were subject to the laws of their own countries and the jurisdiction of their 
own consuls” (Wei, 1993, p.17). In Shanghai, there were three separate administrative 
sectors: the International Settlement merged by the British and American settlements 
in 1863, the French Concession, and the old Chinese city (Hershatter, 1992; Lu, 1999; 
MacPherson, 2002b; Wei, 1987) (See Diagram 1).15 At first, the segregation policy 
                                                 
15 According to Fraser (1939), the area of the original British settlement was 138 acres in 1846 (p.45). 
While the Huangpu River was on the east side of the British settlement, the Defence Creek was the 
westerly limit of the settlement (Hart, 1890, p.218). The Suzhou and Yang-King-Pang Creeks were 
the northern and southern boundaries of the settlement (Hart, 1890, p.218). The American Settlement 
in Hongkou was “located on the north side of the Suzhou Creek” (Lu, 1999, p.29) and extended 
along the bank of the Huangpu River for about three miles in a northerly direction (Hart, 1890, 
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was adopted to exclude Chinese residence in the International Settlement and the 
French Concession. However, the policy was abandoned in 1854 because the outbreak 
of the Taiping Rebellion in 1853 led to about a million refugees fleeing to the foreign 
concessions (MacPherson, 2002b, p.38).16 
 
(a) The Governing Institutions in Shanghai 
The foreign concessions had their own governing institutions to address their needs 
and “provide a commercially viable, urban infrastructure” (MacPherson, 1990, p.42). 
They went “beyond the jurisdiction of the Chinese officials” (Wei, 1993, p.11). The 
International Settlement was governed by the Shanghai Municipal Council established 
in 1854 (Yu, 2010, p.59) while the French Concession was governed by Conseil 
Municipal (MacPherson, 2002b, p.38) established in 1862 (Camus, 2009, p.206). The 
Shanghai Municipal Council, which was elected by ratepayers, enjoyed administrative 
and legislative powers, as well as control over finance, taxation, the police and 
security (Wei, 1993, p.16; Wei, 1987, p.64). It was dominated by moneyed interests in 
                                                                                                                                            
p.218). When the British and American settlements were merged in 1863, “the foreign area occupied 
1, 309 acres” (Fraser, 1939, p.45). The area of the original French settlement was 164 acres in 1849 
(Guo and Li, 1999). It was separated from the British settlement by the Yang-King-Pang Creek, and 
extended in a southerly direction to the walls of the Chinese city (Hart, 1890, p.218). And the area of 
the Chinese city comprised a territory of 204, 800 acres or 320 square miles (one square mile = 640 
acres) with suburbs (Chamberlain, 1931, p.146; MacPherson, 1990, p.45). It was “surrounded by 
high walls with four entrance gates, which [were] guarded day and night and [were] closed after 
sunset” (Hart, 1890, p.220). With repeated expansion of the foreign concessions, the area occupied 
by the International Settlement reached 5,584 acres or 8.73 square miles while the area occupied by 
the French Concession reached 2,525 acres or 3.95 square miles in the early twentieth century (Guo 
and Li, 1999).  
16 The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) was a domestic rebellion against the Qing dynasty, “raging over 
sixteen provinces and destroying more than 600 cities” (Hsü, 2000, p.221). 
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policy making because “stringent property qualifications for franchise in the 
International Settlement” (Wei, 1993, p.16) meant that major trading houses such as 
Jardine Metheson and Swire and “individuals with several domiciles commanded a 
multiple number of votes” (Wei, 1993, p.16).  
 
On the other hand, the French government retained control over the French 
Concession through its consul in Shanghai and minister in Beijing (Wei, 1987, p.64). 
The French consul, who was the chief executive and administrator of the Concession 
government, was “the arbiter of all policies in the French Concession” (Wei, 1987, 
p.77). He held certain important powers, including appointing and dismissing 
employees of the Concession government, promulgating all laws, serving as 
ex-officio chairman of the Conseil Municipal, having the rights to veto council 
decisions and dissolve the council, calling the meetings of ratepayers and retaining 
control over the police (Wei, 1987, pp.79-80; Wei, 1993, p.19). The property 
qualifications for franchise in the French Concession was so stringent that only 
“landowners, or those paying annual rents of 1,000 frans or higher, had the right to 
vote” (Wei, 1987, p.80). Both the Shanghai Municipal Council and Conseil Municipal 
were responsible for constructing public work such as roads, bridges, jetties, street 
lights, providing education and public health services (MacPherson, 2002a; Major, 
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2010).  
 
 Meanwhile, until 1905, the Chinese administration in the old Chinese city 
remained substantially unchanged (Wei, 1987, p.81; Wei, 1993, p.20). It lacked “both 
a tradition of municipal government or of any perceived need for a modern urban 
infrastructure” (MacPherson, 1990, p.42). The local administrative official was the 
intendant assigned by the Qing government to oversee foreign trade, collect customs 
revenues and directly deal with the foreign consuls (Wei, 1993, p.20). But the Chinese 
administrative official gradually lost his power when Settlement authorities and 
foreign consuls assumed responsibilities for trade regulations and took away his right 
to collect customs duties (Wei, 1987, p.81; Wei, 1993, p.20). The decline of the Qing 
government’s power and China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) 
drove the Chinese political reformers to change the local administration in Shanghai 
(Wei, 1987, p.81).17 Being “apprehensive at the growth of foreign power and the loss 
                                                 
17  Before China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Qing government 
implemented the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) to modernize China after her repeated 
military defeats in the First and Second Opium War and foreign concessions. It was a reform 
campaign going under the rubic of “Western learning for [practical] application, Chinese learning for 
cultural essence (Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong)” (Shambaugh, 2010, p.94). According to Hsü 
(2000), the Self-Strengthening Movement can be divided into three periods (p.282). The first period 
(1861-1872) “stressed the adoption of Western firearms, machines, scientific knowledge, and the 
training of technical and diplomatic personnel” (Hsü, 2000, p.282). The second period (1872-1885) 
stressed “the development of profit-oriented enterprises such as shipping, railways, mining, and the 
telegraph” (Hsü, 2000, p.284). And the third period (1885-1895) stressed the military and naval 
build-up (Hsü, 2000, p.286). However, the Self-Strengthening Movement “barely scratched the 
surface of modernization” (Hsü, 2000, p.287) because of limited vision, the lack of coordination, 
technical backwardness, shortage of capital, psychological and social inertia (Hsü, 2000, 
pp.287-290). The failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement was confirmed by China’s defeat in 
the First Sino-Japanese War.  
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of sovereignty” (Elvin, 1974, p.249) and “keen observers of the [Settlements’] 
physical and institutional advances” (MacPherson, 1990, p.42), the Chinese authority 
established the Shanghai City Council in 1905 (Elvin, 1974, p.250), “modeled frankly 
on the Shanghai Municipal Council and paralleling its functions” (MacPherson, 
2002b, p.39). The Shanghai City Council constructed roads and bridges, maintained 
public order, accessed and collected taxes, oversaw schools and charities, and 
provided public health service (MacPherson, 1996, p.501). In the Shanghai City 
Council, all the directors were “publicly selected by the local gentry and merchants” 
(Elvin, 1974, p.250). While consulting directors of the Consultative Assembly were 
responsible for making policies, managing general directors of the Executive 
Committee were responsible for carrying out the policies (Elvin, 1974, p.251). The 
Shanghai City Council, which was disbanded in 1914, was only “a short-lived 
national system of gentry democracy” (Elvin, 1974, p.250). 
 
(b) Public Health and Healthcare Systems in Shanghai  
(i) The Foreign Concessions 
The authorities in the foreign concessions gave greater priority to develop free trade 
that most of the public expenditures were spent on capital works construction and 
police patrol to provide a convenient and safe environment for economic development 
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(Shi et al., 2001).18 It had little involvement in healthcare provision in order to save 
public expenditure and avoid tax increases. It mainly dealt with public health and the 
development of sanitary infrastructure that was “integral to their healthy survival, 
which in turn ensured grounds for economic growth” (MacPherson, 2002a, p.69). 
However, the amount of public expenditures spent on public health was small, which 
only accounted for about 6 per cent in the International Settlement in 1908 and about 
2 per cent in the French Concession in 1906 (Shi et al., 2001).19 During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the sanitary infrastructure, “including water 
supply, sewage systems, and public latrines, could not keep up with the rapid 
population growth” (Nakajima, 2004, p.124) because of the accelerated pace of 
urbanization,20 leading to the deterioration of the sanitary conditions in Shanghai 
(Cheung and Peng, 2007, p.97). Shanty towns, open night soil pots, polluted water 
due to ineffective drainage system, poor food-processing facilities, and untended 
refuse heaps (Nakajima, 2004, p.129) were the breeding grounds for epidemic 
diseases such as cholera, dysentery, hepatitis and typhoid fever (MacPherson, 2002a, 
                                                 
18 According to Shi et al. (2001), in 1908, the authorities in the International Settlement spent about 30 
per cent of the public expenditures on police patrol and about 24 per cent of the public expenditures 
on capital works construction. In 1906, the authorities in the French Concession spent about 24 per 
cent of the public expenditures on capital works construction and about 16 per cent of the public 
expenditures on police patrol (Shi et al., 2001). Due to the lack of a complete set of data, the author 
was not able to provide the amount of public expenditures spent on police patrol and capital works 
construction in the International Settlement and the French Concession in the same year. 
19 Due to the lack of a complete set of data, the author was not able to provide the amount of public 
expenditures spent on public health in the International Settlement and the French Concession in the 
same year. 
20 The population of Shanghai was between 100,000 and 300,000 during the first half of the nineteenth 
century (MacPherson, 2002a, p.2). By 1880, the population of Shanghai had reached 1 million 
(MacPherson, 2002b, p.38). 
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pp.69-73). In order to convert Shanghai into a healthy and habitable place, municipal 
councils in the foreign concessions implemented a series of sanitary measures, 
including extending the drainage, building a piped water supply system to provide 
pure water, providing adequate sewage disposal, building public latrines and 
providing rubbish bins (MacPherson, 1996, p.499; Cheung and Peng, 2007, p.97).  
 
In the French Concession, the Office of Medical Affairs was established in 1858 
to take charge of environmental sanitation and epidemic prevention (Nakajima, 2004, 
p.130). In the International Settlement, the Office of Hygiene was established in 1863 
to take charge of general sanitation of the community such as trash disposal, 
vaccination (Nakajima, 2004, p.130) and the operation of the Public Health 
Laboratory for “constant chemical and bacteriological monitoring of the water 
supply” (MacPherson, 2002a, p.131). In 1898, the Office of Hygiene became the 
Health Department, which gradually institutionalized the management of 
environmental sanitation, epidemic prevention, food hygiene and health statistics in 
order to alleviate the pressure of public health brought by urbanization (Cheung and 
Peng, 2007, p.97). As Nakajima (2004) pointed out, the establishment of public health 
related institutions reflected the concept of ‘state medicine’, which originated in 
Britain in the nineteenth century with the central tenet that the state had the duty to 
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protect the health of the public by “[imposing] hygiene and sanitation regulations on 
private citizens for the public good” (p.130).  
 
 Since the authorities in the foreign concessions had little involvement in 
healthcare provision out of economic concerns, they left the tasks of building 
hospitals and offering medical treatment to missionaries, local elites and businessmen, 
Chinese-style practitioners and later private practitioners (Nakajima, 2004). 
Missionary hospitals which preached Christianity through free medical treatment 
were the first institutions providing the Chinese people in Shanghai with a chance to 
come in contact with Western medicine (Nakajima, 2004, p.35). By 1890, “western 
medicine had its roots well secured in Chinese soil and from that time onward there 
[had] been a constant forward development” (Allen, 1947, p.211). But missionary 
hospitals began to charge medical fees in the early twentieth century when they 
broadened their activities such as providing medical education and doing scientific 
research (Nakajima, 2004). Lester Hospital, St. Luke’s Hospital and St. Marie’s 
Hospitals were the earliest missionary hospitals respectively established in 1844, 1866 
and 1907 in Shanghai and remain the leading hospitals nowadays (Nakajima, 2004, 
pp.36-48).21 Then, there were summer disease hospitals established by local elites 
                                                 
21 In 1844, Lester Hospital was established by William Lockhart, a medical missionary from the 
London Missionary Society. It was “colloquially referred to as the Chinese Hospital since it was 
devolved exclusively to serving the Chinese population” (MacPherson, 2002a, p.148). In 1870, 
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and businessmen “based on the Confucian principle of benevolence and the elite’s 
sense of responsibility” (Nakajima, 2004, p.52) to give free medical treatment and 
drugs to patients infected with communicable diseases such as cholera (Nakajima, 
2004, p.52). These hospitals were staffed with Western-style practitioners and 
“provided treatment based on biomedicine” (Nakajima, 2004, p.53). For example, the 
Chinese Infectious Disease Hospital was established by local elites in 1920 to treat 
patients with gastrointestinal disease every summer and was the largest 
cholera-treatment center in Shanghai (Nakajima, 2004, pp.53-4). Also, there were the 
establishment of Chinese-medicine hospitals with Western management by the 
Chinese medical practitioners to “enhance the status of Chinese medicine and 
attracted patients”(Nakajima, 2004, p.61). For example, the Hubei (northern Shanghai) 
Guangyi Chinese Hospital and the Hunan (southern Shanghai) Guangyi Chinese 
Hospital were established by Ding Ganren, the central figure of the group of Chinese 
style doctors in 1918 to provide all out-patients with free medicine after paying a 
nominal fee (Nakajima, 2004, pp.66-8). These hospitals provided free inpatient rooms 
for the aged and the handicapped while they charged patients for the first- and 
                                                                                                                                            
Lester Hospital was renamed as the Shandong Road Hospital for the Chinese in order to let the 
public identify the hospital in a better way (MacPherson, 2002a, p.157). From May 1844 to June 
1845, Lester Hospital treated 10, 978 patients (Nakajima, 2004, p.37). In 1866, St. Luke’s Hospital 
was established by the American Episcopal Church in the Hongkou area (Nakajima, 2004, p.43). By 
the late nineteenth century, it was staffed with pharmacists and various specialists and was famous 
for doing surgery (Nakajima, 2004, pp.44-5). In 1907, St. Marie’s Hospital was established by 
Prosper Paris, who was a French Jesuit, on the Ruijin Road in the French Concession (Nakajima, 
2004, p.48).  
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second-class inpatient rooms (Nakajima, 2004, pp.68-9). And there were private 
hospitals established by private practitioners in the 1930s to admit wealthy patients 
and charge them for medical treatment (Nakajima, 2004, p.71).  
 
The authorities in the foreign concessions only began to involve in the provision 
of hospital services when the problem of prostitution led to the spread of venereal 
diseases becoming prevalent and a public problem in the 1870s (Henriot, 1992; 
Henriot, 2001; MacPherson, 2002a). From the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century, Shanghai attracted a large number of prostitutes to provide sexual services for 
the growing numbers of unattached businessmen, sailors, policemen and men in the 
army (Hershatter, 1992, p.251; MacPherson, 2002a, p.224). The infection ratio of 
venereal disease in the military and foreign constabulary was so high that it seriously 
compromised the effectiveness of the forces (MacPherson, 2002a, p.224).22 It drove 
the authorities of the two settlements to take up the moral responsibilities of 
preventing the spread of venereal disease (Henriot, 2001; MacPherson, 2002a). In 
1877, the authorities of the two settlements jointly financed the establishment of the 
lock hospital to provide medical checks and treatment for diseased prostitutes 
                                                 
22 According to MacPherson (2002a), in 1862, the ratio of venereal disease per 1,000 men in British 
military records was 234.2, which was “exceedingly high and probably understated” (p.223). In 1870, 
“of the 37 men daily comprising the foreign constabulary, almost one half of their days (205 out of 
541) were lost to sickness attributable to venereal disease” (MacPherson, 2004, p.224). It showed 
that the problem of venereal disease seriously affected the effectiveness of the military and police 
forces.  
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(Henriot, 2001, pp.279-280). In 1923, the authorities of the International Settlement 
established an evening clinic for venereal disease in the Shanghai General Hospital to 
provide medical treatment for diseased foreigners (Henriot, 2001, p.142).  
 
 While the authorities of the two settlements had little involvement in healthcare 
provision, they started subsidizing missionary hospitals and financed summer disease 
hospitals by the grants-in-aid although missionary hospitals also raised contributions 
from the church and from foreign and Chinese merchants while summer disease 
hospitals raised contributions from individuals and from tobacco, waterworks and 
electric companies (Nakajima, 2004). The Shanghai Municipal Council in the 
International Settlement subsidized Lester Hospital (Nakajima, 2004, p.39) while 
Conseil Municipal in the French Concession subsidized St. Marie’s Hospital 
(Nakajima, 2004, p.48). Both the municipal governments financed the Chinese 
Infectious Disease Hospital because its medical treatment given to many poor patients 
significantly reduced the financial burden on two settlements (Nakajima, 2004, p.54).  
 
(ii) The Chinese Administered Area in Shanghai  
On the other hand, the Chinese administration in the old Chinese city did not pay 
attention to the development of public health until the establishment of the Shanghai 
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City Council in 1905. In the same year, the Sanitary Office was established under the 
jurisdiction of the police in the old Chinese city to manage urban sanitation and 
hygiene, namely street cleaning, epidemic prevention, garbage and night soil disposal, 
the provision of drainage and sewerage and forbidding the sale of unclean food (Peng, 
2007, pp.89-104). However, there was little impact on improving the public health 
because of the political turmoil, insufficient capital and the lack of well-trained 
personnel (Hsü, 2000; Nakajima, 2004; Peng, 2007). After the downfall of the Qing 
dynasty in 1912, China entered the Republican era (1912-1927) that was neither 
united nor peaceful but “were characterized by moral degradation, monarchist 
movements, warlordism, and intensified foreign imperialism” (Hsü, 2000, p.493). The 
period of warlordism (1916-27) was the darkest period in Republican history that 
powerful warlords asserted political control in different regions (Jewell, 1983b, p.28) 
and plunged China into chaos and disorder (Hsü, 2000, p.482).  
 
In 1927, the Nationalist Party under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi united China 
(Jewell, 1983b, p.28). In the same year, Jiang, who “had a strong sense of rivalry with 
the Westerners” (Nakajima, 2004, p.96), designated Shanghai as the ‘Special 
Municipality’ (MacPherson, 1990, p.47; MacPherson, 2002b, p.39). He announced the 
Greater Shanghai Plan, which called for “raising infrastructure standards in the 
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Chinese administered areas contiguous with the foreign settlements” (MacPherson, 
2002b, p.39) and had the ultimate goal of uniting “the entire city under Chinese 
municipal government, thereby solving the long-standing loss of sovereignty” 
(MacPherson, 2002b, p.39) over two foreign concessions. In the aspect of healthcare, 
the Nationalist government established hospitals, health stations and clinics to provide 
the general public with free or inexpensive medical care (Nakajima, 2004, p.147).23 It 
adopted “Western medicine as the state standard” (Nakajima, 2004, p.97) and gave the 
legal status to Western-style practitioners in 1930 (Nakajima, 2004, p.113) while 
suppressing the practice of traditional Chinese medicine and discriminating against 
Chinese-style practitioners (Chen, 1984a, p.23). However, the development of 
healthcare was unsatisfactory because the Nationalist government’s greater priority to 
military and political programmes limited government spending on healthcare (Yip, 
1995, p.62). From 1928 to 1937, military appropriations accounted for an average of 
44 per cent of total national expenditures (Yip, 1995, p.62). In 1929, 42 per cent of the 
total budget went to the military while only 0.1 per cent went to health services (Yip, 
1992, p.404). The inadequate funding for healthcare adversely affected health 
planning and programmes (Yip, 1995, p.65). 
                                                 
23 In 1934, the Nationalist government established Municipal Isolation Hospital for treating patients 
with communicable diseases and Municipal Hunan Hospital with 150 beds for serving Nanshi 
residents in Shanghai. From 1929 to 1936, only five health stations (Gaoqiao, Wusong, Jiangwan, 
Hunan and Hubei) were established to treat patients in district areas, which failed to meet the 
Nationalist government’s plan of establishing one station in each of the 17 districts in Shanghai 
because of insufficient funding and medical personnel (Nakajima, 2004, pp.147-8). 
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5.3 Mao’s Era (1949-1976) 
(a) The Political System: the Monopolistic Power of the CCP 
“After the Second World War, the foreign concessions were closed and Shanghai was 
returned to Chinese administration” (Wei, 1987, p.4). The civil war between the 
Nationalist Party and the CCP from 1945 to 1949 culminated in the Communist 
victory in 1949 (Jewell, 1983b, p.61). The PRC was founded on 1 October, 1949 by 
the CCP under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Mao undertook the immediate task to 
rebuild the nation after the end of the Second World War and civil war (Leung and 
Nann, 1995, p. 19). He unequivocally announced his “lean to one side” foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union, a country which had the same ideological affinity with 
socialism and could provide the PRC with aid and protection to forestall Western 
intervention (Hsü, 2000). The Soviet model of socialism provided the CCP with “the 
direction for state organization and a strategy of industrial development” (Leung and 
Nann, 1995, p. 20). During Mao’s era, the CCP established a central planning system 
that “emphasized public ownership and welfare, mass-based collectivism and 
egalitarianism” (Chen, 2001, p.456).  
 
(b) The Work Unit: a Pivotal Institution between the CCP and the People in 
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Urban China 
Under the planned economy, the CCP, which was “the supreme organizing force and 
final legitimate authority” (Hiller, 1983b, p.134) in the PRC, controlled all decisions 
regarding “production, personnel (appointments, promotion, and transfer), finance, 
and welfare” (Leung and Nann, 1995, p. 59). In urban China, all organizations where 
people worked were generally classified as “danwei”, which literally meant work unit 
(Gu, 1999, p.69). According to Gu (2001b), the work units were further divided into 
three categories based on the nature of the work: (1) enterprise units which engaged in 
profit-making businesses; (2) non-profit units which included cultural, educational, 
scientific and healthcare organizations; and (3) administrative units, i.e. governmental 
organs (p.92). During Mao’s era, the work unit was not simply a place where people 
worked (Leung and Nann, 1995, p. 57). In fact, it was a pivotal institution between the 
CCP and the people that implemented state policies and constructed a socialist society 
(Leung and Nann, 1995, p. 56). Apart from functioning as an economic institution 
which guaranteed permanent employment known as the “iron rice bowl” (Duckett, 
1997, p.262; Leung, 1998, p.619; Gu, 1999, p.70), the work unit also functioned as a 
welfare delivery institution providing comprehensive, generous and non-contributory 
welfare benefits from housing, education, social security to healthcare for employees, 
and subsidies from food, meals, haircut to transportation (Leung, 1994, p.343; Leung 
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and Nann, 1995, pp. 57-8; Duckett, 1997, p.262; Gu, 1999, p.70). The 
employment-based welfare benefits were regarded as a social wage necessary to 
compensate for low wages (Leung and Nann, 1995, p. 61; Leung, 1998, p.618). 
Nevertheless, the work unit served an even more important purpose: the purpose of 
political control. Politically speaking, the dependency of employees on the work unit 
for livelihood and welfare benefits meant that they were subject to the influence and 
control of the CCP (Leung, 1994, p.344). The CCP, through the work unit, “provided 
economic and social security in return for the workers’ political compliance and 
allegiance” (Gu, 1999, p.70). It was conducive to nation building and economic 
recovery (Leung and Nann, 1995, p. 55). 
 
(c) Healthcare System in Urban Shanghai 
When the CCP came to power, the PRC was “the sick man of Asia” (Pearson, 1995, 
p.89).24 Under Mao’s leadership, the CCP “made health a priority and included a 
right of access to health care in its constitution” (Bloom, 2005, p.25). The healthcare 
                                                 
24 In 1949, the PRC had enormous health problems caused by poverty, infectious diseases, years of 
wars against Japan and civil war (Wilenski, 1976, p.7). There were a number of indicators showing 
that the PRC was the sick man of Asia, including the maternal mortality rate being about 1.5 per cent 
(Wilenski, 1976, p.7); infant mortality ranging up to “200 deaths in the first year of life per 1,000 
live births” (Wilenski, 1976, p.7), and about 30 per cent of children dying before the age of five 
(Wilenski, 1976, p.7). Besides, there were high infection rates of parasitic diseases in central and 
south China. For example, there were about 10.5 million people being infected with schistosomiasis 
and the infection rate of malaria was 50 per cent (Lampton, 1977, p.14). There were also hookwarm, 
kala-azar, and contagious diseases such as cholera, plague, and smallpox (Lampton, 1977, p.14). And 
there was venereal disease, “with prevalence rates of 3 to 5 per cent in the cities [of the PRC] and 
rates running as high as 10 per cent among the frontier people” (Lampton, 1977, p.14). 
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system was “a major pillar of state socialism” in China (Gu, 2001a, p.197). The CCP 
established health administrative organs from the central down to local governments 
at various levels in order to “strengthen management and leadership over medical 
service” (Chen, 1984, p.80). The Ministry of Health (MOH) in Beijing was the central 
health authority established on 1 November, 1949 (Chen, 1984b, p.60). Its lower tier 
was provincial, municipal, district, and county bureaux of health. Bureaux of health at 
each level was “answerable to the government at the same level” (Tang and Meng, 
2004, p.21) and followed the professional instructions from the higher-level bureau of 
health (Sun, 1993, p.55).  
 
(i) Healthcare Financing System  
After the Second World War, more then 96 per cent of Shanghai residents had to pay 
medical expenses from their pocket (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.114). When Mao came 
to power, he implemented free healthcare for certain employees of the work units and 
social groups as a welfare benefit, which alleviated the financial burden of those who 
enjoyed the benefit when seeking medical treatment. In urban China, free healthcare 
was “a central part of the employment-based welfare programme” (Leung and Nann, 
1995, p. 57) to ensure a healthy workforce. Following the model of the Soviet Union, 
the CCP implemented two types of free healthcare programmes targeting different 
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types of employees: the LIS and the GHS.  
 
The LIS was implemented in urban China after the promulgation of the Labour 
Insurance Regulations in February 1951 (Li, 2009, p.33). It provided employees in 
SOEs and the collective enterprises with free outpatient and inpatient services 
financed by the enterprise’s welfare fund before 1953 and later by the company 
payroll after 1953 (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.114). It also covered the dependents of 
the LIS beneficiaries who were half-subsidized by the enterprises for their health 
expenditures and the costs of prescribed drugs (Dong, 2003, p.224). But the 
enterprise’s welfare fund “was actually financed from fiscal appropriations” (Gu, 
2001a, p.200) because the enterprise units had to submit all their realized profits to the 
central government which in turn “made a unified state plan for resource allocation” 
(Gu, 2001a, p.200). Although the CCP during Mao’ era used the term ‘insurance’ to 
describe the free healthcare it provided for employees of SOES and the collective 
enterprises, the LIS was not actually an insurance scheme in the real sense because it 
involved no premium contributions and no insurance institutions to manage the 
Schemes (Gu, 2001a, pp.200-201). 25  According to Zhang and Shao (1998), 
                                                 
25 The Chinese term “laobao yiliao” adopted by the CCP to describe free healthcare provided for 
employees of SOEs and collective enterprises literally meant ‘Labour Insurance Scheme’ (LIS) after 
translation. It shows that the CCP during Mao’s era had a different interpretation of the word 
‘insurance’ from the West. On the other hand, the Chinese term “gongfei yiliao” adopted by the CCP 
to describe free healthcare provided for government employees, army veterans and university 
students literally meant ‘Government-funded Healthcare Scheme (GHS)’ after translation. However, 
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employees joining the LIS rose from 1.07 million in 1958 to 2.37 million in 1965, 
which accounted for 14.3 per cent and 21.7 per cent of Shanghai’s population 
respectively (p.115).  
 
 The GHS was implemented in urban China after the issue of the Instructions of 
Implementing the Publicly-funded Healthcare Scheme in 1952 (Li, 2009, p.34). It 
covered government employees and retirees, army veterans, university and college 
students, staff in the cultural, education, health and science sectors, and retirees from 
these sectors (Grogan, 1995, p. 1074; Cheung, 2001, p.65; Gu, 2001a, p.200). The 
GHS beneficiaries were only required to pay outpatient registration fees and could 
enjoy free medical treatment that was directly financed by each level of government 
through the state budget (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116; Liu et al., 2004, p.39). The 
central government set the per capita GHS budget and appropriated the GHS budget 
to each level of government through the Ministry of Finance (Liu and Yi, 2004, p.31). 
                                                                                                                                            
a review of current literature shows that the term ‘insurance’ is commonly adopted by Chinese and 
Western scholars to describe these two types of free healthcare schemes. For example, Grogan (1995) 
and Yu and Ren (1997) adopted the terms ‘Government Insurance System’ and ‘Labor Insurance 
System’ to describe the healthcare financing system in the PRC in the 1950s. Dong (2003, 2008) and 
Tang and Meng (2004) adopted the terms ‘Government Insurnace Scheme’ and ‘Labour Insurance 
Scheme’ to describe the healthcare financing system in the PRC in the 1950s. Liu et al. (2004) 
adopted the terms ‘Government Insurance Program’ and ‘Labor Insurance Program’ to describe the 
healthcare financing system in the PRC in the 1950s. Ye (2010) adopted the terms ‘Government 
Health Insurance’ and ‘Labor Health Insurance’. Duckett (2001) adopted the terms ‘insurance for 
public employees’ and ‘labour insurance system’ to describe the healthcare financing system in the 
PRC in the 1950s. In another study, Duckett (2004) adopted the terms ‘public health insurance’ and 
‘labour insurance’. Based on literal translation, this study would still adopt the term ‘Labour 
Insurance Scheme’ (LIS) to describe free healthcare provided for employees of SOEs and collective 
enterprises while adopting the term ‘Government-funded Healthcare System (GHS)’ to describe free 
healthcare provided for government employees, army veterans and university students. 
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According to Zhang and Shao (1998), employees joining the GHS rose from 98,000 
in 1952 to 329,000 in 1965, which respectively accounted for 1.7 per cent and 3.0 per 
cent of Shanghai’s population (p.116). Besides, the insurance funding of the GHS in 
Shanghai rose from RMB 1.08 million in 1952 to about RMB 9 million in 1965 
(Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116). Also, the annual insurance funding of the GHS per 
capita rose from RMB 22.14 in 1952 to RMB 27.33 in 1965 (Zhang and Shao,1998, 
p.116). 
 
(ii) Healthcare Delivery System  
The CCP, “[i]n parallel with the institutional configuration of a planned economy” 
(Gu, 2001a, p.201), nationalized hospitals that were previously run by foreign medical 
missionaries or privately run by local elites and businessmen. All the hospitals were 
directly under state control and “were classified as non-profit work units” (Gu, 2001a, 
p.201). They were directly supervised and managed by the MOH or the lower-tier of 
provincial, municipal, district, and county bureaux of health, depending on their 
locations (Cheung and Gu, 2004; Tang and Meng, 2004). Hospital employees were 
fully paid by the state according to standard salary scales regulated by the central 
government.  
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The CCP established the three-tiered medical institution network in urban areas 
covering the medical needs of the population (Wong et al., 1996, p.409). Each tier was 
assigned a defined service area and was managed by a corresponding health 
administrative department. The first-tiered medical institutions were 
street-level/sub-district hospitals, neighborhood health stations and enterprise health 
stations providing the primary and preventive care for the employees and retirees of 
small collectively-owned enterprises and their families (Dong, 2003, p.225; Cheung 
and Gu, 2004, p.39). The second-tiered medical institutions were district and 
enterprise-level hospitals providing both inpatient and outpatient services for the 
employees and retirees of large and medium-sized collectively-owned enterprises, and 
the employees of district and street-level government agencies, and middle-to-primary 
schools (Dong, 2003, p.225; Cheung and Gu, 2004, p.39). The third-tiered medical 
institutions were municipal hospitals and university-affiliated hospitals providing 
specialist care and complex treatments for the employees and retirees of SOEs, 
municipal-level government agencies, veteran cadres, and university staff (Dong, 
2003, p.225; Cheung and Gu, 2004, p.39) (See Diagram 2).  
 
Besides, the CCP established the three-tiered wholesale drug stations in urban 
China for distributing drugs to medical institutions. It established the first-tiered 
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wholesale drug station at provincial level, the second-tiered wholesale drug station at 
municipal level, and the third-tiered wholesale drug station at county level (Bao, 2008, 
p.76). Only the three-tier stated-owned wholesale drug stations could distribute drugs 
to hospitals (Bao, 2008, p.76). The CCP strictly regulated the drug prices but allowed 
medical institutions to add a 15 per cent markup over the wholesale prices (Bao, 2008, 
p.77). The 15 percent retail markup was treated as revenues to compensate for the 
consultation and treatment fees that were set below costs by the CCP (Bao, 2008, 
p.85).  
 
In Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Health Bureau (SMHB) was an 
administrative department of the MOH. It was responsible for implementing national 
healthcare policies into Shanghai and monitoring the local public health. “By 1956, all 
Shanghai hospitals were directly under state control” according to Cheung and Gu 
(2004, p.39). In 1958, the three-tier medical institution networks were established in 
urban Shanghai (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.84). By the end of 1965, urban Shanghai 
had 340 hospitals, 1,514 clinics (Chinese and Western medicine) and 2,417 health 
stations (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.84). It had 31,671 hospital beds and 2.9 hospital 
beds per 1,000 people (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.84). According to Zhang and Shao 
(1998), the hospital outpatient visits in Shanghai rose from about 4.05 million in 1950 
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to about 63 million in 1965 (p.84).  
 
From 1949 to 1976, the CCP under the leadership of Mao established a state-run 
healthcare system characterized by the public provision of healthcare through a 
three-tiered urban medical institution network and the finance of healthcare through 
the state budget in urban areas. The state-run healthcare system enabled the CCP to 
make healthcare accessible to the majority of the population. During the first three 
decades after its introduction in the 1950s, the state-run healthcare system improved 
the health status of the PRC’s population, leading to an increase in the average life 
expectancy, a decrease in infant mortality, and a decrease in the prevalence of 
infectious diseases (Hsiao, 1995a, p.1047).  
     
In the late 1970s, however, the PRC’s transition from the socialist planning 
economy to the market economy adversely affected the free healthcare system. In 
urban Shanghai, the economic reform led to both the enterprise units and the local 
government bearing a heavy financial burden of financing the LIS and GHS. The 
collapse of the LIS and GHS compelled the central government to implement urban 
health insurance reform. 
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5.4 Discussion  
As outlined in Chapter Three, historical institutionalism emphasizes that history 
matters. It takes history or time seriously, specifying sequences, tracing and analyzing 
processes over substantial stretch of years to explain important political outcomes or 
real-world puzzles (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp.695-8). History is the contingent 
product of the interactions of multiple political actors and institutions operating in and 
influenced by broader political, economic and social contexts over time (Lecours, 
2000, p.514; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p.706). An overview of the historical 
development of public health and healthcare systems in Shanghai shows that the 
establishment and institutionalization of public health and healthcare systems in 
Shanghai “linked inseparably with Western imperialism” in the nineteenth century 
(Jewell, 1983a, p.24). The political and military weaknesses of the Qing government 
led to foreign influence extending to Shanghai. Both the public health and healthcare 
systems in Shanghai were the products of Western presence in China and the 
interactions between the West and the Chinese when China was opened to 
“widespread Western business, military and missionary penetration” (Jewell, 1983a, 
p.3) after her defeat in the First Opium War.  
 
The authorities in the foreign concessions took advantage of the unequal treaties 
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to dominate the control over Shanghai. They had their own governing institutions 
dominated by moneyed interests that favored free trade. Since the beginning of the 
open trade in Shanghai, the authorities in the foreign concessions prioritized economic 
development. They involved in developing public health out of a pragmatic and 
economic concern that a clean environment was conducive to doing trade business. 
On the other hand, the Chinese authority did not appeal for the development of public 
health until 1905 when it feared the growth of foreign power would further intrude on 
China’s sovereignty. But the Chinese authority lagged behind the foreign counterparts 
in developing public health because of lacking political stability, financial resources 
and manpower.  
 
The authorities in the foreign concessions had little involvement in healthcare 
provision in order to save public expenditure and avoid tax increases. Missionaries, 
local elites and businessmen, Chinese-style practitioners and later private practitioners 
were main healthcare providers and hospital founders that provided free medical 
treatment for the mass. The missionary hospitals which were the first institutions 
introducing Western medicine to Shanghai stimulated the Chinese elites to establish 
hospitals based on the principle of benevolence, and the Chinese-style practitioners to 
establish hospitals for enhancing the status of Chinese medicine (Nakajima, 2004, 
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p.61). The establishment of hospitals in Shanghai laid down the foundation of 
building a modern healthcare system during Mao’s era.  
 
As outlined in Chapter Three, historical institutionalism emphasizes that 
institutions matter. Institutions play a determinant role in distributing power among 
political actors in a given polity and shaping their strategies and goals in the 
decision-making process that in turn shape the political outcomes (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). The historical overview of the healthcare 
system in urban Shanghai during Mao’s era showed that the political and economic 
institutions of the PRC significantly affected the establishment of the healthcare 
system in urban Shanghai. The centralized political system gave the CCP leverage to 
completely control the planning and development of healthcare services. It directly 
used political power to coordinate healthcare programmes with economic plans. “In 
parallel with the institutional configuration of a planned economy” (Gu, 2001a, p.201), 
the CCP nationalized hospitals and established a three-tiered medical institution 
network in urban Shanghai to deliver healthcare services to its population. Besides, it 
used the work units to finance the healthcare of urban populations. The work units 
were pivotal institutions between the CCP and people implementing state policies and 
constructing a socialist society in urban Shanghai. They represented the CCP’s power 
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with political, economic and welfare delivery functions.  
 
Under the socialist planned economy, the work units in urban Shanghai provided 
employees with lifetime employment and generous and comprehensive welfare 
benefits, including healthcare. The work units implemented the LIS and GHS to 
benefit urban employees “who were not constrained financially in their pursuit of 
demands for health care” (Hiller, 1983a, p.98). Both the LIS and GHS beneficiaries 
enjoyed free healthcare financed by the state budget. Under the market economy, 
however, the work units and the Shanghai municipal government lost the financial 
capacity to sustain the dual system of the LIS and GHS. The collapse of the LIS and 
GHS put great pressure on the central government to reform the healthcare financing 
system. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, a historical overview of the development of public health and healthcare 
systems in Shanghai shows that the establishment and institutionalization of public 
health and healthcare systems in Shanghai were the products of Western presence in 
China in the nineteenth century after China’s defeat in the First Opium War. During 
Mao’s era, the state-run healthcare system in urban Shanghai performed well in the 
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institutional configuration of the socialist planned economy. While the LIS and GHS 
provided free healthcare for urban employees, the three-tiered medical institution 
network provided an efficient network for the majority of population to access 
healthcare. However, the state-run healthcare system in urban Shanghai came to 
malfunction after the PRC’s economic transition to the market economy. The CCP 
was under great pressure to reform the healthcare financing system. These issues will 
be pursued in detail in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX: SHANGHAI CASE STUDY: HEALTH INSURANCE 
REFORM 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines why the Shanghai municipal government, when implementing 
health insurance reform, was able to significantly deviate from the established policy 
path by replacing the free healthcare system with a new contributory health insurance 
system. It is divided into five sections. Section 6.2 examines three phases of urban 
health insurance reform in Shanghai. Section 6.3 examines the reasons for Shanghai 
witnessing a revolution in healthcare financing. Section 6.4 examines the views of 
different stakeholders, citizens, scholars, and the government official on changes 
brought by the new health insurance reform. Section 6.5 discusses the findings and 
implications. Section 6.6 gives a conclusion. 
 
 The refined theory of historical institutionalism comprises seven explanatory 
elements: contextual conditions, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
sequences, path dependency, and policy feedback. When it is adopted to examine 
urban health insurance reform in Shanghai, it focuses on how the complex interplay of 
forces, namely contextual influences, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
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sequences, path dependency, and policy feedback, shaped urban health insurance 
reform process.  
 
Having looked at urban health insurance reform through the lens of historical 
institutionalism, this study argues that the case of Shanghai is an example of 
institutional change in which the Shanghai municipal government successfully 
implemented health insurance reform in 2000 by replacing the free healthcare system 
with a new contributory health insurance system. It argues that the implementation of 
urban health insurance reform and big change in healthcare financing policy path was 
possible because of (1) changes in political and economic contexts due to the new 
political leader of the CCP coming to power, (2) ideological shift from egalitarianism 
to pro-market policies, (3) policy feedback which accelerated the pace of collapse of 
the free healthcare system, (4) the authoritative political institutions with the strong 
influence of the CCP and a highly centralized decision-making structure, (5) the 
dominance of the political leader and key bureaucratic stakeholders from different 
ministries in urban healthcare insurance reform process, (6) new ideas being 
championed by the political leader and key bureaucratic actors, and (7) the 
decentralization power given to the local governments to implement urban health 
insurance reform. This study argues that it is the dynamic interplay of these forces 
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enabling the Shanghai municipal government to implement urban health insurance 
reform without any impediments.  
 
6.2 Phases of Urban Health Insurance Reform in Shanghai  
During Mao’s era, the free healthcare system which was financed by the state budget 
functioned well and improved the health conditions of the PRC’s population. As 
shown in a later section, in the post-Mao period, however, the free healthcare system 
was plagued with inefficiency and rising costs, thereby imposing unbearable financial 
burdens on both the central government and enterprise units. This compelled the 
central government from the mid-1980s to reform the free healthcare system “through 
a series of local trials, and on this basis in 1998 announced a new national 
programme” (Duckett, 2001, p.290). Following the direction of healthcare reform 
indicated by the central government, the Shanghai municipal government from the 
mid-1980s gradually implemented urban health insurance reform through three phases: 
(1) the exploration phase (1984-1988); (2) the experimental phase (1994-1996); and 
(3) the implementation phase (1998-2001).  
 
(a) The Exploration Phase (1984-1988) 
In Shanghai, the first phase of health insurance reform was “marked by explorative 
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experimentation in search for a direction” (Leung, 1998, p.625). The Shanghai 
municipal government and other local governments were “encouraged [by the central 
government] to experiment with different solutions” (Leung, 1998, p.624) to solve the 
problem of rising healthcare costs in their jurisdiction. From 1984 to 1986, the 
Shanghai municipal government implemented a co-payment scheme in selected 
enterprise units and selected districts, whereby the LIS and GHS beneficiaries who 
received a reserve payment from the municipal government were required to pay 10 
per cent of the outpatient charges out-of-pocket, with an upper limit (RMB 20) set for 
the out-of-pocket payment (Zhang and Shao, 1998, pp.115-6).26 In January 1988, the 
Shanghai municipal government implemented the co-payment scheme in the entire 
city (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116). At the same time, it implemented the 
experimental measures of allocating a fixed amount of healthcare funds to work units 
for self-management (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116; Cheung and Gu, 2004, p.43) and 
placing a year-round budget under the custody of hospitals which “took full 
responsibility for the health care of the work-units’ employees” (Gu, 2001a, p.209) in 
order to control the growth of healthcare expenditures.  
                                                 
26 The co-payment scheme was first implemented in selected enterprise units in June 1984 and then 
extended to selected districts in June 1986 (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116). For the LIS beneficiaries 
of enterprise units selected to join the co-payment scheme, they were given a medical reserve 
payment amount to RMB 3 to 8 every month for paying medical and prescription fees (Zhang and 
Shao, 1998, p.115). As to the GHS beneficiaries in districts selected to join the co-payment scheme, 
they received different amount of medical reserve payments according to different age ranges. 
According to Zhang and Shao (1998), GHS beneficiaries aged 35 or below received RMB 8 every 
year (p.116). Those aged between 36 and 50 received RMB 10 every year while those aged 51 or 
above received RMB 12 every year (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116). 
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However, the initial reform in Shanghai was small-scale, piecemeal and 
incremental. It was limited to certain funding adjustments to reduce the moral hazard 
on the demand and supply side without involving any institutional transformation of 
the existing free healthcare system (Gu, 2001a, p.209). Hence, it made slow progress 
and had little effect on cost containment (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.115), with urban 
healthcare expenditures in Shanghai growing at an annual rate of about 30 per cent 
from 1983 to 1992 (Wang, 2008, p.233).  
 
(b) The Experimental Phase (1994-1996) 
The second phase of health insurance reform began in November 1994 when the 
central government selected the cities of Zhenjiang in Jiangsu province and Jiujiang in 
Jiangxi province (the two jiangs) to implement a pilot study of health insurance model 
(Gu, 2001a, p.209; Liu et al., 2004, p.43; Tang and Meng, 2004, p.32; Wong et al., 
2006, p.16). The “two-jiang model” consisted of the MSA and the SPF, requiring both 
the work units and employees to make mandatory contribution. Employers were 
required to contribute 10 per cent of their total annual payroll while employees were 
required to contribute 1 per cent of their annual salary. These contributions went into 
the MSA and the SPF from which to draw to pay for medical expenses (See Diagram 
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3). In 1996, the central government extended the “two-jiang model” to 57 cities. But 
local governments were given considerable room to modify the model which could 
“better meet their local needs and socioeconomic condition” (Liu et al., 2004, p.45).  
 
In Shanghai, the pilot health insurance model implemented by the Shanghai 
municial government was different from the “two-jiang model” in terms of the 
funding structure, the source of finance, and the contribution rate. In May 1996, the 
Shanghai municipal government implemented a hospitalization insurance scheme for 
enterprise employees (Cheung and Gu, 2004, p.45; Tang and Meng, 2004, p.33), 
which only established the SPF and required the work units to make mandatory 
contribution to the insurance scheme. The work units paid 4.5 per cent of their total 
annual payroll to a health insurance fund which in return, covered 85 per cent of the 
employees’ inpatient expenses that exceeded the threshold of RMB 1,500 for the 
first-tiered hospitals, RMB 2,000 for the second-tiered hospitals, and RMB 2,500 for 
the third-tiered hospitals (Cheung and Gu, 2004, p.45; Wong et al., 2006, p.46). The 
remainder would be paid by the work units and employees (Cheung and Gu, 2004, 
p.45). The insurance scheme was then extended to cover outpatient and emergency 
services of enterprises’ incumbent and retired employees. 27  The hospitalization 
                                                 
27 Interview with Professor 5.  
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insurance scheme was facilitated by a hospital revenue cap policy introduced in July 
1994.28 Being the pioneer of the hospital revenue cap policy, the Shanghai municipal 
government set the annual allowable growth rate of hospital revenues and hospital 
drug revenues every year to match the annual growth rate of GDP.29 Revenues in 
excess of the cap would be fully taxed by the government.30 The Shanghai model had 
significant implication for the pilot urban insurance reform in the PRC because it 
showed that a parallel measure to constrain hospital revenues was necessary in order 
to make the health insurance scheme more effective.31 The hospital revenue cap acted 
as an effective cost control mechanism on the supply side and facilitated the 
implementation of the health insurance scheme.32 Hence, the Shanghai model became 
one of the pilot models gaining national recognition in the experimental phase (Liu et 
al., 2004, p.50).33  
                                                 
28 Interview with Professor 5. The studies of Liu et al. (2004) and Wong et al. (2006) were few of the 
studies mentioning the Shanghai model. However, while the former did not talk about the hospital 
revenue cap policy in detail, the latter did not mention the hospital revenue cap policy at all. In the 
PRC, the Shanghai model is famous for the combination of the hospital insurance scheme with the 
hospital revenue cap policy. The implementation of the hospital revenue cap policy was the main 
contribution made by the Shanghai model. The details of the hospital revenue cap policy provided by 
Professor 5 during the interview are conducive to understanding about the Shanghai model and 
filling the research cap of the current literature. 
29 Interview with Professor 5. According to Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2010, the average annual 
growth rate of GDP in Shanghai from 1991 to 2009 was 12 per cent (Shanghai Municipal Statistics 
Bureau, 2011).  
30 Interview with Professor 5. 
31 Interview with Professor 5. 
32 Interview with Professor 5. 
33 Like the Shanghai model, the Shenzhen model and the Hainan model gained national recognition 
because of their contributions to the pilot urban health insurance reform in the PRC. The Shenzhen 
model was praised for its heterogeneity in tailoring three different insurance plans to meet the needs 
of three different population groups, including employees and retirees with permanent residence of 
Shenzhen, temporary residents at work and the unemployed, and retired senior government officials 
and disabled veterans (Liu et al., 2004, p.50). The Hainan model was praised for its ‘block design’ in 
which the individual MSA only paid for outpatient services and the SPF only paid for inpatient care 
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(c) The Implementation Phase (1998-2001) 
The third phase of health insurance reform began in December 1998 when the central 
government decided to establish a new health insurance system across the country 
(Gu, 2001a, p.211; Gu and Zhang, 2006, p.58; Wong et al., 2006, p.17). In order to 
pursue a nationwide urban health insurance reform, the State Council promulgated a 
landmark decree known as the Decision of the State Council Concerning the 
Establishment of the Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban Employees (hereafter 
“the 1998 Decree”) (The State Council, 1998), which required all urban work units 
and their employees to participate in the Basic Medical Insurance System (hereafter 
the BMI System). Based on the “two-jiang model”, the BMI system consisted of the 
individual MSA and the SPF,34 requiring both the work units and employees to make 
mandatory contribution.35 The work units and their employees should respectively 
contribute 6 per cent and 2 per cent of their total wage bill as annual insurance 
premium.36 The Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) was established to 
“take charge of the urban health insurance and its reform” (Tang and Meng, 2004, 
p.34). The Drug Catalogue for National Basic Medical Insurance (hereafter “the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Liu et al., 2004, p.49). The independent operation of and the service-specific use of the individual 
MSAs and the SPFs had a better contribution to cost containment (Liu et al., 2004, p.53). 
34 Please refer to Section One and Section Three of the 1998 Decree. 
35 Please refer to Section Two of the 1998 Decree. 
36 Please refer to Section Two and Section Seven of the 1998 Decree. 
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Drug Catalogue”) was issued since 2000 to specify both Western medicines and 
Chinese proprietary medicines that were eligible for reimbursement by the BMI.37 
Medicines specified in the Drug Catalogue were essential medicines which were 
cost-effective, safe, and efficacious.38 
 
According to the 1998 Decree, the local government could modify the national 
BMI system in accordance with local circumstances while following the basic 
principle that the BMI system consisted of the individual MSA and the SPF.39 On 
October 20, 2000, the Shanghai municipal government, in accordance with the 1998 
Decree, promulgated Order No. 92 --- the Measures of the Shanghai City on the Basic 
Medical Insurance for Urban Employees (hereafter “the Shanghai BMI Measures”) 
(Shanghai Municipal Government, 2000a; Shanghai Municipal Government, 2000b) 
--- to institutionalize the BMI System in Shanghai. The BMI System in Shanghai 
became effective on December 1, 2000 (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2000b). 
The new BMI System implemented in Shanghai was different from the national BMI 
system introduced by the 1998 Decree in terms of the work unit’s contribution rate, 
                                                 
37 Please refer to Section Five of the 1998 Decree. In order to make sure that the insured participants 
could buy drugs at affordable prices, the MOLSS collaborated with the MOH and the Ministry of 
Finance in formulating the Drug Catalogue. The Drug Catalogue had two categories: Category A 
and Category B. Category A medicines were completely reimbursed by the BMI. Category B 
medicines were partially reimbursed by the BMI and patients were required to pay certain 
percentage of the fees. 
38 Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 was interviewed on July 21, 2010. Pharmaceutical Company 
Manager 2 was interviewed on August 1, 2010. 
39 Please refer to Section One and Section Seven of the 1998 Decree. 
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funding structure, and payment structure. Firstly, the new BMI system implemented in 
Shanghai required the work units to contribute 10 per cent of their total wage bill as 
annual insurance premium, which was four per cent higher than the national model 
introduced in the 1998 Decree. Secondly, the funding structure of the BMI system 
implemented in Shanghai consisted of the individual MSA, the SPF and the LAMI 
fund. However, the national model only consisted of the individual MSA and the SPF. 
Thirdly, the new BMI system implemented in Shanghai had a complicated three-tiered 
payment structure that did not appear in the 1998 Decree (See Table 14 and Table 
15).  
 
Besides, a comparison of the new BMI System in Shanghai and the old LIS-GHS 
system shows that the former was significantly different from the latter in terms of 
coverage, the source of finance, funding structure, payment structure, the use of 
healthcare services and administrative agency.  
 
Firstly, the new BMI system in Shanghai had a wider coverage than the old 
LIS-GHS system because the former compulsorily required employees and retirees of 
all the urban work units, including private enterprises, foreign investment enterprises 
 203 
and private non-enterprise entities, to join the scheme.40 Retired employees could join 
the BMI System without paying any insurance premiums.41 Secondly, the new BMI 
system had a more diversified sources of finance than the old LIS-GHS system. It was 
financed by mandatory contribution from both the work units and their employees42 
while the old LIS-GHS system was financed by the state budget.  
 
Thirdly, the new BMI system had a funding structure consisting of the individual 
MSA and the SPF,43 which did not exist in the old LIS-GHS system. While the 
individual MSAs covered general outpatient and emergency medical expenses, and 
the prescribed drug charges,44 the SPFs covered the inpatient charges (including 
inpatient observation in emergency rooms).45 Besides, the local additional medical 
insurance fund (hereafter the LAMI fund) was also established to supplement the BMI 
System in Shanghai (See Diagram 4).46 For the BMI, the work units and their 
employees should respectively contribute 10 per cent and 2 per cent of their total 
wage bill as annual insurance premium.47 For the LAMI fund, the work units should 
contribute 2 per cent of their total wage bill as annual insurance premium.48 All the 
                                                 
40 Please refer to Article 2 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
41 Please refer to Article 5 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
42 Please refer to Article 5 and Article 6 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
43 Please refer to Article 9 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
44 Please refer to Article 22 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
45 Please refer to Article 25 and Article 26 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
46 Please refer to Article 15 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
47 Please refer to Article 5 and Article 6 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
48 Please refer to Article 6 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
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employees’ contributions were deposited in their individual MSAs.49 30 per cent of 
the work units’ contributions went into the individual MSAs in different proportions 
depending on the age of the insured participants, with the remaining money going to 
the SPFs.50 Retirees received higher proportion (See Table 13).51  
 
Fourthly, the new BMI system in Shanghai had a complicated payment structure 
which did not exist in the old LIS-GHS system. A three-tier payment system was 
adopted in Shanghai to pay the general outpatient and emergency medical expenses, 
with the individual MSA being the first tier, out-of-pocket being the second tier, and 
the LAMI fund being the third tier.52 Besides, payment thresholds and ceilings were 
set for the SPF to pay the medical expenses of inpatient stay and emergency room 
stay.53 The SPF covered inpatient charges which were above the payment threshold 
or below the ceilings, with the remainder paid by the individual MSA or 
self-payment.54 Different age groups enjoyed different degree of medical insurance 
                                                 
49 Please refer to Article 11 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
50 Please refer to Section Two of the Implementation Scheme of Shanghai City for the Decision of the 
State Council Concerning the Establishment of the Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban 
Employees (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2000a). Please also refer to Article 11 of the Shanghai 
BMI Measures. 
51 Please refer to Article 11 of the Shanghai BMI Measures..  
52 Please refer to Article 22 and Article 23 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
53 Please refer to Article 25, Article 26 and Article 27 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. For the 
incumbent employees, the payment threshold of the SPFs was 10 per cent of the employees’ average 
annual salary of Shanghai in the previous year (EAASSP), whereas the ceiling was four times the 
EAASSP. For the retirees, the payment threshold of the SPFs ranged from 5 to 10 per cent of 
EAASSP, with the older retirees enjoying lower payment threshold. The ceiling was four times the 
EAASSP. 
54 Please refer to Article 26 and Article 27 of the Shanghai BMI Measures.  
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coverage (See Table 14 and Table 15). Retirees enjoyed better medical insurance 
coverage than incumbent employees.  
 
Fifthly, the BMI participants who were given a medical insurance certificates, 
had to seek medical treatment at designated medical institutions and buy prescription 
drugs at designated medical institutions or designated retail pharmacies.55 Sixthly, the 
Shanghai Municipal Medical Insurance Bureau was the administrative agency 
established to supervise and administer the operation of the BMI System.56 Diagram 
5 illustrated the operation of the BMI System in terms of cash flows and the 
relationships between the work units, employees, medical insurance agency, and 
medical institutions in Shanghai.  
 
In brief, the Shanghai municipal government abolished the institutional 
demarcations between the LIS and GHS by turning the free healthcare system into a 
mandatory contribution system. The institutional design of the new BMI System 
represented a vast improvement over the old LIS-GHS system in terms of coverage, 
the sources of finance, funding structure, payment structure and the use of healthcare 
services. 
                                                 
55 Please refer to Article 19 and Article 20 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
56 Please refer to Article 2 of the Shanghai BMI Measures. 
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6.3 Reasons for Being Able to Reform the Funding Structure of Healthcare 
The overview of the development trajectory of urban health insurance reform showed 
that since the mid-1980s, Shanghai had entered into the era of health insurance reform.  
The Shanghai municipal government implemented urban health insurance reform in a 
gradual manner. This study argues that Shanghai was able to implement urban health 
insurance reform because of seven reasons: (1) changes in political and economic 
contexts due to the new political leader of the CCP coming to power, (2) ideological 
shift from egalitarianism to pro-market policies, (3) policy feedback which 
accelerated the pace of collapse of the free healthcare system, (4) the authoritative 
political institutions with the strong influence of the CCP and a highly centralized 
decision-making structure, (5) the dominance of the political leader and key 
bureaucratic stakeholders from different ministries in the healthcare insurance reform 
process, (6) new ideas being championed by the political leader and key bureaucratic 
actors, and (7) the decentralization power given to the local governments to 
implement urban health insurance reform. Some of theses forces, as illustrated below, 
are interrelated with each other.  
 
(a) Contextual Influences, New Political Leadership, and Ideological Shift 
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Historical institutionalism argues that changes in contextual conditions, namely 
political, economic or social context, can generate the sources of institutional and 
policy changes. The change in the political or socioeconomic context would lead to 
existing institutions performing new tasks because new political actors emerge to 
pursue new goals through the existing institutions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.16). 
This point was picked up by Professor 1, Professor 5, Professor 6 and Researcher 1, 
who shared the view that changes in political and economic contexts due to the rise of 
the new political leader were the source of institutional dynamism creating the 
windows of opportunity to change the path of urban healthcare financing policy in the 
PRC.57 They argued that the economic reform initiated by the new political leader 
Deng Xiaoping since 1978 had badly and deeply affected the operation of the free 
healthcare system and challenged the prevailing belief in healthcare, thereby 
providing a conjunctual moment for the urban healthcare financing policy to move 
into a new trajectory.58 According to Professor 6, “the picture of urban health 
insurance reform in Shanghai would be incomplete without taking the change in 
political leadership and the economic modernization into account”.59  
 
The argument made by the interviewees warrants a discussion here with the help 
                                                 
57 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 5, Professor 6 and Researcher 1. 
58 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 5, Professor 6 and Researcher 1. 
59 Interview with Professor 6. 
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of literature. The change in the political context and the change in the economic 
context were empirically intertwined. It was the change in the political context 
triggering the change in the economic context. Deng Xiaoping, who was the successor 
to Mao, was regarded as the paramount leader of the PRC from 1978 to 1992 and the 
architect of the PRC’s reform and opening up (Joseph, 2010b, p.154). When Deng 
came to power in 1978, he undertook the foremost task of rebuilding the ruined 
economy caused by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),60 which was a political 
upheaval and anti-capitalist movement that lasted for 10 years (Sidel and Sidel, 1982). 
He hoped to restore the CCP’s credibility and consolidate his authority through 
improving people’s living standards and the delivery of the economic goods (Leung, 
1998, p.619; Saich, 2004, pp.241-2). In order to achieve these political goals, Deng 
embraced new ideas and pursued new economic goals. He believed in the ideas that 
the introduction of market forces into the economy, the Four Modernizations (Hsü, 
2000, p.803)61 and the aspects of capitalism “such as the profit motive and private 
ownership of businesses” (Joseph, 2010b, p.155) could be the driving forces for the 
economic advancement in the PRC. He embraced the dictum ‘to get rich is glorious’ 
                                                 
60 The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was described as “10 lost years” of the PRC, a period during 
which the entire country was plagued with political chaos and the economy and society was 
seriously damaged. It was instigated by Mao to attack and purge bureaucratic elites who deviated 
from the socialist path (Lucas, 1982). The impact of the Cultural Revolution on the healthcare 
system dated from Mao’s criticism of the MOH in the “June 26th Directive” in 1965 for its urban 
biases and becoming “the Urban Ministry of Health” (Lucas, 1982, p.123; Sidel and Sidel, 1982, p.4). 
By June 1967, Mao removed Minister of Health and his six vice-ministers from office. He also 
instructed that medical resources should be shifted to the countryside.  
61 Deng was committed to the Four Modernizations of “agriculture, industry, science and technology, 
and national defence” (Hsü, 2000, p.803) when implementing the economic reform. 
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(Saich, 2004, p.242) and the slogan ‘let some people get rich first’ (Joseph, 2010b, 
p.154). On the other hand, he denounced Mao’s egalitarian principle of “everyone 
eating from the same pot” (Leung, 1998, p.619) “as a dangerous notion that retarded 
economic growth” (Saich, 2004, p.60). His goal was to modernize the PRC through 
implementing the economic reform. The ideological shift from egalitarianism to 
pro-market policies during Deng’s era influenced urban healthcare financing policy in 
the 1980s and worsened the free healthcare system afterwards. 
 
As Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 3 and Professor 5 said during their 
interviews, the economic reform implemented since 1978 had transformed the PRC’s 
economic system from the socialist planning economy to the market economy.62 
While it was undeniable that Deng’s economic reform brought rapid development and 
growth to the PRC, it simultaneously brought adverse effects to the free healthcare 
system in the PRC.63  As illustrated below, fiscal decentralization, the financial 
responsibility system, the relaxation of price controls, enterprise reform, and Open 
Door Policy were the main components of the economic reform causing the free 
healthcare system to malfunction and collapse afterwards.64  
 
                                                 
62 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 3, and Professor 5. 
63 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 3, and Professor 5. 
64 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 3, Professor 5, and Professor 6.  
 210 
(b) Policy Feedback from Economic Reform, the LIS and GHS 
Historical institutionalism argues that policy feedback provides resources and creates 
incentives that can facilitate, strengthen or inhibit the formation or expansion of 
stakeholder interests (Pierson, 1994, pp.40-1). In Shanghai, policy feedback from the 
economic reform implemented since 1978 and the LIS and GHS implemented since 
the early 1950s accelerated the pace of collapse of the free healthcare system. The 
argument of policy feedback can be elaborated by combining interview data and 
literature. Under the economic reform, “the central government’s decision to 
decentralize the fiscal system put health spending decisions in the hands of local 
government” (Duckett, 2011, p.36). Local governments could decide how much 
money to allocate to their local hospitals (Tang and Meng, 2004, p.27). Since they 
gave a higher priority to developing the local economy than developing the local 
healthcare (Tang and Meng, 2004, p.27), they moved towards a cost recovery policy 
in hospital financing (Pearson, 1995, p.108) by significantly reducing the subsidies to 
hospitals (Tang and Meng, 2004, p.27). At the same time, they implemented a 
financial responsibility system which gave hospitals greater financial autonomy but 
required them to generate revenues on their own and be responsible for their profits 
and losses.65 Under the financial responsibility system, bonuses were awarded to 
                                                 
65 Interview with Professor 2. 
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hospital staff for their hard work and quality of care (Henderson, 198, p.206). The 
financial responsibility system created stronger incentives for both the hospitals and 
doctors to earn more revenues through different sources and to charge patients 
substantially greater than the actual cost. It created the new problem of 
supplier-induced demand (SID), which was a moral hazard from the supply-side.66  
 
As Professor 2, Professor 1 and Researcher 1 said during their interviews, SID 
was prevalent among hospitals in Shanghai during Deng’s era.67 It was because 
government and enterprises units that acted as third party payers were incapable of 
adopting any mechanisms to restrict the profit-seeking behavior of medical 
institutions (Tang and Meng, 2004, p.26). It led to hospitals and doctors prescribing 
unnecessary or expensive drugs, doing unnecessary diagnostic tests and therapies, 
performing unnecessary surgeries and procedures, prolonging inpatient stay and 
increasing patient charges whenever they saw fit.68 For example, Henderson (1989) 
found that having higher charges for patients entitled to the GHS boosted the income 
of all Shanghai hospitals “by one-third of their total yearly allocation from the 
Ministry of Health” (p.207). Hsiao (1995a) found that the average cost of drug for 
appendectomy patients entitled to either LIS or GHS were two times higher than that 
                                                 
66 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6.  
67 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 1, and Researcher 1. 
68 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 1, and Researcher 1. 
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of patients having no entitlement to free healthcare in a Shanghai hospital (p.1053). 
Another example was that foreign advanced medical equipment and imported drugs 
were commonly used by hospitals and doctors in Shanghai to earn more profits 
although cheap and simple cure for patients was available.69 It resulted in hospitals in 
Shanghai importing more foreign advanced medical equipment than needed.70 For 
example, in 1986, a survey conducted by the MOH showed that medical equipment 
level at municipal, district, and street-level hospitals in Shanghai was higher than that 
of the average medical equipment level among seven provinces and two cities (Zhang 
and Shao, 1998, p.110) (See Table 16).71 While advanced medical equipment, if 
being used properly, could modernize healthcare and increase service quality, it was 
used by hospitals and doctors as a tool for generating profits.72  
 
The problem of SID was especially serious in third-tiered medical institutions 
where people were attracted to seek better medical care.73 It became more severe 
when price control was relaxed in the early 1980s to give hospitals more room to 
increase charges for different medicines, hospital services and medical equipment.74 
                                                 
69 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 1, and Researcher 1. 
70 Interview with Professor 2. 
71 In 1986, seven provinces surveyed by the MOH surveyed were Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu, Fujian, 
Hubei, Sichuan, and Shaanxi. The two cities surveyed were Beijing and Shanghai. 
72 Interview with Professor 2. 
73 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 1, Researcher 1, Government Official 1, and Armed Police 
Officer 1. 
74 Interviews with Professor 1 and Professor 5. 
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Healthcare became a commodity to be bought and sold, and was available to those 
who could afford it. As Professor 2 said during the interview, hospitals and doctors 
would not regard SID as an unethical practice but “a strategy to survive in the 
changing economic environment”.75 On the other hand, the local government turned a 
blind eye to the practice of SID because prohibiting the practice would only lead to 
hospitals asking for money from the government.76 In brief, policy feedback from 
fiscal decentralization, the financial responsibility system and the relaxation of price 
controls created strong incentives for hospitals and doctors to charge patients 
substantially greater than the actual cost in Shanghai. 
 
The new problem of SID arising out of economic reform drastically escalated the 
healthcare expenditures of citizens in Shanghai. It further worsened the free 
healthcare system in Shanghai that had long been plagued with the problem of moral 
hazard from the demand side. Policy feedback from the LIS implemented since the 
early 1950s provided free outpatient and inpatient services for employees in SOEs and 
the collective enterprises and their dependents while policy feedback from the GHS 
provided free medical treatment for government employees and retirees, army 
veterans, university and college students, staff in the cultural, education, health and 
                                                 
75 Interview with Professor 2. 
76 Interviews with Professor 2 and Government Official 1. 
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science sectors, and retirees from these sectors (Grogan, 1995, p. 1074; Cheung, 2001, 
p.65; Gu, 2001a, p.200). Beneficiaries’ entitlements to the LIS and GHS to generous 
medical benefits led to the problem of moral hazard from the demand side, which 
caused unnecessary waste of medical resources and money.77 As Professor 2 said 
during the interview, “the non-contributory nature of the LIS and GHS improperly 
encouraged people entitled to these schemes to over-utilize healthcare service”.78 
Both the LIS and GHS beneficiaries were not cost conscious when seeking healthcare 
because they were not responsible for their abusive behavior.79 Besides, the free 
healthcare system in Shanghai was plagued with the problem of having too many 
retired people using the system.80 Enterprise units and the government had to pay the 
medical bills for their retired workers.81 The older the enterprise units were, the more 
retired workers they had, and the heavier the financial burden they had to bear (Gu, 
2001b, p.98; Yu and Ren, 1997, p.447).82  Retired workers usually had higher 
healthcare expenditures due to having more illnesses and poorer health, thereby 
causing tremendous financial burden on both the government and enterprise units.83 
                                                 
77 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Researcher 1, Researcher 2, Insurance Company Manager 
2, and Citizen 3. 
78 Interview with Professor 2. 
79 Interviews with Professor 6, Insurance Company Manager 2, and Citizen 5. 
80 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 6, and Government Official 1. 
81 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and Professor 6. 
82 Shanghai had become the first ageing city in the PRC since 1979 (Li and Zhu, 2010, p.36; Zhang, 
2004) when the segment of its population aged 65 and above first accounted for 7.2 per cent, which 
fit the United nation’s definition of ageing society as one with 7 per cent or more of its population 
being aged 65 and above (Zhang, 2004). The longer the retired employees lived, the heavier financial 
burden the enterprise units bore. 
83 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and Professor 6. 
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When the new problem of SID arose, it worsened the free healthcare system at a faster 
pace in Shanghai by drastically escalating the healthcare expenditures. It ended up 
imposing unmanageable financial burdens to the enterprise units, the central and local 
governments. 
 
 Also, policy feedback from the enterprise reform imposed greater financial 
pressure for enterprise units to pay the medical expenses of LIS beneficiaries. The 
implementation of enterprise reform made the enterprise units become responsible for 
paying the healthcare expenditures of their employees. In order to increase enterprise 
units’ efficiency and their responsiveness to market forces, the central government 
decentralized both administration and responsibility to the enterprise units (Gu, 2001c, 
p.133) which became “responsible for all their economic decisions, as well as their 
return of a profit or loss” (Hsü, 2000, p.850). On one hand, the enterprise units 
enjoyed the autonomy to make decision with respect to production plans, personnel 
management (recruitment, promotion, dismissal), salaries, bonuses, distribution of 
profits, capital allocation and utilization (Hsü, 2000, p.855; Gu, 2001c, p.134; Saich, 
2004, p.255). On the other hand, they became responsible for paying employees’ 
welfare expenditures through self-financing because the central government ceased to 
distribute fiscal appropriations to enterprise units’ welfare funds (Gu, 2001c, p.134). 
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They used their profits to pay the healthcare expenditures of LIS beneficiaries.84 
However, the rapid increase in healthcare expenditures led to enterprise units, in 
particular the SOEs, having a big drain on profits which could have been used to 
reinvest in their businesses.85 It also damaged the financial viability of enterprise 
units and impaired their competitiveness in the market economy.86 Enterprise units 
became weaker players in the market. 
 
The rapid increase in healthcare expenditures adversely affected enterprise units’ 
ability to pay medical bills for their employees entitled to the LIS. Enterprise units 
which barely earned a profit or had little profit left only paid part of the medical 
expenses for their employees (Grogan, 1995, p.1079). Besides, those which used 
contract-based system to hire employees only paid part of the medical expenses for 
their employees or did not pay any medical expenses for their employees at all.87 
Also, enterprise units which were financially insolvent became incapable of paying 
the medical expenses for their employees (Yu, 1998, p.9). 
 
Policy feedback from the LIS only allowed employees of SOEs and collective 
enterprises and their dependents to enjoy the entitlement to free medical benefits. 
                                                 
84 Interview with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
85 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 5. 
86 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 5. 
87 Interview with Insurance Company Manager 2.  
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Hence, employees who were laid off from SOEs and collective enterprises under the 
economic reform lost their entitlement to the LIS (Dong, 2003, p.225). Besides, 
policy feedback from the LIS that only required SOEs and collective enterprises to 
provide LIS for their employees exacerbated the problem of employees being 
‘underinsured’ and ‘uninsured’ because private enterprises emerged and prospered 
under the enterprise reform and foreign enterprises under the Open Door Policy did 
not need to provide any LIS for their employees.88 As Professor 6 said during the 
interview, employees being ‘underinsured’ and ‘uninsured’ were particularly serious 
in Shanghai because Deng’s adoption of Open Door Policy had the preference for 
channeling foreign investment to Shanghai in the mid-1980s.89 While the continued 
growth of foreign and private enterprises sped up the pace of economic development 
in Shanghai, it concurrently deepened the problem of employees having ‘no health 
insurance coverage’.90   
 
                                                 
88 Interview with Professor 6. Since Professor 6 regarded both the LIS and GHS as ‘insurance’ 
prorgammes, he used ‘underinsured’ to reflect the situation of employees only having part of their 
medical expenses paid by their work units while using ‘uninsured’ to reflect the situation of 
employees having no work units to pay for their medical expenses. 
89 Interview with Professor 6. Under the economic reform, Deng implemented Open Door policy, 
which unprecedentedly opened up the PRC to foreign capital, technology, and investment for 
economic advancement. It led to the establishment of four special economic zones (SEZs) in 1980, 
including Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen. Besides, there was the opening of 14 coastal 
cities in 1984, including Beihai, Dalian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Lianyungang, 
Nantong, Ningbo, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wenzhou, Yantai, and Zhanjiang (Yeung et al., 2009, p.225). In 
June 1985, Deng announced that foreign investment should be channeled specially to four of the 
biggest coastal cities which included Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Dalian (Grogan, 1995, 
p.1075). 
90 Interview with Professor 6. 
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Transferring the responsibility of financing the LIS to the enterprise units did not 
help relieve the central government’s financial burden of healthcare. It was because 
policy feedback from the GHS that the central government’s responsibility for 
financing the GHS through the state budget remained unchanged 91 although under 
economic reform it decentralized the financing of the GHS to local governments 
which could determine the per capita GHS budget “based on local budgets and the 
previous use rates of health care services” (Liu and Yi, 2004, pp.31-2). Then, the GHS 
budget was allocated to the work units of GHS beneficiaries to manage (Liu and Yi, 
2004, p.31). Any deficits had to be met by the work units “using their operating 
budget and/or other self-raising fund” (Liu and Yi, 2004, p.31). As Insurance 
Company Manager 2 said during the interview, since the work units of GHS 
beneficiaries such as government departments and universities were not profit-making 
institutions, they hardly had money drawn from other sources to meet the deficits 
when their employees’ healthcare expenditures exceeded the GHS budget. 92 
Therefore, the so-called self-raised funds actually were seeking financial help from 
the local government which in turn set a higher per capita GHS budget.93 When the 
economic reform proceeded, work units seeking financial help from the local 
government became more frequent, which increased the financial burden of both the 
                                                 
91 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
92 Interview with Insurance Company Manager 2.  
93 Interview with Insurance Company Manager 2. 
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local and central governments.94 
 
 Indeed, policy feedback from the economic reform implemented since 1978 and 
the LIS and GHS implemented since the early 1950s created many problems, 
including drastic increase in healthcare expenditures, the moral hazard from the 
demand side, imposing greater financial pressure for enterprise units and central 
government to pay the medical expenditures of their employees, and exacerbating the 
problem of employees being ‘underinsured’ and ‘uninsured’. It accelerated the pace of 
collapse of the free healthcare system in Shanghai and compelled the government to 
implement urban health insurance reform. 
 
 The collapse of the free healthcare system in Shanghai was due to unstable and 
insufficient financial support for paying the rising healthcare expenditures. In the 
1980s, both the enterprise units and the government found the financial burden of 
medical expenses unbearable when there was a continued growth in the number of 
LIS and GHS beneficiaries and a continued growth in healthcare expenditures. In 
Shanghai, from 1978 to 1989, the number of employees joining the LIS rose from 
about 3.6 million to about 5.5 million, which respectively accounted for about 33 per 
                                                 
94 Interview with Insurance Company Manager 2 and Insurance Company Manager 1. 
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cent and about 43 per cent of Shanghai’s total population (Zhang and Shao, 1998, 
p.115). As to the number of employees joining the GHS, it rose from 498,000 in 1980 
to 769,000 in 1985, which respectively accounted for about 4 per cent and 6 per cent 
of Shanghai’s total population (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116). The total number of 
LIS and GHS beneficiaries would be more if retired employees were also taken into 
account.95 At the same time, both the overall LIS and GHS expenditures and the 
average annual LIS and GHS expenditure per beneficiary continued to increase 
drastically because of the problems of SID, moral hazard from the demand side and 
having too many retired employees using the free healthcare system. According to 
Zhang and Shao (1998), the LIS expenditure rose from RMB 120 million in 1978 to 
RMB 1,560 million in 1989 (p.115). The average annual health insurance expenditure 
per LIS beneficiary rose about five times, from about RMB 55 in 1978 to about RMB 
283 in 1989 (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.115). As to the GHS expenditure, it rose for 
about eight times, from RMB 19.7 million in 1980 to about RMB 152.6 million in 
1990 (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116). The average annual health insurance 
expenditure per GHS beneficiary rose from about RMB 40 in 1980 to about RMB 198 
                                                 
95 No interviewees were able to give the exact or estimated number of retired population enjoying 
either the LIS or GHS before urban health insurance reform took place in Shanghai. However, 
Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2000 showed that there were 952, 400 retired employees of enterprise 
units in 1980, with 673,900 employees retiring from SOEs and 278,500 employees retiring from 
collective enterprises (Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2000). In 1990, the number of retired 
employees of enterprise units drastically rose to about 1.6 million, with 1.1 million employees 
retiring from SOEs and 424, 200 employees retiring from collective enterprises (Shanghai Municipal 
Statistics Bureau, 2000). Since enterprise units were responsible for paying the medical bills of their 
retired employees, they bore heavy financial burden.   
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in 1990 (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.116).  
 
The alarming trend of soaring healthcare expenditures became irreversible in 
Shanghai and in other places within the PRC. A continued drain on the state budget 
and profits weakened the financial capacity of both the government and enterprise 
units to sustain the free healthcare system. The problem of employees paying their 
medical expenses out-of-pocket at point of consumption became serious. In Shanghai, 
the number of patients having self-pay medical treatments rose from 6 per cent in 
1980 to 10 per cent in the late 1980s (Zhang and Shao, 1998, p.114). Those who failed 
to have self-payment delayed getting needed healthcare or failed to access 
healthcare.96 It showed that the free healthcare system which functioned well in the 
socialist planning economy did not perform well within the new institutional 
configuration of the market economy (Gu, 2001a, p.199). Without unstable and 
insufficient financial support, the free healthcare system began to collapse. It 
compelled the central government to reform the free healthcare system.  
 
(c) The Authoritative Political Institutions 
Historical institutionalism argues that political institutions play a determinant role in 
                                                 
96 Interviews with Professor 6 and Hong Kong Citizen 1. 
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constraining or facilitating the structure of political opportunities for political actors in 
a given polity (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941; Immergut, 1998, p.21) and shaping their 
strategies and goals in the decision-making process that in turn shape the political 
outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). In the PRC, the 
authoritative political institutions with the strong influence of the CCP and a highly 
centralized decision-making structure enabled the central government to implement a 
nationwide urban health insurance reform in 1998 without any political impediments. 
As Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6 and Researcher 2 said during their interviews, 
the CCP was the locus of political power in the PRC and never faced any political 
opposition which challenged its role as the ruling party since the establishment of the 
PRC in 1949.97 The CCP claimed that it represented the interests of the people and 
was able to act in the best interest of the state.98 Being a non-democratic state, the 
PRC had a centralized political system without any separation of executive, legislative 
and judicial powers that the CCP enjoyed the monopoly on setting national goals and 
policy making, including the monopoly on setting healthcare goals and making 
healthcare policy. 99  It adopted a top-down decision-making model which only 
allowed the political leaders, senior and high-ranking ministerial officials to 
participate in the process of formulating health insurance policy behind closed door 
                                                 
97 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Researcher 2.  
98 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Researcher 2.  
99 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Researcher 2.  
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and left no room for public participation or policy opposition.100 As Citizen 1, Citizen 
2, Citizen 5, Citizen 7 and Armed Police Officer 1 said during their interviews, the 
CCP was the strong authoritative voice in the PRC while the voices from the public 
and non-state actors were weak that citizens’ open criticism of the CCP and its 
policies was deemed risky.101 
 
The argument made by the interviewees warrants a discussion here with the help 
of literature. The written Constitution legitimized the power of the CCP (Christiansen 
and Rai, 1996, p.83) and vested the CCP with full authority (Gu, 2009, p.227). Over 
the past six decades, the CCP had ensured its position as the dominant political 
institution in the PRC by providing political, ideological and organizational leadership 
(Townsend and Womack, 1986, p.89). It exercised its leadership functions, ensured its 
control over government operations and sustained the strong party-state by 
dominating and penetrating all levels of government from provinces, cities, counties 
to townships (Duckett, 2011, p.14; Gu, 2009, p.132; Guo, 2003, p.55; Townsend and 
Womack, 1986, p.89) and by emphasizing “thought control and reinforcing the party 
line” (Gu, 2009, p.132). Leading party cadres at various levels concurrently occupied 
the highest posts in local government institutions (Li, 2010, p.166) and established 
                                                 
100 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Researcher 2. 
101 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 7, and Armed Police Officer 1. 
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party cells within government entities to oversee all activities (Duckett, 2011, p.14; 
Gu, 2009, p.132). It was the CCP that made policy (Joseph, 2010a, p.13) and the state 
or government that operated “merely as the executor of decisions made by the party” 
(Li, 2010, p.166). Policy making “remained relatively closed” (Duckett, 2011, p.15) 
and had “little open public debate or lobbying” (Duckett, 2011, p.15). The general 
public “retained the mentality of deference and dependence” (Guo, 2003, p.110), 
which was conducive to stabilizing and reinforcing the legitimacy of the CCP rule 
(Guo, 2003, p.110).  
 
(i) The Roles of the Central Committee and the State Council 
Concerning the top-down decision-making model, attention needed to be paid to the 
roles played by the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council. The Central 
Committee was the highest authority within the CCP containing the leading figures of 
the PRC, including president of the PRC and premier of the State Council. It was “the 
most important representative body in the PRC” (Townsend and Womack, 1986, p.91) 
having “the power to make decisions on major policies of a nationwide character” 
(Wang, 2002, p.406).102 The State Council, which consisted “almost entirely of 
high-ranking party members” (Townsend and Womack, 1986, p.101), was the highest 
                                                 
102 Please refer to Article 15 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982).  
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executive organ and the command headquarter (Wang, 2002, pp.92-3) exerting 
leadership over the ministries, bureaux, commissions and committees (Saich, 2004, 
p.133), and was responsible for administering and coordinating the government’s 
programmes at the provincial and local levels (Wang, 2002, pp.92-3). The Central 
Committee and the State Council had close relationship when formulating health 
insurance policy. 103  While the Central Committee indicated the direction of 
healthcare reform should proceed, the State Council established leading small groups 
(lingdao xiaozu) or small groups (xiaozu) to propose policies, implement pilot 
experiments of health insurance reform, and give suggestions to the Central 
Committee based on the results of the pilot experiments. 104  Once the Central 
Committee approved the healthcare policy option it chose, the State Council would 
administer various ministries below it to actualize the healthcare reform.105  
 
Indeed, the close relationship of the Central Committee and the State Council 
was reflected in the timeline of urban health insurance reform in the PRC. Since the 
mid-1980s, the Central Committee’s emphasis on implementing the economic reform 
had led to accelerating the pace of implementing health insurance system reform106 
                                                 
103 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Insurance Company Manager 2.  
104 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Insurance Company Manager 2.  
105 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Insurance Company Manager 2.  
106 For more details, please refer to the Notification of the Key Points of 1989 Economic Reform Made 
by the State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems (Chinese Version). 
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because the free healthcare system was in bad condition and acted as an institutional 
impediment to further enterprise reforms and economic reforms (Gu, 2001a, p.197). 
During the three years from 1985 to 1987, the average annual growth rate of 
healthcare expenditures in the state sector reaching about 25 per cent “compelled the 
central government to put health reform on the policy agenda” (Gu, 2001a, p.208). In 
March 1988, the State Council established a Research Small Group on Health 
Insurance System Reform to draft a proposal on reforming the GHS and LIS (Gu, 
2001a, p.208; Wong et al., 2006, p.16). However, the pilot reform based on the 
suggestions of the Research Small Group “could not reverse the national tendency of 
soaring [healthcare] expenditure” (Gu, 2001a, p.209). This in turn compelled the 
Central Committee to initiate a new round of pilot health insurance reform.  
 
In May 1992, the State Council established a Small Group on Healthcare System 
Reform to conduct a comprehensive study on reforming the GHS and LIS (The State 
Council, 1992). In November 1993, the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth 
Central Committee of the CCP decided on a health insurance system for urban 
employees based on a contribution system consisting of the individual MSA and the 
SPF (The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP, 1993).107 In November 1994, 
                                                 
107 Please refer to the Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP Concerning the Establishment of 
the Socialist Market Economy (Chinese Version). 
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the State Council commenced the pilot experiments of health insurance reform in the 
two jiangs (Gu, 2001a, p.209; Liu et al., 2004, p.43; Tang and Meng, 2004, p.32; 
Wong et al., 2006, p.16).108 Based on the Central Committee’s decision to accelerate 
the urban health insurance reform, the State Council decreed in May 1996 that all 
provincial government should implement the experimental health insurance reform 
based on the “two-jiang model” (The State Council, 1996). At the same time, the State 
Council established a Leading Small Group on the Pilot Spots of Health Insurance 
System Reform for Urban Employees to deal with the extension of experimental 
health insurance reform in “57 cities in 27 provinces” (Yu, 1998, p.2).  
 
In January 1997, the Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued the 
Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council Concerning 
Public Health Reform and Development, which talked about the necessity of 
reforming the health insurance system for urban employees and expanding the health 
insurance coverage so as to provide the basic medical protection for urban employees 
(The Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council, 1997). In order to pursue a 
nationwide urban health insurance reform, the State Council on December 14, 1998 
promulgated the 1998 Decree (The State Council, 1998), which required all urban 
                                                 
108 For more details, please refer to the Approval of the Proposal for Pilot Health Insurance System 
Reform for Urban Employees in Zhenjiang in Jiangsu Province and Jiujiang in Jiangxi Province 
(Chinese Version) issued by State Council on November 18, 1994.    
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work units and their employees to participate in the BMI System.  
 
(ii) Leading Small Groups, Their Key Participants and the Bargaining Process 
The role of leading small groups or small groups of the State Council needs further 
elaboration here. Most of the current Chinese and English literature about healthcare 
reform in the PRC seldom mentioned the existence of leading small groups or 
contained detailed information or discussion about the nature of leading small groups. 
During the interview, except Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6 and Insurance 
Company Manager 2, most of the interviewees had difficulty in giving a detailed 
description about the role or nature of leading small groups of the State Council in 
healthcare policy making process. This was due to the fact that being the important 
institutions, leading small groups or small groups did not officially appear on the 
organizational chart of the CCP and were “largely hidden from public view” 
(Lieberthal, 2004, p.217). The policy making process was not transparent in the PRC 
and there were limited official documents disclosed to the public. While this could be 
understood as one of the characteristics of policy making in the PRC, this could also 
meant that one was not easy to grasp the understanding of leading small groups well. 
Nevertheless, the work of Lieberthal (2004), Hai and Fook (2005) and Miller (2008) 
were few of the current literature offering insights about the nature of leading small 
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groups in the PRC.  
 
In fact, leading small groups or small groups were not new institutions used by 
the Chinese leadership for policy making (Hai and Fook, 2005, p.2). First created in 
1958 in the Central Committee and later in the State Council and People’s Liberation 
Army (Miller, 2008, pp.2-3), leading small groups or small groups were informal 
bodies being used as a complement to “reduce the workload of already burdened (and 
often elderly) decision makers” (Hai and Fook, 2005, p.2). They dealt with “major 
and complex issues which cut across geographic and bureaucratic lines” (Hai and 
Fook, 2005, p.2), ranging from politics and laws, party affairs, culture and education, 
economic affairs, science and technology to foreign affairs (Miller, 2008, pp.8-21). 
They were “a bridge between the top leaders of the political system and the major 
bureaucracies” (Lieberthal, 2004, p.216) and a coordination mechanism to straddle 
different ministries in policy deliberation so that various views could be tapped to 
make the best recommendation and cooperation among ministries could be ensured 
during policy implementation (Hai and Fook, 2005, pp.1-2). In brief, leading small 
groups or small groups were “the trouble-shooter, problem-solver and arbitrator” (Hai 
and Fook, 2005, p.2) of the Chinese leadership.  
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Leading small groups or small groups of the State Council played a crucial role 
in formulating health insurance policy because there were about 20 ministries 
containing certain degrees of responsibilities for healthcare in the PRC.109 “Nine 
dragons harnessing floods” (jiu long zhi shui) was the Chinese idiom adopted by 
Professor 2 and Insurance Company Manager 2 interviewed to describe this complex 
institutional arrangement for healthcare.110 Since healthcare was a complicated issue 
in the PRC and involved multi-institutions, leading small groups or small groups of 
the State Council served as ad hoc committees where heads or representatives of 
various ministries gathered together to exchange ideas, monitor the progress of pilot 
health insurance reform experiments and tried to reach a consensus on health 
insurance reform proposal.111 For example, the Research Small Group on Health 
Insurance System Reform established in March 1988 included the directors and heads 
of the State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems, Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Finance, State Pharmaceutical Bureau, the 
Organization Department of the Central Committee of China, All China Federation of 
Trade Unions and the People’s Insurance Company of China (Gu, 2001a, p.208). 
Under the leadership of the State Council, the Research Small Group “recommended 
that medical costs [should] be borne jointly by the employer and the employees” 
                                                 
109 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
110 Interviews with Professor 2 and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
111 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
 231 
(Wong et al., 2006, p.16) and Dandong, Siping, Huangshi and Zhuzhou should be 
chosen as the pilot cities to implement the experimental reform (Gu, 2001a, p.208; 
Wong et al., 2006, p.16).  
 
As to the Small Group on Healthcare System Reform established in May 1992, it 
comprised the directors and heads of seven government entities and a national trade 
union federation led by the CCP, including the State Commission for Restructuring 
Economic Systems, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Personnel, 
Ministry of Finance, Price Bureau, Medical Bureau and All China Federation of Trade 
Unions, to conduct a comprehensive study on reforming the GHS and LIS (The State 
Council, 1992). Under the direct leadership of the State Council, the Small Group 
used about six months to regularly discuss the current situation, problems, steps and 
experience of health insurance reform and conduct pilot health insurance reform 
experiments by using different reform models in different provinces, autonomous 
regions, municipalities and counties in order to formulate a reform proposal (The 
State Council, 1992). Also, the Leading Small Group on the Pilot Spots of Health 
Insurance System Reform for Urban Employees established in May 1996 comprised 
the representatives of different ministries and related authority such as the State 
Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems, Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
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Labor and Ministry of Finance to lead, guide, supervise, coordinate and evaluate the 
health insurance reform experiments based on the two-jiang model in pilot spots.112 
 
The policy making process within the leading small groups or small groups of 
the State Council was a process involving bargaining among members of different 
ministries.113 This was attributed to the fact that the division of authority among the 
ministries was not clear, the ministries operated largely independently on a daily basis, 
had different interests to defend, and saw the way to reform the free healthcare system 
from different angles and perspectives.114 Professor 2 and Professor 5 who had close 
relationship with the health-related authority felt uncomfortable disclosing the 
bargaining process within the leading small groups in detail because the information 
was sensitive and was related to top leadership. Thus, they were unwilling to go 
through each commission or ministry participating in the leading small groups or 
small groups of the State Council. Nevertheless, Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6 
and Insurance Company Manager 2 interviewed mentioned the positions of four key 
political institutions when formulating health insurance policy. They were the State 
Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems, the Ministry of Health, the 
                                                 
112 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Insurance Company Manager 2. For more 
details, please refer to the Opinion on Expanding the Pilot Spots for Reforming Health Insurance 
System for Urban Employees (Chinese Version) issued by the State Commission for Restructuring 
Economic Systems, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Health in April 1996.  
113 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 5. 
114 Interviews with Professor 2 and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
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Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor respectively.  
 
The State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems, which was 
established in early 1982 to study and guide the overall economic reform and to 
coordinate the interests of all parties to ensure the smooth implementation of 
economic reform, emphasized efficiency and favored less government involvement in 
healthcare financing.115 The Ministry of Health, which was responsible for managing 
hospitals, favored protecting the interests of hospitals and doctors and wanted to 
ensure that health insurance reform would not affect the incomes earned by hospitals 
and doctors.116 The Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for managing and 
supervising the public expenditures of the central government, had a fiscally 
conservative position. 117  It favored balancing the fiscal budget of the central 
government and reducing the government’s financial burden caused by escalating 
healthcare expenditures and shrinking the government’s role in financing 
healthcare.118 The Ministry of Labor, which was responsible for managing the LIS, 
was eager to reduce the financial burden of enterprises and favored cost-sharing and 
                                                 
115 Interview with Professor 6 and Insurance Company Manager 2. According to Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988), the commissions “are at a higher bureaucratic level than are ministries” (p.63). 
They “take a more comprehensive view of things than do the more narrowly focused line 
ministries” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988, p.63). In 1998, the institutional reform led to the State 
Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems becoming the Office of Restructuring Economic 
Systems. In 2003, the Office of Restructuring Economic Systems was merged with State Economic 
and Trade Commission and became National Development and Reform Commission.  
116 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, Professor 6, and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
117 Interview with Professor 5. 
118 Interview with Professor 5. 
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risk-pooling measures. 119  From the above, it showed that the commission and 
ministries took divergent positions on health insurance reform and represented 
different interests which appeared to be in conflict with each other. It was not easy to 
reach a consensus on health insurance option which could satisfy all the commissions 
and ministries involved without making any compromises. It implied that there were 
even more differences when there were 20 ministries involving in healthcare. As 
Professor 5 and Professor 6 said during their interviews, disagreement among 
ministries over health insurance policy was unavoidable.120 Competing policy options, 
conflicting perspectives and conflicting interests among ministries often led to 
time-consuming discussion, heated debates, or even impasse.121 Nevertheless, since 
the commissions and ministries knew that the Central Committee was the final 
decision-maker while their tasks were to propose policy options to the Central 
Committee, they would find ways to reconcile their differences and find common 
ground to peacefully co-exist.122  
 
The closed policy-making process within the leading small groups or small 
groups of the State Council showed that the leading small groups were confined to a 
small circle of senior officials from different ministries only. Other stakeholders or 
                                                 
119 Interviews with Professor 6 and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
120 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 6. 
121 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 6. 
122 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 6. 
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interest groups in health insurance reform such as employers/work units, employees, 
patients, doctors, pharmaceutical companies and insurance companies barely had a 
chance to voice out their opinions.123 As Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 5, 
Professor 6 said during their interviews, scholars and experts on health insurance were 
sometimes invited to meet the members of the leading small groups of the State 
Council for joining the discussions.124 Their opinions could be served as useful 
reference for the leading small groups.125 However, they may not decisively influence 
the formulation of health insurance policy.126 Insurance Director 1 and Insurance 
Company Manager 2 interviewed also said that representatives of the insurance 
companies were sometimes invited to meet the government officials of the leading 
small groups of the State Council. 127  However, the opinions given by the 
representatives of the insurance companies were not influential and could be rejected 
immediately during the meeting.128 Doctor 1 and Doctor 2 interviewed said that the 
culture of doctors expressing opinions on health insurance policy did not exist and 
doctors liked them did not have the enthusiasm for expressing opinions on healthcare 
issues.129 Citizen 1, Citizen 3, Citizen 4 and Citizen 6 interviewed said that the 
government did not consult their opinions on health insurance reform, but they did not 
                                                 
123 Interviews with Professor 5, Professor 6, Insurance Company Manager 2, and Insurance Director 1.  
124 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
125 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 5, and Professor 6 
126 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
127 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 2 and Insurance Director 1. 
128 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 2 and Insurance Director 1. 
129 Interviews with Doctor 1 and Doctor 2.  
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bother to express their opinions because they did not think that their opinions carried 
any weight.130  
 
It shows that the closed policy-making process did not give stakeholders outside 
the leading small groups or small groups of the State Council an equal footing to 
participate in policy formulation and discussion. Scholars and representatives of 
insurance companies could only express their opinions on health insurance reform at 
the invitation of government officials. On the other hand, both the doctors and citizens 
were indifferent to expressing opinions on health insurance reform because they did 
not think their opinions were influential enough to shape the health insurance policy. 
In the PRC, the authoritative political institutions with the strong influence of the CCP 
and a highly centralized decision-making structure did not provide any veto 
opportunities for non-bureaucratic stakeholders in healthcare insurance reform or 
interest groups to affect policy proposals or policy results. Non-bureaucratic 
stakeholders or interest groups did not have any leverage over healthcare financing 
policy making. In brief, the closed policy-making process gave the central 
government an advantage in formulating and choosing urban health insurance reform 
policy it favored in the absence of voices of other stakeholders.  
                                                 
130 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, and Citizen 6. 
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(d) New Ideas being Championed by the Political Leader and Key Bureaucratic 
Actors 
Historical institutionalism argues that ideational forces matter in policy making 
because they “favor significant policy change or reinforce existing institutional paths” 
(Hwang, 2006, p.16). In the PRC, the new ideas of individual MSA, the SPF, 
co-payment, individual responsibility and social solidarity were championed by the 
political leader and key bureaucratic actors from different ministries that a new 
mandatory health insurance system replaced the free healthcare system in Shanghai. 
As Professor 5 and Professor 6 said during their interviews, these new ideas could 
achieve political prominence because they fitted into the market-oriented economic 
context well and were believed to be a solution to the intractable problems of moral 
hazard from the demand side and rising healthcare expenditures.131 On the other hand, 
the old ideas of free healthcare and egalitarianism were regarded as one of the root 
causes of rising healthcare expenditures and impediments to further promote 
economic reforms. 132  The collapse of the free healthcare system provided an 
opportune time for the political leader and key bureaucratic actors to promote and 
endorse new ideas.133 The highly centralized decision-making structure and closed 
                                                 
131 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 6. 
132 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 6. 
133 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 6. 
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policy-making process favored the political leader and key bureaucratic actors 
adopting these new ideas without facing any stiff opposition.134 As a result, these new 
ideas gained political prominence and were adopted in urban health insurance 
reform.135 
 
 In fact, the new health insurance model adopted by the Central Committee 
showed that the leading small groups of the State Council did not generate the health 
insurance option from scratch but by borrowing international experience. The new 
model which combined the individual MSA and the SPF was a new mandatory health 
insurance system replacing the work-unit-based free healthcare system.  The 
institutional design of the new insurance model showed that the individual MSA was 
similar to the Medisave Scheme in Singapore in 1984 while the SPF and the 
mandatory contribution from both the work units and employees was similar to the 
sickness fund of the social insurance scheme in Germany. As Professor 5 and 
Professor 2 said during their interviews, the “two-jiang model” had a funding 
framework based on the compulsory medical savings scheme in Singapore and 
borrowed the German experience to form the institutional framework of the new 
health insurance model.136 This was similar to the findings of Yip and Hsiao (1997) 
                                                 
134 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 6. 
135 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 6. 
136 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 2.  
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and Cheung (2001) that the “two-jiang model” patterned after the Singapore’s 
Medisave Scheme and the finding of Gu and Zhang (2006) that the Singaporean 
funding arrangement was “incorporated into the German-style institutional framework 
of social insurance” (p.58). Professor 5 and Professor 2 interviewed said that it was 
common for governments to borrow experience from other countries when they 
implemented reform.137 Since the PRC had become an open economy in the late 
1970s, it was understandable for the leading small groups of the State Council to look 
at international experience for reference.  
 
Nevertheless, the institutional design of the new health insurance model showed 
that the leading small groups of the State Council did not directly copy the health 
insurance models from Singapore and Germany because the political, economic and 
social contexts of the PRC were different from that of Singapore and Germany. The 
path-dependent logic had played a role in shaping the design of the new health 
insurance model in the PRC. The Singapore’s compulsory medical savings scheme 
emphasized self-reliance and had the advantages of increasing cost consciousness and 
reducing the moral hazard on the demand side. However, the leading small groups of 
the State Council did not follow the contribution requirements of the Medisave 
                                                 
137 Interviews with Professor 5 and Professor 2. 
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Scheme, which required the work units and employees, including the self-employed, 
to equally contribute 6 to 8 per cent of their earnings as insurance premium (Hsiao, 
1995b, p.261). Instead, they excluded the self-employed to participate in the health 
insurance reform and required the work units and employees to respectively 
contribute 10 per cent and 1 per cent of their total wage bill as insurance premium. In 
fact, the practice of excluding the self-employed and having the work units bearing 
higher contribution rate reflected the institutional legacies of the past that the health 
insurance benefit was work-unit based and the work units assumed the financial 
responsibility to pay for employees’ medical expenses. As a result, the State Council, 
when implementing the health insurance reform, excluded the self-employed who did 
not belong to any work units from participating in urban health insurance reform. 
Besides, although the work units no longer responsible for paying the full amount of 
the employees’ medical expenses, they were required to pay a higher insurance 
premium rate.  
 
The German institutional framework of social insurance adopted by the leading 
small groups of the State Council emphasized social solidarity and redistributive 
financing and had the advantage of providing a risk pool to insure the enterprise 
employees against catastrophic illnesses. The insurance pool that was absent in the 
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work units in the past could prevent the work units from running deficits or being 
bankrupt due to paying medical expenses for their own employees. It could also 
prevent the employees from being underinsured or uninsured because of work units 
having fiscal difficulties in paying their medical expenses. In brief, the institutional 
design of the new health insurance model showed that the leading small groups of the 
State Council carefully designed the health insurance model during the policy-making 
process. 
 
(e) Implementing Urban Health Insurance Reform in a Decentralized Manner 
As mentioned before, historical institutionalism argues that political institutions play a 
determinant role in facilitating or constraining the structure of political opportunities 
for political actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941; Immergut, 1998, p.21) to strive for 
particular goals or strategies to achieve these ends (Immergut, 1998, p.20). In the PRC, 
the central government’s delegation of power to the local governments increased the 
enthusiasm of the Shanghai municipal government to implement urban health 
insurance reform. During Deng’s era, while the CCP still centralized the political and 
policy making powers in its hands, it decentralized the administrative power to the 
local governments to implement policy reforms. For healthcare, local governments 
were encouraged to implement variations based on national health insurance model to 
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reflect different needs and socioeconomic conditions of local governments. 138 
Decentralization increased the autonomy, discretion, efficiency, enthusiasm, flexibility, 
incentives, initiatives and support of local governments for implementing health 
insurance reform.139 As Professor 2 and Government Official 1 said during their 
interviews, the Shanghai municipal government benefited from the decentralized 
power to experiment with the Shanghai model to constrain growth of healthcare 
expenditures.140 Its successful experience in 1996 gained recognition from the central 
government and this boosted its activism and confidence to implement urban health 
insurance reform in 1998.141 Knowing that it was a role model in health insurance 
reform, the Shanghai municipal government spent much time and effort to carefully 
consider the contribution rate and the payment structure of the BMI scheme and 
develop lengthy instructions on the use of BMI.142 According to Shanghai Statistical 
Yearbook 2010, there were about 3.6 million BMI participants in 2000 (Shanghai 
Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2011), covering only about 22 per cent of Shanghai 
population.143 In 2008, the BMI System covered about 41 per cent of Shanghai 
population, including about 4.5 million working participants and about 3.2 million 
retired participants (Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2009). 
                                                 
138 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
139 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
140 Interviews with Professor 2 and Government Official 1. 
141 Interviews with Professor 2 and Government Official 1. 
142 Interview with Government Official 1.  
143 According to Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2010, the year-end resident population in Shanghai was 
about 16.08 million.  
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In brief, using historical institutionalism to examine urban health insurance 
reform in Shanghai shows that Shanghai succeeded in implementing health insurance 
reform since the mid-1980s because of seven reasons: (1) changes in political and 
economic contexts due to the new political leader of the CCP coming to power, (2) 
ideological shift from egalitarianism to pro-market policies, (3) policy feedback 
which accelerated the pace of collapse of the free healthcare system, (4) the 
authoritative political institutions with the strong influence of the CCP and a highly 
centralized decision-making structure, (5) the dominance of the political leader and 
key bureaucratic stakeholders from different ministries in the healthcare insurance 
reform process, (6) new ideas being championed by the political leader and key 
bureaucratic actors, and (7) the decentralization power given to the local governments 
to implement urban health insurance reform. 
 
6.4 Different Views on the Changes Brought by Health Insurance Reform  
The implementation of health insurance reform in Shanghai could affect stakeholders 
in many aspects: citizens’ access to, affordability of and demand for healthcare, 
healthcare providers’ capacity of and efficiency in healthcare delivery, insurers’ 
profits and their freedom of action. As illustrated below, different stakeholders who 
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had different interests and expectations toward health insurance reform responded 
differently to the change in policy path. This section will examine the views of former 
LIS and GHS beneficiaries, BMI participants, non-BMI participants, doctors, 
pharmaceutical company managers, private insurance managers and director, a 
government official, scholars and researchers on health insurance reform in Shanghai. 
Their views reflected policy feedback. 
 
(1) Former LIS or GHS beneficiaries 
Former LIS or GHS beneficiaries who had become BMI participants were against the 
changes brought by health insurance reform because the BMI System went against 
their vested interests embedded in the pre-existing free healthcare system. They were 
discontent with the government’s decision of replacing the free healthcare system 
with a contribution-based BMI System and regarded the new BMI System as an 
unpopular institutional change. Citizen 3 who used to enjoy the GHS for more than 
two decades said in the interview that BMI participants like her were reluctant to give 
up free healthcare benefits enjoyed for decades. 144  She complained that the 
implementation of the new BMI System went against her expectations of having the 
government to continuously pay for her medical bills. 145  She found herself 
                                                 
144 Interview with Citizen 3.  
145 Interview with Citizen 3.  
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“experiencing psychological imbalance” because she kept asking about herself why 
the government abandoned its responsibility to pay her medical expenses and she was 
left to pay her own medical bills.146 She said she missed the old days and did not like 
the new ideas of deductibles and co-payment.147 Like other parents in Shanghai, she 
felt pity for her daughter who never had a chance to enjoy free healthcare.148 And she 
worried that medical expenses would increase the financial burden of her daughter 
who was a young BMI participant obtaining less favorable medical coverage. 
Professor 4 who used to enjoy the GHS was dissatisfied with the implementation of 
the new BMI System because she no longer enjoyed free healthcare and had to pay 
for her medical expenses nowadays.149 She perceived herself as “a victim rather than 
beneficiary” because as a patient with chronic illnesses, she had to “spend more 
money on long-term medication for high blood pressure and heart disease”.150 
Besides, she found the complicated instructions on the use of the individual MSA and 
the SPF inconvenient, annoying and confusing.151 Both Citizen 3 and Professor 4 
interviewed felt disappointed that they were not as lucky as retired cadres, old Red 
Army and disabled military personnel, whose rights to continuously enjoy free 
healthcare were guaranteed by the 1998 Decree and thus were not affected by the 
                                                 
146 Interview with Citizen 3. 
147 Interview with Citizen 3. 
148 Interview with Citizen 3. 
149 Interview with Professor 4.  
150 Interview with Professor 4. 
151 Interview with Professor 4. 
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changes brought by urban health insurance reform.152 These special groups of people 
could still obtain medical services and drugs without any restrictions, with their 
medical expenses paid by the BMI fund.153 For example, the grandmother of Citizen 
1 interviewed was a retired veteran cadre enjoying free healthcare.154 She could stay 
at Shanghai Cancer Hospital of Fudan University, which was one of the three best 
municipal hospitals in Shanghai,155 to receive colorectal cancer treatment which cost 
from RMB 300,000 to RMB 1 million.156 Her privilege of enjoying free healthcare 
freed the parents of Citizen 1 interviewed from paying the expensive medical bill.157 
 
(2) BMI Participants 
BMI participants interviewed disliked the changes brought by urban health insurance 
reform because they did not find the new BMI System useful or fair. During the 
interview, BMI participants shared the view that they were dissatisfied with the new 
BMI scheme.158 Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, and Citizen 7 who were in 
their late twenties, and Citizen 6 and Researcher 2 who were in their early thirties said 
in their interviews that the BMI System was not quite useful to them because the 
                                                 
152 Interviews with Citizen 3 and Professor 4. Section Six of the 1998 Decree stated that the medical 
benefits of retired cadres, old Red Army and disabled military personnel remained unchanged. 
153 Interviews with Citizen 3 and Professor 4.  
154 Interview with Citizen 1. 
155 Shanghai Cancer Hospital of Fudan University, together with Zhongshan Hospital of Fudan 
University, and Huashan Hospital, were three best municipal hospitals in Shanghai.   
156 Interview with Citizen 1. 
157 Interview with Citizen 1. 
158 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 4, Citizen 5,Citizen 7, Citizen 6, and Researcher 2.  
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standard premium rate for urban employees was too low that the money saved in the 
individual MSAs was insufficient to use.159 They said that money deposited into the 
individual MSAs could last longer if it was used to pay for the outpatient expenses in 
the second-tiered medical institutions where doctors prescribed less expensive drugs 
that could be reimbursed by the BMI.160 But the practice of “using drug sale to feed 
hospitals” (yi yao yang yi) was so common in the third-tiered medical institutions in 
Shanghai that the individual MSAs would be depleted quickly when profit-minded 
doctors prescribed more drugs than necessary or do unnecessary examinations.161 It 
was an open secret that hospitals and doctors received kickbacks and red pocket 
money from pharmaceutical companies in exchange for prescribing expensive 
drugs.162 As Citizen 6 said during the interview, he felt upset about a doctor in a 
municipal hospital prescribing expensive and unnecessary drugs to treat his hacking 
cough, which included antibiotics, painkillers, and vitamins.163 He ended up throwing 
all the unnecessary drugs away.164 Sometimes, BMI participants could not use the 
individual MSAs at all but ended up paying out-of-pocket when expensive or 
imported drugs prescribed were excluded from the Drug Catalogue for 
                                                 
159 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 7, Citizen 6, and Researcher 2.  
160 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 7, Citizen 6, and Researcher 2.  
161 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 7, Citizen 6, and Researcher 2.  
162 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 7, and Citizen 6. 
163 Interview with Citizen 6. 
164 Interview with Citizen 6. 
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reimbursement.165 Besides, money deposited into the individual MSAs was definitely 
insufficient to pay for the inpatient expenses which were usually expensive.166  
 
Since all the employees insured were charged at the same premium wage 
regardless of wage level, those who had a lower-paid job were less advantageous than 
their counterparts who earned higher wages because the former only had small 
amount of money deposited into the individual MSAs and could hardly afford their 
medical bills if they became seriously ill.167 Citizen 2 who was a manager said during 
the interview that her individual MSAs had accumulated about RMB 3,000 after 
working for five year.168 But her friends who had lower-paid jobs only accumulated 
about RMB 1,200 to RMB 1,500 after working for five year.169 Medical expenses 
became her friends’ principal worry that her friends restrained consumption in order 
to save for future medical expenses.170 Besides, young and healthy BMI participants 
did not find the BMI System useful because they seldom had medical treatment that 
money would only accumulate in the individual MSAs.171 As Citizen 5 and Citizen 7 
                                                 
165 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, and Citizen 6. According to the 2009 Drug 
Catalogue, 349 Western medicines and 154 Chinese proprietary medicines belonging to Category A 
could be completely covered by the BMI while 791 Western medicines and 833 Chinese proprietary 
medicines belonging to Category B could be partially covered by the BMI (The Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security of China, 2009, p.1). The 2009 Drug Catalogue is the third version 
of drug catalogue. The second version was published in 2004.  
166 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, and Citizen 6. 
167 Interviews with Citizen 1 and Citizen 2. 
168 Interview with Citizen 2. 
169 Interview with Citizen 2. 
170 Interview with Citizen 2. 
171 Interviews with Citizen 5 and Citizen 7. 
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said in their interviews, if the premium contribution was not mandatory, they could 
have spent the money on elsewhere such as buying digital products, clothes, or 
renting an apartment.172  
 
In addition, the BMI participants interviewed thought that the BMI System was 
an unfair health insurance system because of the problems of age disparity and free 
healthcare enjoyed by retired cadres, old Red Army and disabled military 
personnel.173 Citizen 1, Citizen 4 and Citizen 5 interviewed said that they were 
unfairly treated because retirees who did not pay premium could enjoy better and 
higher medical coverage than incumbent employees who paid premiums (See Table 
14 and Table 15).174 In particular, older retirees could enjoy lower self-payment rate, 
higher LAMI coverage for their outpatient and emergency medical expenses, and 
higher SPF coverage for their inpatient expenses.175 Besides, most of the BMI 
participants interviewed were upset by free healthcare enjoyed by retired cadres, old 
Red Army and disabled military personnel.176 It was because the medical expenses of 
these special groups of people that were financed by the state budget in the past were 
financed by the BMI fund nowadays.177 As Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 6 
                                                 
172 Interviews with Citizen 5 and Citizen 7. 
173 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 4 , Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Researcher 2.  
174 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 4, and Citizen 5. 
175 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 4, and Citizen 5. 
176 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7.  
177 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7. 
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and Citizen 7 said during their interviews, they opposed pooling their risks with 
retired cadres, old Red Army and disabled military personnel because similar to 
retired employees, these special groups of people quickly depleted the SPFs in the 
BMI System, thereby leaving little money or no money for the younger incumbents 
like them to pay their medical bills (See Table 17).178 Citizen 7 interviewed argued 
that health insurance reform became meaningless when young incumbents in 
Shanghai replaced the government to pay the medical expenses of these special 
groups of people.179 She questioned whether the BMI fund would still be sustainable 
to finance the healthcare of young incumbents in future.180 Citizen 2 interviewed also 
argued that the BMI scheme failed to assure any medical security she deserved in the 
long run.181 As Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 6 and Citizen 7 said during 
their interviews, their sense of powerlessness grew and intensified because it should 
be the government’s responsibility rather than that of young incumbents to pay the 
                                                 
178 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7. According to the data of 
Shanghai Municipal Medical Insurance Statistical Yearbook 2005 reproduced from Wang (2008), 
the average medical expenses of the insured urban employees of the BMI rose from about RMB 
382 in 2001 to about RMB 1,017 in 2005 (p.302). The growth rate was about 166 per cent. The 
average medical expenses of the insured retirees of the BMI rose from about RMB 3,297 in 2001 to 
about RMB 4,564 in 2005 (Wang, 2008, p.302). The growth rate was about 38 per cent. The 
average medical expenses of the retired veteran cadres of the BMI rose from about RMB 14,122 in 
2001 to about RMB 26,104 in 2005 (Wang, 2008, p.302). The growth rate was about 85 per cent. 
Shanghai Municipal Medical Insurance Statistical Yearbook 2005 was not available in libraries in 
Shanghai or in Hong Kong. It was also not available online. The author cited the data of Shanghai 
Municipal Medical Insurance Statistical Yearbook 2005 from the study of Wang (2008) who 
reproduced the data. 
179 Interview with Citizen 7. 
180 Interview with Citizen 7. 
181 Interview with Citizen 2. 
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medical bills of retired cadres, old Red Army and disabled military personnel.182 
However, the existing government policy did not seem to give them any choice to 
choose or to quit the BMI scheme.183 They thought that it was unrealistic to pin their 
hopes on the BMI System having enough money to pay their medical bills when they 
retired.184 
  
 Since the BMI participants interviewed did not find the new health insurance 
system useful and fair, they used different means to ensure medical security or save 
money. These included joining the individual commercial health insurance scheme, 
using the group commercial health insurance provided by the companies they worked 
for, practising self-medication, using the medical insurance certificates of their 
parents or grandparents, and delaying in seeking medical treatment. Besides, some 
work units in Shanghai committed fraud in order to reduce or deny health insurance 
benefits to employees. Citizen 2 interviewed planned to join the individual 
commercial health insurance scheme after getting married because she thought that 
the BMI System was unable to insure her against catastrophic illness.185 She thought 
that the individual commercial health insurance could be “a safety net to provide 
                                                 
182 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7. 
183 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7. 
184 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7. 
185 Interview with Citizen 2. According to Insurance Company Manager 1 and 2 interviewed on July 
20, 2010 and Insurance Director 1 interviewed on July 29, 2010, commercial health insurance 
required a participant to contribute premium on his/her own and mainly covered the medical 
expenses of critical illness and hospitalization. 
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better and extra financial protection against medical expenses resulting from a major 
illness in future”.186  Citizen 1, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7 
interviewed said that they sometimes used the group commercial health insurance 
which was an employee benefits to cover more expensive medical expenses.187 In 
brief, some of the BMI participants interviewed joined the individual commercial 
health insurance scheme or the group commercial health insurance for getting extra 
financial protection against soaring medical costs.  
 
Meanwhile, Citizen 2, Citizen 5 and Citizen 7 interviewed practiced 
self-medication by taking over-the-counter (OTC) drugs which did not require a 
doctor’s prescription or left-over medicines from family members.188 Both OTC 
drugs and left-over medicines could save money because the former was cheaper than 
prescribed drugs and could be easily bought at pharmacies while the latter did not 
require one to spend extra money to buy them.189 As Citizen 2, Citizen 5 and Citizen 
7 said during their interviews, they self-medicated with a combination of drugs based 
on their own judgment or lay advices obtained from parents, spouses, friends, or staff 
                                                 
186 Interview with Citizen 2. 
187 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7. According to Insurance 
Company Manager 1 and 2 interviewed on July 20, 2010 and Insurance Director 1 interviewed on 
July 29, 2010, the group commercial health insurance was an employee benefits provided by some 
private foreign companies or big state-owned enterprises to attract and retain good staff. They said 
that the group commercial health insurance covered the medical expenses of outpatient illnesses, 
hospitalization and critical illnesses.  
188 Interviews with Citizen 2, Citizen 5, and Citizen 7. 
189 Interviews with Citizen 2, Citizen 5, and Citizen 7. 
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from pharmacies.190 Depending on the severity of the symptoms, they would take a 
heavier dose of OTC drugs or left-over medicines for faster relief without doctors’ 
instructions.191  
 
Besides, Citizen 1, Citizen 2 and Citizen 4 interviewed used the medical 
insurance certificates of their parents or grandparents when seeking medical treatment 
at hospitals in order to get better medical coverage and save money.192 Although both 
Citizen 1 and Citizen 2 mentioned that they opposed pooling their risks with retired 
cadres, they admitted that it was better for them to use their grandmothers’ and 
parents’ medical insurance certificates because they could enjoy higher LAMI and 
SPF coverage.193 Citizen 1 admitted that using her grandparents’ medical insurance 
certificate “was not a right thing to do”.194 However, she was not afraid of getting 
caught because she and her family members were familiar with the doctors.195 Citizen 
4 interviewed said that the staff at hospitals did not match the identity of a patient 
with the name printed on the medical insurance certificate as long as the patient paid 
his/her medical bills.196 Citizen 2 and Citizen 6 interviewed said that some of their 
friends who did not have a well-paid job would simply borrow their parents’ or 
                                                 
190 Interviews with Citizen 2, Citizen 5, and Citizen 7. 
191 Interviews with Citizen 2, Citizen 5, and Citizen 7. 
192 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, and Citizen 4. 
193 Interviews with Citizen 1 and Citizen 2. 
194 Interview with Citizen 1. 
195 Interview with Citizen 1. 
196 Interview with Citizen 4. 
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relatives’ medical insurance certificates when seeking medical treatment.197 Some of 
their friends who wanted to accumulate more money in their individual MSAs would 
simply delay in seeking medical care until their health conditions deteriorated or 
having more serious symptoms such as severe pain.198 
 
Some of the BMI participants interviewed said that urban health insurance 
reform created the problem of work units’ fraud which reduced or denied health 
insurance benefits to employees.199 As Citizen 1, Citizen 5, and Hong Kong Citizen 1 
said during their interviews, running a business in Shanghai was not an easy task 
because of high operation costs. 200  Work units were required to compulsorily 
contribute four insurance premiums for their employees, including health insurance, 
pension insurance, unemployment insurance, and work injury and maternity 
insurance.201 The total contribution rates of these four types of social insurance for 
work units were equal to about 40 per cent of the total wage bill.202 In order to reduce 
or escape premium contribution, some work units willfully falsified the total number 
                                                 
197 Interviews with Citizen 2 and Citizen 6. 
198 Interviews with Citizen 2 and Citizen 6. 
199 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 5, and Hong Kong Citizen 1.  
200 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 5, and Hong Kong Citizen 1.  
201 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 5, and Hong Kong Citizen 1.  
202 Interviews with Hong Kong Citizen 1 and Citizen 1. According to the Central People’s Government 
of the People’s Republic of China (2010), in Shanghai, the total contribution rates of these four 
types of social insurance for work units were equal to 37 per cent of the total wage bill. Work units 
had to respectively contribute 12 per cent, 22 per cent, 2 per cent and 1 per cent of the total wage 
bill to health insurance, pension insurance, unemployment insurance, and work injury and 
maternity insurance (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2010). 
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and the identity of the employees and the payroll records.203 Hence, employees had 
less amount of money in their health insurance account than what they originally 
deserved.204 However, these employees were discouraged from pursuing a legitimate 
claim because there was no health insurance legislation to deal with work units’ fraud 
in Shanghai.205 Even if the health insurance legislation to deal with insurance fraud 
existed, these employees “would usually keep quiet about this unfair treatment in 
order to keep their jobs”.206 On the other hand, some work units used a lump sum 
cash payment to employees as a substitute for premium contribution.207 As Citizen 2 
and Citizen 5 said during their interviews, some employees, in particular those who 
were healthy, did not resist this practice and even favored the practice because the 
lump sum cash payment was like increasing their salary and could be used in a more 
flexible way. 208  The support from employees led to work units’ fraud going 
undetected.209 
 
(3) Non-BMI Participants 
Armed Police Officer 1 interviewed was a non-BMI participant because armed police 
officers in the PRC got free healthcare in military hospitals financed by government 
                                                 
203 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 5, and Hong Kong Citizen 1. 
204 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 5, and Hong Kong Citizen 1.  
205 Interview with Citizen 5. 
206 Interview with Citizen 5. 
207 Interviews with Citizen 2 and Citizen 5. 
208 Interviews with Citizen 2 and Citizen 5. 
209 Interview with Citizen 5. 
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subsidies.210 He said that since the amount of government subsidies received by 
military hospitals was limited, the quality of the medical services and the attitudes of 
doctors and nurses were poorer.211 In order to seek better medical care, he and other 
armed police officers sometimes would go to municipal hospitals.212 Without the 
individual MSAs, they had to pay out-of-pocket.213 However, he had bad experience 
of paying unreasonably expensive fees for minor ailments at municipal hospitals.214 
He thought that the government should initiate some measures to restrain the profit 
maximizing behaviors of hospitals and doctors.215 
 
(4) Doctors 
The doctors interviewed had mixed views about urban health insurance reform. 
Doctor 1 interviewed did not like urban health insurance reform because the BMI 
System was full of disparities when insurance coverage varied among participants 
according to age.216 Besides, the BMI System did not promote equal access to 
healthcare, leading to the poor having difficulties in seeing doctors when they were 
sick.217 As Doctor 1 said during the interview, the Shanghai municipal government 
                                                 
210 Interview with Armed Police Officer 1. 
211 Interview with Armed Police Officer 1. 
212 Interview with Armed Police Officer 1. 
213 Interview with Armed Police Officer 1. 
214 Interview with Armed Police Officer 1. 
215 Interview with Armed Police Officer 1. 
216 Interview with Doctor 1. 
217 Interview with Doctor 1. Charity organizations in Shanghai implemented medical charity card 
scheme which partially or fully covered the medical expenses of vulnerable people when seeking 
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did not bear the financial responsibility of funding the BMI System so that it could 
spend the money on projects that could facilitate the economic growth.218 He argued 
that the implementation of health insurance reform was all about money.219 The 
Shanghai municipal government’s financial involvement in the BMI System could 
improve the insurance coverage and thus reduce the problem of disparities in the BMI 
System.220 On the other hand, Doctor 2 interviewed said that the current BMI System 
was good because it provided participants with basic medical protection.221 However, 
he found that the free healthcare system in Hong Kong was more attractive because of 
the idea of universal access to free healthcare irrespective of differences in age, sex 
and income.222 Since he thought that “healthcare was a public welfare”,223 he hoped 
that a free healthcare system like that of Hong Kong could be established in Shanghai 
                                                                                                                                            
medical care at designated hospitals and community healthcare centers (Shanghai Municipal 
Government, 2008; Shanghai Charity Foundation, 2009). Besides, they gave subsidies to vulnerable 
people when seeking medical treatment (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2008). For example, in 
February 2001, the Shanghai Charity Foundation initiated the nation’s first medical charity card 
project which gave free medical charity cards and subsidies to poor elderly residents aged over 60 
who fell below poverty threshold (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2008). Up to October 2009, 
the Shanghai Charity Foundation had distributed 232, 550 medical charity cards and the medical 
expenses it subsidized had been accumulated to RMB 116 million (Yau and Lai, 2009). In 2006, 
Shanghai Angel Charity Foundation also distributed free medical cards and gave subsidies to the 
poor (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2006). For example, SACF Medical Charity Card, which 
ran until 2011, provided people under poverty-line with free medical treatment, free medical 
examination, free drugs donated by pharmaceutical companies, and an annual medical subsidies of 
RMB 500 (US$62) (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2006; Shanghai Angel Charity Foundation, 
2009a). Another example was that SACF Loving Care Medical Card provided basic medical 
services for the disables, the elderly and low-income population (Shanghai Angel Charity 
Foundation, 2009b). Nevertheless, the charity organizations in Shanghai only implemented the 
medical charity card project on selected regions such as Yangpu District and Hongkou District in 
Shanghai (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2008; Yau, 2007) or a specific period of time. 
Therefore, the problem of vulnerable people without access to healthcare due to the lack of money 
still existed. 
218 Interview with Doctor 1. 
219 Interview with Doctor 1. 
220 Interview with Doctor 1. 
221 Interview with Doctor 2. 
222 Interview with Doctor 2. 
223 Interview with Doctor 2. 
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so that the poor and the vulnerable could receive medical care when being sick.224  
 
 Concerning the problems of soaring healthcare expenditures and SID, Doctor 2 
interviewed acknowledged that there were doctors in other Shanghai hospitals 
“frequently padding the medical bills with expensive and unnecessary medication, 
treatment, examinations, and even unneeded operations”.225 He and his colleagues 
did not pad the medical bills because the hospital he worked for emphasized medical 
ethics. 226  But he admitted that the bonus policy implemented by the hospital 
substantially increased his monthly income for at least four times.227 The monthly 
income which included both salary and bonus was about RMB 5,000 for resident 
physicians, RMB 7,000 for doctor-in-charge, RMB 10,000 for associate chief, and 
RMB 12,000 for chief physicians at the third-tiered hospital he worked for.228  
 
On the other hand, Doctor 1 interviewed argued that it was the disorder of drug 
                                                 
224 Interview with Doctor 2. 
225 Interview with Doctor 2. Chen Hong (pseudonym), who was a doctor working at a Shanghai 
hospital, disclosed in a newspaper interview that how a doctor jacked up the medical bills (Luo, 
2006). He said that a doctor would change oral antibiotics into injection because he/she could earn 
more revenues by charging the fees of “using injection syringe and manual injection” (Luo, 2006). 
And if a doctor changed oral antibiotics into intravenous infusion, he/she could even earn more 
revenues by charging “the fees of using infusion apparatus, a saline water solution, and a bottle of 
glucose water” (Luo, 2006). 
226 Interview with Doctor 2. 
227 Interview with Doctor 2. 
228 Interview with Doctor 2. In Shanghai, doctors had low baseline salaries. According to Luo (2006), 
the monthly salary of doctors varied according to their ranks. The monthly salary of resident 
physicians (junior) was about RMB 1,000, doctor-in-charge (intermediate) RMB 1,400, associate 
chief (senior) RMB 2,000, and chief physician (senior) RMB 2,500 (Luo, 2006). It showed that the 
bonuses received by Doctor 2 interviewed and his colleagues were about five times higher than 
their monthly salaries. 
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distribution channel being the main cause of soaring healthcare expenditures.229 He 
said that the central government’s withdrawal of price control on drugs since Deng’s 
era had left much room for different members in the drug distribution channel to make 
profits from production to consumption.230  Drug manufacturers who were drug 
suppliers, wholesale pharmaceutical companies which were drug distributors, and 
hospitals and drug stores which were drug retailers made use of the complicated and 
highly non-transparent drug distribution channel to mark up drug prices in order to 
earn as much money as possible.231 As Doctor 1 said during the interview, the Price 
Bureau allowed drug manufacturers to add a 5 to 10 per cent markup on the 
production costs of the drugs.232 But drug manufacturers liked to exaggerate the 
production costs such as the costs of raw materials, labor, machinery and management 
in order to gain more profits.233 On top of the manufacturer prices, the first-tier drug 
distributor added a 5 to 10 per cent markup to constitute the first-tier drug wholesale 
prices. 234  On top of the first-tier drug wholesale prices, the second-tier drug 
distributor added a 5 to 10 per cent markup to constitute the second-tier drug 
wholesale prices.235 On top of the second-tier drug wholesale prices, the third-tier 
drug distributor added a 15 to 20 per cent markup to constitute the third-tier drug 
                                                 
229 Interview with Doctor 1. 
230 Interview with Doctor 1. 
231 Interview with Doctor 1. 
232 Interview with Doctor 1. 
233 Interview with Doctor 1. 
234 Interview with Doctor 1. 
235 Interview with Doctor 1. 
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wholesale price.236 Then, hospitals added a 15 per cent markup on the third-tier drug 
wholesale price as profit margin (See Diagram 6).237 Imported drugs also went 
through similar drug distribution process.238 But some drugs would even go through 
two or three more layers of sub-distributors before reaching hospitals in Shanghai.239 
Hence, the drug retail prices reflected markups charged by hospitals, wholesale 
pharmaceutical companies and drug manufacturers, which could be many times 
higher than the manufacturer prices.240 That was why patients who were consumers 
ended up paying unreasonably expensive drug fees.241 
 
 Both Doctor 1 and Doctor 2 interviewed said that they were sympathetic about 
patients’ eagerness to save money through self-medication. 242  However, they 
discouraged the practice of self-medication because patients may not have accurate 
diagnosis for their illnesses that taking drugs without professional advice would only 
worsen their health status and lead to paying higher treatment charges at last.243 In 
fact, the Shanghai Municipal Medical Insurance Bureau had issued the internal 
guideline which imposed a number of restrictions on doctors, from the number of 
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prescription drugs for each patient, the length of medication for each patient, to the 
average monthly cost of prescription drugs for each patient.244 Doctors who failed to 
follow the internal guideline would face financial penalties.245 As Doctor 2 said 
during the interview, the internal guideline stated that “each prescription should not 
exceed five medicines” and the length of medication should not exceed three days for 
emergency prescription, one week for outpatient prescription, and one month for 
chronic illness prescription.246 The average monthly cost of prescription drugs for 
each patient varied among different departments at hospitals but the limit set on the 
Dermatology Department he worked for was RMB 100.247 However, he and his 
colleagues found it difficult to follow the internal guideline because they inclined to 
prescribe more drugs to treat some complicated illness or to elderly patients who were 
inconvenient to walk for saving their travelling time.248 As medical frontline workers, 
they thought that the penalty policy reduced the medical freedom they deserved and 
induced pressure to them.249 Meanwhile, Doctor 2 interviewed also said that because 
of following the internal guideline, he and his colleagues were sometimes complained 
or even scolded by patients, in particular those BMI participants, for prescribing too 
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248 Interview with Doctor 2. 
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little medicine.250 
 
(5) Pharmaceutical Company Managers 
Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2 
interviewed thought that although the new BMI System implemented in 2000 
provided a few million urban employees in Shanghai with basic insurance coverage, it 
was unable to reduce the financial burden of insured participants when seeking 
medical care.251 The problem of soaring healthcare expenditures continued to plague 
Shanghai citizens and raised a serious question about the sustainability of the BMI 
fund in the long run.252 The problem of soaring healthcare expenditures remained 
unsolved because the Shanghai municipal government lacked an effective mechanism 
to fight against collusion among doctors, hospitals, drug manufacturers and 
pharmaceutical companies, and the disorder of drug distribution channel.253  As 
Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2 said during the interview, it was common for 
drug manufacturers and wholesale pharmaceutical companies to send pharmaceutical 
representatives to hospitals to meet Pharmaceutical Affairs Committee, which decided 
what drugs the hospital should purchase.254 The Committee comprised Vice Dean of 
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251 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
252 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
253 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
254 Interview with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
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hospital, Hospital Pharmacy Director, chief physicians from different Units such as 
Respiratory Unit, Cardiovascular Unit and Orthopedic Unit.255 The legitimate way 
for the pharmaceutical representatives to promote their drugs was presenting the 
scientific data of the drugs in terms of clinical safety and efficacy to Pharmaceutical 
Affairs Committee. 256  Private foreign pharmaceutical companies like the ones 
Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and 2 worked for followed the legitimate 
practice.257 However, drug manufacturers and distributors who faced tremendous 
pressures to survive in an increasingly competitive environment preferred using 
unscrupulous means to respectively lure hospitals to purchase and doctors to prescribe 
certain kinds of drugs.258  
 
Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2 
interviewed acknowledged that it was common for drug manufacturers and 
pharmaceutical companies, especially the state-owned ones, to give Shanghai 
hospitals and doctors kickbacks, commissions, cash gift or gifts of significant value 
such as digital products, entertainment, having banquets in five-star hotels and luxury 
                                                 
255 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
256 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
257 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
258 Interview with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1. After the implementation of economic 
reforms in the 1980s, the drug manufacturing and wholesale sectors had become highly competitive 
because of the growth of different kinds of formal enterprises in the pharmaceutical industry, 
including sole proprietorships, collective enterprises and joint ventures (Bao, 2008, p.79). 
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vacations in exchange for purchasing and prescribing the companies’ products.259 
Commissions or kickbacks could range from hundreds of RMB to more than ten 
thousands of RMB, depending on the type and volume of drugs prescribed by 
doctors.260 The companies’ products usually were new, expensive imported drugs that 
could not be reimbursed from the BMI.261 Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 
interviewed said that kickbacks or other forms of rewards were “dirty”, “unethical”, 
“unhealthy” practices which “buried one’s conscience” and could not be discussed 
further during the interview.262 Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2 interviewed said 
that commission and kickbacks were an irresistible temptation and “a stimulator 
which drove doctors to prescribe expensive or over-prescribe unnecessary drugs”.263  
 
 Soaring healthcare expenditures was the result of the collusion behaviors of 
doctors, hospitals, drug manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies.264 It deprived 
citizens’ rights of obtaining medicines at reasonable prices.265 In fact, the Drug 
Catalogue which was originally used to inform the BMI participants about which 
essential medicines could be reimbursed by the BMI became a useful guide to inform 
doctors, hospitals, drug manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies about which 
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drugs could hardly make lucrative profits.266 The pecuniary incentives from drug 
manufacturers and wholesale pharmaceutical companies distorted or switched 
doctors’ prescribing habits.267 In order to generate more revenues for the hospitals, 
doctors intentionally prescribed new, imported, or expensive drugs that were excluded 
from the Drug Catalogue for reimbursement.268  
 
Besides, the disorder of drug distribution channels led to drug retail prices “being 
30 to 40 times higher than the manufacturer prices”.269 It raised the question of 
whether the BMI fund would be sustainable in the long run.270 The mandatory drug 
price reductions implemented by the Price Bureau in Shanghai failed to hold down 
drug prices but produced the new problem of inexpensive and effective generic drugs 
disappearing from the market.271 Pharmaceutical companies’ rules of survival were 
“knowing how to play the game and being quick to respond”. 272  Once the 
government placed price caps on certain drugs, drug manufacturers would find these 
price-cut drugs unprofitable to produce while drug distributors and retailers found 
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268 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
269 Interview with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
270 Interview with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
271 Interview with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1. The Price Bureau in Shanghai followed the 
instructions of the National Development and Reform Commission mandated by the State Council 
to implement mandatory drug price reduction. In order to limit the drug retail prices, the Price 
Bureau in Shanghai set the retail prices of certain approved medications well below the free market 
prices. The National Development and Reform Commission was the successor of the State Planning 
Commission, which managed the centrally planned economy of the PRC.  
272 Interview with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
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these price-cut drugs unprofitable to sell.273 In order to avoid revenue loss, drug 
manufacturers would produce lower volumes of price-cut drugs or replace price-cut 
drugs with expensive substitute drugs which were not affected by the drug price 
reduction policy.274 Eventually, price-cut drugs would disappear from the market.275 
Drug manufacturers would make price-cut drugs become new drugs again by giving 
them a new name, new packaging, or new dosage so that they could still be sold 
expensively in the market.276 As to the hospitals and doctors, they would react by 
prescribing expensive substitute medicines or asking patients to take more 
unnecessary medical tests in order to compensate for the loss of drug sales 
revenues.277 At last, patients were still the ones suffering tremendous loss.278  
 
(6) Private Insurance Managers and Director 
Private insurance managers interviewed did not like urban health insurance reform 
because of two main reasons. This first reason was that the implementation of the new 
BMI System in 2000 and other health insurance schemes afterwards adversely 
affected the development and growth of commercial health insurance market.279 As 
                                                 
273 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
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275 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
276 Interview with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1. 
277 Interviews with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1 and Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2. 
278 Interview with Pharmaceutical Company Manager 1. 
279 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1 and Insurance Company Manager 2. According to 
Insurance Company Manager 2, following the BMI Scheme, the Shanghai municipal government 
implemented five insurance schemes which provided partial health insurance coverage to urban, 
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Insurance Company Manager 1 and 2 said during their interviews, the Shanghai 
municipal government had provided different segments of population, including urban 
employees, retirees, individual businessmen and urban residents, with basic medical 
protection through multi-type health insurance schemes implemented since 2000 and 
afterwards.280 Most of the BMI participants did not find it necessary to join the 
individual commercial health insurance scheme because the individual commercial 
health insurance scheme had limited insurance categories and would unavoidably 
increase the financial burden of an individual.281 Due to the dominant role played by 
the BMI System in providing insurance coverage for the Shanghai population, the 
commercial health insurance could only play a supplementary role in Shanghai and 
have little room to develop and grow in the market.282  
 
                                                                                                                                            
suburban and rural population. These five insurance schemes were: (1) Basic Medical Insurance for 
Individual Businessmen and Professionals in Shanghai (August 2002), (2) Basic Medical Insurance 
for Urban Residents in Shanghai (January 2008), (3) Comprehensive Insurance for Migrant 
Workers in Shanghai (September 2002), (4) Small Town Social Insurance (October 2003), and (5) 
New Rural Cooperative Medical System (2005). Insurance scheme (1) mainly covered the medical 
expenses of serious outpatient illnesses and hospitalization for individual businessmen and 
professionals who were self-employed persons. Insurance scheme (2) was a voluntary scheme 
covering partial medical expenses of hospitalization for urban residents who paid a lump-sum to 
join the scheme. Insurance scheme (3) was a compulsory scheme providing migrant workers from 
other municipalities, autonomous regions and provinces in China with hospitalization insurance. 
Insurance scheme (4) is a compulsory scheme providing suburban employees and land-deprived 
peasants with partial medical coverage for serious outpatient illnesses, hospitalization and 
emergency room stay. Insurance scheme (5) was a subsidized voluntary medical insurance scheme 
covering the outpatient and inpatient medical expenses of peasants and rural residents. It required 
every participant to contribute RMB 10. Correspondingly, the local and central government 
respectively gave subsidies amount to RMB 10 to each participant. The NRCM fund was used to 
cover 70 per cent to 80 per cent of outpatient medical expenses and inpatient medical expenses 
below RMB 5,000. It was also used to cover 20 per cent to 30 per cent of inpatient medical 
expenses above RMB 5,000. 
280 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1 and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
281 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1 and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
282 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1 and Insurance Company Manager 2. 
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The individual commercial health insurance could hardly become a profitable 
business in Shanghai.283 The Shanghai municipal government left the low-income 
groups, the poor, and the unemployed uninsured.284 But these vulnerable groups of 
people were financially incapable of joining commercial health insurance scheme.285 
On the other hand, those who bought individual commercial health insurance were 
usually less healthy people who saw doctors more often.286 This led to insurance 
companies setting the premium higher than that of the BMI in order to prevent 
financial loss.287 As Insurance Company Manager 2 said during the interview, the 
monthly premium of an individual commercial health insurance could range from few 
hundred RMB to few thousands of RMB, depending on one’s needs and economic 
ability.288 For example, one of the individual commercial health insurances provided 
by the health insurance company he worked for required a participant to pay RMB 
15,000 as the annual premium and covered VIP and specialist services at hospitals.289 
The expensive premiums could hardly attract participants to join the individual 
commercial health insurance.290 In fact, individual commercial health insurance was 
usually treated as a rider added to the base plan.291 The base plan was usually life 
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insurance because life insurance was more profitable. 292  During the interview, 
insurance managers and director were unable to provide the statistics about the 
number of Shanghai population joining commercial health insurance because their 
companies did not have the record.293  Nevertheless, the Operating Statistics of 
Insurance Industry in 2009 showed that only about 6 per cent of premium income 
came from health insurance while about 69 per cent came from life insurance 
(Shanghai Bureau of China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 2010) (See Table 18). 
This implied that there were not many participants joining the commercial medical 
insurance in Shanghai. 
 
The second reason for private insurance managers interviewed disliking urban 
health insurance reform was the problem of soaring healthcare expenditures 
remaining unsolved.294 Insurance Company Manager 1 and 2 interviewed complained 
that the Shanghai municipal government only focused on establishing the BMI 
System to reduce the moral hazard on the demand side while neglecting the 
establishment of an effective prevention mechanism to control moral hazard on the 
                                                                                                                                            
insurance added to the base plan in order to provide the insured with additional insurance coverage 
that is not covered by the base plan. The insured who buy the base plan can pay extra premium in 
order to enjoy the coverage provided by the insurance rider. 
292 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1 and Insurance Director 1.  
293 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1, Insurance Company Manager 2, and Insurance 
Director 1. 
294 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1, Insurance Company Manager 2, and Insurance 
Director 1.  
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supply side.295 The soaring healthcare expenditures caused by the combined force of 
SID and the disorder of the drug distribution channel seriously hurt the interests of the 
insurance business and impeded the growth and development of commercial health 
insurance market. 296  As Insurance Manager 2 said during the interview, the 
profit-seeking behavior of hospitals and doctors was detrimental to the insurance 
business.297 Doctors who took advantage of asymmetric information induced patients 
to buy unnecessary and expensive drugs, do unnecessary medical examinations and 
surgeries, and prolong the length of hospital stays and treatments, leading to a drastic 
escalation of medical expenses.298 Since patients and doctors were agents of health 
insurance companies, health insurance companies due to imperfect information were 
in an inferior position to collect patients’ medical information and to supervise doctors 
who were profit-minded and failed to act in a fully responsible manner.299 Both 
Insurance Company Manager 1 and 2 interviewed argued that the Shanghai municipal 
government could have boosted the confidence of private insurance companies in 
Shanghai by following the insurance industry’s suggestion of establishing a constraint 
mechanism to restrain the profit-seeking behavior of hospitals and doctors. 300 
However, the Shanghai municipal government refused to establish the constraint 
                                                 
295 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1 and Insurance Company Manager 2.  
296 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1 and Insurance Company Manager 2.  
297 Interview with Insurance Company Manager 2.  
298 Interview with Insurance Company Manager 2.  
299 Interview with Insurance Company Manager 2. 
300 Interviews with Insurance Company Manager 1 and Insurance Company Manager 2.  
 271 
mechanism because it feared that the constraint mechanism established “would hurt 
the interests of hospitals and doctors who may ask the government for financial 
support or monetary compensation”.301 The insurance industry felt frustrated and 
disappointed that the Shanghai municipal government gave empty promises about 
strengthening the development of commercial health insurance.302  
 
(7) A Government Official 
Government Official 1 interviewed thought that the Shanghai municipal government 
implemented the new BMI System with good intentions because it wanted to provide 
basic healthcare protection for as many citizens as possible.303 She also thought that 
the Shanghai municipal government moved in the right direction by introducing the 
ideas of social responsibility and social pooling to the BMI System because the BMI 
System could insure citizens against catastrophic illness.304 In reality, however, she 
thought that the BMI System could neither provide enough healthcare protection for 
incumbent employees nor remain sustainable in the long run due to poor institutional 
design and the lack of a national health insurance or anti-fraud legislation to support 
the BMI System.305 
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For the poor institutional design, Government Official 1 interviewed said that the 
low contribution rate from urban employees resulted in slow accumulation of money 
in the individual MSAs that could be used for seeing doctors.306 Based on the 
principle of “basic healthcare protection, wide population coverage” (bao ji ben, 
guang fu gai), the Shanghai municipal government carefully considered an affordable 
premium rate for urban employees to make contribution without making the 
employees feel that the BMI system was a financial burden. 307  However, low 
contribution rate resulted in depleting the individual MSAs easily and quickly.308 
More often than not, urban employees had to pay out-of-pocket, especially when the 
problem of expensive drug fees still existed.309 Another institutional design problem 
was that the Shanghai municipal government put ‘the old people’ (jiu ren) who were 
retirees and those who still enjoyed free healthcare nowadays and ‘the new people’ 
(xin ren) who were young or incumbent urban employees in the same health insurance 
pool.310 As Government Official 1 said during the interview, it was not an ideal or 
appropriate practice for the government to mix ‘the old people’ with ‘the new people’ 
because ‘the old people’ had higher health risk and healthcare expenditures, which 
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substantially depleted the BMI fund. 311  The Shanghai municipal government 
guaranteed the retired cadres, old Red Army and disabled military personnel the right 
of continuously enjoying free healthcare. 312  But it no longer paid the medical 
expenses for these special groups of people for fear of bearing any financial burden 
and increasing work units’ and other BMI participants’ expectations for the 
government’s financial injection into the BMI fund.313 Without the financial support 
from the government, the BMI fund had became financially unsustainable and 
occurred a deficit over the past few years.314 Government Official 1 was asked if she 
could further explain about the BMI fund deficit problem she mentioned because the 
deficit problem she raised was in contradiction to the record of China Statistical 
Yearbook, with figures indicating the revenues of the BMI fund being greater than the 
expenses of the BMI fund from 2002 to 2009 (See Table 19).315 But Government 
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315 During the interview, Government Official 1 was unable to provide the deficit numbers of the BMI 
fund and said that no one could get the real deficit number because the BMI fund deficit problem 
was a very sensitive topic. But this study found that the deficit problem of the BMI fund was 
disclosed by the Shanghai municipal government at the 40th Standing Committee meeting of the 
12th Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress on November 28 in 2007 (Chen, 2007). During the 40th 
Standing Committee meeting, the Shanghai municipal government reported that the BMI fund 
actually had accumulated a deficit of RMB 2 billion over the past five years (Chen, 2007). The 
figure given by the Shanghai municipal government was in direct contradiction to the record of 
China Statistical Yearbook. According to China Statistical Yearbook from 2003 to 2008, the 
revenues of the BMI fund were greater than the expenses of the BMI fund from 2002 to 2007. In 
2002, the revenue of the BMI fund was about RMB 9 billion while the expense of the BMI fund 
was about RMB 7 billion. In 2007, the revenue of the BMI fund was about RMB 27 billion while 
the expense of the BMI fund was about RMB 23 billion. It showed that China Statistical Yearbook 
did not release the accurate records of the BMI fund in Shanghai. One explanation for the figures of 
the BMI fund in Shanghai being overstated in China Statistical Yearbook was that the Shanghai 
municipal government who discovered the deficit in the BMI fund at the end of every year 
borrowed money from the Shanghai Municipal Finance Bureau to make up the differences (Chen, 
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Official 1 interviewed said that the BMI fund deficit problem was “a very sensitive 
topic” and “a taboo subject” which could not be openly and further discussed.316 She 
only said that the BMI fund deficit problem really existed and had made the BMI 
participants, especially the young ones, have a dim hope for the usefulness of the BMI 
System.317 She also “felt a sense of powerlessness” because she had no idea when the 
BMI fund deficit problem could stop before it became irreversible.318 However, she 
was not enthusiastic about the capability of the government to solve the BMI fund 
deficit problem because the problems of ageing population in Shanghai and the 
soaring healthcare expenditures continued to worsen the situation.319  
 
As Government Official 1 said during the interview, the mandatory drug price 
reduction policy was ineffective to reduce drug prices because drug manufacturers 
would react by playing the trick of “putting old wine in a new bottle” in order to 
escape price controls. 320  The vicious circle of new expensive drugs replacing 
price-cut drugs continued.321 At the same time, the relationship between the Shanghai 
                                                                                                                                            
2007). Then, it returned the owed money to the Shanghai Municipal Finance Bureau at the 
beginning of the second year (Chen, 2007). Hence, it was possible that the loans borrowed from the 
Shanghai Municipal Finance Bureau were treated as revenues and thus overstated the revenues of 
the BMI fund in Shanghai. According to Government Official 1, the BMI fund deficit problem 
continued nowadays although the figures of China Statistical Yearbook showed that the revenues of 
the BMI fund were still greater than the expenses of the BMI fund in 2008 and 2009.  
316 Interview with Government Official 1.  
317 Interview with Government Official 1. 
318 Interview with Government Official 1. 
319 Interview with Government Official 1. 
320 Interview with Government Official 1.  
321 Interview with Government Official 1. 
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Municipal Medical Insurance Bureau and the SMHB became tense, with the former 
being responsible for supervising and administering the operation of the BMI System 
and the latter responsible for supervising medical service delivery and implementing 
the municipal essential medicine system at hospitals.322 It was because the SMHB 
regarded the financial penalty imposed by the Shanghai Municipal Medical Insurance 
Bureau on hospitals and doctors for overcharging and over-prescription as 
interrupting hospital business.323 Government Official 1 interviewed foresaw the 
deterioration of relationship between the Human Resource and Social Security Bureau 
and the SMHB because the responsibility of imposing financial penalty on hospitals 
and doctors fell on the Human Resource and Social Security Bureau after the 
Shanghai Municipal Medical Insurance Bureau was incorporated into the Human 
Resource and Social Security Bureau in 2009.324 
 
Apart from the poor institutional design, Government Official 1 interviewed said 
that the lack of a national health insurance or anti-fraud legislation was another reason 
why the BMI System could hardly provide enough healthcare protection for 
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324 Interview with Government Official 1. On January 30, 2011, the Shanghai municipal government 
promulgated The Procedures of the Shanghai City on Supervising the Administration of the Basic 
Medical Insurance through Decree No. 60, which stated that the Human Resource and Social 
Security Bureau could impose financial penalty ranging from RMB 3,000 to RMB 100,000 on 
hospitals which overcharged and over-prescribed drug (Shanghai Government Legislative 
Information Network, 2011). Please refer to Article 16 of The Procedures of the Shanghai City on 
Supervising the Administration of the Basic Medical Insurance. 
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incumbent employees.325 She admitted that the poor institutional design had driven 
citizens and some employers to involve in fraud conspiracy for saving money.326 
While it was common for younger BMI participants to get higher insurance coverage 
by using the medical insurance certificates of their parents or the elderly, work units 
reduced or escaped premium contributions by falsifying salary record of the 
companies.327 It was undeniable that the fraudulent behaviors would negatively affect 
the operation of the BMI System and were unfair to participants who fully complied 
with the insurance payment requirement. 328  However, the Shanghai municipal 
government found it difficult to plug these loopholes because of the lack of a national 
health insurance or anti-fraud legislation.329 Without any health insurance legislation, 
the Shanghai municipal government found it difficult to detect, investigate and 
combat fraud activities.330 As Government Official 1 said during the interview, the 
operation of the BMI System would be better if a national health insurance legislation 
could be enacted to increase the government’s capacity to identify, report, sanction, 
and combat fraud.331  
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investigation, the Shanghai Medical Insurance Bureau found that the identity of a 75-year-old BMI 
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(8) Scholars and Researchers 
All the professors interviewed argued that urban health insurance reform in Shanghai 
was a failure. 332  In China, Shanghai was officially recognized by the central 
government as a success story of health insurance implementation and a role model 
for other parts of China to follow.333 After implementing the BMI Scheme in 2000, 
the Shanghai municipal government had made continuous efforts for extending 
insurance coverage to different segments of population through multi-type insurance 
schemes.334 By 2008, the Shanghai municipal government had provided 90 per cent 
of Shanghai population with health insurance coverage that it was praised for 
achieving the national goal of wide population coverage at the fastest pace.335 
However, the professors interviewed argued that Shanghai only appeared successful 
on the surface in terms of the number and pace of health insurance schemes was 
                                                 
332 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 3, Professor 4, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
333 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and Professor 5. 
334 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 5, and Professor 6.  
335 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. According to Shanghai National Economic and Social 
Development Statistical Report 2008 and the Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2009, the BMI scheme 
was the most dominant medical insurance scheme in 2008, with about 4.5 million working 
participants and about 3.2 million retired participants (Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau and 
National Bureau of Statistics in Shanghai, 2009; Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2009). 
Basic Medical Insurance for Urban Residents in Shanghai had about 2 million participants, Basic 
Medical Insurance for Individual Businessmen and Professionals in Shanghai having about 166,700 
participants, Comprehensive Insurance for Migrant Workers in Shanghai having about 3.8 million 
participants, Small Town Social Insurance having about 1.5 million participants, and NRCMS 
having about 1.8 million participants in 2008 (Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau and National 
Bureau of Statistics in Shanghai, 2009; Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2009). If adding the 
number of participants in all the medical insurance schemes together, it showed that about 90 per 
cent of Shanghai population was covered by medical insurance in 2008. According to Shanghai 
Statistical Yearbook 2009, the year-end resident population in Shanghai was about 18.8 million in 
2008. 
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implemented. 336  Following the BMI Scheme, all the health insurance schemes 
implemented afterwards provided less favorable treatment for participants (See Table 
20 to 23).337 Professor 6 interviewed criticized that the whole health insurance system 
in Shanghai comprising multi-type schemes was very fragmented and “similar to a 
traditional feudal system that divided people into different classes and ranks”.338 In 
particular, the BMI System, which was the first and the most dominant health 
insurance system implemented in Shanghai, was a symbol of inequality.339 In fact, a 
critical look at urban health insurance reform implemented in 2000 showed that the 
reform revealed more problems than achievements.340 Summarizing the arguments 
made by the professors interviewed, urban health insurance reform in Shanghai was a 
failure due to three main reasons: the BMI System being inherently age discriminatory, 
the government shirking its responsibility for funding healthcare, and the problem of 
soaring healthcare expenditures remaining unsolved.  
 
                                                 
336 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 3, Professor 4, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
337 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and Professor 6. For example, since Comprehensive 
Insurance for Migrant Workers in Shanghai (September 2002) and Small Town Social Insurance 
(October 2003) were comprehensive social insurance schemes, the premiums contributed by 
participants were not solely focused on providing medical insurance. For Comprehensive Insurance 
for Migrant Workers in Shanghai (September 2002), the premiums contributed were used for 
industrial injuries, hospitalization and old-age allowance. As to Small Town Social Insurance 
(October 2003), every contributor paid 24 per cent of the premium base in which 17 per cent was 
for old-age insurance, five per cent for health insurance, and two per cent for unemployed insurance. 
Therefore, both insurance schemes provided less favorable health insurance coverage. 
338 Interview with Professor 6. 
339 Interviews with Professor 1 and Professor 6. 
340 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
 279 
Firstly, the BMI System was inherently age discriminatory.341 It was a highly 
stratified system dividing participants into different age groups.342 It let the retirees 
enjoy higher and better medical coverage than the incumbent employees.343 As 
Professor 2 said during the interview, the central government was inclined to favor the 
elderly when designing the BMI system because most of the elderly “lived a difficult 
life during Mao’s era and they deserved to share the fruit brought by economic 
prosperity nowadays”.344 The impact of the Confucian idea of respecting for elders 
and the virtue of filial piety in taking care of the elderly led to the institutional design 
of the BMI System favoring the elderly or retirees. 345  With limited financial 
resources, the trade-off of providing the elders or retirees with better and higher 
medical coverage was the younger insured participants enjoying less medical 
coverage.346 Therefore, urban health insurance reform was a failure because the 
reform institutionalized inequalities through the establishment of the BMI System, 
with the elders enjoying more favorable insurance coverage.347 
 
 Secondly, the government shirked its responsibility for funding healthcare.348 
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The BMI System was financed by mandatory contribution from both the work units 
and their employees without the financial support from the government.349 But it was 
used for covering the medical expenses of different groups of people, including 
employees, retirees, and retired cadres, old Red Army and disabled military 
personnel.350 The BMI fund was inadequate to cover all the medical expenses, 
especially the expensive medical expenses of retirees and privileged people who still 
enjoyed free healthcare.351 During Mao’s era, it was the government’s responsibility 
to pay the medical expenses of retired cadres, old Red Army and disabled military 
personnel.352 After the implementation of urban health insurance reform in 2000, 
however, the government shifted this financial responsibility to the incumbent 
employees and the work units.353 As Professor 2 said during the interview, the 
Shanghai municipal government, in accordance with the 1998 Decree, gave retired 
cadres, old Red Army and disabled military personnel the privilege of continuously 
enjoying free healthcare because these special groups of people were senior CCP 
members, high-ranking government officials, or prestigious leaders fighting for the 
country when they were young and showing deep and continuing loyalty to the 
CCP.354 The government wanted these political elites to know that they were not left 
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354 Interview with Professor 2.  
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out and forgotten by the government.355 The promise made by the government to take 
care of these special groups of people was “a historical debt the government should 
pay”.356 However, the government was afraid of bearing the heavy financial burden 
brought by this promise that it made the incumbent employees and the work units 
responsible for paying the medical expenses of these special groups of people.357 As 
a result, the government had put the incumbent employees, especially the younger 
incumbents, in a very disadvantageous and unequal position because most of the 
premiums contributed by the incumbent employees and the work units ended up 
paying the medical expenses of these special groups of people.358 The substantial 
medical expenses of these special groups of people exhausted the BMI fund 
quickly.359 Incumbent employees felt insecure and became anxious about the BMI 
fund being inadequate and unsustainable to finance their healthcare in future.360  
 
 Thirdly, the implementation of the BMI System failed to solve the problem of 
soaring healthcare expenditures. 361 Since Deng era, the Shanghai municipal 
government had implemented financial responsibility system, which increased the 
financial autonomy of medical institutions to charge the medical services they 
                                                 
355 Interview with Professor 2. 
356 Interview with Professor 2. 
357 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
358 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
359 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
360 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
361 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 3, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
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provided and the drugs they prescribed at a profit.362 Nowadays, the proportion of 
government subsidies to hospitals was only about 5 per cent.363 In order to gain the 
remaining 95 per cent of revenues on their own, Shanghai hospitals used drug sale as 
the major source of revenue because the disorder of drug distribution channel caused 
by the greed of doctors, hospitals, drug manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies 
provided plenty of room to make a profit.364 In response to soaring drug prices, the 
Shanghai Municipal Medical Insurance Bureau imposed financial penalty on hospitals 
and doctors who failed to follow the internal guideline which prohibited 
over-prescription and overcharging. 365  But this penalty policy caused strong 
discontent from the SMHB.366 The SMHB argued that the Shanghai Municipal 
Medical Insurance Bureau had no rights to meddle in hospital affairs by instructing 
what the hospitals and doctors should or should not do.367 The reaction from the 
SMHB also caused strong discontent from the Shanghai Municipal Medical Insurance 
Bureau, which complained that the SMHB did nothing to restrain the profit-seeking 
                                                 
362 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 3, and Professor 5. 
363 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
364 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 3, and Professor 5. According to Zhao (2009), Shanghai 
hospitals had strong incentives to maximize their revenues from four sources: consultation and 
treatment services, examination service, hospital material fees (e.g. surgical tools and injection 
syringe) and drug sales. Drug sales became the largest revenue source for hospitals. For example, 
the revenue structure of Shanghai No.6 People’s Hospital, which was a municipal hospital, showed 
that drug sales accounted for about 40 per cent of gross income of the hospital in 2008, which was 
followed by hospital material fees (19.5 per cent), consultation and treatment services (19 per cent), 
and examination service (17 per cent) (Zhao, 2009). The revenue structure of Shanghai No.6 
People’s Hospital was revealed by Mr. He Meng Qiao, Dean of Shanghai No. 6 People’s Hospital. 
365 Interview with Professor 6. 
366 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
367 Interview with Professor 2.  
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behavior of hospitals and doctors.368 As Professor 2 and Professor 6 said during their 
interview, both the bureaux had the same administrative ranking, implying that both 
had equal footing.369 The financial penalty policy was not effective enough to restrain 
the profit-maximizing behavior of doctors and hospitals without the coordination of 
the SMHB.370 In fact, the government did not make enough effort to restrain the 
revenue-maximizing behavior of hospitals and doctors because the government did 
not want to increase subsidies to hospitals or make any financial compensation.371 As 
a result, many BMI participants had to pay out-of-pocket because of expensive drug 
fees.372 Although commercial health insurance could be joined by Shanghai citizens 
as an alternative to cover their medical expenses, it only played a supplementary role 
in the health insurance system in Shanghai.373 The premium rate of commercial 
health insurance was too high that Shanghai citizens preferred saving money on their 
own to pay their medical expenses.374 The establishment of the BMI System did not 
make the Shanghai citizens feel secure and protected, thereby losing its existence 
value and the meaning of implementing urban health insurance reform.375 
 
                                                 
368 Interview with Professor 2. 
369 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
370 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
371 Interviews with Professor 2, Professor 3, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
372 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, Professor 3, Professor 5, and Professor 6. 
373 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 3, Researcher 1, and Researcher 2. 
374 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 3, Researcher 1, and Researcher 2. 
375 Interviews with Professor 2 and Professor 6. 
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From the above, it shows that different actors, including former LIS and GHS 
beneficiaries, BMI participants, non-BMI participants, doctors, pharmaceutical 
company managers, private insurance managers and director, a government official, 
scholars and researchers, responded differently to the new urban health insurance 
reform in Shanghai because of having different interests and expectations. Historical 
institutionalism emphasizes the role of policy feedback in shaping interest groups and 
influencing how the public “navigate the social world’s complexities” (Pierson, 1994, 
p.41). The views of a variety of actors interviewed reflected policy feedback. The old 
LIS and GHS provided LIS and GHS beneficiaries with free medical benefits. During 
the interviews, former LIS and GHS beneficiaries who had become BMI participants 
were against the new health insurance reform because they became responsible for 
paying their own medical bills. Their views reflected the exposure model of policy 
feedback that they felt more comfortable with the old free healthcare system. Their 
views also reflected the experience model of policy feedback that their previous 
personal experience of enjoying free healthcare made them dislike the new health 
insurance reform.  
 
Another policy feedback that retirees could enjoy better medical coverage and 
retired cadres, old Red Army and disabled military personnel could continue to enjoy 
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free healthcare made BMI participants interviewed feel that the new health insurance 
scheme was unfair. Also, policy feedback from economic reform that hospitals and 
doctors could enjoy the autonomy of earning more revenues led to the problem of 
moral hazard from the supply side. However, without an effective prevention 
mechanism to control moral hazard on the supply side, BMI participant and non-BMI 
participants interviewed found that the new health insurance scheme was useless to 
provide medical protection while private insurance managers complained that their 
business interests were hurt. Besides, the policy feedback of bureaux having the same 
administrative ranking led to the Shanghai Medical Insurance Bureau being unable to 
exert authority over the SMHB that the problem of hospitals and doctors overcharging 
patients remained unresolved. Although most of the actors interviewed were against 
the new health insurance reform, they failed to form an impassable barrier to obstruct 
the implementation of the new contributory health insurance scheme. It was because 
policy feedback from the authoritative political institutions did not give any veto 
opportunities for citizens and different stakeholders such as insurers to overturn 
political decisions or policy results. 
 
6.5 Historical Institutionalism and the Case Study of Shanghai: Findings and 
Implications  
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The refined theory of historical institutionalism comprises seven explanatory elements: 
contextual conditions, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and sequences, path 
dependency, and policy feedback. When it is adopted to examine urban health 
insurance reform in Shanghai, it focuses on how the complex interplay of forces, 
namely contextual influences, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
sequences, path dependency, and policy feedback, shaped urban health insurance 
reform process.  
 
Having looked at urban health insurance reform through the lens of historical 
institutionalism, this study argues that the case of Shanghai is an example of 
institutional change in which the Shanghai municipal government successfully 
implemented health insurance reform in 1998 that the free healthcare system was 
replaced by a new contributory health insurance system. It argues that the 
implementation of health insurance reform and big change in healthcare financing 
policy path was possible because of (1) changes in political and economic contexts, (2) 
ideological shift from egalitarianism to pro-market policies, (3) policy feedback 
which accelerated the pace of collapse of free healthcare system, (4) the authoritative 
political institutions with the strong influence of the CCP and a highly centralized 
decision-making structure, (5) the dominance of the political leader and key 
bureaucratic stakeholders from different ministries in the healthcare insurance reform 
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process, (6) new ideas being championed by the political leader and key bureaucratic 
actors, and (7) the decentralization power given to the local governments to 
implement urban health insurance reform. It is the dynamic interplay of these forces 
enabling the Shanghai municipal government to leverage big change in healthcare 
financing without any impediments.  
 
Firstly, historical institutionalism argues that changes in contextual conditions, 
namely political, economic or social context, can generate the sources of institutional 
and policy changes. In the PRC, the change in the political context due to the rise of 
Deng Xiaoping as the new political leader since 1978 triggered the change in the 
economic context when Deng dismissed the ideology of egalitarianism that was 
embedded in the socialist economy for more than three decades and endorsed the new 
ideology of marketization to modernize the PRC through implementing the economic 
reform. Economic reform caused the free healthcare system to malfunction and 
collapse afterwards and led to the establishment of a new health insurance system to 
adapt to the changing environments. As Gu (2001a) argued, the drastic changes in the 
institutional configuration of the economic system in 1978 broke down “the 
equilibrium present under the planned economy” (p.199), thereby causing tremendous 
pressure to induce institutional change in the healthcare financing system (Gu, 2001a, 
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p.199; Gu, 2001c, p.133). The case study of Shanghai verified the second source of 
institutional dynamism identified by Thelen and Steinmo (1992) that the change in the 
political or socioeconomic context led to existing institutions performing new tasks 
because new political actors emerged to pursue new goals through the existing 
institutions (p.16). It showed that changes in the political and economic contexts 
created the window of opportunity for changing the policy path of healthcare finance.  
 
Secondly, historical institutionalism argues that policy feedback provides 
resources and creates incentives that can facilitate, strengthen or inhibit the formation 
or expansion of stakeholder interests (Pierson, 1994, pp.40-1). In Shanghai, policy 
feedback from the LIS and GIS created beneficiaries who could enjoy generous 
medical benefits. However, these beneficiaries lacked the strength and power to form 
political coalitions against the CCP’s health insurance reform because of the 
authoritative political institution with the strong influence of the CCP.  
 
Besides, policy feedback from the economic reform implemented since 1978 and 
the LIS and GHS implemented since the early 1950s induced negative feedback 
effects, thereby underming the fiscal and social sustainability of the free healthcare 
system in Shanghai. Policy feedback from fiscal decentralization, the financial 
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responsibility system and the relaxation of price controls created strong incentives for 
hospitals and doctors to charge patients substantially greater than the actual cost in 
Shanghai. It created the problem of moral hazard from the supply side. On the other 
hand, policy feedback from the LIS and GHS provided generous medical benefits for 
beneficiaries, leading to the problem of moral hazard from the demand side. Under 
the economic reform, policy feedback from the enterprise reform imposed greater 
financial pressure for enterprise units to pay the medical expenses of LIS beneficiaries. 
But policy feedback from the GHS remained unchanged that the central government 
was still responsible for financing GHS through the state budget. Policy feedback 
from the LIS that only allowed employees of SOEs and collective enterprises to enjoy 
free medical benefits led to employees who were laid off from SOEs and collective 
enterprises under the economic reform losing their entitlement to the LIS. Also, policy 
feedback from the LIS that only required SOEs and collective enterprises to provide 
LIS for their employees exacerbated the problem of employees being ‘underinsured’ 
and ‘uninsured’ when private enterprises emerged and prospered under the enterprise 
reform and foreign enterprises under the Open Door Policy did not need to provide 
LIS for their employees. In brief, policy feedback from the economic reform and the 
LIS and GHS created many problems that led to the collapse of the free healthcare 
system in Shanghai and compelled the government to implement urban health 
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insurance reform. 
 
Thirdly, historical institutionalism argues that political institutions play a 
determinant role in constraining or facilitating the structure of political opportunities 
for political actors in a given polity (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941; Immergut, 1998, 
p.21) and shaping their strategies and goals in the decision-making process that in turn 
shape the political outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). 
In the PRC, the authoritative political institutions with the strong influence of the CCP 
and a highly centralized decision-making structure enabled the central government to 
implement a nationwide urban health insurance reform in 1998 without any political 
impediments. The closed policy-making process was only confined to a small circle 
of senior officials from different ministries. The policy making process involved 
bargaining among different senior officials. There were competing policy options, 
conflicting perspectives and conflicting interests among senior officials. As Koelble 
(1995) and Immergut (1998) argued, the policy formulating process involved 
bargaining due to divergent institutional position, institutional responsibilities and 
relationships with others. However, different senior officials in this closed 
policy-making process would find ways to reconcile their differences and reach a 
consensus because they knew that the Central Committee was the final 
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decision-maker. On the other hand, the closed policy-making process did not provide 
any veto opportunities for non-bureaucratic stakeholders in health insurance reform or 
interest groups to affect policy proposals or policy results. Stakeholders or interest 
groups in health insurance reform such as employers/work units, employees, patients, 
doctors, pharmaceutical companies and insurance companies barely had a chance to 
exert any political influence. In brief, the centralized political system placed the 
central government in an advantageous position to implement urban health insurance 
reform without any political opposition. 
 
 Besides, the central government’s delegation of power to the local governments 
increased the autonomy, discretion, efficiency, enthusiasm, flexibility, incentives, 
initiatives and support of local governments for implementing health insurance reform. 
The Shanghai municipal government’s successful experience in implementing 
hospitalization insurance scheme in 1996 gained recognition from the central 
government that its activism and confidence to implement urban health insurance 
reform was boosted. In 2000, it implemented the BMI System in Shanghai. 
 
 Fourthly, historical institutionalism argues that ideas play a role in policy making. 
The ideological shift from egalitarianism to marketization in the late 1970s 
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transformed the PRC’s economic system from a socialist planned economy to a 
market economy. Deng’s endorsement of the pro-market economic polices also 
affected the ideas adopted to implement urban health insurance reform. In the PRC, 
the new ideas of individual MSA, the SPF, co-payment, individual responsibility and 
social solidarity were championed by the political leader and key bureaucratic actors 
from different ministries that a new mandatory health insurance system replaced the 
free healthcare system in Shanghai. These new ideas could achieve political 
prominence because they fitted into the market-oriented economic context well and 
were believed to be a solution to the intractable problems of moral hazard from the 
demand side and rising healthcare expenditures. At the same time, the path-dependent 
logic also affected the design of the new health insurance model. The practice of 
excluding the self-employed and having the work units bearing higher contribution 
rate reflected the institutional legacies of the past that the health insurance benefit was 
work-unit based and the work units assumed the financial responsibility to pay for 
employees’ medical expenses. Besides, the design of the BMI System showed that the 
political leader and key bureaucratic actors from different ministries were affected by 
the Confucian idea of respecting for elders because the new BMI System let retirees 
who did not have to pay any premium enjoy better medical coverage than incumbent 
employees. It shows that political actors followed the logic of appropriateness, 
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established norms, routines, rules of thumbs or existing values when choosing their 
course of action (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.939; Oliver and Mossialos, 2005, p.11; 
Steinmo, 2008, p.126).  
 
As Figueras et al. (1998) argued, the actual implementation of reform 
programmes is a major challenge faced by policy makers (p.13). The case study of 
Shanghai shows a big change in the urban health insurance system could take place 
because of the complex interplay of forces, namely the strong political institutions, 
policy feedback, contextual influences, and ideological shift. The successful 
implementation of urban health insurance reform in Shanghai matches the argument 
of Freeman (2000), who argued that institutional change was a product of the 
interaction between different forces. As Freeman (2000) argued, 
 
“Change is a product of the interaction between the institutional and procedural routine 
characteristic of any given health system, and the pressures on that system from its 
environment…What mattered for the reform of health care was the combination of relative pressure on 
government, and its relative capacity to do something about it. Change has to do with the relationship 
between structure and conjuncture: Structures are the institutions and processes that form the 
infrastructural framework for policy (decisions) within which dynamic events unfold over time. This 
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may be thought of as an endogenous universe, which then may be subject to exogenous shocks, that is, 
conjunctures” (p.77). 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, the Shanghai municipal government had implemented urban health 
insurance reform since the mid-1980s. It reformed the urban health insurance system 
through three phases: (1) the exploration phase (1984-1988); (2) the experimental 
phase (1994-1996); and (3) the implementation phase (1998-2001). It was capable of 
departing from the established policy path by replacing the free healthcare system 
with a new contributory health insurance system because of changes in political and 
economic contexts, ideological shift from egalitarianism to pro-market policies, 
policy feedback which accelerated the pace of collapse of the free healthcare system, 
the authoritative political institutions with the strong influence of the CCP and a 
highly centralized decision-making structure, the dominance of the political leader 
and key bureaucratic stakeholders from different ministries in the healthcare insurance 
reform process, new ideas being championed by the political leader and key 
bureaucratic actors, and the decentralization power given to the local governments to 
implement urban health insurance reform. It is the dynamic interplay of these forces 
enabling the Shanghai municipal government to leverage big change in urban health 
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care financing without any impediments. The next chapter will examine the healthcare 
system in Hong Kong before 1990.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HONG KONG CASE STUDY: THE HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the historical development of healthcare system and the role of 
the colonial government in healthcare provision in the pre-reform era from 1841 to 
1990. It provides important historical context necessary for understanding healthcare 
financing reform in Hong Kong by showing that the establishment of public health 
and healthcare systems in Hong Kong were the products of Western presence in the 
nineteenth century and by looking at the contextual conditions and political 
institutions in which the healthcare system was embedded in the pre-reform era 
(1945-1990). It is divided into four sections. Section 7.2 examines the institutions of 
government, the public health and healthcare systems in Hong Kong in early years 
(1841-1941). Section 7.3 examines healthcare development in post war years 
(1945-1990). Section 7.4 discusses how the contextual conditions and political 
institutions shaped the development trajectory of healthcare in Hong Kong. Section 
7.5 gives a conclusion. 
 
 An overview of the development trajectory of the healthcare system in Hong 
 297 
Kong before 1990 shows that during the early colonial period, the colonial 
government was indifferent to providing healthcare services to its subjects because 
the prevailing philosophy was that the government should have limited functions and 
focus on developing the economy of Hong Kong. The expatriate-business alliance 
which articulated the interests of business elites also discouraged the colonial 
government from providing healthcare which would increase taxation. Until the 
Second World War, the colonial government played only a negligible role in 
healthcare provision. After the Second World War, however, the critical junctures 
brought by the economic crisis of the inactivity of entrepôt trade in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s and the political crisis caused by the 1966 and 1967 riots forced the 
colonial government to change its apathetic attitude towards healthcare provision and 
provide more healthcare facilities and services. It was obliged to increase its 
involvement in healthcare provision out of political, economic, and social 
considerations. In the 1980s, the colonial government established the Hospital 
Authority (HA) to deflect the complaints from the community about the poor service 
quality of public hospitals. This further confirmed the role of the colonial government 
in providing healthcare services for its people. It created a deep impact on healthcare 
financing reforms in Hong Kong in the following decades. 
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7.2 Early Years (1841-1941) 
Hong Kong was located at the mouth of Pearl River Delta in southern China (Wong 
and Gui, 2004, p.1). From the period 1841 to 1997, “Hong Kong was a British 
colony” (Scott, 2010, p.5). It comprised three parts: Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon 
Peninsula, and the New Territories. Britain acquired Hong Kong Island “as a part of 
the settlement imposed on China” (Tang, 1998, p.45) after her victory in the First 
Opium War (1839-1842), the Kowloon Peninsula after her victory in the Second 
Opium War (1856-1860), and a lease on the New Territories for 99 years during the 
Scramble for Concessions in 1898 (See Diagram 7). On 5 April, 1843, Britain issued 
the Chartered Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions, which were the conventional 
legal device declaring Hong Kong as a Crown Colony and establishing the colonial 
administration in Hong Kong (Collins, 1975, p.46; King, 2003, pp.73-4).  
 
(a) The Institutions of the Government of Hong Kong  
The formal governmental structure of Hong Kong was “constructed on the basis of 
the classical colonial structure” (Harris, 1988, p.27). It was composed of the Governor, 
the Executive and Legislative Councils, and the Judiciary (Harris, 1988, p.27). The 
Chartered Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions set out the powers and 
responsibilities of the Governor, the Executive and Legislative Councils, and the 
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Judiciary (Collins, 1975, p.46; Harris, 1988, p.4). The Governor was “the single and 
supreme authority responsible to and representative of the Queen” (King, 2003, p.73) 
and was “in a real sense the head of the Government [of Hong Kong]” (King, 2003, 
p.73). He was assisted and advised by the Councils to make laws, appoint and 
suspend officials, appoint and dismiss judges, exercise the power of pardon of 
convicted criminals, and make grants of land (Endacott, 1973, p.37; Harris, 1988, 
pp.84-6; Tsang, 2004, p.19). The Executive Council (Exco) was endowed with the 
task of advising the Governor in the exercise of his powers (Harris, 1988, p.88; King, 
2003, p.74; Tsang, 2004, p.19). The Legislative Council (Legco) “was given the 
authority to pass local ordinances enforceable in the colony” (Tsang, 2004, p.19). 
Both the Exco and Legco Councils were not elected bodies (King, 2003, p.74). Both 
the official and unofficial members in the Councils were appointed by the Governor 
(King, 2003, p.74; So, 2003, p.474). The Judiciary was “in charge of the 
administration of justice and [adjudicated] civil disputes as well as criminal cases” 
(Ho, 2004, p.50). It operated on the principle of complete independence from the 
Exco and Legco (Harris, 1988, p.103; Ho, 2004, p.50).  
 
 The colonial government was strongly centralized to “maintain political control” 
(Scott, 2010, p.6) and “perpetuate colonial rule” (Scott, 2010, p.5). Consistent with 
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the centralized government, the civil service was “organized on strongly hierarchical 
lines” for policy implementation (Scott, 2010, p.6). Government departments 
developed autonomously from each other and focused on “top-down implementation 
rather than lateral co-ordination” (Scott, 2010, p.6). Until the Second World War, all 
the senior positions in the civil service were occupied by British expatriates (So, 2003, 
p.474; Scott, 2010, p.7). The executive-led principle was dominant during colonial 
times, assuming leadership by the Governor and civil servants (Lam, 2007, p.10). 
Under the leadership of the Governor, many major public policy decisions were 
formulated in-house in the Government Secretariat (Wong, 2007, p.76; Scott, 2010, 
p.9), which contained within it the Colonial Secretary who was the person “in charge 
of the civil service” (Scott, 2010, p.70) and the most senior civil servants who were in 
charge of “the central functions of finance, policy-making and the regulation of the 
civil service” (Scott, 2010, p.70). After the consultation with the Government 
Secretariat, the colonial government would issue a green paper which clearly 
indicated its preferred position on a policy proposal and was sometimes distributed to 
the public for discussion (Scott, 2010, p.9). A green paper was followed by the issue 
of a white paper which detailed the government’s chosen plan of action (Scott, 2010, 
p.9). Then, the policy action plan would go to the Exco for approval and the Legco for 
passing legislation (Scott, 2010, p.9). This systematic arrangement for policy 
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formulation and policy implementation showed that the political system of Hong 
Kong was actually a system dominated only by bureaucrats but no politicians (Wong, 
2007, p.76). The absence of politics in Hong Kong led to Hong Kong being described 
as “an administrative state” (Harris, 1988) with “only administration but no politics” 
(Wong, 2007, p.76).  
 
 The early colonial regime in Hong Kong was not a democratic system because it 
was “an elite-consensual polity” (King, 2003, p.75). As a colonial regime, the 
government “suffered from a legitimacy deficit” (Scott, 2010, p.9) and found it 
difficult to “generate consent for its rule” (Scott, 2010, p.9). In order to make the 
governing regime legitimate, the colonial government adopted the practice of 
“administrative absorption of politics” (King, 2003, p.72) that co-opted business and 
social elites who existed “as a form of patronage” (Harris, 1988, p.32) into the 
decision-making system in exchange for their loyalty and support for the colonial 
government (King, 2003, p.72; Scott, 2010, p.298). These elites who were the 
appointed unofficial members in the Councils were wealthy men (King, 2003, p.74), 
representatives from the great British hongs (commercial establishments) (Harris, 
1988, p.50; So, 2003, p.474), Chinese business leaders (Ma, 2007, p.97), and the 
Chinese elites who came from established rich families (King, 2003, p.74; Ma, 2007, 
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p.98) or had high reputation and social status (Harris, 1988, p.57). Starting from 1850, 
the Governor appointed the representatives of the British hongs such as Jardin, Swire 
and Matheson into the Councils (Harris, 1988, p.50; Ma, 2007, p.97; So, 2003, p.474). 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Governor appointed the Chinese business 
leaders and the Chinese elites into the Councils (Ma, 2007, pp.97-8). Through the 
appointment system, the senior government officials and business elites formed a 
close expatriate-business alliance (Ma, 2007, p.98; So, 2003, p.474) which guaranteed 
the monopolistic representation of big business interests in the colonial government 
(So, 2003, p.474). “Consensus on new policies was sought behind closed doors” (Ma, 
2007, p.98) between the Exco, government officials, and the Legco, and most 
government proposals were rubber-stamped in the Legco (Ma, 2007, p.98). In brief, 
the elite-consensual polity was a closed decision-making system which legitimized 
the government’s decisions only by the consensus of elites and only articulated the 
interests of business elites (Scott, 1989). The colonial administration was cohesive 
because of a “high degree of political consensus and trust among the ruling elites” 
(Cheung, 2010, p.40). It only provided a channel for elite-to-elite communication 
instead of elite-to-mass communication (King, 2003, p.80). The colonial government 
had little consultation with the mass who “were expected to be grateful recipients of 
whatever was provided” (Scott, 2010, p.9).  
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(b) The Public Health and Healthcare Systems in Hong Kong 
Regarding Hong Kong as “the borrowed place, the borrowed time” (Wong, 2009, 
p.137), the colonial government “governed Hong Kong without long-term perspective 
and vision” (Wong, 2009, p.137). In line with colonial policy elsewhere, the British 
government expected the colonial government in Hong Kong “to be small and to 
provide only minimal services” (Scott, 2010, p.6). Scott (1989) called the colonial 
government “a minimal state” (p.42), with functions limited to “a level compatible 
with the maintenance of the society” (Scott, 1989, p.42). For much of the history 
before the Second World War, the colonial government only provided the barest 
minimum of public services to meet the needs of the people (Tang, 2000, p.114; 
Gould, 2006, p.18; Scott, 2010, p.6). Its role was primarily to maintain law and order 
(Tang, 1998, p.46; Tang, 2000, p.114; Scott, 2010, p.6) and “support the growth of a 
capitalist economy” (Scott, 2010, p.6) through entrepôt trade. It kept a low level of 
taxation to attract investment (Wong, 2009, p.138) and “encouraged free trade with 
minimum intervention” (Gould, 2006, p.18). In order to save public expenditure and 
avoid tax increases (Scott, 1989; Scott, 2010), its role to provide sanitation and 
healthcare was negligible (Tang, 2000, p.114).  
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 Due to having large swamps and a tropical climate, Hong Kong was a hot-bed of 
fatal diseases such as fever, diarrhea and dysentery, leading to illness and premature 
death amongst local Chinese, European traders, officials, and men of the military 
corps (Jerman, 1996a, pp.7-8; Gauld, 1997, p.24).376 As the colony grew, poor 
sanitation and “primitive arrangements for water supply, waste disposal and garbage 
removal” (Gould, 2006, p.19) further deteriorated the health conditions of the people. 
The colonial government appointed the Colonial Surgeon in 1843 and established the 
Committee of Public Health in 1844 to develop and enforce sanitary rules and 
measures among all classes of residents in order to improve sanitation and building 
standards (Gauld, 1997, p.24; Gauld and Gould, 2002, p.35). In 1883, the colonial 
government set up the Sanitary Board to deal with the heavy workload of improving 
public health (Gauld and Gould, 2002; Ho, 2002). However, the sanitary rules and 
measures brought little improvement in sanitary conditions because of the opposition 
and resistance from the Chinese people, property owners, tenants and British 
merchants (Scott, 1989; Gauld, 1997; Gould, 2006; Ma, 2007). The Chinese people 
regarded the sanitary rules and measures as an unwarranted intrusion which disrupted 
                                                 
376 Edited by R.L. Jarman (1996), Hong Kong Annual Administration Reports, 1841-1941, which 
contained six volumes, is the “collection of administration and other reports [covering] the first 100 
years of British rule in Hong Kong” (Jarman, 1996a, p.v). For the first time, it reproduced some of 
the reports that were never published (Jarman, 1996a, p.vi). In volume 1, it contained a report on 
Hong Kong written by Governor J.F. Davis in 1844, which talked about how the geological character 
and climate of Hong Kong led to the sickness and death of military corps and local Chinese. For 
details, please refer to “Report on the Island Of Hong Kong (Enclosure 1, in No.1)” (Volume 1, 
pp.5-16).  
 
 305 
the Chinese way of life (Scott, 1989, pp.52-3; Gauld, 1997, p.24). Property owners 
feared that better sanitary standards meant smaller profits while tenants feared that 
better sanitary standards meant higher rents (Gould, 2006, p.19). British merchants 
feared that the cost of sanitary improvement would lead to extra tax payment (Ma, 
2007, p.99). It was not until the outbreak of bubonic plague which claimed thousands 
of lives in the mid-1890s did the maintenance of proper sanitary conditions became 
“an essential element to protect human lives and the economic development” of Hong 
Kong (Ho, 2002, p.167). In 1935, the colonial government reformed and renamed the 
Sanitary Board as the Urban Council to further improve the public health of its 
inhabitants (Scott, 1989, p.53; Ma, 2007, p.99).    
 
 The colonial government had little involvement in healthcare provision. In 1843, 
it appointed the Colonial Surgeon and established the Medical Board to mainly serve 
the medical needs of government officials and European citizens (Ho, 2002, p.167). In 
1850, it established a government hospital to mainly provide medical treatment for the 
police, civil servants and prisoners and later fee-paying private patients (Scott, 1989, 
p.50; Gauld, 1997, p.25; Gauld and Gould, 2002, p.39; Ho, 2002, p.169; Gould, 2006, 
p.19). In 1872, it established the Medical Department to manage the government 
hospital and “performed health control on board” (Ho, 2002, p.169). Before the 
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Second World War, the colonial government left the provision of medical services for 
the general public to market forces (Gould, 2006, p.19) and not-for-profit 
organizations including “churches, missionaries and Chinese charitable organizations” 
(Scott, 2010, p.121). There were private hospitals independently operating and being 
financed outside the colonial government’s direct control (Chu, 1992, p.860). But they 
must be registered with the colonial government and received a certificate of 
registration after their accommodations, equipment, and staffing were judged fit for 
operation (Chu, 1992, p.860). In 1843, the first private hospital was established by 
private general practitioners to provide Western treatment (Gauld, 1997, p.25; Gauld 
and Gould, 2002, p.39). There were also government-assisted hospitals, which were 
private, not-for-profit hospitals receiving “a major portion of their funding through 
government subventions” (Chu, 1992, p.860). Since they received government 
subventions, “their financial autonomy over operations [was] virtually non-existent” 
(Chu, 1992, p.863). In 1872, the Tung Wah hospital sponsored by the colonial 
government and the local community was established to provide Chinese treatment 
and later Western treatment free of charge (Scott, 1989, p.51; Sinn, 1989, p.50; Gauld, 
1997, p.25).  
 
In brief, the colonial government was reluctant to become involved in healthcare 
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provision and it left the tasks of building hospitals and offering free medical services 
to missions and benefactors (Gauld and Gould, 2002, p.39). By the early twentieth 
century, a ‘tripartite’ hospital system had been established in Hong Kong, with the 
government hospitals, government-assisted hospitals (including Tung Wah), and 
private hospitals all providing medical services (Gauld, 1997, p.25; Gauld and Gould, 
2002, p.41). More hospitals were established “in accordance with the escalating 
population” (Gauld and Gould, 2002, p.41). In the 1930s, the colonial government 
which still had little commitment to healthcare drew up hospital expansion plans to 
address the problems of “funding, overcrowding and shortfall in provision” (Gould, 
2006, p.20). However, its plan was interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World 
War and the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong in December 1941 (Gauld and Gould, 
2002, p.42). 
 
7.3 Post War Years (1945-1990) 
The Second World War largely destroyed the economy and infrastructure of Hong 
Kong (Gauld, 1997, p.26; Tang, 2000, p.116). During the post-war years, the colonial 
government had the immediate need to rehabilitate the public administration and 
reestablish entrepôt trade (Hong Kong Government, 1964, p.2). It still had close ties 
with business elites. It prioritized economic development and strongly supported the 
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laissez-faire policy which favored a balanced budget and low taxation (Wong, 1999, 
p.77). Until 1949, the colonial government focused on controlling communicable 
diseases to maintain healthy conditions for developing entrepôt trade (Wong, 1999, 
p.77) and had little involvement in healthcare provision. In order to solve the problem 
of bed and staff shortages at hospitals (Gauld, 1997, p.26; Gauld and Gould, 2002, 
p.43), the colonial government expediently recruited unregistered doctors on a 
temporary basis to provide a restricted range of medical treatments and services to 
patients (Wong, 1999, p.79; Gould, 2006, p.20). Its involvement in healthcare 
provision was kept to a minimum (Wong, 1999, p.80). However, changes in the 
geopolitical environment triggered a change in the colonial healthcare policy (Tang, 
2000, p.116). On one hand, the CCP coming into power in the PRC in 1949 and the 
trade embargo imposed on the PRC by the United Nation in 1950 led to a drastic 
reduction in the entrepôt trade volume in Hong Kong (Wong, 1999, p.81). On the 
other hand, the influx of mainland refugees and immigrants provided Hong Kong with 
a large volume of cheap labor, knowledge, skill, capital and technology to 
successfully restructure itself to manufacturing industry in the 1950s (Wong, 1999, 
p.81). Realizing the importance in providing a healthy workforce for the expansion of 
industrializing economy (Wong, 1999, p.87), the colonial government began to 
provide more hospital facilities and free medical services to its population in the 
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1960s.  
 
(a) The First Medical White Paper (1964) 
In 1964, the colonial government issued the first Medical White Paper entitled 
Development of Medical Services in Hong Kong, which was the first “consolidated 
and publicly-available document detailing the government’s development plans” 
(Gauld and Gould, 2002, p.44). In the 1964 Medical White Paper, the colonial 
government mentioned that a healthy population was an economic asset to Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong Government, 1964, p.30). It stated the minimal ratios of provision 
necessary for augmented clinic and hospital services to meet the medical needs of its 
population (Hong Kong Government, 1964, p.11). Its targets were to provide by 1972 
4.25 hospital beds per 1,000 population, one standard urban clinic to about 100,000 
urban population, one standard rural clinic to about 50,000 rural population, and one 
polyclinic for every 500,000 population (Hong Kong Government, 1964, pp.12-26; 
Hong Kong Government, 1974, p.3). Besides, the colonial government stated that it 
would provide low cost or free medical services directly or indirectly to the large 
section of the population which could not afford healthcare (Hong Kong Government, 
1964, p.9).377 It stated in the 1964 Medical White Paper that there were respectively 
                                                 
377 The government’s statement of providing low cost or free medical services to the large section of 
the population which could not afford healthcare also appeared in the Hong Kong Annual Report 
1959 (p.129), Hong Kong Annual Report 1960 (p.123), Hong Kong Annual Report 1961 (p.131), and 
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50 per cent of the community being unable to pay for outpatient charges and 80 per 
cent of the community being unable to pay for inpatient charges (Hong Kong 
Government, 1964, p.30). In fact, the colonial government did not intend to provide 
highly subsidized medical services to the whole community but to those who failed to 
afford healthcare with their own means (Wong, 1999, p.101). In reality, however, 
patients “who could afford to go private could go public if they wish” (Wong, 1999, 
p.102) because means testing all patients involved high administrative costs. In brief, 
the publication of the 1964 Medical White Paper showed that the colonial government 
had become more directly involved in healthcare provision.  
 
(b) The Second Medical White Paper (1974) 
The colonial government further increased healthcare provision after the outbreak of 
the 1966 and 1967 riots which shattered its legitimacy. The 1966 riot caused by poor 
social and working conditions and people’s grievances against the unresponsive 
colonial government, and the territory-wide and anti-colonial 1967 riot inspired by the 
Cultural Revolution in the PRC “enabled the government to understand the danger of 
remoteness with the general public” (Wong, 1999, p.115). In order to strengthen its 
political legitimacy and enhance social stability (Wong, 1999, p.116), the colonial 
                                                                                                                                            
Hong Kong Annual Report 1962 (p.138).  
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government implemented a ‘big bang’ social policy which led to a “sudden growth of 
social policy in Hong Kong in the 1970s” (Tang, 1998, p.61). Governor MacLehose 
drastically expanded the provision of medical and health services, housing, education 
and social welfare and these four areas became the pillars to support the future 
well-being of Hong Kong (Tang, 1998, p.63).  
 
In 1974, the colonial government issued the second Medical White Paper entitled 
The Further Development of Medical and Health Services in Hong Kong. The 1974 
Medical White Paper was a 10-year medical expansion plan concerning the expansion 
of the general public health services and the development of additional hospital and 
clinical facilities for inpatient and outpatient services in order to meet the demands of 
growing population (Hong Kong Government, 1974, pp.1-2). Its goals were to 
improve hospital bed ratio to 5.5 beds per 1,000 population, add new specialized units 
such as a clinical pathology unit and a burns unit at some public hospitals, build up 
medical and health services in new towns, establish new hospitals and clinics, and 
establish training schools to produce more doctors, nurses and dentists (Hong Kong 
Government, 1974). The colonial government stated in the 1974 Medical White Paper 
that it must take the economic conditions and the availability of fiscal resources into 
account when achieving its goals (Hong Kong Government, 1974, p.34). It showed 
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that the colonial government did not unconditionally provide healthcare services 
(Wong, 1999). Healthcare development was still subordinate to economic 
development (Wong, 1999, p.125) and relied on the economy for funding.  
 
 A booming economy from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s enabled the colonial 
government to “pursue a vigorous public hospital and clinic construction programme” 
(Gould, 2006, p.21). However, the Medical Department, which changed its name to 
the Medical and Health Department (M&HD) in 1958 (Ho, 2002, p.172), became 
“increasingly monolithic and unwieldy in terms of management and operations” 
within an outdated pre-war structure (Gould, 2006, p.21). Despite an increase in the 
number of hospitals, hospital bed ratio, and medical staff, there was growing 
dissatisfaction with the public hospital system, “with criticism both from within and 
from the community (Grant and Yuen, 1998, p.171). Medical staff experienced low 
morale in and frustration with their working environment due to excessive patient 
overcrowding, the lack of communication with their supervisors, shortfall of doctors, 
and the lack of promotion prospects (Scott and Co, 1985, p.8). There were inequalities 
between government and government-assisted hospitals (Scott and Co, 1985, p.1). 
Government-assisted hospitals received a lower level of resources, government 
funding and staff fringe benefits compared with government hospitals (Scott and Co, 
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1985, pp.3 – 11). The community was discontented with declining service standards 
due to overcrowding, long waiting times, the lack of consultation times, the shortage 
of hospital facilities and the use of camp beds (Scott and Co, 1985, p.7; Grant and 
Yuen, 1998, pp.171-2; Gauld and Gould, 2002, p.57).    
 
(c) The Scott Report (1985) 
In 1984, the Exco approved a review of hospital management. Believing that an 
internal inquiry would only lead to the support for the status quo, the Governor 
appointed “W.D. Scott and Co., an Australian affiliate of accountants Coopers and 
Lybrand” (Gauld, 1998, p.930) to conduct an independent review of hospital 
management. In December 1985, W.D. Scott and Co. published the report entitled The 
Delivery of Medical Services in Hospitals (commonly known as The Scott Report). It 
recommended the creation of a statutory HA to supersede M&HD for managing all 
government and government-assisted hospitals (Scott and Co., 1985, pp.2-3). The HA 
was independent from the government but largely funded by it and accountable to it 
(Scott and Co., 1985, pp.2-4). It thought that the HA, being outside the civil service, 
could lead to more flexible employment arrangements, more effective management, 
policy implementation and service delivery, and better responsiveness to citizen 
demands (Scott and Co., 1985, pp.5-9). Late in 1988, a Provisional Hospital Authority 
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was established to construct a detailed plan for the implementation of The Scott 
Report (Gauld, 1998, p.931). As advocated by The Scott Report, in early 1989, 
M&HD was split into a new Department of Health to take charge of public health 
functions and a Hospital Services Department being an interim arrangement for 
managing government and government-assisted hospitals (Gauld, 1998, p.931; Gauld 
and Gould, 2002, p.65). On December 1, 1990, the HA, a corporate body with 
complete administrative and financial autonomy, was inaugurated to replace the 
Hospital Services Department. According to Hospital Authority Ordinance enacted in 
1990, the HA should uphold the principle that “no person should be prevented, 
through lack of means, from obtaining adequate medical treatment” (Hospital 
Authority Ordinance, section 4(d)). Although legally applied only to the HA, the 
colonial government “subsequently adopted this as a statement of its overall health 
care policy” (Gould, 2005, p.180).  
 
Following the establishment of the HA, the operating costs of public hospitals 
kept increasing because the no-turn away policy and the commitment of the HA to the 
ongoing expansion and upgrading of facilities and services attracted more patients to 
the public hospitals (Gauld, 1998, p.932; Gould, 2005, p.190; Gould, 2006, p.22). 
According to Gauld (1998) and Gould (2006), the HA captured over 90 per cent of 
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inpatient admissions, with the market share of private hospitals proportionally 
diminishing. Since the colonial government failed to redefine the extent of its 
financial responsibility within the healthcare system, it continued to heavily subsidize 
the HA, which was 98 per cent taxpayer funded (Gauld, 1997, p.33). On the other 
hand, private hospitals found it increasingly difficult to compete with the HA (Gauld, 
1997, p.33). The gap between public and private hospitals was “so large in terms of 
both the level of supply and prices” (Cheung, 1994, p.354) that there was “virtually 
little complementarity between the two” (Cheung, 1994, p.354). The two sectors 
remained rigidly separated from each other (Gould, 2006, p.21). 
 
In fact, the establishment of the HA had created a deep impact on healthcare 
financing reforms in Hong Kong in the following decades. The more successful the 
HA was in its service improvement, the more patients were drawn away from the 
private hospitals (Cheung, 1994, p.361). This left little room for private hospitals for 
level-field competition (Cheung, 1994, p.361). On the other hand, the colonial 
government “faced a serious dilemma over health financing (Gauld, 1997, p.34): how 
to contain health spending and maintain the universally-accessible service without 
compromising service quality (Gauld, 1997, p.34). With the rapid growth of ageing 
population, higher user expectations, and rising medical costs, the colonial 
 316 
government was under growing pressure to implement healthcare financing reform.  
 
7.4 Discussion 
Using the theory of historical institutionalism to review the development trajectory of 
the healthcare system in Hong Kong before 1990 shows that how the interplay of 
political institutions and critical junctures caused by changes in the contextual 
conditions shaped the development of healthcare policy in Hong Kong over time. It 
shows that the political and economic crises became turning points for the colonial 
government to change its apathetic attitude towards healthcare provision and become 
more involved in financing and providing healthcare.  
 
As outlined in Chapter Three, historical institutionalism emphasizes that history 
matters. It takes history or time seriously, specifying sequences, tracing and analyzing 
processes over substantial stretch of years to explain important political outcomes or 
real-world puzzles (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp.695-8). History is the contingent 
product of the interactions of multiple political actors and institutions operating in and 
influenced by broader political, economic and social contexts over time (Lecours, 
2000, p.514; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p.706). An overview of the development 
trajectory of healthcare system in Hong Kong shows that the establishment and 
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institutionalization of public health and healthcare systems in Hong Kong were the 
product of Western presence in Hong Kong in the nineteenth century when Hong 
Kong became the British colony because of British military aggression against China 
(Tang, 1998, p.45).  
 
As outlined in Chapter Three, historical institutionalism emphasizes that 
institutions matter. Institutions play a determinant role in distributing power among 
political actors in a given polity and shaping their strategies and goals in the 
decision-making process that in turn shape the political outcomes (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). The historical overview of the healthcare 
system in Hong Kong showed that the political institutions significantly affected the 
establishment of healthcare system in Hong Kong. The political system of Hong Kong 
was strongly centralized to maintain political stability, with the civil service being 
hierarchically organized to implement policies. It was not a democratic system 
because it only appointed business elites to the Councils and made policy decisions 
behind closed doors. The colonial government which lacked a popular mandate 
formed an alliance with the business elites. It endorsed pro-market principles that it 
favored developing a capitalist economy through free trade and adopting a 
laissez-faire policy with minimal government intervention and a low level of taxation 
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(Gauld, 1998; Tang, 1998; Scott, 2010). It had little involvement in healthcare 
provision in order to save public expenditure and avoid tax increases. It mainly dealt 
with public health and provided medical services for government officials, European 
citizens, and prisoners only. Churches, missionaries, charitable organizations, and 
private practitioners were main healthcare providers and hospital founders that 
provided free medical treatment for the mass. Before the Second World War, the 
institutional triad of healthcare providers which included the government, 
government-assisted, and private hospitals was entrenched (Gauld, 1998, p.929).  
 
Historical institutionalism argues that changes in contextual conditions, namely 
political, economic or social context, can generate the sources of institutional and 
policy changes. During the immediate post-war years, the colonial government which 
prioritized economic development still had minimum involvement in healthcare 
provision. However, changes in the geopolitical environment triggered the colonial 
government to reconsider its role in healthcare provision. While the CCP coming into 
power in the PRC in 1949 led to the inactivity of entrepôt trade, the influx of 
mainland refugees and immigrants who had knowledge, skill, capital and technology 
helped transform Hong Kong into a labor-intensive manufacturing economy. In order 
to reproduce a healthy workforce to facilitate economic growth, the colonial 
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government was committed to building more hospitals, increasing hospital bed ratios, 
and providing low cost or free medical services for the population through the issue of 
the 1964 Medical Paper. As Wong (1999) argued, the colonial government used 
healthcare service as a form of the social wage to supplement the low private wage 
earned by the local population (p.133).  
 
The riots of 1966 and 1967 which led to the legitimacy crises triggered the 
colonial government to further increase more healthcare facilities and services 
through the issue of the 1974 Medical White Paper. The colonial government used 
healthcare service as political and social stabilizers. It shows that the critical junctures 
brought by the economic crisis of the inactivity of entrepôt trade in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s and the political crisis caused by the 1966 and 1967 riots forced the 
colonial government to change its apathetic attitude towards healthcare provision and 
provide more healthcare facilities and services. As Scott (2010) argued, the colonial 
government became a larger healthcare provider “grudgingly under the pressure of 
social and political forces that it could not entirely control” (p.121). The colonial 
government’s greater involvement in healthcare provision due to economic restructure 
in the 1950s and the political crisis in the late 1960s verified the third source of 
institutional dynamism identified by Thelen and Steinmo (1992) that changes in 
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political or economic context led to old actors adopting new goals or strategies within 
the old institutions (pp.16-7). In brief, the colonial government had involuntarily 
increased its involvement in healthcare provision out of political, economic, and 
social considerations.  
 
In the 1980s, the increasing demands for qualitative rather than quantitative 
improvements in the public hospital system drove the colonial government to 
establish the HA both as a means of cutting costs and “deflecting complaints about 
healthcare” (Scott, 2010, p.212). The no-turn away policy and the commitment of the 
HA to the ongoing upgrading of facilities and services attracted a majority of the 
population to the public hospitals. It further confirmed the role of the colonial 
government in providing healthcare services its people. With the rapid growth of 
ageing population, higher user expectations, and rising medical costs, the colonial 
government faced a serious dilemma over healthcare financing and was under 
tremendous pressure to implement healthcare financing reform.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, a historical overview of the development trajectory of healthcare in 
Hong Kong shows that the establishment and institutionalization of public health and 
 321 
healthcare systems were the products of Western presence in Hong Kong in the 
nineteenth century when Hong Kong became the British colony in 1841. The colonial 
regime was indifferent to providing healthcare services to its subjects because the 
colonial government’s endorsement of pro-market principles and the 
expatriate-business alliance favored economic development and low taxation. Until 
the Second World War, the colonial government played only a negligible role in 
healthcare provision. After the Second World War, however, the critical junctures 
brought by the economic crisis of the inactivity of entrepôt trade in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s and the political crises caused by the 1966 and 1967 riots forced the 
colonial government to change its apathetic attitude towards healthcare provision and 
provide more healthcare facilities and services. It was obliged to increase its 
involvement in healthcare provision out of political, economic, and social 
considerations. In the 1980s, the colonial government established the HA to deflect 
the complaints from the community about the poor service quality of public hospitals. 
This further confirmed the role of the colonial government in providing healthcare 
services for its people. It created a deep impact on healthcare financing reforms in 
Hong Kong in the following decades. The details of healthcare financing reforms will 
be pursued in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: HONG KONG CASE STUDY: HEALTH INSURANCE 
REFORMS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines healthcare financing reforms in Hong Kong since the early 
1990s and explains why the government failed to bring a drastic change in the funding 
structure of healthcare notwithstanding repeated attempts. It is divided into four 
sections. Section 8.2 examines the proposed financing options during the transition 
period (1991-1997) and the reasons for the failure in implementing health insurance 
reform in 1993. Section 8.3 examines the proposed financing options during the Tung 
Administration (1997-2005) in the post colonial era and explains why healthcare 
financing reforms in 1999 and 2000 ended in failure. Section 8.4 examines the 
proposed financing options during the Tsang Administration (2005 --- present) and the 
views of different stakeholders, citizens, scholars and the government official on the 
new regulated voluntary private health insurance scheme proposed in October 2010. 
Section 8.5 discusses the findings and implications. Section 8.6 gives a conclusion. 
 
 The refined theory of historical institutionalism comprises seven explanatory 
elements: contextual conditions, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
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sequences, path dependency, and policy feedback. When it is adopted to examine 
healthcare financing reforms in Hong Kong, it focuses on how the complex interplay 
of forces, namely contextual influences, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
sequences, path dependency, and policy feedback, shaped the process of healthcare 
insurance reform.  
 
Having looked at healthcare financing reforms through the lens of historical 
institutionalism, this study argues that the case of Hong Kong is an example of path 
dependency. Hong Kong remains status quo in healthcare financing because the 
government’s repeated attempts to implement healthcare financing reforms faced 
severe opposition and ended in failure. This study argues that the government failed to 
implement healthcare financing reform in 1993 because of (1) the political system 
becoming more democratic and representative, (2) policy feedback from 
government’s previous commitment to healthcare, (3) the old ideas of free healthcare 
and equality being championed by citizens and legislators, and (4) a robust economy. 
Besides, it argues that the government failed to implement healthcare financing 
reforms in 1999 and 2000 because of (1) a disjointed political system, (2) difficult 
economic circumstances, (3) the new idea of mandatory contributions lacking public 
and political acceptance, (4) policy feedback from previous healthcare policies and 
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the mandatory pension scheme, and (5) the institutionalization of old ideas. This study 
argues that it is the complex interplay of forces at different stages that constrained the 
government from implementing healthcare financing reforms.  
 
8.2 Transition Period (1991-1997) 
As mentioned in the last chapter, after the Second World War, the critical junctures 
brought by the economic crisis of the inactivity of entrepôt trade in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s and the political crisis caused by the 1966 and 1967 riots forced the 
colonial government to change its apathetic attitude towards the provision and finance 
of healthcare and provide more healthcare facilities and services out of political, 
economic, and social considerations. The government’s decisions to increase its 
involvement in healthcare during these critical junctures triggered feedback 
mechanism that reinforced the government’s involvement in providing and financing 
healthcare in future. In the 1980s, the colonial government established the HA to 
deflect the complaints from the community about the poor service quality of public 
hospitals. This further confirmed the role of the colonial government in providing and 
subsidizing healthcare services for its people. However, a rapidly ageing population, 
higher public expectations for improved medical services, and rising medical costs 
caused by highly expensive drugs and advanced medical technology began to put 
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great pressure on the colonial government to reform the financing structure of 
healthcare (Hong Kong Government, 1993, pp.14-17).  
 
(a) The Proposal for Healthcare Financing Reform 
In July 1993, the colonial government published the first consultation document on 
healthcare financing entitled Towards Better Health (commonly known as The 
Rainbow Report because of the design of the cover), which proposed five reform 
options:  
 
(1) the percentage subsidy approach which raised charges based on a percentage 
of the actual operating cost;  
(2) the target group approach which introduced more expensive semi-private 
beds and itemized charging at public hospitals based on the principle of cost 
recovery while groups with less ability to pay were granted waiver;  
(3) the coordinated voluntary insurance approach which encouraged the take-up 
of private health insurance schemes approved by a designated statutory body; 
(4) the compulsory comprehensive insurance approach which required all 
households in Hong Kong to join a health insurance scheme centrally 
administered by the government that covered primary and hospital care in 
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both public and private sectors; and  
(5) the prioritization of treatment approach which focused on treating patients 
with higher priority conditions (Hong Kong Government, 1993, pp.27-38).  
 
The Rainbow Report stated that the colonial government preferred “a combination of 
the target group approach and the percentage subsidy approach” (Hong Kong 
Government, 1993, p.41) and also the introduction of the coordinated voluntary 
insurance as a framework which facilitated an effective operation of the target group 
approach and percentage subsidy approach (Hong Kong Government, 1993, p.41). 
However, the issue of The Rainbow Report invoked severe criticisms and 
dissatisfaction from legislators and the community, leading to the government’s 
decision to withdraw the proposal and continue to heavily subsidize healthcare 
services. 
 
(b) Reasons for Failing to Reform the Funding Structure of Healthcare 
Having looked at healthcare financing reform in 1993 through the lens of historical 
institutionalism, this study argues that the government failed to implement healthcare 
financing reform because of four main reasons: (1) the political system becoming 
more democratic and representative, (2) policy feedback from government’s previous 
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commitment to healthcare, (3) the old ideas of free healthcare and equality being 
championed by citizens and legislators, and (4) a robust economy. 
 
(i) The Political System Becoming More Democratic and Representative 
Historical institutionalism argues that political institutions play a determinant role in 
constraining or facilitating the structure of political opportunities for political actors in 
a given polity (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941; Immergut, 1998, p.21) and shaping their 
strategies and goals in the decision-making process that in turn shape the political 
outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). Before 1985, Hong 
Kong was an elite-consensual polity in which the colonial government appointed 
business and social elites in the Exco and Legco and made policy decisions behind 
closed doors. The political system was not democratic and there was the lack of 
communication between the colonial government and the general public. However, 
this closed political system had begun to change since 1985 when political reforms 
were implemented in Hong Kong. As Professor 1, Professor 2 and the former member 
of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA said during their interviews, before 
1985, the colonial government could easily secure the support from the Exco and the 
Legco because the appointed business elites in the Councils were proponents of the 
government’s recommended policies rather than opponents of the government’s 
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recommended policies.378 However, the democratization reform implemented since 
1985 led to the colonial government losing majority support for its recommended 
policies, including the proposal for healthcare financing reform in 1993.379  
 
The democratization reform implemented since 1985 warrants a discussion here 
with the help of literature. The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 which stated 
that the PRC would resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 
1997380 triggered the implementation of democratization reform in Hong Kong as 
part of the British decolonization process and changed the political design of the 
Legco and the Exco (Lam, 2003; Ma, 2007). The introduction of the indirect election 
of legislators based on functional constituencies which represented business and 
professional interests in 1985 and the introduction of the direct election of legislators 
for the first time in 1991 substantially reduced the number of appointed official in the 
Legco and turned the Legco into a more representative political institution. It also 
accelerated the formation and growth of political parties (Choy, 1999).  
 
Besides, the arrival of Chris Pattern in 1992 as the new and last Governor further 
                                                 
378 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
379 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
380 For details, the Sino-British Joint Declaration could be found on the website of Constitutional and 
Mainland Affairs Bureau at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm. 
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democratized the political system of Hong Kong by prohibiting members from 
simultaneously serving on the Exco and Legco in order to avoid conflict of roles and 
in 1995 abolishing the appointment system in the Legco (Ma and Choy, 2003; Ma, 
2007). Appointed members who resigned from the Exco to keep their seats in the 
Legco were not obligated to support the colonial government thereafter while the 
appointed Legco members who wanted to gain a seat in future election through direct 
election would not blindly support the government position in debates (Ma and Choy, 
2003, p.290; Ma, 2007, p.105). These measures weakened the capacity of the colonial 
government in securing majority support in the Legco. As Professor 1, Professor 2 
and the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA said during 
their interviews, on the surface, the colonial government wanted to leave Hong Kong 
with glory through the implementation of the democratization reform381. In reality, 
however, the democratization reform changed the institutional configuration of the 
elite-consensual polity into a consultative democracy, leading to the colonial 
government having a difficult time to secure a guaranteed majority support from the 
members in the Councils, in particular the Legco.382 Pro-democratic parties which 
had a landslide victory in the 1991 Legco election put tremendous pressure on the 
colonial government because democrats who had a strong sense of social 
                                                 
381 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
382 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
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responsibility did not easily agree with the government.383 As a result, the Governor 
spent much time to discuss policy issues with the legislators who gathered and 
reflected public opinions in the Legco.384  
 
(ii) Policy Feedback, the Endorsement of Old Ideas, and a Robust Economy 
Historical institutionalism argues that policy feedback provides resources and creates 
incentives that can facilitate, strengthen or inhibit the formation or expansion of 
stakeholder interests (Pierson, 1994, pp.40-1). Besides, it shapes public attitudes 
towards contemporary public policies (Pierson, 1994, p.45; Gusmano et al., 2002, 
p.734). Policy feedback from the government’s previous commitment to provide free 
medical services and increase the number of hospitals, clinics and hospital beds since 
the early 1960s had continuously increased the public acceptance of and demand for 
the government’s involvement in providing and financing healthcare services. Policy 
feedback from the establishment of a public healthcare system heavily subsidized by 
taxation generated a strong and wide base of public support because every citizen in 
Hong Kong could have universal access to free healthcare irrespective of age, sex, 
income or health status. The ideas of government provision, free healthcare, universal 
access and equality became deeply entrenched in the public healthcare system that 
                                                 
383 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
384 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA.  
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created framing effects. As Professor 1, Professor 2 and the former member of the 
Public Complaints Committee of the HA said during their interviews, since the 
community had the prevailing philosophy that healthcare service was a social welfare 
and citizen right, they raised strong objections to the five reform options proposed by 
the government in The Rainbow Report.385  The former member of the Public 
Complaints Committee of the HA interviewed said that although the heavily 
subsidized medical service was originally a product made by the colonial government 
out of political and economic calculation, it gradually became deep-rooted in the 
citizens’ mind that free or low cost healthcare service was their rights and the colonial 
government had the responsibility to provide healthcare service for them.386 Professor 
1 interviewed also argued that the establishment of the HA in 1990 further 
strengthened the view that providing healthcare services for the public was ‘a 
responsibility the colonial government could not shirk’.387  
 
Since the old ideas entrenched in public healthcare system were endorsed by the 
general public, it led to new ideas lacking public and political acceptance. Besides, a 
robust economy at that time when new programmatic ideas were proposed to reform 
the funding structure of healthcare failed to provide a window of opportunity for the 
                                                 
385 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
386 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
387 Interview with Professor 1. 
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colonial government to persuade citizens to accept new ideas. Programmatic ideas 
proposed in the 1993 Rainbow Report, such as the target group approach, the 
percentage subsidy approach and the coordinated voluntary insurance, did not 
generate wide support but severe criticisms. As Professor 1, Professor 2 and the 
former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA said during their 
interviews, a robust economy at that time did not justify the request made by the 
colonial government to implement healthcare financing reform or ask the citizens to 
share a proportion of their medical expenses through alternative financing options.388 
The economic statistics provided by the literature could give a clearer picture about 
how robust the Hong Kong economy was. Before the hand-over in 1997, Hong Kong 
had routinely experienced an annual growth respectively in its GDP and the per capita 
GDP (Lee, 2009, p.9). From 1986 to 1993, the annual growth rate of GDP was about 
7 per cent while that of per capita GDP was about 6 per cent (Lee, 2009, pp.34-5). It 
showed that Hong Kong had a strong economic growth before hand-over and the 
colonial government was not under any financial pressure necessitating reforming the 
structure of healthcare finance.   
 
In fact, the arguments of policy feedback, old ideas gaining wide public and 
                                                 
388 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
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political acceptance, and the robust economy could be substantiated by the archive of 
the Legco. The Official Record of Proceedings of the Legco (1993-94) showed that 
during a motion debate held on October 13, 1993 in the Legco, the majority of the 
appointed, indirectly elected and directly elected legislators opposed the proposed 
financing options raised by the colonial government based on seven main arguments 
which could be summarized as follows:389 
 
(1) Healthcare service was an important social welfare benefit (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 1994a, pp.170-232);  
(2) Healthcare service was a citizen right (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 
1994a, pp.170-232);  
                                                 
389 The author got a photocopy of the Official Record of Proceedings of the Legco (1993-94) which 
contained the motion debate on the proposed financing options of The Rainbow Report among 
legislators during a meeting on October 13, 1993. It recorded the stances and views of legislators 
on the proposed financing options in detail. In order to summarize the arguments made by 
legislators about the proposed financing options, the author conducted a content analysis of the 
Official Record of Proceedings of the Legco (1993-94). She read the Official Record line by line 
and focused on locating the stances and views of legislators on the proposed financing options. She 
used a pen to underline the key words, phrases or sentences which represented the views of 
legislators on the proposed financing options. Besides, she counted how frequently the same 
argument appeared in the Official Record. In order to categorize the arguments, she gave an 
alphabet to each of the argument located in the Official Record. For example, she would use “W” to 
represent the argument of “healthcare service as a social welfare benefit” and “R” to represent the 
argument of “healthcare service as a citizen right”. If a legislator made the same argument 
repeatedly in the Official Record, the author would only count the repeated argument as one time 
only. For example, if a legislator repeated the argument of “healthcare service as a citizen right” 
twice in the Official Record, the author would only count it as one time only. After the content 
analysis, the author found that the frequencies of each of the argument made by legislators were as 
follows: (1) “healthcare service being an important social welfare benefit” appeared 14 times; (2) 
“healthcare service being a citizen right” appeared two times; (3) “the government using the 
healthcare financing reform to shirk its (basic) responsibility for healthcare provision” appeared 
five times; (4) “the government using the healthcare financing reform to back out its commitment 
to healthcare” appeared seven times; (5) the argument that “the government should uphold its 
time-honored policy of no one being denied adequate medical treatment through lack of means” 
appeared four times; (6) “the government grossly overlooking the development of primary 
healthcare” appeared 10 times; and (7) “the government having a huge surplus under a prosperous 
economy” appeared four times in the Official Record. 
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(3) The government used the healthcare financing reform to shirk its (basic) 
responsibility for healthcare provision (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 
1994a, pp.170-232);  
(4) The government used the healthcare financing reform to back out of its 
commitment to healthcare (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1994a, 
pp.170-232);  
(5) The government should uphold its time-honored policy that “no one should 
be denied adequate medical treatment through lack of means” (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 1994a, pp.170-232); 
(6) The government incompetently managing the development of primary 
healthcare was the reason for spiraling healthcare expenditures (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 1994a, pp.170-232). 
(7) The government did not have any financial burden of funding healthcare 
because it made a huge surplus under a prosperous economy and it had 
already committed to raise the recurrent spending on healthcare by 22 per 
cent in real terms from 1992 to 1997 (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 
1994a, pp.170-232). 
 
During the motion debate, the legislators gathered and reflected public opinions 
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about the proposed financing options in the Legco by conducting opinion polls. The 
results of the public opinions conducted by different legislators showed a consistent 
result that the majority of citizens surveyed were against the proposed financing 
options and thought that healthcare service was a welfare service. According to the 
Official Record of Proceedings of the Legco (1993-94), an opinion poll conducted by 
the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK)390 showed that among the 1,337 
questionnaires returned, 90 per cent of the respondents were against the cost-pegged 
charging system proposed in The Rainbow Report and over 90 per cent of the 
respondents were against the proposal of itemized charging (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 1994a, p.194). Besides, it showed that an overwhelming 97 per cent regarded 
public medical service as a welfare service which should be provided by the 
government (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1994a, p.194). Another opinion poll 
conducted by the directly elected legislator Mr. James To in September 1993 showed 
that among the 500 questionnaires returned, 95 per cent of the respondents disagreed 
with the government’s proposal of itemized charging while 89 per cent disagreed with 
the cost-pegged charging system (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1994a, p.212). 
Besides, it showed that 98 per cent of respondents regarded public medical service as 
a welfare service which should be provided by the government (Hong Kong 
                                                 
390 The United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) was merged with another pro-democracy party 
called the Meeting Point to form the Democratic Party in 1995.  
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Legislative Council, 1994a, p.212). The Official Record of Proceedings of the Legco 
(1993-94) showed that both the legislators and the community strongly opposed the 
healthcare financing reform.  
 
In fact, motion debates in the Legco did not have any binding power on the 
colonial government but provided legislators with a chance to express their views and 
create public pressure (Ma, 2002, p.360). Nevertheless, motion debates received 
widespread media coverage shortly after the direct election in the Legco in 1991 and 
created considerable political impact for the government (Ma, 2002, p.360). As the 
Secretary for Health and Welfare said during the Legco meeting, change to the 
healthcare financing system, “in order to take root, must have the support of the 
community” (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1994a, p.227). But the colonial 
government failed to receive positive feedback during the consultation period. At last, 
the Secretary for Health and Welfare announced at the end of the consultation period 
that the colonial government would not implement the healthcare financing reform 
due to “public opposition and fear of public misunderstanding” (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 1994b, p.3235) and that “the status quo should be remained” 
(Legislative Council Secretariat, 2005a, p.1). Policy feedback from the 
democratization reform reduced the colonial government’s capacity of securing 
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majority support for its recommended policies while providing a chance for the views 
of the public being channeled into the Legco through the elected legislators. The 
government’s previous commitment to healthcare produced a lock-in effect that 
reduced the government’s capacity of implementing healthcare financing reform. As 
Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints Committee 
of the HA said during their interviews, the Governor did not dare to implement any 
healthcare financing reform in 1993 when facing opposition from legislators and the 
community because he was the one who wanted to promote a more open and 
representative government in Hong Kong.391 It was important for him to avoid 
confrontation with the legislators and the public during the political transition 
period.392 Since the Governor Chris Pattern always talked about adherence to the 
principles of “openness, fairness and acceptability to the public” (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 1994a, p.175), he could not disregard the criticisms and 
oppositions of legislators and the community by changing the financing structure of 
healthcare. Hence, the implementation of healthcare financing reform became an issue 
leaving for the post-colonial government to deal with.  
 
 In sum, the colonial government failed to bring any structural change in 
                                                 
391 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
392 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 2, and the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA. 
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healthcare financing through the public consultation of The Rainbow Report in 1993 
because of the complex interplay of forces, namely the political system becoming 
more democratic and representative, policy feedback from government’s previous 
commitment to healthcare, the old ideas of free healthcare and equality being 
championed by citizens and legislators, and a robust economy. 
  
 Since 1985, the political system of Hong Kong became more democratic and 
representative because of the introduction of the democratization reform triggered by 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. The introduction of the indirect and direct 
election into the Legco substantially reduced the number of appointed officials in the 
Legco and made the Legco become a more representative political institution. The 
change of political leadership to the new Governor Chris Pattern further democratized 
the political system of Hong Kong by prohibiting members from simultaneously 
serving on the Exco and Legco and abolishing the appointment system in the Legco. 
Members in the Councils who had electoral consideration and wanted to win votes in 
future elections would not easily support the colonial government. The change in the 
institutional configuration from the elite-consensual polity to a consultative 
democracy unavoidably weakened the capacity of the colonial government in securing 
majority support in the Legco. It increased the difficulties of the colonial government 
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in implementing healthcare financing reform because it had to be responsive to the 
Legco.  
 
Besides, policy feedback from government’s previous commitment to healthcare 
strengthened the role of the colonial government in providing and financing 
healthcare. New financing options proposed in The Rainbow Report generated public 
discontent because the principle of cost recovery that asked citizens to pay more went 
against the thought of citizens that healthcare service was a welfare benefit and right. 
These financing options also went against public expectation that the colonial 
government should be committed to the finance and provision of healthcare services. 
Also, a buoyant economy at that time showed that the financial sustainability of 
healthcare system was not a question at all because the colonial government enjoyed 
large surplus. With strong economic growth, the colonial government found it difficult 
to convince the citizens to pay more for their medical expenses. Citizens regarded the 
proposed financing options as an excuse for the government to shirk its responsibility 
of paying the healthcare expenditures. Therefore, they did not support the 
government’s proposal and favored the maintenance of the status quo. At last, the 
colonial government’s effort to implement healthcare financing reform in 1993 ended 
in failure.  
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8.3 The Tung Chee-hwa Administration (1997 - 2005) 
After returning to the Chinese rule on July 1, 1997, Hong Kong became the HKSAR 
under the concept of “one country, two systems” (Lee, 2009, p.162). The Basic Law, 
which was the constitutional instrument for the HKSAR, laid down the general 
framework of governance that was similar to that of the colonial governance: a high 
degree of autonomy, executive-led government, a capitalist way of life, a balanced 
budget, a low tax policy, and the protection of individual rights and freedoms.393  
 
The formal governmental structure and functions of the HKSAR was similar to 
that of colonial administration, with the Chief Executive replacing the Governor at the 
apex of the structure (Scott, 2010, p.71). The Exco, the Legco, and the civil service 
were still the key actors or institutions in the political system. Since 1997, the 
executive-led principle had remained dominant in the HKSAR (Lam, 2007, p.10). The 
Exco was composed of the Chief Executive, the Principal Officials and non-official 
members (Burns, 2004). The work of the Chief Executive was supported by the 
Principal Officials who were responsible for policy formulation and supervision of 
                                                 
393 The Basic Law was promulgated by the PRC in 1990 and came into effect on July 1, 1997 when 
Hong Kong was returned to the PRC. It stipulated that under the principle of “one country, two 
systems”, the socialist system and policies would not be practiced in the HKSAR. The full text of 
the Basic Law could be found at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/. 
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subordinate departments within their portfolios (Li, 2007, p.25). Principal Officials 
that included three senior secretaries (The Chief Secretary for Administration, the 
Financial Secretary, and the Secretary for Justice) and 11 bureau secretaries were held 
by senior civil servants until 2002 when the Principle Officials Accountability System 
(POAS) was introduced to “enhance the accountability of the Principal Officials for 
policy failures” (Scott, 2010, p.52) and enable the Chief Executive to form his/her 
own governing team “without the restriction of having to choose from inside the civil 
service” (Li, 2007, p.24). Since 2002, Principal Officials had been held by non-civil 
service political appointees on contract and “could be dismissed by the Chief 
Executive” (Scott, 2010, p.13). Since 1997, the government had remained highly 
centralized with a hierarchically-organized civil service (Scott, 2010). The Chief 
Secretary for Administration was the successor of the Colonial Secretary and became 
the head of the civil service (Scott, 2010, p.71). The civil service was divided into 16 
policy bureaux headed by a senior civil servant, which formulated policy that the 
departments below them were responsible for implementation (Scott, 2010).  
 
(a) The Proposals for Healthcare Financing Reform 
Tung Chee-hwa was the first Chief Executive of the HKSAR government. During 
Tung’s first term of office, the HKSAR government released two consultation 
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documents on healthcare financing in 1999 and 2000. However, both consultation 
documents were shelved due to widespread criticisms from the legislators and stiff 
resistance from the public. In November 1997, the HKSAR government 
commissioned a team of economists, public health specialists, physicians and 
epidemiologists from Harvard University, which was led by Professor William Hsiao 
and Professor Winnie Yip, to conduct a study on the current healthcare system and 
recommend reform options to improve healthcare financing in Hong Kong. The 
decision of using overseas experts, as illustrated later in this section, was due to Tung 
lacking his own team of policy advisors and his distrust of the civil service.  
 
In April 1999, the Harvard Team completed the study with the release of a public 
consultation report entitled Improving Hong Kong’s Health Care System: Why and 
For Whom? (hereafter The Harvard Report) (Health and Welfare Bureau, 2000, p.2). 
The HK$7 million Harvard Report found that the current healthcare system in Hong 
Kong suffered from three inter-related weaknesses, which included the 
compartmentalized healthcare system, the variable quality of healthcare, and the 
questionable long-term financial sustainability (The Harvard Team, 1999, pp.52-82). 
In order to improve healthcare financing in Hong Kong, the Harvard Team presented 
five reform options in The Harvard Report:  
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(1) maintaining the status quo;  
(2) capping the government budget for healthcare; 
(3) raising user fees at public hospitals and clinics; 
(4) implementing Health Security Plan (HSP) and Saving Accounts for Long 
Term Care (MEDISAGE), a two-tier mandatory health insurance scheme 
which required both employers and employees to jointly contribute about 1.5 
to 2 per cent of employees’ wages to HSP for paying inpatient and outpatient 
medical expenses, and 1 per cent of employees’ wages to MEDISAGE for 
purchasing long-term care insurance at age of 65. The concept of “money 
follows the patient” was introduced by establishing the Health Security Fund, 
Inc. to pay a standard payment rate to public or private healthcare provider 
chosen by a patient (The Harvard Team, 1999, p.13); and 
(5) competitive integrated system which adopted the HSP and MEDISAGE 
option and reorganized the HA into 12 to 18 regional Health Integrated 
Systems for providing preventive, primary, outpatient and hospital care (The 
Harvard Team, 1999, pp.92-112).  
 
After evaluating five reform options (See Table 24), the Harvard Team recommended 
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that the HKSAR government adopt the HSP and MEDISAGE first, which could pave 
the way for implementing competitive integrated system in the long run (The Harvard 
Team, 1999, p116). However, The Harvard Report was shelved due to public 
resentment.  
 
In December 2000, the HKSAR government produced its own version of 
healthcare financing reform in a public consultation document entitled Life Long 
Investment in Health (hereafter The Life Long Investment document), which proposed 
a mandatory medical savings scheme by establishing Health Protection Accounts 
(HPA). The mandatory medical savings scheme required every individual aged 40 to 
64 to contribute 1 to 2 per cent of his/her earnings to a personal account that cover the 
future medical and dental expenses of both the individual and his/her spouse when the 
individual reached the age of 65 (Health and Welfare Bureau, 2000, p.57). An 
individual would only be reimbursed at the public sector rates if he/she sought 
medical treatment at the private sector and needed to meet the price difference either 
from his/her own means or “from the entitlement of private insurance” (Health and 
Welfare Bureau, 2000, p.57). However, The Life Long Investment document was 
shelved due to public resentment. As a result, the Tung administration failed to reform 
the funding structure of healthcare and the status quo was maintained.  
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(b) Reasons for Failing to Reform the Funding Structure of Healthcare 
Having looked at healthcare financing reform in 1999 and 2000 through the lens of 
historical institutionalism, this study argues that the HKSAR government failed to 
implement healthcare financing reforms because of because of five reasons: (1) a 
disjointed political system, (2) difficult economic circumstances,394 (3) the new idea 
of mandatory contributions lacking public and political acceptance, (4) policy 
feedback from previous healthcare policies and the mandatory pension scheme, and (5) 
the institutionalization of old ideas. It shows that the complex interplay of these forces 
constraining the government from implementing healthcare financing reforms.  
 
(i) A Disjointed Political System 
Historical institutionalism argues that political institutions play a determinant role in 
constraining or facilitating the structure of political opportunities for political actors in 
a given polity (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941; Immergut, 1998, p.21) and shaping their 
strategies and goals in the decision-making process that in turn shape the political 
outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). While a cohesive 
                                                 
394 Whilst Hong Kong economy has been generally successful, there have been episodes of economic 
problems --- in this case, the local impact of 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. To know more about 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, please see Pak Wai Lui (1998), The Asian Financial Crisis and After 
Problems and Challenges for the Hong Kong Economy. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asian 
Pacific Studies; Y.C. Jao (2001), The Asian Financial Crisis and Ordeal of Hong Kong. Westport, 
Conn: Quorum Books. 
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political system facilitates policy implementation, a disjointed political system acts as 
an impediment to gather political support, reach a consensus on policy decisions and 
implement policies. In Hong Kong, the continuation of the mode of executive-led and 
bureaucracy-based governance became unsustainable after the 1997 handover (Eliza, 
1999, p.943-4; Cheung, 2007a, p.52-3; Cheung, 2007b, p.22; Cheung, 2010, p.40). It 
was because the political institutions, actors occupying that inherited political 
institutions, their thinking and interests, and the policy environment had undergone 
significant changes (Cheung, 2007a, p.52-3; Cheung, 2010, p.40). A disjointed 
political system after the 1997 handover became an impassable barrier to implement 
healthcare financing reforms. The disjointed political system was attributed to policy 
feedback from the democratization reform implemented in the final years of the 
colonial rule on one hand, and the fracture and disharmony within the Exco since the 
post-handover era on the other hand. Two consequent implications of the 
democratization reform were that the Tung administration suffered the legitimacy 
crisis when facing a more representative Legco and the Exco-Legco relationship 
became very tense when the Exco was delinked from the Legco. Besides, the Chief 
Executive’s distrust of the civil service and his paternalistic attitude towards the civil 
service led to his poor working relationship with the civil service and disunity within 
the Exco. The political system became disjointed in the post-handover era, causing a 
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series of policy blunders and failures, including the implementation of healthcare 
financing reforms.  
 
 The legitimacy deficit and the tense Exco-Legco relationship caused by policy 
feedback from the implementation of democratization reform warrants a detailed 
discussion here with the help of interviewing data and literature. During their 
interviews, Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Civil Servant 2, and the former 
member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA shared the view that there had 
been the lack of institutional collaboration in the executive-led political system since 
the post-colonial era.395 It was obvious to see that the HKSAR government suffered 
legitimacy crisis and the Exco had a tense relationship with the Legco.396 Like the 
colonial administration, the Tung administration suffered from a legitimacy deficit 
because both the Chief Executive and the Exco lacked an electoral mandate.397 While 
the Chief Executive was elected by a Selection Committee dominated by 400 business 
and pro-China elites, members in the Exco were appointed by the Chief Executive. 
“The small circle election of the Chief Executive”398 and the pro-business and 
pro-Beijing image of Tung administration limited the capacity of the HKSAR 
                                                 
395 Interviews with Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Civil Servant 2, and the former member 
of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
396 Interviews with Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Civil Servant 2, and the former member 
of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
397 Interviews with Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Civil Servant 2, and the former member 
of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
398 Interviews with the former Legco member 1 and Civil Servant 2.  
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government to secure majority support from citizens who had a deep distrust of 
Beijing and anti-communist sentiments (Lau, 2002b).  
 
On the other hand, the Legco obtained legitimacy and electoral mandate because 
legislators were elected by voters. As the former Legco member 1 said during the 
interview, as a representative political institution, the Legco had popular mandate to 
oppose the government’s healthcare financing proposals, which made the HKSAR 
government unable to take any action except abandoning its proposals.399 In the 
Legco, there were 18 panels that roughly corresponded to the policy bureaux of the 
HKSAR government (Ma, 2002, p.359). The panels did not have the veto power to 
block the government’s proposals, but the power of appropriation and legislation 
obtained by the Legco gave the panels’ opinions more weight (Ma, 2002, p.359). The 
Panel on Health Services monitored and examined government’s healthcare policies, 
and provided a forum for legislators to exchange and express their views on 
healthcare polices (The Legislative Council, 2011). It also gave legislators a venue to 
question government officials in charge of healthcare policies face-to-face and “push 
for policy change” (Ma, 2002, p.359). The Panel on Health Services was where the 
meeting and debate on healthcare financing reform took place.  
                                                 
399 Interview with the former Legco member 1. 
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The legitimacy crisis suffered by the Tung administration had already made it 
hard to secure support for its policy implementation. What made the problem worse 
was the tense relationship between the Exco and the Legco. The colonial legacy of 
separating the Exco membership from the Legco membership in 1993 led to the 
disjunction between the work of the two Councils (Scott, 2000, p.40). Before 1993, 
the colonial government could largely rely on the support of the members who 
simultaneously served the two Councils to help government’s policies cruise through 
the Legco (Ma and Choy, 2003, p.289). With the de-linking of the Exco and Legco, 
the Legco had the right to challenge the Exco and to “bring requests for policy 
changes to its notice” (Scott, 2000, p.44). When it came to the post-handover era, the 
situation was that government officials and the heads of policy bureaux were left to 
present a lengthy defence of their reform proposals and became targets of anger and 
criticism in the Legco. As the former Legco member 1, Civil Servant 2 and Civil 
Servant 3 said during their interviews, the Exco-Legco relationship had become tense 
since the post-handover period because members of the Exco thought that members of 
the Legco always played the opposition role and were being too critical of 
government’s policies in order to gain more votes in future elections.400 On the other 
                                                 
400 Interviews with the former Legco member 1, Civil Servant 2, and Civil Servant 3.  
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hand, the Legco members thought that they had the responsibility to channel citizens’ 
voice into the Legco, especially when the HKSAR government chose to do things in 
its own way that its proposed reform options and policies did not truly reflect the 
expressed wishes and needs of citizens.401 In fact, even the pro-government and 
pro-Beijing political party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong 
(DAB), and the government-friendly and pro-business political party, the Liberal 
Party, failed to give reliable support to the HKSAR government in the Legco when it 
came to the issue of healthcare financing. Since the post-handover period, the 
Democratic Party, the DAB, and the Liberal Party became three dominant political 
parties that exhibited “divergent views on the politics of Hong Kong” (Lam, 2003, 
p.225). However, on issues of healthcare, the DAB actually shared the pro-grassroots 
position with the Democratic Party (Ma, 2007, p.106) while the Liberal Party adopted 
a pro-business position that represented the voices of employers. These political 
parties, as illustrated below, did not support the healthcare financing options proposed 
by the government but put pressure on the government. As a result, the tense 
Exco-Legco relationship was detrimental to implement healthcare financing reform.  
 
The legitimacy deficit suffered by the Tung Administration and the tense 
                                                 
401 Interviews with the former Legco member 1, Civil Servant 2, and Civil Servant 3. 
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Exco-Legco relationship had already disarticulated the political system of Hong Kong. 
What further worsened the disjointed political system was the disunity within the 
Exco. The disunity within the Exco was attributed to the Chief Executive’s distrust of 
the civil service on one hand, and his paternalistic attitude towards the civil service on 
the other hand. As illustrated below, the fracture and disharmony within the Exco 
became an impediment to hold the members together for countering oppositional 
forces from the Legco and the community when implementing healthcare financing 
reforms. The Chief Executive’s distrust of the civil service led to his poor working 
relationship with the civil service. As Civil Servant 2 said during the interview, Tung 
thought that the civil service which served the colonial administration was not a loyal 
partner to him.402 His reluctance to listen to the advice of senior civil servants when 
formulating policies and his paternalistic attitude that required the civil service to 
follow what he said showed a lack of respect for the civil service.403 In fact, most of 
the Principal Officials in the Tung administration were principal officials of Governor 
Patten (Lau, 2002b, p.12). The retention of these former colonial officials was a move 
to maintain public confidence in the future of Hong Kong because their track record 
of administrative performance could gain public trust (Lau, 2002b, p.12). However, 
these senior civil servants’ perception that they played a leadership role in 
                                                 
402 Interview with Civil Servant 2. 
403 Interview with Civil Servant 2. 
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policy-making went against the Chief Executive’s perception that civil servants 
should be subordinate to a political master (Lee, 1999, pp.947-8). The Chief 
Executive’s attitude to compete with the civil service for taking policy initiatives led 
to both parties having difficulties in working with one another (Lee, 1999, p.948).  
 
Being a shipping tycoon, Tung was a political newcomer and an outsider of the 
civil service. He had “limited political experience before his political ascendancy” 
(Lau, 2002b, p.10). He failed to have “a preexisting network of political allies to assist 
him” (Lau, 2002b, p.10) and support him in policy making. Therefore, what he could 
do was becoming a political loner who created a grand policy agenda that ended up 
achieving little (Lau, 2002a, p.ix) or finding policy advisors outside the civil service 
for analyses. In fact, Tung’s decision to commission the Harvard Team to recommend 
reform options for improving healthcare finance was due to his distrust of the civil 
service and lacking his own team of policy advisors on healthcare. As Professor 1 said 
during the interview, Tung’s decision to hire the Harvard Team was due to his belief 
that the Team headed by a senior health economist who had experience in reforming 
healthcare systems of other countries represented authority.404 Besides, Tung believed 
that “the fame and reputation of the Harvard University could easily win public 
                                                 
404 Interview with Professor 1. 
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acceptance”.405 Nevertheless, Tung failed to understand the political reality that 
healthcare financing reform was not as simple as what he thought because it involved 
lots of vested interests.406 
 
In fact, implementing healthcare financing reform was part of Tung’s project to 
depoliticize Hong Kong. “Tung’s political conservatism and the objection of Beijing” 
(Lau, 2002b, p.4) made further democratization in Hong Kong impossible. By 
deliberately focusing on economic and social issues such as healthcare financing 
reform, the Tung administration attempted to “draw people’s attention away from 
political issues” (Lau, 2002b, p.8) and establish its political legitimacy by producing 
satisfactory policy outputs (Lee, 1999; Lau, 2002b). However, it ignored the political 
reality that social issues such as healthcare financing reform only escalated 
politicization. As Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Social Worker 1, and 
Doctor 2 said during their interviews, the rise of political parties, pressure groups and 
civil societies stimulated by the democratization process since the early 1990s and 
extensive media coverage heightened the political awareness of the community.407 
Political parties, pressure groups and civil societies had been active and vibrant to 
                                                 
405 Interview with Professor 1. 
406 Interviews with Professor 1and Civil Servant 4. 
407 Interviews with Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Social Worker 1, and Doctor 2. 
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influence the government policies related to their interests.408 Apart from channeling 
citizens’ voices through the Legco, political parties mobilized the mass to take 
collective action such as demonstrations to express public grievances.409 On the other 
hand, pressure groups and civil societies actively worked outside the formal political 
institutions to press for policy changes while extensive media coverage of healthcare 
financing reform formulated public opinions.410 Since healthcare financing reforms 
touched upon vested interests embedded in the healthcare system, it unavoidably 
provoked a public outcry and created discontent against the HKSAR government. It 
meant that healthcare financing reform as a de-politicization project of the Tung 
administration actually became a political issue because of the rise of political parties, 
pressure groups and civil societies and extensive media coverage.  
 
(ii) The Difficult Economic Circumstances and Policy Feedback 
Historical institutionalism argues that changes in contextual conditions, namely 
political, economic or social context, can generate the sources of institutional and 
policy changes. Contextual changes created a window of opportunity for political 
actors to adopt new goals or strategies. In Hong Kong, the government respectively 
proposed the mandatory health insurance scheme in 1999 and the mandatory medical 
                                                 
408 Interviews with Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Social Worker 1, and Doctor 2. 
409 Interviews with Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Social Worker 1, and Doctor 2. 
410 Interviews with Professor 1, the former Legco member 1, Social Worker 1, and Doctor 2. 
 355 
savings scheme in 2000 amid economic downturn. However, it failed to obtain wide 
public and political support. Both the mandatory schemes were strongly resisted by 
both the Legco and the community who thought that the schemes were introduced at 
the wrong time when Hong Kong had suffered a severe economic downturn after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997. The economy of Hong Kong was hard hit by the Asian 
financial crisis (Wong and Luk, 2007, p.192). The GDP of Hong Kong “shifted from 
high growth, to slow and even negative growth” (Wong, 2009, p.145). In 1998, GDP 
growth of Hong Kong was down to -5.3 per cent for the first time in its history (Ho, 
2002, p.179; Lee, 2005, p.7).411 Besides, the average annual rate of growth per capita 
GDP fell from 4.5 per cent in the pre-handover era (1983-1997) to 1.9 per cent in the 
post-colonial era (1997-2001) (Sung, 2002, p.123). Also, the unemployment rate went 
up rapidly from 2.2 per cent in 1997 to 6.2 per cent in 1999 (Wong, 2009, p.145). 
Although the unemployment rate fell back to 4.9 per cent in 2000, it rose to 5.1 per 
cent in 2001 and even reached a record high of 7.9 per cent in 2003 (Wong, 2009, 
p.145). “The huge surpluses of colonial days were gone” (Scott, 2010, p.11) and the 
budget deficit had snowballed to a record high of HK$ 65 billion by 2002, which 
amounted to 5.2 per cent of GDP (Lee, 2009, p.167). Both the middle and lower 
classes suffered “unemployment, wage decline and asset deflation” (Lee, 2005, p.7). 
                                                 
411 According to Ho (2002), Hong Kong did not experience any negative GDP growth from 1963 to 
1997 (p.179).  
 356 
Both the Legco and the community complained that it was inappropriate and untimely 
for the government to propose these mandatory health insurance or medical savings 
schemes at a time of economic hardship.  
 
Legislators and political parties were against the mandatory health insurance or 
medical savings schemes because of the perceived financial burden imposed by these 
mandatory schemes and policy feedback from the government’s decision of 
implementing the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF). Historical institutionalism 
argues that policy feedback provides resources and creates incentives that can 
facilitate, strengthen or inhibit the formation or expansion of stakeholder interests 
(Pierson, 1994, pp.40-1). Besides, it shapes public attitudes towards contemporary 
public policies (Pierson, 1994, p.45; Gusmano et al., 2002, p.734). Policy feedback 
from the government’s decision of implementing the Mandatory Provident Fund 
(MPF) warrants a discussion here because it helps understands about how legislators, 
political parties and the public viewed about the proposed mandatory schemes for 
healthcare. In August 1995, the colonial government enacted the Mandatory Provident 
Fund Schemes Ordinance in order to provide a framework for establishing a 
compulsory personal savings scheme known as MPF for retirement protection 
(Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority, 2010, p.18). In September 1998, the 
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Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority was established to “regulate, supervise 
and monitor the operation of the MPF System” (Information Services Department, 
2011, p.1). In 1999, the Authority drew up the timetable that the MPF System would 
come into operation in December 2000 (Legislative Council Panel on Financial 
Affairs, 1999). The MPF scheme was an “employment-based, contribution-defined, 
[and] privately managed” scheme (Chow and Chou, 2005, p.139). It required 
employees to contribute 5 per cent of their salaries and employers had to match this 
amount (Chow and Chou, 2005, p.139). According to Chow and Chou (2005), the 
MPF scheme could not provide adequate financial protection for employees when 
they were old until they had contributed for at least 30 years (p.139). However, since 
the scheme was mandatory, employees had to join it without any choice. The MPF 
scheme was regarded as an unpopular scheme because of its mandatory nature, the 
perceived financial burden it brought and its insufficient retirement protection.412 
Since legislators, political parties and the public got a bad impression of the MPF 
scheme even before its actual implementation, they felt annoyed when the HKSAR 
government consecutively proposed the mandatory health insurance in 1999 and 
medical savings schemes in 2000.413 
 
                                                 
412 Interview with Professor 2. 
413 Interview with Professor 2. 
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Different political parties opposed these mandatory schemes proposed by the 
HKSAR government. The Democratic Party argued that both the mandatory schemes 
would increase citizens’ financial burden under poor economic environment because 
citizens were already required to join the MPF (Law and Ho, 1999; Legislative 
Council Secretariat, 2001b, p.6).414 The Democratic Party argued that the government 
should not use the mandatory medical savings scheme to “dig into the pockets of the 
public” (The Legislative Council, 2001, p.4042), especially to the lowest income 
group who had “problems with their essential daily expenses” (The Legislative 
Council, 2001, p.4043). The DAB argued that the mandatory health insurance scheme 
was “hardly different from a new tax” (Li, 1999, April 26) while the mandatory 
medical savings scheme would aggravate the financial burden of citizens who had 
already contributed 5 per cent of their salaries to the MPF scheme and who suffered 
salary cut or salary freeze (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2001a, p.5). The Liberal 
Party thought that a mandatory health insurance scheme on top of the MPF scheme 
would increase the operation costs and undermine the competitive edge of the 
companies under poor business environment (Wan, 1999b, May 6) while it thought 
that the controversial mandatory medical savings scheme was “not the right time of 
implementation” (The Legislative Council, 2001, p.4053). The Democratic Party, the 
                                                 
414 For more information, please visit the website of Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority 
(http://www.mpfa.org.hk/eindex.asp) or the website of the HKSAR government about MPF 
(http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/mpf.pdf).  
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DAB, and the Liberal Party recommended the government adopt other measures to 
control healthcare costs such as revamping the fees structure of public healthcare 
services, restructuring the HA, and enhancing the primary healthcare services 
(Legislative Council Secretariat, 2001a, p.5; Legislative Council Secretariat, 2001b, 
p.6; The Legislative Council, 2001, pp. 4051-2). In brief, legislators and political 
parties showed a consistent position on opposing the introduction of the mandatory 
health insurance or medical savings schemes because of the perceived financial 
burden imposed by these mandatory schemes and policy feedback from the 
government’s decision of implementing the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF). 
 
Similar to legislators and political parties, Hong Kong citizens also opposed both 
the mandatory health insurance and medical savings schemes because of the 
perceived financial burden imposed by these mandatory schemes. As Citizen 2, 
Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 6 and Citizen 7 said during their interviews, it was very 
unkind and inconsiderate for the government to ask the citizens to join the mandatory 
schemes during the economic recession period when many of them were in an 
economic plight due to bankruptcies, unemployment, and declining standard of 
living.415 They said that the government did nothing to help them go through the 
                                                 
415 Interviews with Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7. 
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difficult time but used the mandatory schemes as an excuse to ask the citizens to pay 
for their own medical expenses.416 Both Citizen 6 and Citizen 7 interviewed said that 
they were threatened by job insecurity and salary cut at that time that both the 
mandatory schemes were a nightmare and a burden to them.417 Citizen 4 interviewed 
said that the mandatory health insurance scheme was “a tax in disguise” and “a trick 
played by the government to ask for more money” that was especially unfair to the 
middle-class people like him.418 Citizen 6 and Citizen 8 interviewed said that both the 
mandatory schemes were too much to bear because they had already joined the MPF 
scheme for retirement protection.419 Citizen 5 interviewed were against both the 
mandatory schemes at that time because he thought that the government may increase 
the rate of contribution if the medical expenditures increased drastically in future.420 
As Professor 1, Professor 3, Social Worker 1 and Civil Servant 4 said during their 
interviews, timing was very important and the economic recession period was never 
an opportune time to implement any healthcare financing reform.421 
 
Also, policy feedback from the establishment of the HA led to the HA and 
medical professionals who worked in public hospitals opposing both the mandatory 
                                                 
416 Interviews with Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 6, and Citizen 7. 
417 Interviews with Citizen 6 and Citizen 7. 
418 Interview with Citizen 4. 
419 Interviews with Citizen 6 and Citizen 8.  
420 Interview with Citizen 5. 
421 Interviews with Professor 1, Professor 3, Social Worker 1, and Civil Servant 4. 
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schemes. It was because they worried that the implementation of these mandatory 
schemes would create the new problem of moral hazard on both the supply side and 
demand side. The HA and doctors were against the mandatory health insurance 
scheme proposed by the Harvard Team because the HA would no longer receive 
funding automatically from the government under the principle of “money follows the 
patient” and had to compete with private hospitals in the market.422 The “money 
follows patients” concept would create strong incentives for medical institutions to 
increase their revenues through over-prescription or doing unnecessary medical 
examinations or surgeries.423 The HA and doctors worried that the competition with 
private hospitals for more financial resources would drive the HA to focus on money 
rather than patient care when delivering medical service, resulting in the failure in 
upholding the time-honored policy that “no one would be denied adequate medical 
care because of lack of means”.424 Since healthcare was not an economic issue, both 
the mandatory schemes would definitely deter ordinary citizens, especially the poor 
and the elderly, from seeking medical treatment for the fear of high medical fees.425 
 
On the other hand, both the Hong Kong Medical Association and the HA argued 
that the mandatory health insurance scheme created moral hazard on the demand side 
                                                 
422 Interviews with Professor 1 and Doctor 2. 
423 Interviews with Professor 1 and Doctor 2. 
424 Interviews with Professor 1 and Doctor 2. 
425 Interviews with Nurse 1, Doctor 1, Social Worker 1, and Social Worker 2. 
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because those who were conscious of their own financial contribution would abuse 
the healthcare system and induce unnecessary demand that ended up increasing both 
the workload of medical staff and the financial burden of the HA (The Hong Kong 
Medical Association, 1999; Yeung, 1999, December 27). Anther problem was that the 
negligible savings accumulated in the HPA of the mandatory medical savings scheme 
only made ordinary citizens stick to the public hospital system, resulting in the failure 
in reducing the workload of medical staff and the financial burden of the HA. The 
contribution rate of 1 to 2 per cent of the mandatory medical savings scheme was 
inadequate to help citizens accumulate enough money in the HPA for paying their 
future medical expenses, in particular those with chronic or catastrophic diseases.426 
Besides, the mandatory medical savings scheme would not drive patients to seek 
medical treatment at private hospitals because medical charges at private hospitals 
could be a bottomless pit.427 It meant that the mandatory medical savings scheme 
ended up defeating the government’s purpose of reducing the workload of doctors and 
alleviating the financial burden of the HA.428 
                                                 
426 Interviews with the former Legco member 1 and Doctor 2. The DAB calculated on the basis of the 
current median wage of HK$10,000 and found that the HPA would “have a balance of HK$56,012 
after 25 years of contribution” (The Legislative Council, 2001, p.4078). For low-wage earners, they 
would only have HK$20,000 to HK$30,000 in their HPA (The Legislative Council, 2001, p.4078). 
The calculation done by Alliance of Patient Mutual Help Organization showed that an individual 
would only have a mere saving of HK$40,000 in his/her HPAs when he/she reached 65 and could 
only have had HK$222 for monthly healthcare expenditure if he/she had life expectancy of 80 years 
(Sing Pao, 18 December 2000, p.6). 
427 Interviews with the former Legco member 1 and Doctor 2. 
428 Interviews with the former Legco member 1 and Doctor 2. 
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(iii) The New Idea Lacking Support and the Institutionalization of Old Ideas 
Historical institutionalism argues that ideas matter in policy making (Campbell, 1998) 
because they either “favor significant policy change or reinforce existing institutional 
paths” (Hwang, 2006, p.16). In Hong Kong, the new idea of mandatory contribution 
towards healthcare failed to get public and political support and acceptance because of 
three main reasons: objection to compulsion, the lack of detailed information about 
the mandatory schemes, and concern for health as a right. Firstly, both the mandatory 
health insurance and medical savings schemes restricted the choices of individuals to 
choose because employees, whether they were willing to join the schemes or not, 
were required to make financial contributions. Besides, the mandatory medical 
savings scheme only allowed citizens to use the money deposited into the HPA when 
they reached 65 years old. As Professor 1 and Professor 2 said during their interviews, 
citizens strongly resisted both the mandatory schemes because the schemes deprived 
citizens of their freedom to choose and violated the spirit of freedom embraced by a 
capitalist city like Hong Kong for a long time.429 It meant that the idea of mandatory 
contribution was incompatible with the economic and social contexts which promoted 
freedom. Citizen 1 and Citizen 5 interviewed said that the mandatory medical savings 
                                                 
429 Interviews with Professor 1 and Professor 2. 
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scheme could no doubt help one save for a rainy day.430 However, they questioned 
why they had to wait until the age of 65 when the retirement age in Hong Kong was 
60 and suggested the government should give flexibility to citizens to use their money 
stored in the HPA.431 The Liberal Party supported a voluntary medical contribution 
scheme and suggested that the government should let citizens choose the kinds of 
medical services “according to their ability and wishes” (The Legislative Council, 
2001, p, 4054). 
 
Secondly, the reason why different segments of people negatively reacted to the 
proposed mandatory savings scheme was due to the lack of detailed information about 
the scheme. Historical institutionalism argues that policy feedback shapes public 
attitudes toward contemporary public policies (Pierson, 1994, p.45; Gusmano et al., 
2002, p.734). Policies provide information for the public that help them interpret the 
social world (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.734). The exposure model of policy feedback 
suggests that “the longer [the] citizens interact with a particular policy or institutions, 
the more ‘comfortable’ they become with that policy” (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.734). 
Emotional reactions play a particularly important role in shaping public attitudes 
toward public policies when “the public lacks detailed information about policy 
                                                 
430 Interviews with Citizen 1 and Citizen 5. 
431 Interviews with Citizen 1 and Citizen 5. 
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matters” (Gusmano et al., 2002, p.734). Legislators, the Patients’ Rights Group, 
medical associations, and citizens found the mandatory medical savings scheme 
especially disappointing and irritating because the HKSAR government refused to 
give figures and evidence to support its proposed mandatory medical savings scheme 
despite repeated requests by contending that the figures and evidence confused the 
picture (Benitez, 2001a, January 26; Benitez, 2001b, January 27; Benitez, 2001c, 
March 13).432 They criticized that The Life Long Investment document was “a blank 
cheque” (Benitez, 2001a, January 26), “a skeleton proposal” (Benitez, 2000, 
December 13), “an empty proposal” (Benitez, 2001c, March 13) used by the 
government to force them to support the mandatory medical savings scheme which 
was not a real choice at all.  
 
Thirdly, both the mandatory schemes went against legislators’ and citizens’ 
perception that healthcare was a welfare benefit and the government should be 
committed to healthcare provision. The DAB argued that the co-responsibility 
principle emphasized by the mandatory health insurance scheme and the user pay 
principle emphasized by the mandatory medical savings scheme were actually in 
conflict with the equity principle emphasized in the current healthcare system and the 
                                                 
432 Secretary for Health and Welfare said in a newspaper interview that the figures would confuse the 
pictures while the details of the mandatory savings scheme would give citizens an impression that 
the government had already “made up its mind” (Benitez, 2001b, January 27).  
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idea that medical service was a social welfare (The DAB, 1999; The Legislative 
Council, 2001, p, 4078). Both the mandatory schemes went against the principle of 
social justice by personalizing the issue of healthcare in the name of individual 
responsibility and aggravated social disparity which increased the financial burden of 
the low income groups and the poor.433 The introduction of these two mandatory 
schemes only gave citizens the impression that the government had an urgent desire to 
shirk its responsibility in financing healthcare at a time of economic difficulty.434 As 
Doctor 2, Nurse 1, and Social Worker 2 said during their interviews, the HA had 
contributed a lot by making continuous improvement of medical services at public 
hospitals since its establishment in 1990.435 However, it was exactly because of this 
that the HA had strengthened the image of the public hospital systems as a strong 
welfare safety net and had acted as a serious obstacle to implementing healthcare 
financing reforms.436 Since 1990, the establishment of the HA and the enactment of 
Hospital Authority Ordinance, which stated that the HA should uphold the 
time-honored policy that “no one should be denied adequate medical treatment 
through lack of means”, had institutionalized the ideas of free healthcare, universal 
access to healthcare and equality. The institutionalization of these old ideas reduced 
                                                 
433 Interviews with the former Legco member 1, the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA, and Civil Servant 1. 
434 Interviews with the former Legco member 1, the former member of the Public Complaints 
Committee of the HA, and Civil Servant 1. 
435 Interviews with Doctor 2, Nurse 1, and Social Worker 2. 
436 Interviews with Doctor 2, Nurse 1, and Social Worker 2. 
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the government’s capacity of persuading the legislators and the community to accept 
and support new ideas. 
 
In brief, both the mandatory health insurance and medical savings scheme were 
perceived by legislators and the community as unpopular reform options and were 
met with strong resistance. As Dr. Wing-lok Lo, the former legislator of medical 
functional constituency, said in a newspaper interview, the Harvard Report “achieved 
nothing but confrontation” (Lee, 2000, October 3) because it did not assess the 
adverse effect of the proposed mandatory health insurance scheme on local citizens. 
Professor William Hsiao, who led the Harvard Team, admitted in a newspaper 
interview that the Team “did not examine how the middle class and the poor would be 
affected in the scheme” (Wan, 1999a, April 18). Since the release of The Harvard 
Report, the HKSAR government had not shown its stance on the mandatory health 
insurance scheme proposed by the Harvard Team. Legislator and chairman of the 
DAB Jasper Tsang said that this was because the HKSAR government tried to 
distance itself from the unpopularity of The Harvard Report (Hong Kong Standard, 26 
April 1999, p.3). However, the HKSAR government’s quick release of The Life Long 
Investment document which proposed the mandatory medical savings scheme did not 
secure majority public support but resentment. The Tung administration later admitted 
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that it should not introduce the mandatory medical savings scheme “in times when 
Hong Kong was facing economic difficulties” (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2004, 
p.5). Besides, it would not introduce any long-term healthcare financing scheme 
unless it was supported by the Legco and the community (Legislative Council 
Secretariat, 2004, p.6). In brief, the disjointed political system, difficult economic 
circumstances, the new idea of mandatory contributions lacking public and political 
acceptance, policy feedback from previous healthcare policies and the mandatory 
pension scheme, and the institutionalization of old ideas were strong forces to impede 
any changes in the current healthcare financing system and thus, the status quo of the 
healthcare financing system was maintained.  
 
8.4 The Donald Tsang Administration (2005 – Present) 
Tung Chee-hwa resigned in March 2005 on health grounds (Cheung, 2007a, p.51). 
His successor Donald Tsang, who was former Chief Secretary for Administration and 
a longtime civil servant (Cheung, 2007a, p.51; Cheung, 2010, pp.38-9), “was only 
given a two year term, the balance of Tung’s period in office” (Scott, 2007, p.30). 
Tsang, due to his bureaucratic background, “returned to the age-old colonial wisdom 
of government by administrators” (Cheung, 2010, p.39) by mainly depending on “the 
civil service as the backbone of his administration” (Cheung, 2010, p.48). The senior 
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civil servants once again provided the government with the unifying and sustaining 
force that brought “policy and administrative organizations together within more 
coherent structures and processes” (Cheung, 2010, p.48). On the other hand, in 2008, 
Tsang extended the political appointment system by adding two layers of 
politically-appointed officials known as under-secretaries and political assistants. 
These new political appointees closely worked with bureau secretaries to provide the 
government with “a broader political support base” (Cheung, 2010, p.48).  
 
(a) The Proposals for Healthcare Financing Reform 
The truncated term of office from May 2005 to June 2007 left little room for Tsang to 
introduce any new policies. Although Tsang mentioned in the 2005-06 Policy Address 
that the government had embarked on a study and analysis of different healthcare 
financing options and would release an initial proposal for public discussion in early 
2006 (Tsang, 2005),437 the proposal was not released in early 2006 and there was no 
follow-up on healthcare financing issue in the 2006-07 Policy Address.438 A possible 
explanation was that Tsang was prudent enough not to take any hasty steps to 
introduce healthcare reforms which had the potential to encounter great resistance. 
                                                 
437 Please refer to paragraph No. 67 of the 2005-06 Policy Address. 
438 The 2006-07 Policy Address focused on economic development, strengthening government support 
for families, and enhancing the quality of life. For details, please visit the website of the 2006-07 
Policy Address (http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/06-07/). 
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Facing re-election for Chief Executive in 2007, Tsang at first did not reply to a written 
request made by Election Committee members of the Hong Kong Medical 
Association concerning a meeting to discuss his ideas about healthcare policies in 
January 2007 (Lee, 2007a, January 5). He also failed to attend a debate forum 
organized by the Hong Kong Medical Association in January 2007 for debating and 
discussing medical issues with chief executive challenger Alan Leong, who was a 
pan-democratic candidate from Civic Party (Goh, 2007, January 28).439 However, in 
early February 2007, Tsang pledged in his election platform that a detailed report on 
healthcare financing would be released during his next term in office (Yung, 2007, 
February 2) and “the proposed medical financing system would have more flexibility, 
engaging the government, the Hospital Authority, the private sector and individuals” 
                                                 
439 In 2007, Chief Executive was elected by a 800-person Election Committee (Case, 2007, p.376). The 
Election Committee was widely understood as “a political caucus representing the privileged few, 
tilting heavily toward the central government and its local elite allies” (Case, 2007, p.377). 
Originally, Tsang, who had Beijing’s blessing, would be re-elected as Chief Executive without 
contest (Case, 2007, p.377). However, Alan Leong, who secured 132 nominations mostly from his 
pan-democratic strongholds (Leung and Lee, 2007, February 1; Lee et al., 2007, February 15), 
emerged as a challenger and became the first pan-democrat Chief Executive candidate in the history 
of Hong Kong (Leung, 2007, January 31). Leong was the former president of the Hong Kong Bar 
Association and member of the Civic Party, which was a political party founded in 2006 promoting 
democracy and social justice (Civic Party, 2012). Leong released his election platform entitled “The 
Hong Kong We Want”, which set out his policy agenda in six areas, namely environmental 
protection, a justice society, education system, economic policy, urban planning and constitutional 
reform (Leong, 2007, p.63). He was criticized by Election Committee members of the Hong Kong 
Medical Association for failing to have any election platform on medical issues (Lee, 2007a, 
January 5). In late January 2007, Leong attended the debate forum organized by the Hong Kong 
Medical Association without the presence of Tsang (Goh, 2007, January 28). He was criticized by 
doctors and the Election Committee members of the Hong Kong Medical Association for his poor 
understanding about medical issues and the harsh working environment in public hospitals in Hong 
Kong (Goh, 2007, January 28). At last, his hope of securing the Election Committee members from 
the Hong Kong Medical Association was dashed when the questionnaire survey conducted by the 
Hong Kong Medical Association in February 2007 showed that the majority of medical 
professionals favored nominating Tsang (Lee, 2007b, February 16). 50.5 per cent of the 2,111 
medical professionals surveyed favored nominating Tsang while only 43.8 per cent of the medical 
professionals surveyed favored nominating Leong (Lee, 2007b, February 16). 
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(Yung, 2007, February 2). He also pledged to increase government spending on public 
healthcare from the current 15 per cent to 17 percent of total public expenditure in 
five years, which was approximately HK$ 40 billion (Yung, 2007, February 2). In the 
same month, he had closed-door meeting with Election Committee members from the 
medical sector and told them that “his top priority would be constitutional reform, 
followed by medical reform and the environmental protection” (Lee and Wong, 2007, 
February 11). At last, Tsang secured the support of the Election Committee members 
from the Hong Kong Medical Association in the Chief Executive Election (Lee, 
2007b, February 16).440  
 
After winning the election in 2007,441 Tsang “made a new start with his second 
term” (Cheung, 2010, p.49). The Tsang administration decided to have a two-stage 
public consultation on healthcare financing. In March 2008, Food and Health Bureau 
released the first stage consultation document entitled Your Health, Your Life. Instead 
of recommending a particular option, Food and Health Bureau used three months to 
                                                 
440 In February 2007, the Hong Kong Medical Association conducted a questionnaire survey of 
medical professionals’ opinion on the nomination of the Chief Executive candidates (Lee, 2007b, 
February 16). It released the survey result that “Donald Tsang won the support of 50.5 per cent of 
the 2,111 respondents, compared with 43.8 per cent who were in favour of nominating Mr. Leong” 
(Lee, 2007b, February 16). The Election Committee members from the Hong Kong Medical 
Association abided by their earlier promises made in December 2006 (Yung, 2006, December 12) 
that they would nominate the Chief Executive candidate based on the winner-takes-all principle of 
the internal poll result (Lee, 2007b, February 16) and form a block vote (Yung, 2006, December 
12).  
441 Tsang, who won 649 votes, defeated Leong, who only got 123 votes in the Chief Executive 
Election in 2007 (Keatley, 2007). 
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consult the views of the community on the six supplementary healthcare financing 
options, “with a view to putting forward concrete recommendations in the second 
stage consultation” (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.47). The six supplementary 
healthcare financing options included: 
 
 (1) social health insurance which compulsorily required each employee who 
earned monthly income of HK$5,000 or more and capped at HK$20,000 to 
contribute 3 per cent to 5 per cent of monthly income to a social health 
insurance fund designated for healthcare use for every member of the public 
(Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.61);  
(2) out-of-pocket payments which increased the user fees from 5 per cent 
cost-recovery to 10 per cent cost-recovery (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, 
pp.67-8);442 
(3) mandatory savings accounts which compulsorily required each individual in 
employment to save up 3 per cent to 5 per cent of his/her regular income in 
                                                 
442 “The subsidy level of public healthcare in Hong Kong is amongst the highest in developed 
economies, at over 95 [per cent] of the cost across-the-board for public hospital services” (Food 
and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.125). Due to high subsidy, citizens only need to pay nominal fees 
when seeking medical care at public hospitals. For out-patient care, at present, the subsidized fees 
are HK$45 for each general out-patient consultation, HK$60 for each specialist out-patient 
consultation, and HK$100 for each Accident & Emergency attendance (Food and Health Bureau, 
2008a, p.126). “The fees are inclusive of all diagnostic tests and treatment procedures” (Food and 
Health Bureau, 2008a, p.126). As to in-patient care, patients only need to pay HK$100 per day 
although the average cost is HK$3,290 per day (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.126). “The fee 
is a flat-rate inclusive of doctor consultations, drugs, diagnostic tests, treatment procedures, 
accommodation and food” (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.126). 
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his/her individual medical savings account for his/her own future medical 
needs when reaching age 65 (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, pp.71-2); 
 (4) voluntary private health insurance which was individually-purchased 
medical insurance providing risk-pooling for an individual’s health risks 
and more choice of healthcare services from both the public and private 
sectors (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, pp.77-81);  
(5) mandatory private health insurance which compulsorily required employees 
aged from 18 to 64 with monthly income HK$10,000 or above to pay 
HK$160 for the monthly insurance premium provided the insured 
participants with benefit coverage at around 40 per cent of the cost of public 
healthcare services (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.86); and  
(6) personal healthcare reserve which compulsorily required employees earning 
monthly income HK$10,000 or above to deposit a fixed percentage of their 
monthly income (3 per cent to 5 per cent) to their own Personal Healthcare 
Reserve (PHR) account for financing their own healthcare (Food and Health 
Bureau, 2008a, p.94). Part of the deposit in the PHR account would be used 
to subscribe a compulsory regulated health insurance scheme to provide 
basic healthcare protection before and after retirement while the remaining 
deposit in the PHR account would be accrued through investment to pay for 
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future medical expenses after retirement (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, 
p.94).443  
 
Your Health, Your Life stated that the six supplementary healthcare financing 
options proposed would not affect current “tax-based public funding as the major 
financing source for healthcare services” (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.2). The 
HKSAR government would “continue to be the major financing source for 
healthcare” (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.41) while the public healthcare system 
would “continue to provide an available and accessible safety net for the community” 
(Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.xv). Your Health, Your Life stated that the 
supplementary healthcare financing would only be used to “supplement government 
funding to cope with increasing healthcare needs” (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, 
p.42) and sustain healthcare reform in the long run (Food and Health Bureau, 2008a, 
p.42). When proposing the six supplementary healthcare financing options, the 
HKSAR government was aware of the impact of history, contextual conditions and 
societal values on the choice of healthcare financing options. As stated in Your Health, 
Your Life, 
“…the healthcare system of each economy has its own specific history and circumstances…No 
                                                 
443 The advantages and disadvantages of the six supplementary healthcare financing options and 
existing healthcare financing model were summarized in Your Health, Your Life. 
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one single model can be readily transplanted…ultimately it is each society’s own choice, based on its 
own political, social and economic conditions, as well as the values and expectations of its members, as 
to what to gain and what to give up by adopting its own specific mix of financing arrangements” (Food 
and Health Bureau, 2008a, p.44)”.  
 
In December 2008, the government released a public consultation report after the 
first stage public consultation on healthcare financing came to an end. The public 
consultation report showed that “no single proposal commanded majority support” 
(Food and Health Bureau, 2008b, p.vii).444 Nevertheless, the report showed that the 
                                                 
444 In December 2008, Food and Health Bureau released Your Health, Your Life Report on First Stage 
Public Consultation on Healthcare Reform, which contained a detailed consultation result and 
public responses collected by government-commissioned questionnaire surveys and focus groups. 
In Appendix V of the Report, it contained detailed findings of three government-commissioned 
questionnaire surveys. Survey 1 was Telephone Opinion Poll on Healthcare Reform and Financing 
jointly conducted the Hong Kong Polytechinic University and the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. It was conducted from March to August 2008 for a total of 15 weekly rounds, with about 800 
and 1,000 respondents being successfully enumerated in each round of the poll. The result of 
Survey 1 showed that about two-thirds of the respondents agreed that healthcare system must 
reform now. Besides, most of the respondents supported the supplementary financing option 
“voluntary private health insurance” (71%), which was followed by “medical savings accounts” 
(58%),  “out-of-pocket payments” (47%), “mandatory private health insurance” (44%), “personal 
healthcare reserve” (42%), and “social health insurance” (40%). Survey 2 was Telephone Survey on 
Healthcare Service Reform 2008 conducted by Social Sciences Reserach Centre of the University 
of Hong Kong in July 2008. A total of 1,118 respondents were successfully interviewed for their 
level of support about financing reform. The result of Survey 2 showed that about 65% of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that government funding alone was insufficient for 
implementing healthcare reform and meeting increasing healthcare demand casued by ageing 
population. Survey 3 was Telephone Survey on Supplementary Financing for Healthcare 2008 
conducted by Social Sciences Reserach Centre of the University of Hong Kong from November to 
December 2008. A total of 1,035 respondents were successfully interviewed for their values in 
relation to supplementary healthcare financing. The result of Survey 3 showed that about 78.5% of 
respondents agreed that tax funding alone was insufficent for maintaining and improving the 
current level and quality of public healthcare services and perceived a need for additional financing. 
Among these respondents, a rapid increase in ageing population and incresing healthcare demand 
(23.7%) was the most common reason for the need for additional financing. Besides, among 1,035 
respondents interviewed, most of them thought that freedom to choose (84.9%), saving for the 
future (82.0%) and equity of access (78.6%) were core values behind healthcare financing. For 
more details of these survey findings, please visit 
http://www.fhb.gov.hk/beStrong/eng/consultation/consultation_report1.html to read the report.  
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community embraced five societal values, which included individual need, voluntary 
participation, equity, freedom to choose, and employer’s responsibility.445 It provided 
a useful reference for the government to develop a detailed proposal for the 
supplementary healthcare financing option in the second stage consultation.   
 
In October 2010, Food and Health Bureau released the second stage consultation 
document entitled My Health, My Choice, which proposed a Health Protection 
Scheme (HPS) that standardized and regulated voluntary private health insurance 
(Food and Health Bureau, 2010, p.ii). The consultation document stated that the HPS 
offered three advantages over existing private health insurance schemes in the market: 
first,  it must accept high-risk individuals and those with pre-existing medical 
conditions; second, it had transparent age-banded premium schedule, guaranteed 
renewal for life and was fully portable; and third, it promoted transparent medical fees 
with packaged charging based on diagnosis-related groups (DRG) and established 
High-Risk Pool to buffer the risks of high-risk subscribers, with financial injection 
                                                 
445 The 2008 First Stage Report said that different societal values were observed from the respondents’ 
views towards the supplementary financing proposals and they could be categorized into eight 
themes: (1) individual vs communal; (2) voluntary vs mandatory; (3) risk-pooling vs savings; (4) 
equity vs two-tier service; (5) role of employers and employees; (6) user fee increase; (7) income 
level for contribution; and (8) financial sustainability (Food and Health Bureau, 2008c, p. vii-ix). 
However, the author thinks that the government’s categorization is strange because categories such 
as (6), (7), and (8) do not seem to reflect societal values. On the other hand, category (1) and (3) 
seems to present similar societal value while some of the contents in category (1) and (4) can be 
combined to form the societal value of equity. Therefore, the author tries to argue that The 2008 
First Stage Report reflected five societal values instead of eight themes. For more details about the 
eight themes, please refer to the executive summary of The 2008 First Stage Report. 
 377 
from the government when necessary (Food and Health Bureau, 2010, pp.29-30). The 
government would use HK$50 billion fiscal reserve earmarked to provide incentives 
and subsidies to HPS subscribers (Food and Health Bureau, 2010, p.v). It was hoped 
that the HPS could divert more people to the private healthcare sector and thus 
“relieve the pressure on the public healthcare system” (Food and Health Bureau, 2010, 
p.ii).  
 
At the time of this study, the HKSAR government was still collating and 
analyzing the views gathered from the second stage consultation. Whether or not the 
voluntary HPS would be implemented, the HKSAR government would continue to 
heavily subsidize healthcare and the public healthcare system would continue to 
predominate. It means that Hong Kong would still stick to its original path of funding 
the universal healthcare system through taxation even if the proposed voluntary 
private health insurance scheme can be implemented successfully. 
 
(b) Different Views on the Changes Proposed by Health Insurance Reform  
The proposed health insurance reform, if implemented successfully, could affect 
stakeholders in many aspects: citizens’ access to, affordability of and demand for 
healthcare, healthcare providers’ capacity of and efficiency in healthcare delivery, 
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insurers’ profits and their freedom of action. As illustrated below, different 
stakeholders who had different interests and expectations toward health insurance 
reform responded differently to the proposed regulated voluntary private health 
insurance. This section will examine the views of citizens, civil servants, social 
workers, insurance consultants, medical professionals, former Legco member, former 
member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA, scholars, and a government 
official on health insurance reform in Hong Kong.  
 
(1) Citizens 
Eight citizens interviewed shared the view that the free public healthcare system 
should be maintained because it was a safety net providing the general public with 
healthcare protection irrespective of one’s income level and promoting the ideas of 
equality and universal access.446 They thought that the government should continue 
to fund the public healthcare system through taxation because healthcare was a 
time-honored welfare benefit and the government had the responsibility to provide 
this welfare for citizens.447 They doubted if it was necessary to implement the 
proposed HPS as an additional source to fund healthcare because of the confused 
                                                 
446 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
447 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
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message sent by the HKSAR government.448 On one hand, the government said that 
it was under pressure to implement health insurance reform when facing the problem 
of rising medical costs.449 On the other hand, the government promised to increase 
the recurrent funding for healthcare, implying that the government was still capable of 
financing the public healthcare system and meeting the challenge of rising medical 
costs in the foreseeable future.450 Therefore, they doubted if there was an urgent need 
to implement health insurance reform.451  
 
Eight citizens interviewed had mixed feelings about joining the proposed HPS 
and controversial views on the effectiveness of the proposed HPS. Citizen 1 and 
Citizen 2 interviewed who had no private health insurance were interested in joining 
the HPS. Citizen 1 who suffered from a devastating disease known as Multiple 
Sclerosis452  said that her applications for hospital insurance and critical illness 
insurance being repeatedly declined by insurance companies had been a very 
                                                 
448 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
449 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
450 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
451 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
452 Multiple Sclerosis (MS) is a devastating decease of the central nervous system that “strikes 
predominantly young adults during their most productive years” (Lau et al., 2002, p.77). To know 
more about MS in Hong Kong, please refer to Lau et al. (2002). Epidemiological Study of Multiple 
Sclerosis in Hong Kong Chinese: Questionnaire Survey. Hong Kong Medical Journal, vol.8 (2), pp. 
77-80. The article can be found at http://www.hkmj.org/article_pdfs/hkm0204p77.pdf. 
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frustrating experience.453 She was interested in joining the proposed HPS because the 
HPS accepted pre-existing condition, guaranteed renewal for life, and absorbed risk of 
high-risk subscribers like her.454 Citizen 2 who was a cleaning lady in her mid 50s 
said that she had financial difficulties in subscribing to private health insurance which 
required her to contribute an expensive old-age annual premium costing more than 
HK$10,000.455  She said that the proposed HPS with the transparent premium, 
transparent medical fees and government regulation sounded attractive and reliable.456 
She was interested in joining the proposed HPS if the premium was less expensive.457 
On the other hand, Citizen 7 who was a part-time worker had no private health 
insurance and did not consider joining the HPS. As a hepatitis B carrier, Citizen 7 
interviewed said that the HPS was good news to people with pre-existing conditions 
like her because the HPS could provide medical coverage for them.458 However, she 
could not afford to join the HPS because she had already been contributing to life 
insurance with savings plan.459 Joining the HPS would impose extra financial burden 
on her.460 
 
                                                 
453 Interview with Citizen 1. 
454 Interview with Citizen 1. 
455 Interview with Citizen 2. 
456 Interview with Citizen 2. 
457 Interview with Citizen 2.  
458 Interview with Citizen 7. 
459 Interview with Citizen 7. 
460 Interview with Citizen 7. 
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Citizen 5, Citizen 6 and Citizen 8 interviewed who had no private health 
insurance were not interested in joining the HPS. Citizen 5 who was a firm owner was 
against the proposed HPS because he thought that insurance companies were not 
trustworthy and insurance subscribers usually could not get what he/she paid for.461 
He thought that the government should not implement health insurance reform but put 
more financial resources to promote preventive healthcare and educate citizens on 
how to live a healthy life.462 Citizen 6 who was a bank manager found it unnecessary 
to subscribe to the proposed HPS because he seldom got sick.463 He thought that the 
government only promoted the positive side of the proposed HPS so as to attract more 
people to join the Scheme. 464  He questioned whether the government would 
drastically raise the premium when there were insufficient participants or when the 
HK$50 billion was used up.465 In fact, he thought that the voluntary nature of the 
proposed HPS could hardly attract people to join the Scheme because no one wanted 
to spend his/her hard earned money on healthcare when he/she had full access to free 
public healthcare anytime he/she wanted.466 Citizen 8 who was a secondary teacher 
did not subscribe to any private voluntary health insurance because she “had the habit 
                                                 
461 Interview with Citizen 5. 
462 Interview with Citizen 5. 
463 Interview with Citizen 6. 
464 Interview with Citizen 6. 
465 Interview with Citizen 6. 
466 Interview with Citizen 6. 
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of saving money and bought stock” to increase her wealth.467 She was not interested 
in joining the proposed HPS, saying that “the HPS was a government trick to shirk its 
responsibility and ask the citizens to pay for their own medical fees”.468 She was 
discontent with the government targeting the middle class to join the Scheme.469 As 
Citizen 8 said in the interview, 
 
 “I think that the proposed HPS is suitable for those who do not have money saving habit. But the 
government targets middle class people like me to join the Scheme. The Scheme has nothing to do with 
the poor or the rich because the former do not have extra money to buy any health insurance while the 
rich has much money to pay for their medical bills without any need to buy health insurance. I have 
already used one-seventh of my annual salary to pay taxes. As a taxpayer, however, I don’t think I have 
                                                 
467 Interview with Citizen 8.  
468 Interview with Citizen 8. 
469 According to Lui (2003), the middle class “refers primarily to those professional, administrative, 
and managerial salaried employees working in various sectors of the Hong Kong economy” (p.161). 
The middle class is different from the self-employed petty bourgeoisie because its status is not 
based on the means of production. Instead, it is based on education, professional qualification, or 
working experience in order to find a better job and have better working conditions (Lui and Wong, 
2003, p.5). The middle class emerged in the 1970s, which was a new class representing “an 
outcome of the structural transformation of the Hong Kong economy” after the Second World War 
(Lui, 2003, p.162). The emergence of the middle class and the affluent life it represents have the 
symbolic significance of the so-called “Hong Kong dream”, a dream that can be realized through 
individual efforts and luck (Lui and Wong, 2003, pp.52-3). The middle class has a belief that an 
individual can fight for opportunities and change his/her own destiny (Lui and Wong, 2003, p.54). 
However, the outbreak of Asian financial crisis in 1998 was a shock to the middle class and 
shattered the belief the middle class upholds. Asian financial crisis led to a dramatic plunge in both 
the stock and property markets (Lui, 2003, p.177). Business environment deteriorated. The middle 
class were affected by salary cuts, downsizing, lay-off and unemployment (Lui, 2003, pp.177-8). 
Educational attainments, working experience, and seniority no longer guarantee promotion 
prospects as they did in the past. After the outbreak of Asian financial crisis, “security and stability 
in employment that the middle class has long enjoyed are giving ways to competitiveness and 
flexibility” (Lui, 2003, p.178). The career path of the middle class is not as smooth as it was in the 
past. The middle class has become more confused, insecure, and anxious about the uncertain 
environment (Lui, 2003; Lui and Wong, 2003). 
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benefited from any government’s policies”.470   
 
Citizen 3 and Citizen 4 interviewed were covered by the group medical insurance 
of their companies and had no interests in joining the proposed HPS.471 Citizen 3 who 
was a bank employee said that she would rather save money on her own for paying 
medical bills than subscribe to the proposed HPS because insurance companies were 
not trustworthy.472 She thought that similar to the group medical insurance she had, 
the proposed HPS may reduce patients’ freedom to choose by restricting the number 
of doctor or clinics she could visit when seeking medical care.473 Besides, she 
doubted whether the premium would be increased if the HK$50 billion was used 
up.474 Citizen 4 who was a manager said that the group medical insurance provided 
him with better and more comprehensive coverage.475 The benefits provided by the 
group medical insurance included hospitalization and surgical benefits with full 
reimbursement, emergency assistance services, supplementary major medical benefits, 
clinical benefits, dental benefits, and dependent cover.476 He usually received medical 
treatment at private hospitals.477Although he could not enjoy the group medical 
                                                 
470 Interview with Citizen 8. 
471 Interviews with Citizen 3 and Citizen 4. 
472 Interview with Citizen 3.  
473 Interview with Citizen 3. 
474 Interview with Citizen 3. 
475 Interview with Citizen 4. 
476 Interview with Citizen 4. 
477 Interview with Citizen 4. 
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insurance after retirement, he could rely on the free public healthcare system to get 
medical treatment.478 He said that as a taxpayer, he should utilize the tax-funded 
public healthcare system when he was old.479 
 
In fact, eight citizens interviewed shared the view that the current public 
healthcare system had been plagued with the problems of lacking medical personnel, 
long queues and waiting time for public medical services, and the deterioration of 
service quality.480 These problems were attributed to the government’s over-reliance 
on hospital services and the underdevelopment of primary care over the past few 
decades. 481  Therefore, eight citizens interviewed thought that implementing 
healthcare financing reform should not be the main concern of the government and 
healthcare financing reform alone was not effective enough to address the 
aforementioned problems.482 They thought that a comprehensive healthcare reform to 
develop and strengthen the role of primary care, train more medical professionals, and 
restructure the HA was needed to resolve and lessen the aforementioned problems, 
especially when the problem of ageing population would affect the financial 
                                                 
478 Interview with Citizen 4. 
479 Interview with Citizen 4. 
480 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
481 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
482 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
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sustainability, capacity and quality of public healthcare services in the long run.483  
 
(2) Civil Servants 
Four civil servants interviewed were not interested in joining the proposed HPS. Civil 
Servant 1 who was a contract-based civil servant said that the voluntary nature of the 
proposed HPS was much better than the mandatory health insurance scheme proposed 
by the 1999 Harvard Report and the mandatory medical savings scheme proposed in 
2000 because citizens had the freedom to choose whether or not to join the Scheme.484 
However, she did not have spare money to subscribe to the proposed HPS because her 
money had been spent on paying the tuition fees of a legal education programme that 
cost HK$110,000.485 She thought that healthcare was a social welfare benefit and the 
government was responsible for taking care of citizens’ healthcare, especially those 
who were poor and less fortunate.486 The free public healthcare system should be 
maintained with the government continuously being the main financier of 
healthcare.487  
 
Civil Servant 2 who was a tenured civil servant criticized the health insurance 
                                                 
483 Interviews with Citizen 1, Citizen 2, Citizen 3, Citizen 4, Citizen 5, Citizen 6, Citizen 7, and Citizen 
8. 
484 Interview with Civil Servant 1. 
485 Interview with Civil Servant 1. 
486 Interview with Civil Servant 1. 
487 Interview with Civil Servant 1. 
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reform proposed by the government as unnecessary because she believed that the 
government was still capable of funding the public healthcare system.488 She was not 
interested in joining the proposed HPS because she was eligible for civil service 
medical benefits which include free medical treatment, X-ray examination and drugs 
in public hospitals, and free dental check according to Civil Service Regulations.489 
Besides, she could enjoy the dependant cover of her husband’s group medical 
insurance provided by his company that seeking medical treatment in private hospitals 
could obtain full reimbursement.490  
 
Civil Servant 3 who was a senior police officer thought that the HPS was not a 
useful reform proposal because the problems plaguing the free public healthcare 
system were multifold, including public hospitals being overcrowded, uneven 
resource allocation among public hospitals, insufficient support for frontline 
healthcare personnel, the significant public-private imbalance, and the HA using too 
much public money to pay staff costs.491 He thought that apart from implementing 
healthcare financing reform, the government should implement a structural reform of 
the HA so that the HK$30 billion government subvention given to the HA could be 
used in a better way to improve medical supplies and treatment and prescribe better 
                                                 
488 Interview with Civil Servant 2. 
489 Interview with Civil Servant 2. 
490 Interview with Civil Servant 2. 
491 Interview with Civil Servant 3. 
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drugs.492  
 
Civil Servant 4 who was an inspector of police said that she was not interested in 
joining the proposed HPS because she had already bought a comprehensive private 
insurance plans which included life insurance, accident insurance, hospital insurance 
and critical illness insurance.493 Since police officer was a high-risk career, life 
insurance and accident insurance which could bring security to her and her family 
were more important than health insurance.494 She said that the idea of subscribing to 
voluntary health insurance was good because the insured could offload their financial 
risks when getting sick and have more choices of medical services.495 However, since 
Hong Kong already had a free public healthcare system, it was difficult for the 
government to convince citizens to join the proposed HPS.496 After all, the immediate 
feeling people had after joining the Scheme was having less money in their pockets.497 
Civil Servant 4 was suspicious of the government’s intention of using the proposed 
                                                 
492 Interview with Civil Servant 3. The HA used 85 per cent of government subvention to pay staff 
costs. According to the Hospital Authority Yearbook 2008-9, about HK$26 billion of HK$30 
billion was used on staff costs (Hospital Authority, 2009, p.67). But the staff costs included the 
annual salaries of Chief Executive, and the 33 Directors, Cluster Chief Executives and Hospital 
Chief Executives (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2011a). Each of them had the annual salary that 
was as high as HK$2 million to over HK$4 million (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2011a). 
Legislator Emily Lau criticized the HA for rewarding the upper-ranked staff generously while 
giving frontline medical staff niggardly pay (Hong Kong’s Information Services Department, 
2009). 
493 Interview with Civil Servant 4. 
494 Interview with Civil Servant 4. 
495 Interview with Civil Servant 4. 
496 Interview with Civil Servant 4. 
497 Interview with Civil Servant 4. 
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HPS as an excuse to dip into middle-class people’s pockets and ask middle-class 
people to take care of their own health.498 But the voluntary nature of the health 
insurance scheme helped the government face less resistance from the public and 
Legco members because citizens were given space to decide whether to join the 
Scheme or not.499  
 
(3) Social Workers 
Both Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2 interviewed thought that the health 
insurance reform was meaningless because the low income group and chronically ill 
patients could not benefit from the proposed HPS.500 They said that the government 
should not use the HK$50 billion fiscal reserve earmarked to subsidize HPS 
subscribers because HPS subscribers had economic ability to buy health insurance.501 
Instead, the government should use this amount of fiscal reserve in a more meaningful 
way by helping the vulnerable groups who were in need of healthcare and improve 
quality of medical services in public hospitals.502 As Social Worker 1 and Social 
Worker 2 said during their interviews, it was undeniable that the free public healthcare 
system was a strong safety net providing low income patients, the elderly patients and 
                                                 
498 Interview with Civil Servant 4. 
499 Interview with Civil Servant 4. 
500 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2.  
501 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2. 
502 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2. 
 389 
chronically ill patients with essential medical services.503 Low-income patients, the 
elderly patients, chronically ill patients, and recipients of Comprehensive Social 
Security Assistance having financial difficulties could apply to Medical Social 
Workers stationed in public hospitals or Social Workers of the Social Welfare 
Department for a medical fee waiver.504 A certificate for medical fee waiver which 
was one-off or valid for three months to one year would be granted by social workers 
to applicants who passed the income and asset limit tests or to those based on 
non-financial reasons such as an applicant’s clinical condition.505 The medical fee 
waiver system and the free public healthcare system showed that the government had 
upheld its fundamental philosophy of “no one being denied adequate medical care due 
to lack of means”.506 Nevertheless, the free public healthcare system contained the 
problems of overcrowding, long queues, poorer medical quality and growing shortage 
of medical professionals that the vulnerable groups who see doctors more often felt 
tired and psychologically felt bad when seeking medical treatment in public 
                                                 
503 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2. 
504 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2. The Comprehensive Social Security 
Assistance Scheme is a non-contributory but means-tested scheme administered by the Social 
Welfare Department to provide a safety net for Hong Kong residents who suffer financial hardship 
due to various reasons such as low earnings, unemployment, disability, illness and old age (Social 
Welfare Department, 2011, p.1). The Scheme is designed to bring the income of such residents “up 
to a prescribed level to meet their basic needs” (Social Welfare Department, 2011, p.1). 
505 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2. According to Social Worker 2, Medical 
Social Workers or Social Workers of the Social Welfare Department have discretion to decide 
whether an applicant will be granted a one-off medical waiver or a medical waiver that is valid for a 
period of time based on an applicant’s needs and clinical condition. In 2004/05, about 1.1 million 
persons were granted medical waiver at a cost of over HK$500 million (Office of The Ombudsman, 
2006, p.2). For more detailed information about the medical fee waiver system and the income and 
asset limit tests, please refer to the information leaflet entitled “Waiving Mechanism of Public 
Hospitals”, which can be accessed online (http://www.ha.org.hk/haho/ho/hacp/122630e.htm). 
506 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2. 
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hospitals.507 Both Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2 interviewed said that there 
was much room for the government to improve the existing public healthcare system 
by implementing hospital reform although it was possible that the government would 
face strong opposition from doctors or upper-ranked staff who had embedded interests 
in the hospital system.508  
 
(4) Insurance Consultants 
Insurance Consultant 1 and Insurance Consultant 2 interviewed had diverse views on 
whether the voluntary HPS would be implemented but shared the view that the 
introduction of the proposed HPS would only bring incremental change to the existing 
healthcare financing structure.509 Insurance Consultant 1 interviewed said that he and 
his colleagues were against the implementation of the HPS because the regulatory 
requirements specified in the proposed HPS were too harsh, thereby making the 
proposed HPS look very unattractive.510 Two of the regulatory requirements specified 
in the proposed HPS, namely “no-turn away of subscribers and guaranteed renewal 
for life” and “high-risk individuals insurable with a cap on premium loading”, would 
definitely attract the seriously ill and people with pre-existing medical conditions to 
                                                 
507 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2. 
508 Interviews with Social Worker 1 and Social Worker 2. 
509 Interviews with Insurance consultant 1 and Insurance consultant 2. 
510 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
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join the Scheme.511 Since insurance companies were for-profit organizations, they 
were reluctant to bear high risk and suffer heavy financial losses.512 Insurance 
Consultant 1 interviewed said that the HPS would be a stillborn scheme without the 
support of the insurance industry.513 Even if the HPS was implemented finally, the 
voluntary nature of the scheme would only have little take-up rate.514 The proposed 
HPS would not attract the rich, the healthy or those who had already bought health 
insurance but people with pre-existing conditions or people whose insurance 
applications were rejected by insurance companies before.515 The HPS would end up 
playing a negligible role in supplementing public funding.516  
 
Besides, Insurance Consultant 1 interviewed said that it was too ideal for the 
government to think that people who subscribed to the HPS would go to private 
hospitals to receive medical treatment and thus alleviate the burden of the public 
hospitals.517 In fact, his clients who bought private health insurance fell back to 
public hospitals for medical treatment, in particular inpatient treatment, because the 
charging system in private hospitals was not transparent enough.518 Although the 
                                                 
511 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
512 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
513 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
514 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
515 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
516 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
517 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
518 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
 392 
proposed HPS offered coverage based on packaged charging to reduce charge 
uncertainty, it may not gain the support from private hospitals which had different 
costing and pricing systems.519 Private hospitals may only provide packaged charging 
with limited scope or provide no packaged charging at all in order to protect their 
business.520 Therefore, there was great possibility that people subscribed to the 
proposed HPS were deterred from using private healthcare services but fell back to 
public hospitals again when they were sick. 521  But Insurance Consultant 1 
interviewed said that he and his colleagues were against the introduction of packaged 
charging because it would only distort the operation of the market.522 Hong Kong, as 
a capitalist city, should not implement any measures which distort the operation of the 
market.523 
 
Insurance Consultant 2 interviewed said that there was high possibility that the 
HPS would be implemented because the scheme was better than current private health 
insurance products in terms of the type of subscriber, renewal, and portability.524 
However, she thought that the implementation details of packaged charging were 
unclear in the public consultation document that the pricing system at private 
                                                 
519 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
520 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
521 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
522 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
523 Interview with Insurance consultant 1. 
524 Interview with Insurance consultant 2. 
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hospitals still lacked transparency.525 It made citizens hesitant about joining the 
proposed HPS and those who subscribed to the HPS feel more secure to seek medical 
care in public hospitals where the medical fees were low, the pricing system was 
transparent, and the risk of bearing uncertain costs were the lowest.526 Besides, 
Insurance Consultant 2 interviewed thought that introducing packaged charging 
would not be feasible in private hospitals because private hospitals treated the 
provision of private medical services as a profit making business.527 Private hospitals 
would only introduce packaged charging with limited scope or refuse to introduce any 
packaged charging.528 Without the cooperation of private hospitals, those subscribed 
to the HPS would not be able to benefit much from the Scheme as the government 
originally expected.529 And the supplementary role played by the HPS would not be 
able to alleviate the financial burden of the government in the long run, especially 
when the problem of ageing population became more serious.530   
 
(5) Medical Professionals 
Doctor 1 interviewed thought that citizens would not be enthusiastic about joining the 
proposed HPS because they did not want to spend extra money on healthcare when 
                                                 
525 Interview with Insurance consultant 2. 
526 Interview with Insurance consultant 2. 
527 Interview with Insurance consultant 2. 
528 Interview with Insurance consultant 2. 
529 Interview with Insurance consultant 2. 
530 Interview with Insurance consultant 2. 
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the existing public healthcare system provided them with free medical services.531 
The immediate effect one felt after subscribing to health insurance was having less 
money in his/her pocket.532 Besides, it was possible that citizens subscribing to the 
HPS would still obtain medical treatment in public hospitals for fear of bearing 
uncertain and expensive medical expenses charged by private hospitals.533 Doctor 1 
interviewed thought that the proposed health insurance reform had little impact on 
alleviating the burden of public hospitals.534 In fact, he argued that the government 
should not focus on implementing health insurance reform because a physician 
shortage was the most urgent problem to deal with.535 As a doctor, money was not his 
main concern although he recognized that the financial sustainability of the public 
healthcare system in the long run would be a problem because of the rapid growth of 
ageing population. 536  But he concerned more about delivering quality care to 
patients.537 The undersupply of doctors in public hospitals lowered the morale of 
doctors and increased the workload of doctors, which in turn affected the service 
quality of public healthcare services.538 Patients complained about long waiting times 
but short consultation times.539 As Doctor 1 said during the interview, the specialist 
                                                 
531 Interview with Doctor 2. 
532 Interview with Doctor 2. 
533 Interview with Doctor 1. 
534 Interview with Doctor 1. 
535 Interview with Doctor 2. 
536 Interview with Doctor 1. 
537 Interview with Doctor 1. 
538 Interview with Doctor 1. 
539 Interview with Doctor 1. The Accident and Emergency Departments in public hospitals triage 
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outpatient clinic he worked for only had 180 quotas every day.540 In reality, however, 
it accepted 260 patients in an afternoon when there were only 10 doctors.541 In 
general, he and his colleagues worked overtime and could only spend five to eight 
minutes on each patient.542 He thought that the problem of physician shortage should 
be solved without delay.543 Besides, he thought that a reform on developing primary 
healthcare should be implemented so that the number of patients flocking to public 
hospitals could be reduced.544 
 
Doctor 2 interviewed criticized the health insurance reform proposed by the 
government for being piecemeal, lacking details, and ineffective to solve the crux of 
the problem in the existing public healthcare system.545 He thought that it would be 
difficult for the government to implement the proposed HPS because the packaged 
charging proposed in the Scheme angered private hospitals and doctors and met 
                                                                                                                                            
patients into five categories based on their clinical conditions, “namely critical, emergency, urgent, 
semi-urgent and non-urgent” (Hong Kong’s Information Services Department, 2012). In 2010-11, 
the Accident and Emergency Departments in public hospitals provided critical patients with 
immediate treatment, emergency patients with treatment within 15 minutes and urgent patients with 
treatment within 30 minutes (Hong Kong’s Information Services Department, 2012). But the overall 
waiting time for non-urgent patients was 101 minutes in 2010-11 (Hong Kong’s Information 
Services Department, 2012). As to specialist out-patient clinics in public hospitals, it triage patients 
into three categories, namely urgent, semi-urgent and routine categories (Hong Kong’s Information 
Services Department, 2012). The current median waiting time for urgent patients and semi-urgent 
patients are respectively one week and five weeks while that of non-urgent case vary from two 
weeks to 101 weeks (Hong Kong’s Information Services Department, 2012).  
540 Interview with Doctor 1. 
541 Interview with Doctor 1. 
542 Interview with Doctor 1. 
543 Interview with Doctor 1. 
544 Interview with Doctor 1. 
545 Interview with Doctor 2. 
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strong resistance from these two parties.546 While the government introduced the 
packaged charging to increase medical cost transparency in private hospitals and 
enhance consumer protection, private hospitals and doctors regarded the introduction 
of packaged charging as an unpopular measure adopted by the government to 
intervene in their business and restrict how much money they could earn.547 As 
Doctor 2 said during the interview, doctors and private hospitals were reluctant to cut 
the prices in order to fit packaged charging, especially doctors and private hospitals 
that wanted to earn more profits.548 Besides, senior and prestigious specialists would 
not have any intention to provide packaged charging because they were approached 
by patients who did not mind paying more for the doctor’s expertise and fame.549 
These doctors had been fully occupied with patients that they had no interest in using 
packaged charging to attract more patients.550  
 
On the other hand, packaged charging did not mean lowering medical fees or 
providing patients with healthcare services at a more reasonable price.551 It was 
because the packaged fees were set higher by hospitals so that the medical costs of 
                                                 
546 Interview with Doctor 2. 
547 Interview with Doctor 2. 
548 Interview with Doctor 2. 
549 Interview with Doctor 2. 
550 Interview with Doctor 2. 
551 Interview with Doctor 2. 
 397 
high-risk patients would be subsidized by low-risk patients.552 Packaged charging 
would increase the fees of low-risk surgery such as appendectomy but decrease the 
fees of high-risk surgery such as brain surgery.553 Low-risk patients were treated 
unfairly for paying higher medical fees.554 Besides, hospitals would limit patients’ 
freedom to choose their doctors when implementing packaged charging in order to 
control medical costs and maintain profit levels.555 Patients failing to choose their 
own doctors under packaged charging meant that patients’ rights were not 
protected”.556  
 
In fact, Doctor 2 interviewed thought that rather than implementing health 
insurance reform, the government should focus on implementing doctor work reform 
because the crux of the problem in the existing public healthcare system was serious 
wastage problem of doctors in public hospitals.557 Heavy workload, long work hours, 
and excessive call frequency led to high turnover rates of doctors at public hospitals, 
                                                 
552 Interview with Doctor 2. 
553 Interview with Doctor 2. 
554 Interview with Doctor 2. 
555 Interview with Doctor 2. 
556 Interview with Doctor 2.  
557 Interview with Doctor 2. According to the information provided by Legislative Council Secretariat 
(2011b), as at 28 February 2011, “there were 5,063 doctors working in HA and the ratio of doctors 
per 1,000 population was 0.7” (p.1). The turnover rates of doctors in HA rose from 4.4 per cent in 
2009-2010 to 5.3 per cent in 2010-2011 (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2011b, p.1). In 2010-2011, 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology had the highest turnover rate of 10.2 per cent, which was followed by 
Ophthalmology (7.3 per cent), and Intensive Care Unit (7.1 per cent) (Legislative Council 
Secretariat, 2011b, p.1).  
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especially senior doctors.558 The shortage of doctors in public hospitals was one of 
the reasons why the problems of long queues and service quality deterioration had 
become more serious in recent years. 559  Doctor 2 interviewed said that the 
government should implement doctor work reform to reduce doctors’ work hours, 
reshuffle doctors’ work activities, enhance manpower training, attract and retain 
doctors, which in turn improved the delivery and quality of healthcare service in 
public hospitals.560 
 
 Nurse 1 interviewed said that the proposed HPS was not a good option because 
health insurance was a commodity or product for insurance companies to earn many 
profits.561 She thought that buying the HPS did not mean the insured would seek 
medical care in private hospitals because private hospitals were places for doing 
minor surgeries and having body check only and their charges were not transparent.562 
When people were seriously ill, they would still prefer seeking medical treatment in 
public hospitals.563 Besides, the implementation of the proposed HPS would worsen 
                                                 
558 Interview with Doctor 2. According to the information provided by Legislative Council Secretariat 
(2011b), in September 2006, about 900 HA doctors in 12 clinical specialties worked for more than 
65 hours per week on average, representing 18 per cent of HA doctors (p.7). By the end of 
December 2009, there were still 252 doctors in 10 clinical specialties working for more than 65 
hours per week on average, representing 4.8 per cent of HA doctors (Legislative Council Secretariat, 
2011b, p.7). In 2009, there were 221 doctors undertaking on-site on-call duties for more than 24 
hours in one-go (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2011b, p.7). 
559 Interview with Doctor 2. 
560 Interview with Doctor 2. 
561 Interview with Nurse 1. 
562 Interview with Nurse 1. 
563 Interview with Nurse 1. 
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the problem of manpower shortage in public hospitals because there would be an 
exodus doctors and nurses from public hospitals to private hospitals in order to earn 
more money.564 Public hospitals would become even more short-handed, leading to 
doctors and nurses in public hospitals bearing heavier workload, having lower morale 
and having more medical blunders.565 It would also worsen the delivery of healthcare 
and the quality of medical services.566 Nurse 1 interviewed said that the government 
should not rush into implementing health insurance reform because the idea of 
individual responsibility promoted by health insurance went against the idea of 
government responsibility deeply embedded in the free healthcare system.567 She 
emphasized that healthcare was a social welfare and the government should continue 
to bear the responsibility of funding the public healthcare system.568 Besides, she 
thought that the implementation of health insurance reform was unable to solve a 
critical shortage of nurses in public hospitals.569 She said that the government should 
implement nurse work reform to increase the supply of nurses, reduce nurses’ work 
                                                 
564 Interview with Nurse 1. 
565 Interview with Nurse 1. 
566 Interview with Nurse 1. 
567 Interview with Nurse 1. 
568 Interview with Nurse 1. 
569 Interview with Nurse 1. According to the information provided by Legislative Council Secretariat 
(2011c), as at 31 December 2010, “there were 19,951 nurses working in HA”(p.2). The turnover 
rates of HA nurses rose from 4.1 per cent in 2009 to 5.1 per cent in 2010 (Legislative Council 
Secretariat, 2011c, p.2). In 2010, Paediatrics (8.8 per cent) had the highest turnover of nurses, 
which was followed by Obstetrics and Gynaecology (6.2 per cent), and Surgery (5.6 per cent) 
(Legislative Council Secretariat, 2011c, p.2). In 2009, “the shortage of nurses reached a crisis 
point” (Cheng, 2010, January 21) that there was a forced closure of a 36-bed ward in Pamela Youde 
Nethersole Eastern Hospital (Cheng, 2010, January 21). Besides, there was the cancellation of 30 
surgeries in Queen Mary Hospital “after more than half the nurses scheduled for duty that day 
called in sick” (Cheng, 2010, January 21). 
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hours, improve nurses’ working environment and promotion prospects, and enhance 
the training of nurses.570 
 
(6) Former Legco Member 
Former Legco Member 1 interviewed argued that the government’s real intention of 
introducing the proposed HPS was shirking its responsibility for funding healthcare 
because the government anticipated the financial burden caused by the problem of 
ageing population would be serious in future.571 The government used the health 
insurance scheme to spread a message that healthcare was a personal responsibility 
and asked the citizens, in particular the middle class, to take care of their own 
health.572 As Former Legco Member 1 said during the interview, it was obvious that 
the government’s real target was the middle class when proposing the voluntary health 
insurance scheme due to the middle class having the financial ability to join the 
Scheme.573 The poor who barely made ends meet would not join the Scheme while 
the rich did not need to buy health insurance.574 And the elderly could hardly join the 
Scheme because the indicative annual premium of the proposed HPS was very 
expensive, which was at least HK$5,570.575 Since the proposed HPS was a voluntary 
                                                 
570 Interview with Nurse 1. 
571 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
572 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
573 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
574 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
575 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. According to Food and Health Bureau (2010), the 
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scheme, middle-class people could decide whether to join the proposed HPS or not.576 
But the proposed HPS was very unfair to the middle class because the middle class 
had already contributed through taxation which paid for the public healthcare 
system.577 Joining the proposed HPS would increase the financial burden of the 
middle class.578  
 
Besides, Former Legco Member 1 interviewed argued that packaged charging 
was just a promotion gimmick used by the government that could hardly gain support 
from private hospitals.579 Private hospitals were not interested in providing packaged 
charging because packaged charging reduced their profits.580 If the private hospitals 
refused to provide packaged charging or only provided limited packaged charging, the 
government would become the provider of packaged charging, private hospital 
services or other value-added services within public hospitals.581 It would create a 
two-tier service structure within the public hospitals while at the same time creating 
social inequality within public hospitals.582 It was because the HPS participants could 
                                                                                                                                            
indicative annual premiums with zero deductible based on actuarial evaluation varied among 
different age bands (p.70). The indicative annual premium was HK$1,570-$2,360 for people aged 
20 to 39, HK$5,570-$12,570 for people aged 60 to 84, and HK$15,000 for people aged over 85 
(Food and Health Bureau, 2010, p.70). 
576 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
577 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
578 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
579 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
580 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
581 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
582 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
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enjoy the privileges of seeing a doctor with shorter queuing time and having better 
service quality while the uninsured had to bear the long queue.583 
 
(7) Former Member of the Public Complaints Committee of the Hospital 
Authority 
Former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA interviewed argued 
that it was wrong for the government to have the thought of implementing health 
insurance reform because the advantages of the proposed HPS claimed by the 
government, namely the provision of more choices of value-for-money healthcare 
services for citizens and lifelong protection, did not exist in reality.584 He said that 
packaged charging which was a major selling point made by the government was not 
applicable to all patients, especially high-risk patients and those who had 
complications making the medical costs difficult to calculate.585 Complications could 
never be predicted by patients, family members or doctors.586 It was very difficult 
and impossible to calculate the accurate costs caused by complications and there was 
no way private hospitals would provide an all-inclusive packaged charging.587 If a 
HPS participant suffered from post surgery complications and needed extra inpatient 
                                                 
583 Interview with the former Legco Member 1. 
584 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
585 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
586 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
587 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
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stays, he/she would end up paying expensive medical fees.588 He said that the 
government should not overemphasize the positive aspects of packaged charging 
while hindering its negative aspects just because it wanted more citizens to join the 
health insurance scheme. 589  Besides, packaged charging affected doctors’ 
professional judgment by encouraging them to deliver medical services based on 
prices instead of being based on patients’ conditions and needs.590 It would violate 
medical ethics and create an unhealthy doctor-patient relationship.591 
 
 In fact, former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA 
interviewed argued that the proposed HPS was not a feasible scheme to direct patients 
away from the public hospitals.592 Citizens joining the HPS may not obtain healthcare 
services in private hospitals for fear of private hospital expenses being an endless 
pit.593 He argued that if the government really concerned about rising medical costs 
and the financial sustainability of the public healthcare system in the long run as 
mentioned in the public consultation document, it should not use the implementation 
of voluntary health insurance reform as a solution.594 He believed that implementing 
structural reform of the HA was a more practical way to help government save money 
                                                 
588 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
589 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
590 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
591 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
592 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
593 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
594 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
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while a reform on developing and strengthening primary care was more conducive to 
having better access to preventive care and reducing citizen’s demand for hospital-led 
healthcare, thereby reducing medical costs and increasing both efficiency and the 
financial sustainability of the public healthcare system in the long run.595 
 
(8) Scholars 
Professor 1 interviewed said that the proposed HPS, if being implemented finally, 
would only play a negligible role in healthcare financing.596 At present, there were 
about 2.4 million people in Hong Kong subscribing to private health insurance, which 
exceeded one-third of the Hong Kong population.597 However, only about 10 per cent 
of the insured used medical services in private hospitals”.598 It was because the 
insured were afraid of insufficient insurance coverage for all the private hospital 
expenses, having insufficient cash on hand to pay the private hospital expenses in 
advance, and losing no-claim discount.599 There was great possibility that citizens 
subscribing to the HPS ended up seeking medical care in public hospitals due to the 
lack of price transparency in private hospitals and the burden of unforeseen medical 
                                                 
595 Interview with the former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA. 
596 Interview with Professor 1. 
597 Interview with Professor 1. 
598 Interview with Professor 1. According to “My Health, My Choice” document, there were about 
2.42 million people covered by private health insurance in 2008, which was equivalent to 34 per 
cent of Hong Kong’s resident population (Food and Health Bureau, 2010, p.72). However, the share 
of private health insurance in financing total health expenditure was only 13 per cent (Food and 
Health Bureau, 2010, p.78).  
599 Interview with Professor 1. 
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costs.600 As a result, public hospitals would become further strained.601 Professor 1 
interviewed said that the government was over-optimistic about the effectiveness of 
the HPS to increase citizens’ use of private healthcare services.602 Since the HA was 
the victim of its own success, the implementation of the HPS would not resolve the 
problem of imbalance between the public and private sectors.603 He criticized the 
government for proposing health insurance reform while ignoring the importance of 
developing preventive and primary care in increasing efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of the public healthcare system.604 
 
Professor 2 interviewed said that the packaged services provided by private 
hospitals would be piecemeal because most of the businesses of private hospitals 
came from the rich and there was tight supply of medical services in private 
hospitals.605 Besides, he worried that the proposed HPS would “stimulate moral 
hazard from both the supply and demand sides”606 when doctors tried to earn more 
money by having unnecessary tests, operations and treatments while patients tried to 
get more reimbursement by having longer inpatient stays.607 Also, he thought that the 
                                                 
600 Interview with Professor 1. 
601 Interview with Professor 1. 
602 Interview with Professor 1. 
603 Interview with Professor 1. 
604 Interview with Professor 1. 
605 Interview with Professor 2.  
606 Interview with Professor 2. 
607 Interview with Professor 2. 
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government should utilize the HK$50 billion drawn from the fiscal reserve in a better 
way by helping the poor and the seriously ill instead of using the money as an 
incentive to encourage people to join the HPS.608 It gave a very bad impression to 
citizens that the government used tax dollars to subsidize private insurance 
companies.609 Professor 2 interviewed said that “tax deduction or tax rebate were 
more effective to attract people to join the HPS”.610 But he said that “the government 
should consider developing primary healthcare which played a gate-keeping role to 
relieve the burden on public hospitals”.611  
 
Professor 3 interviewed criticized the government for targeting the working 
population, especially the middle class, when proposing the HPS.612 He said that the 
proposed HPS was an unfair scheme and would definitely increase the financial 
burden of citizens who had already paid tax and contributed to MPF.613 He argued 
that the implementation of health insurance reform was not a right solution to solve 
the problems of rising medical costs and ageing population. He suggested the 
government strengthen and promote the development of Chinese medicine because 
Chinese medicine was conducive to maintaining good health, preventing diseases, and 
                                                 
608 Interview with Professor 2. 
609 Interview with Professor 2. 
610 Interview with Professor 2. 
611 Interview with Professor 2. 
612 Interview with Professor 3. 
613 Interview with Professor 3. 
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treating both common and chronic diseases, which in turn reduced citizens’ demand 
for hospital-led and curative medical services.614  
 
(9) Government Official 
Government Official 1 interviewed said that the government intended to maintain the 
tax-funded public healthcare system which was efficient, equitable, and accessible 
                                                 
614 Interview with Professor 3. Since 1998, “formal education at tertiary level on Chinese medicine has 
been introduced in Hong Kong” (Health and Welfare Bureau, 2000, p.32). At present, three local 
universities, namely the Baptist University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the 
University of Hong Kong, operate a full-time degree course on Chinese medicine  (Health and 
Welfare Bureau, 2000, p.32; Hong Kong’s Information Services Department, 2011). In 1999, the 
HKSAR government enacted the Chinese Medicine Ordinance to “provide the statutory framework 
for the regulatory control and development of Chinese medicine in Hong Kong” (Legislative 
Council Secretariat, 2005b, p.1). In his 2001-2002 Policy Address, the Chief Executive announced 
the introduction of Chinese medicine in the public sector in the form of outpatient service 
(Legislative Council Secretariat, 2007, p.1), with a view to “integrating Chinese medicine and 
western medicine in the public healthcare system in the long run” (Legislative Council Secretariat, 
2005b, p.1) and providing “Chinese medicine in the hospital services” (Legislative Council 
Secretariat, 2005b, p.1). His target was establishing 18 Chinese medicine clinics by 2005 
(Legislative Council Secretariat, 2007, p.2). However, the actual progress of establishing Chinese 
medicine clinics was slower than the target that only three public Chinese medicine outpatient 
clinics were established by 2005 on a trial basis (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2005b, p.1; 
Legislative Council Secretariat, 2007, p.2). A tripartite model was adopted in the clinics that the HA 
collaborated with a non-governmental organization and a local university (Legislative Council 
Secretariat, 2007, p.2). Under the collaboration model, the HA was responsible for “ensuring 
standardization and safety in the use of Chinese medicine products” (Legislative Council 
Secretariat, 2007, p.2) while the non-governmental organization was responsible for “the day to day 
operations of the clinics” (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2007, p.2) and the university was 
responsible for managing the research and training programmes of the clinics (Legislative Council 
Secretariat, 2007, p.2). According to Health, Welfare and Food Bureau and Hospital Authority 
(2005), the number of consultation per month in the three public Chinese medicine clinics increased 
from 3,873 in January 2004 to 6,803 in March 2005 (p.2). In his Policy Address in 2005, the Chief 
Executive was committed to establish six new Chinese medicine clinics in 2005-2006 (Legislative 
Council Secretariat, 2007, p.2). At present, there are a total of 16 public Chinese medicine 
outpatient clinics (The Hospital Authority, 2011). When all the 18 public Chinese medicine clinics 
were established, it would only take up 5 to 6 per cent of the Chinese medicine service market in 
Hong Kong (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2007, p.4). The Chinese medicine clinics serve 
patients through a daily quota system and charge a fee of HK$120 “for each consultation, including 
two doses of Chinese medicine” (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2007, p.3). The level of subsidy 
for the public Chinese medicine outpatient clinics is about 50 per cent (Legislative Council 
Secretariat, 2007, p.4). In his 2010-2011 Policy Address, the Chief Executive mentioned that the 
legislation on proprietary Chinese medicines would come into effect in phases from late 2010 
(Tsang, 2010). But the government has not announced any concrete policies or new arrangement to 
develop and promote Chinese medicine over the past seven years. 
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and used the proposed HPS to supplement instead of replacing public funding.615 He 
said that in light of much opposition to previous healthcare financing reforms, the 
government had to carefully consider the level of public acceptance and the reaction 
of Legco members who represented the interests of grassroots, middle-class people, 
and business field when proposing the HPS.616 It wanted to adopt a gradual approach 
to improve the existing public healthcare system in order to meet the expectations of 
the community and provide the safety net for low-income patients.617 Government 
Official 1 interviewed said that the government did not encourage the elderly to join 
the HPS because the old-age premium was expensive.618 Public hospitals would still 
be the safety net for the elderly to seek medical care.619  But the government 
encouraged those who were able and willing to afford to join the HPS.620 Besides, the 
government encouraged those with existing medical insurance to migrate to the HPS 
so that the risk pool under the HPS would be larger and have better ability to spread 
risks.621  
 
Government Official 1 interviewed said that the implementation of the HPS was 
only viable unless there were 500,000 HPS participants to form a risk pool, the 
                                                 
615 Interview with Government Official 1. 
616 Interview with Government Official 1. 
617 Interview with Government Official 1. 
618 Interview with Government Official 1. 
619 Interview with Government Official 1. 
620 Interview with Government Official 1. 
621 Interview with Government Official 1. 
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participation of all private insurance companies in the HPS to bear the risk and the 
cooperation of private hospitals to provide packaged charging.622 He said that the 
government did not prefer using tax rebate or any other tax incentives to attract people 
to join the HPS because it would violate the established tax neutrality principle and 
further narrow the tax base of Hong Kong.623 If private hospitals were not interested 
in providing packaged charging, the government would consider providing more 
private rooms and private hospital beds in public hospitals so that patients joining the 
HPS could have greater choice in public hospitals.624 And if private insurance 
companies were not interested in providing the HPS, the government would consider 
establishing its own mechanism to provide the Scheme.625 Besides, it would consider 
establishing a government regulated arbitration mechanism to handle health insurance 
claim disputes.626  
 
 From the above, it shows that different actors, including citizens, civil servants, 
social workers, insurance consultants, medical professionals, former Legco member, 
former member of the Public Complaints Committee of the HA, scholars, and the 
government official, responded differently to the proposed voluntary private health 
                                                 
622 Interview with Government Official 1. 
623 Interview with Government Official 1. 
624 Interview with Government Official 1. 
625 Interview with Government Official 1. 
626 Interview with Government Official 1. 
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insurance. Most of them shared the view that the free public healthcare system should 
be maintained because it was a safety net which promoted the ideas of universal 
access, equality and was a welfare benefit the government having the responsibility 
for providing it. Besides, they questioned the effectiveness of the proposed voluntary 
private health insurance to provide participants with enough medical protection and 
worried about the problems that could be brought by the proposed voluntary private 
health insurance and packaged charging, such as moral hazard from both the supply 
and demand sides and the creation of two-tier service structure within public hospitals. 
Also, they thought that the proposed voluntary private health insurance was not useful 
to solve the problems faced by the current healthcare system, including ageing 
population, the lack of medical professionals, deteriorating service quality, and 
significant public-private imbalance. They argued that rather than implementing 
voluntary private health insurance, the government should implement preventive care, 
hospital reform, provide more training for medical professionals, and promote the 
development of Chinese medicine. 
 
8.5 Historical Institutionalism and the Case Study of Hong Kong: Findings and 
Implications 
The refined theory of historical institutionalism comprises seven explanatory elements: 
 411 
contextual conditions, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and sequences, path 
dependency, and policy feedback. When it is adopted to examine healthcare financing  
reforms in Hong Kong, it focuses on how the complex interplay of forces, namely 
contextual influences, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and sequences, path 
dependency, and policy feedback, shaped healthcare financing reform process.  
 
Having looked at healthcare financing reforms through the lens of historical 
institutionalism, this study argues that the case of Hong Kong is an example of path 
dependency. The Hong Kong government has failed to implement healthcare 
financing reforms over the past two decades. Its proposals for a coordinated voluntary 
insurance in 1993, a two-tier mandatory health insurance scheme in 1999 and a 
mandatory medical savings scheme in 2000 were shelved due to severe political and 
public opposition. As Gauld (2005b) argued, every time Hong Kong fell back to the 
status quo on healthcare financing after an exhaustive process of public consultation 
(p.227). In October 2010, a voluntary health insurance scheme was proposed to 
supplement public funding, with the government promising that it continued to 
heavily subsidize healthcare service. At the time of study, the government was still 
collating and analyzing the views on the reform option gathered from the public 
consultation. But the new voluntary health insurance scheme, if being implemented 
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successfully, would only bring incremental change to the existing healthcare financing 
arrangement that the status quo would be maintained once again. This study argues 
that the government’s attempts to implement healthcare financing reforms in 1993 
ended in failure because of (1) the political system becoming more democratic and 
representative, (2) policy feedback from government’s previous commitment to 
healthcare, (3) the old ideas of free healthcare and equality being championed by 
citizens and legislators, and (4) a robust economy. Besides, it argues that the 
government failed to implement healthcare financing reforms in 1999 and 2000 
because of (1) a disjointed political system, (2) difficult economic circumstances, (3) 
the new idea of mandatory contributions lacking public and political acceptance, (4) 
policy feedback from previous healthcare policies and the mandatory pension scheme, 
and (5) the institutionalization of old ideas. This study argues that it is the complex 
interplay of forces constraining the government from implementing healthcare 
financing reforms.  
 
Firstly, historical institutionalism argues that political institutions play a 
determinant role in constraining or facilitating the structure of political opportunities 
for political actors in a given polity (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941; Immergut, 1998, 
p.21) and shaping their strategies and goals in the decision-making process that in turn 
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shape the political outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.6; Koelble, 1995, p.236). 
During the final years of the colonial rule, the democratization reforms implemented 
by the colonial administration to decolonize Hong Kong saw the emergence of new 
political actors, including elected legislators, political parties, business, professional 
and labour organizations, and civil society groups (Cheung, 2007a, p.53). The 
transition of the political system from an elite-consensual polity to a consultative 
democracy led to the colonial government having difficulty in securing a guaranteed 
majority support from the members in the Legco when implementing the 1993 
healthcare financing reform. Legislators were active to gather and reflect public 
opinions in the Legco to affect the implementation of healthcare financing reform. In 
the post-colonial era, the disjointed political system caused by the legitimacy crisis of 
the Tung Administration, the tense Exco-Legco relationship and the disunity within 
the Exco acted as an impediment for the government to gather political support and 
reach a consensus on policy decisions for implementing healthcare financing reforms. 
Different political actors and different segments of people made the government’s 
policy environment more crowded, turbulent and uncertain because they were more 
vocal and challenged the government’s monopoly of decision-making powers both 
inside and outside the establishment. Political consultations, confrontations and 
negotiations replaced elite integration and consensus as the rule of the game between 
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the HKSAR government and the new political actors. In the Legco, legislators 
questioned government officials in charge of healthcare policies face-to-face. Political 
parties mobilized the mass to take collective action such as demonstrations to express 
public grievances. Outside the formal political institutions, pressure groups and civil 
societies actively pressed for policy changes while extensive media coverage of 
healthcare financing reforms formulated public opinions. As Cheung (2007a) argued, 
the introduction of democratization reforms in Hong Kong helped “unleash new 
players and new dynamics into local politics” (p.53) and created “new institutional 
tensions and cleavages” (p.53) because of conflicting interests and competing values 
among political actors. It weakened the government’s capacity for securing majority 
support and reaching policy consensus. In the post-colonial era, the HKSAR 
government was “marred by internal cleavages and insufficient coordination and 
joining up” (Cheung, 2007a, p.57), facing the problem of institutional incongruity 
(Lee, 1999, p.941). The disunity within the Exco due to intra-elite rivalries between 
the Chief Executive and the senior civil service and the disconnection and tensions 
between the Exco and the Legco weakened the strength of political institutions to 
formulate and implement healthcare financing reforms (Lee, 1999; Cheung, 2010). As 
Rathwell (1998) argues, the “lack of broad public support for reform [acts as] a major 
barrier to change” (p.396). Without political support and trust, the HKSAR 
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government could face high political costs of changing the healthcare funding system. 
At last, the status quo of healthcare financing system was maintained.  
 
Secondly, historical institutionalism argues that policy feedback provides 
resources and creates incentives that can facilitate, strengthen or inhibit the formation 
or expansion of stakeholder interests (Pierson, 1994, pp.40-1). Besides, it shapes 
public attitudes towards contemporary public policies (Pierson, 1994, p.45; Gusmano 
et al., 2002, p.734). Policy feedback from the government’s previous commitment to 
provide and finance medical services since the early 1960s had continuously 
increased the public acceptance of and demand for the government’s involvement in 
providing and financing healthcare services. Although the colonial government’s 
decision to increase its involvement in healthcare out of political and economic 
calculation, it produced feedback effect that greatly limited its capacity of 
implementing healthcare financing reform or deviating from the original path. As 
Pierson and Skocpol (2002) argued, outcomes “at a critical juncture trigger feedback 
mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future” 
(p.699). The self-reinforcing process made the policy makers feel difficult to reverse 
course once they had ventured far down a particular path (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, 
pp.699-700). Besides, policy feedback from the establishment of a public healthcare 
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system generated a strong and wide base of public support that the general public had 
become strong defenders of their interests and opponents of healthcare financing 
reforms over the past two decades. The exposure model of policy feedback led to the 
general public feel comfortable with interacting with the current public healthcare 
system. Besides, the experience model of policy feedback led to the general public 
supporting the public healthcare system when their previous personal experience 
showed that they benefited from enjoying free healthcare, universal access to 
healthcare and equal treatment. In Hong Kong, the policy of providing free healthcare 
system induced positive feedback effect, thereby reinforcing the status quo. Citizens 
and legislators favored the maintenance of the free healthcare and disliked the 
government’s proposals for implementing health insurance. 
 
Policy feedback from the establishment of the HA also led to doctors who 
worked in public hospitals opposing both the mandatory schemes. It was because they 
worried that the implementation of these mandatory schemes would led to the HA 
losing government funding, the problem of moral hazard from both the supply and 
demand sides, and increasing their workload. Historical institutionalism argues that 
timing is very important. Policy feedback from the government’s decision of 
implementing the MPF gave a bad impression to the public that the MPF scheme 
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restricted their freedom, increased their financial burden and was unable to give them 
sufficient retirement protection. The public felt annoyed when the HKSAR 
government consecutively proposed the mandatory health insurance in 1999 and 
medical savings schemes in 2000. 
 
Thirdly, historical institutionalism argues that ideas matter in policy making 
(Campbell, 1998) because they either “favor significant policy change or reinforce 
existing institutional paths” (Hwang, 2006, p.16). The old ideas of free healthcare, 
universal access to healthcare, equality and healthcare as a welfare benefit were 
deeply entrenched in the public healthcare system since the early 1960s. The 
establishment of the HA further institutionalized these old ideas that created framing 
effects. These ideas became societal beliefs and were widely accepted and endorsed 
by the public and greatly reduced the government’s capacity of persuading the 
legislators and the community to accept and support new ideas. This explained why 
the programmatic ideas proposed in the 1993 Rainbow Report, such as the target 
group approach, the percentage subsidy approach and the coordinated voluntary 
insurance, did not generate wide support but severe criticisms. It also explained why 
the new idea of mandatory contribution towards healthcare failed to get public and 
political support and acceptance because the idea of compulsion was in conflict with 
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the equity principle. Besides, the idea of mandatory contribution was incompatible 
with the economic and social contexts which promoted freedom. 
 
In fact, this study finds that there was a substantive contradiction between the 
government’s thinking and the public’s thinking on healthcare financing. The 
ideology embedded in the economic system shaped the government’s proposals for 
healthcare financing reforms. As Cheung (1994) argued, institutions had “their own 
values, history and memory” that did not change overnight (p.353). The ideas of 
laissez-faire and free market were embedded in the economic system of Hong Kong. 
Both the colonial government and the HKSAR government adhered to the principle of 
‘small government, big market’ and maintained a simple and low tax system to attract 
investment. Health care was subordinate to the economy. In order to maintain 
economic competiveness and a friendly investment environment, the Hong Kong 
government did not propose any tax options such as widening the tax base or 
increasing tax rates to reform the healthcare financing system. As Wong (1999) 
argued, the maintenance of the low-tax policy provided the government with a strong 
justification to seek other options for financing healthcare (p.157). The government 
adopted demand-side strategies that emphasized individual responsibility and the 
principle of ‘those who had the means paid more’ when proposing financing options. 
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The coordinated voluntary insurance and increasing user fees proposed by the 
colonial government and both the mandatory medical insurance and savings schemes 
proposed by the HKSAR government were financing options that required citizens to 
should their own responsibility for healthcare. These financing options prevented 
taxpayers from bearing the brunt of cost shifting from patients. However, the 
government’s idea of asking citizens to bear a greater responsibility for their medical 
expenses was contrary to widespread public belief that healthcare was a basic right 
and healthcare service was a welfare service that the government was morally 
obligated to provide.  
 
The government’s official statement that ‘no one should be denied adequate 
healthcare through lack of means’ had became the government’s fundamental 
philosophy since 1960. It made the government committed to providing heavily 
subsidized medical services which did not “discriminate patients on grounds of class 
or economic means” (Cheung, 1994, p.360). The establishment of the HA in 1990 
further accentuated the government’s role in and commitment to financing and 
providing healthcare services (Gauld, 1997, p.29). At the same time, the public 
perception that healthcare was a fundamental right and legal entitlement for all 
became further entrenched. Universal healthcare became a norm for all. As Wong 
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(1999) argued, the universal healthcare originally provided by the government out of 
economic and political considerations was of “undesirable ideological significance in 
shaping the public health care system as a social welfare institution” (p.151). Yuen 
(1997) also argued that the HA became “the victim of its own success” (p.396) 
because its no-turn away policy and its ongoing service improvements “resulted in a 
significant increase in patient load in HA hospitals” (Yuen, 1997, p.396). Since the 
public could receive better healthcare services at HA hospitals by paying a nominal 
fee, they were not willing to “pay more for what had already become the expected 
standard” (Gould, 2006, p.22). They strongly opposed the proposed healthcare 
financing options which deviated from the original healthcare financing model. As 
Gauld (1997) argued, the healthcare system harbored a multitude of entrenched 
interests that favored the status quo (p.36). Societal values or historical values “have a 
strong influence on what sorts of policies are considered feasible to execute” (Walt, 
1998, p.377). In Hong Kong, the value clashes between the government and 
stakeholders led to “considerable resistance to executing policies” (Walt, 1998, p.369). 
In brief, both the ideas embedded in the economic system and public healthcare 
system were institutional values that were difficult to alter. While the ideas embedded 
in the economic system shaped the government’s logic in proposing healthcare 
financing options, the ideas embedded in the public healthcare system shaped the 
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public perception of healthcare. The substantive contradiction between the 
government’s thinking and the public’s thinking on healthcare financing created an 
obstacle to reform the healthcare financing system. 
 
Fourthly, historical institutionalism argues that changes in contextual conditions, 
namely political, economic or social context, can generate the sources of institutional 
and policy changes. Contextual changes created a window of opportunity for political 
actors to adopt new goals or strategies. In the colonial era, a robust economy did not 
provide a window of opportunity for the colonial government to implement healthcare 
financing reform because a strong economic growth did not justify the government’s 
claim that it was under any financial pressure. Legislators and the general public did 
not see that there was an urgent need to reform the funding structure of healthcare 
when the government was still financially capable of financing healthcare. As Gould 
(2006) argued, the colonial government was “in the absence of any urgent financial 
needs” to press ahead the healthcare financing reform in 1993 (p.22). In the HKSAR 
era, Hong Kong suffered a severe economic downturn after the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997. Amid economic downturn, the government respectively proposed the 
mandatory health insurance scheme in 1999 and the mandatory medical savings 
scheme in 2000. However, it failed to obtain wide public and political support but 
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oppositions. Legislators, political parties and the public complained that it was 
inappropriate and untimely for the government to propose these mandatory schemes 
at a time of economic hardship when many citizens suffered wage decline, asset 
deflation and unemployment. As Cheung (2007a) argued, the risk from change was 
“perceived to be too high by the public during times of economic recession” (p.60). 
Besides, it also gave the public an impression that the HKSAR government wanted to 
shirk its responsibility of financing healthcare at times of economic difficulties. 
Economic circumstances in Hong Kong did not provide any windows of opportunity 
or conjunctures for the current healthcare financing policy to move onto a new 
trajectory.  
 
In brief, the case of Hong Kong is an example of path dependency in which 
“historical developments are a significant determinant of existing policy arrangements 
and capacity for change” (Gauld, 2005, p.228). Path dependency “occurs as the 
institutions and structures surrounding health policy and the health system, such as 
bureaucracies, policies and regulations, public perceptions and interest groups, 
become entrenched” (Gauld, 2005, p.228). These entrenchments “obstruct an easy 
reversal of the initial choice” (Pierson, 2000a, p.252) that the implementation of 
healthcare financing reforms in Hong Kong had turned out to be very difficult, be it in 
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the colonial or the post-colonial era. Hong Kong failed to break from its original path 
of healthcare funding that the statua quo remained. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, the Hong Kong government had been proposing different financing 
options to reform the current funding arrangement of healthcare over the past two 
decades. However, its effort proved in vain because a complex interplay of forces, 
namely contextual influences, ideas, actors, political institutions, timing and 
sequences, path dependency, and policy feedback, acted as powerful constraints on its 
capacity for formulate and implement healthcare financing reforms that the status quo 
was maintained. 
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CHAPTER NINE: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE REFORM IN SHANGHAI AND HONG KONG: FINDINGS AND 
IMPLICATIONS  
 
9.1 Introduction  
This study uses a refined theory of historical institutionalism to examine the divergent 
reform paths in Shanghai and Hong Kong from the mid-1980s onwards. It utilizes a 
qualitative case study approach to respectively examine the development trajectory of 
healthcare insurance reform in these two places. Shanghai and Hong Kong represent 
two contrasting cases. The former succeeded in replacing a free healthcare system 
with a mandatory cost-sharing health insurance system in 2000. The latter, however, 
failed to implement any health insurance reforms notwithstanding repeated attempts 
to do so that the healthcare system remains free. This study presents in detail the 
within-case descriptions and data analysis for each individual case.  
 
A refined theory of historical institutionalism pays crucial attention to the role of 
political institutions, policy feedback and contextual conditions in affecting policy 
outcomes. This study finds that Shanghai succeeded in implementing health insurance 
reform because of the strong political institution along with a highly centralized 
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decision-making structure, policy feedback from the economic reform and free 
healthcare system, and changes in the political and economic contexts. On the other 
hand, this study finds that Hong Kong failed to implement any health insurance 
reforms because of a more democratic political system, policy feedback from the free 
healthcare system, and the impact of contingent economic circumstances. After 
presenting a detailed within-case analysis for each individual case, this chapter 
presents the cross-case analysis and major findings of this study by placing materials 
from the preceding chapters in a comparative context.  
 
9.2 Two Case Studies: Comparing and Contrasting the Records of Shanghai and 
Hong Kong 
Recalling Chapter Two on literature review, an intellectual debate on the convergence 
or divergence of healthcare system over the past two decades has generated much 
international comparative work in the field of health policy (Hurst, 1991; Ham and 
Brommels, 1994; Wilsford, 1994, 1995; Freeman, 1998; Hacker, 1998; Giaimo and 
Manow, 1999; Giaimo, 2001; Bandelow, 2007; Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007; Wendt 
and Thompson, 2004; Cacace and Schmid, 2008; Wendt and Kohl, 2010). Most of 
these cross-national comparative health research works are conducted to gain insight 
into how and why countries differ in the policies they adopt when facing similar 
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pressures or trying to solve similar healthcare problems. They help generate empirical 
knowledge for researchers and policy makers about health policy abroad, bring 
explanatory insight, and contribute to policy formulation and lesson drawing.  
 
 In comparing and contrasting Shanghai and Hong Kong, this study notes that it 
would be difficult to have a formal comparison between these two cases because they 
belong to diverse political and economic regimes. In order to circumvent this problem, 
this study utilizes the interpretive case study approach to compare these two cases. 
The use of the interpretive case study approach means that a theoretical framework is 
adopted to provide an explanation of particular circumstances or particular cases, 
which process, thereafter, can lead to a reevaluation of the theory. In this study, the 
theory of historical institutionalism is used as the basis of case interpretation or a 
template with which to compare the empirical results of these two case studies. 
Through the lens of historical institutionalism, the researcher aims toward analytical 
generalization of the case study results. Recalling Chapter Three on theory, historical 
institutionalism emphasizes that history matters. It takes time seriously, specifying 
sequences, tracing and analyzing process over substantial stretch of years to explain 
policy outcomes (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp.695-8). Therefore, special attention 
is paid to the chronology when comparing and contrasting the development trajectory 
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of healthcare policy in Shanghai and Hong Kong. In fact, paying special attention to 
the chronology also has the advantage of highlighting the commonalities and 
differences in Shanghai and Hong Kong during different periods of time. 
 
Both Shanghai and Hong Kong shared a common history as two of the five 
trading ports along the Chinese coast after China’s defeat in the First Opium War 
(1839-1842). The semi-colonial status of Shanghai and the colonial status of Hong 
Kong contributed to the establishment and institutionalization of public health and 
healthcare systems in both places in the nineteenth century.  
 
In Shanghai, the authorities in the foreign concessions developed public health at 
a faster pace and with a wider scope than the Chinese authorities. It was because the 
former aimed at turning Shanghai into a healthy place for economic growth while the 
latter lacked the political stability, financial resources and manpower to do so. Since 
the mid-19th century, the authorities in the foreign concessions had established 
sanitary infrastructures and public health related institutions to manage environmental 
sanitation and prevent epidemics. But the Chinese authorities did not establish a 
public health related institution until 1905 and even then they only provided 
piecemeal public health. On the other hand, neither the foreign nor the Chinese 
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authorities had any significant involvement in direct healthcare provision. While the 
foreign authorities wanted to save public expenditure and avoid tax increases, the 
Chinese authorities lacked sufficient funding. The Chinese authorities left the tasks of 
building hospitals and providing medical treatment for the mass to missionaries, local 
elites and businessmen, Chinese-style practitioners and later private practitioners. It 
was the establishment of missionary hospitals, summer disease hospitals, 
Chinese-medicine hospitals, and private hospitals that laid down the foundations of 
healthcare in China and provided the basis for building a modern healthcare system 
following the establishment of the PRC.  
 
 In Hong Kong, the colonial government, concerned with economic development 
and anxious to save public expenditure and avoid tax increases, played a negligible 
role in providing public health and healthcare. It was not until the outbreak of bubonic 
plague in the mid-1890s that the colonial government became more engaged in 
maintaining proper sanitary conditions so as to improve the public health of its 
population and facilitate economic growth. The colonial government provided limited 
medical services that were restricted to government officials, European citizens and 
prisoners. It left the tasks of providing medical services for the masses to churches, 
missionaries, charitable organizations and private practitioners. These groups 
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established clinics and hospitals. Thus, before the Second World War, the tripartite 
hospital system was established in Hong Kong, with the government, 
government-assisted, and private hospitals providing medical services.  
 
 From 1949 after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the Pacific War and the Civil 
War, China underwent enormous political, economic and social changes. Elite politics 
were crucial from Mao to the post-Deng era because a state-party system made the 
political elite powerful enough to direct all policy decisions and to seek to impose any 
changes. Citizens barely had a chance to become involved in a closed policy-making 
process that was confined to a small circle of senior government officials. When the 
CCP under the leadership of Mao came to power in China in 1949, it advocated 
socialism and egalitarianism. Since the CCP elite regarded the healthcare system as a 
major pillar of socialism, they made healthcare a priority. The government 
implemented two types of free healthcare programmes--- the LIS and the GHS --- to 
ensure a healthy workforce in urban China and nationalized hospitals to make 
healthcare accessible to the majority of the population. In urban Shanghai, employees 
of work units enjoyed the LIS and the GIS and hospitals that were previously run by 
foreign missionaries or privately run by local elites and businessmen became 
nationalized.  
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However, when Deng came to power in China in the late 1970s, macro-policy 
was changed, as the elite advocated marketization and the implementation of 
economic reform to modernize China. Under the economic reform, the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization, the establishment of the financial 
responsibility system, and programmes of enterprise reform brought sharp changes to 
national economy. These also brought changes to healthcare: local government 
sharply reducing subsidies to hospitals, hospitals generating revenues on their own, 
and enterprises paying employees’ medical expenses on their own. These changes led 
to soaring healthcare expenditures, the inability of enterprises to pay their employees’ 
medical expenses, and in time the collapse of the free healthcare systems in China, 
including Shanghai. In turn, this compelled the central government to implement 
urban health insurance reform in the 1980s, which it accomplished in a number of 
phases: exploration, experimental, and implementation. Under decentralization, the 
Shanghai municipal government also became responsible for implementing urban 
health insurance reform.  
 
 On the other hand, after the Second World War, the Hong Kong authorities only 
made slow and minor policy changes. In the post-war period, the elite-consensual 
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polity remained unchanged and the government’s decisions were legitimized only by 
the consensus of business elites who were closely allied with the colonial government. 
The masses barely had a chance to participate in the closed decision-making system 
and were expected to be grateful recipients. The colonial government adopted a 
passive and reactive attitude towards healthcare and it only increased its involvement 
in healthcare in response to the economic crisis in the 1950s and political crises 
triggered by the riots in the late 1960s. The provision of free medical services and 
more hospital facilities was the government’s strategy to provide a healthy workforce 
for facilitating economic growth, strengthening political legitimacy and increasing 
social stability. The colonial government was involved in healthcare provision not out 
of any commitment to welfare, but involuntarily, in response to crises, which made it 
imperative to acknowledge political, economic, and social considerations. In the 
1980s, it established the HA as a way to cut costs and deflect citizens’ complaints 
about healthcare. Yet this further confirmed the role of the colonial government in 
providing healthcare services for its people. Thereafter, in the 1990s, the colonial 
government was under tremendous pressure to implement healthcare financing reform 
which it sought to accomplish via a series of reports and proposals. 
 
 Thus, both Shanghai and Hong Kong, in response to the pressures associated 
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with the rapid growth of ageing population, higher user expectations, and rising 
medical costs, embarked upon a series of health insurance reform in order to finance 
healthcare in a better way. But the reform process and result in these two places 
represented polar extremes: broad scale reform versus an enduring stability.  
 
In Shanghai, health insurance reform was implemented in a gradual and peaceful 
manner because the CCP enjoyed the monopoly on making healthcare policy and it 
delegated power to the Shanghai municipal government to implement urban health 
insurance reform. It left no room for public participation or policy opposition. During 
the exploration phase (1984-1988), Shanghai experimented with co-payment schemes 
to contain healthcare costs. During the experimental phase (1994-1996), it 
implemented a pilot hospitalization insurance scheme coupled with a hospital revenue 
cap policy. And finally in 2000, it witnessed a revolution in healthcare financing in 
2000 by officially replacing the free healthcare system with a mandatory cost-sharing 
health insurance system. The new health insurance scheme which contained an MSA 
and a SPF required contributions from both the work units and employees. In this 
study, when interviewing different stakeholders of healthcare,627 it became clear that 
they all responded differently to the new urban health insurance reform in Shanghai 
                                                 
627 Different stakeholders interviewed in Shanghai included former LIS and GHS beneficiaries, BMI 
participants, non-BMI participants, doctors, pharmaceutical company managers, private insurance 
managers, government officials and scholars. 
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because of having different interests and expectations. Most of the stakeholders 
interviewed were against the new health insurance reform because of the problems the 
reform created, including age disparity, soaring medical expenses and fraud 
conspiracy. However, notwithstanding such popular criticism, Shanghai was officially 
recognized by the central government as a success story of health insurance 
implementation and a role model for other parts of China to follow. 
 
On the other hand, in Hong Kong, health insurance reform was implemented in a 
slow and winding process. It is because a consultative democracy implemented since 
the mid-1980s made different political actors and stakeholders more vocal and both 
the colonial and the HKSAR governments found it more difficult to secure guaranteed 
majority support from the Legco and the community. The HKSAR government was 
more active and consultative in considering health insurance reform. But it was 
unable to gather political support for implementing the reform. Vested interests that 
were deeply embedded in the public healthcare system blocked the health insurance 
reforms. Citizens responded negatively to the government’s proposed financing 
options by invoking the principles of fairness, state utility and financial hardship. 
Every time the government found itself back to square one after conducting an 
exhaustive process of public consultation because it failed to obtain public support for 
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its proposed healthcare financing options.  
 
The government’s 1993 proposals for a coordinated voluntary insurance, their 
1999 proposal for a two-tier mandatory health insurance scheme and their 2000 
proposal for a mandatory medical savings scheme in 2000 were all shelved due to 
severe political and public oppositions. As a result, Hong Kong fell back to the status 
quo on healthcare financing. In the course of this study, many different actors were 
interviewed.628 These interviewees responded differently to the recent 2010 proposal 
for a voluntary private health insurance, but most of them shared the view that the free 
public healthcare system should be maintained.  
 
So, overall, the patterns of healthcare financing reform in Shanghai and Hong 
Kong --- whilst confronting similar problems related to costs --- are quite different 
when viewed through the lens of historical institutionalism.  
 
9.3 Historical Institutionalism: the Contribution of the Revised Approach 
Recalling Chapter Three on theory, the traditional version of historical institutionalism 
contains six key characteristics: an insistence that institutions matter; the use of both 
                                                 
628 Different actors interviewed in Hong Kong included citizens, civil servants, social workers, 
insurance consultants, medical professionals, scholars and government officials. 
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calculus and cultural approaches to explain political behavior; the claim that history 
matters; an emphasis on path dependency; an insistence upon the importance of policy 
feedback from previous policy choices; and the use of in-depth case studies as the 
research strategy. However, recognizing that traditional historical institutionalism 
itself is weak in explaining changes in policy paths and pays insufficient attention to 
the roles of ideas and actors in shaping policy, this study refines historical 
institutionalism in two ways: firstly, by bringing the approach of institutional 
dynamism into the theory, and secondly, by taking note of the roles of ideas and actors. 
These revisions to the theory of historical institutionalism strengthen its analytical and 
explanatory power. 
 
Firstly, this study refines historical institutionalism by bringing the approach of 
‘institutional dynamism’ developed by Thelen and Steinmo (1992) into the theory in 
order to examine how broad changes in contextual conditions, namely political, 
economic or social, generate institutional and policy changes. According to Thelen 
and Steinmo (1992), there are four sources of institutional dynamism. The first source 
derives from the way changes in the political or socioeconomic context can suddenly 
transform previously latent institutions into salient arena of conflict and cooperation 
among political actors (p.16). The second source of institutional dynamism derives 
 436 
from the way in which changes in the political or socioeconomic context lead to 
existing institutions performing new tasks, as new political actors emerge to pursue 
new goals through the existing institutions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.16). The 
third source of institutional dynamism derives from the way in which changes in the 
political or socioeconomic context lead to changes in political outcomes, as existing 
actors pursue new ideas, goals or strategies within the existing institutions (Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992, pp.16-7). The fourth source of institutional dynamism derives 
from the way in which drastic institutional changes resulting from exogenous changes 
lead to political actors adjusting their strategies to accommodate such institutional 
changes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.17). The theoretical contribution made by this 
study is that the refined version of historical institutionalism after adding the approach 
of ‘institutional dynamism’ into it is no longer restricted to explain status quo and 
institutional stasis. Instead, it becomes more conducive to explaining institutional and 
policy changes.  
 
Secondly, this study refines historical institutionalism by taking note of the roles 
of ideas and actors. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Thelen and Steinmo (1992), when 
introducing institutional dynamism, also acknowledge the roles of ideas and actors in 
affecting institutional change. However, they did not define the terms “ideas” and 
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“actors” and nor did they explain in any detail how the roles of ideas and actors 
affected institutional change. In recent years, Peters et al. (2005) and Steinmo (2008) 
have also stressed the importance of bringing ideas and actors into institutional 
analysis to understand institutional change. But similar to Thelen and Steinmo (1992), 
they do not define the terms “ideas” and “actors” well and nor do they explain in any 
detail how the roles of ideas and actors affected institutional change. The definitions 
of ideas and actors are loose and used to mean many different things. But if these two 
concepts are brought into institutional analysis, then they have to be clearly defined 
and operationalized so as to enhance the researcher’s ability to collect data more 
easily and gain new understandings of the usefulness of historical institutionalism in 
the analysis of healthcare.  
 
In order to rectify the problem of the term “ideas” being poorly conceptualized, 
this study sharpens the concept of ideas by borrowing from the study of Campell 
(1998) and Hwang (2006), which identifies and clearly defines three types of 
ideational forces, namely programmatic ideas, policy paradigms and societal beliefs. 
In this study, these forces are illustrated in detail, revealing the impact of different 
types of ideas on governments’ and stakeholders’ attitudes towards health insurance 
reforms in Shanghai and Hong Kong, and the design and contents of health insurance 
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models in these two places. While this study emphasizes the importance of new ideas 
in facilitating changes, it also pays attention to the influences of old established ideas 
on affecting policy outcomes. Further, this study, by drawing insights from the study 
of Berman (2001) and Béland (2005a), highlights five conditions under which new 
ideas can achieve political prominence and public acceptance and in turn trigger 
institutional changes. These five conditions are: first, influential political actors with 
second, the ability and determination to promote new ideas, third, the right timing, 
fourth, a right fit with existing institutional structures, and fifth, being responsive to 
particular problems. By highlighting the conditions when new ideas can achieve 
political prominence, this study is able to explain how the relationship among ideas, 
actors, and institutions affects the success and failure of health insurance reform in 
Hong Kong 
 
Besides, when bringing the role of actors into the theory of historical 
institutionalism, this study stresses the importance of identifying key political actors 
and different stakeholders and examining how and why they affect the health 
insurance reform process. Healthcare is a complicated issue and involves many 
stakeholders. These stakeholders have a vested interest in both the existing healthcare 
system and potential or real changes health insurance reform brings. They can either 
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facilitate or block the implementation of health insurance reform. Therefore, it is 
important for this study to examine whether and how different political actors, 
stakeholders and the public exert their influence over healthcare insurance reform 
process without downplaying the institutional influences on their goals, strategies and 
behavior. This study conducted interviews with government officials and different 
stakeholders in order to examine their views on changes brought by or proposed by 
new healthcare financing reform. Data collected from these interviews helps give a 
more complete picture of health insurance reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong. 
 
In sum, this study refines the theory of historical institutionalism by bringing into 
it the approach of institutional dynamism plus the roles of ideas and actors. Adding 
these elements into the theory does not mean that the role of institutions in affecting 
policy outcomes is undermined. Instead, adding these elements makes the role of 
institutions in affecting policy outcomes more distinct. After all, institutional 
dynamism explains institutional and policy changes as an interaction between 
institutions and the broader political and socioeconomic context in which they operate. 
Besides, political institutions play a determinant role in defining the channels and 
mechanisms for absorbing and diffusing ideas, distributing power among political 
actors and shaping their goals and strategies in the decision-making process. 
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Therefore, one would not overlook the importance of political institutions when 
talking about institutional dynamism plus the roles of ideas and actors because these 
concepts are closely linked. While this study argues that institutions are not the sole 
determinant of political outcomes, rather there is a constellation of factors, it still 
regards institutions as the most influential factor in explaining policy outcomes. 
Below is the summary, discussion and comparison of the empirical findings of 
Shanghai and Hong Kong in relation to the theory of historical institutions 
 
(a) The Case Study of Shanghai  
 
This study argues that the Shanghai municipal government’s successful 2000 
implementation of health insurance reform, by replacing the free healthcare system 
with a new contributory health insurance system, was dependant upon four main 
factors: 
 
(1) the strong influence of the CCP along with a highly centralized 
decision-making structure; 
(2) the pace of collapse of the free healthcare system was triggered by a process 
of rapid policy feedback; 
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(3) the crucial changes in the political and economic contexts, which had been 
initiated by the elite; and  
(4) the elite’s ideological shift from egalitarianism to pro-market policies. 
 
Firstly, this study finds that political institutions play a determinant role in 
facilitating urban health insurance reform. Here three points can be noted: the role of 
a strong state, the absence of veto opportunities, and the benefits of devolved local 
power.  
 
In the PRC, the authoritarian political institutions, with the strong influence of 
the CCP, and a highly centralized decision-making structure, placed the central 
government in an advantageous position to implement urban health insurance reform 
without any political opposition. The closed policy-making process was confined to a 
small circle of senior officials from different ministries. The senior officials involved 
in bargaining during the policy making process had competing policy options, 
conflicting perspectives and conflicting interests. However, they would find ways to 
reconcile their differences and reach a consensus because they knew that the Central 
Committee to which they reported was the final decision-maker. On the other hand, 
the closed policy-making process did not provide any veto opportunities for 
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non-bureaucratic stakeholders in health insurance reform or interest groups to affect 
policy proposals or policy results. And finally, this study also finds that the Shanghai 
municipal government benefited from the central government’s delegation of power to 
the local governments, because it enjoyed the autonomy, discretion, efficiency and 
flexibility to implement urban health insurance reform. Thus in 2000, it implemented 
the BMI System in Shanghai. 
 
Secondly, this study finds that whilst policy feedback from the LIS and GIS 
created beneficiaries who could enjoy generous medical benefits, they lacked the 
strength and power to form political coalitions against the CCP’s health insurance 
reform. The economic reforms implemented since 1978 and the LIS and GHS 
implemented since the early 1950s induced negative feedback effects, thereby 
undermining the fiscal and social sustainability of the free healthcare system in 
Shanghai. The economic reforms, together with the LIS and GHS, created a number 
of problems: a drastic increase in healthcare expenditures; moral hazard from both the 
supply and demand sides; and employees being ‘underinsured’ and ‘uninsured’. These 
problems accelerated the pace of collapse of the free healthcare system in Shanghai. 
The government was compelled to change its policies and implement urban health 
insurance reform.  
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Thirdly, this study supports the claims made by Thelen and Steinmo (1992), that 
changes in the political or socioeconomic context lead to existing institutions 
performing new tasks because new political actors emerged to pursue new goals 
through the existing institutions (p.16). This study finds that elite-initiated changes in 
the political and economic contexts are crucial. In the PRC, from 1978 onwards, 
changes in the political context due to the rise of Deng Xiaoping as the new political 
leader, triggered changes in the economic context. Deng dismissed the ideology of 
egalitarianism that had been embedded in the socialist economy for more than three 
decades and endorsed the new ideology of marketization in order to modernize the 
country. Yet economic reform caused the free healthcare system to malfunction and 
then collapse. This, in turn, led to the establishment of a new health insurance system 
able to adapt to the changing environments.  
 
Fourthly, picking up from Thelen and Steinmo (1992), this study finds that new 
ideas play a role in policy making. The ideological shift from egalitarianism to 
marketization in the late 1970s transformed the PRC’s economic system from a 
socialist planned economy to a market economy. Deng’s endorsement of the 
pro-market economic policy also affected the ideas adopted to implement urban health 
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insurance reform. In the PRC, the new ideas of individual MSA, the SPF, co-payment, 
individual responsibility and social solidarity were championed by the political leader 
and key bureaucratic actors from different ministries when designing the new 
mandatory health insurance system. These new ideas achieved political prominence 
because they fitted into the market-oriented economic context and were believed to be 
a solution to the intractable problems of moral hazard from the demand side and rising 
healthcare expenditures.  
 
 In brief, health insurance reform in Shanghai represents the case of institutional 
change. The Shanghai municipal government was able to significantly deviate from 
the established policy path because of the complex interplay of forces, with strong 
political institutions playing a salient role in shaping health insurance reform.  
 
(b) The Case Study of Hong Kong 
 
This study argues that Hong Kong government’s efforts to implement healthcare 
financing reform in 1993, 1999 and 2000 ended in failure because of four main 
factors: 
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(1) the political system becoming more democratic, allowing different political 
actors a greater role, and therefore becoming somewhat ‘disjointed’;  
(2) policy feedback from government’s previous commitment to healthcare; 
(3) the role of old ideas, where free healthcare and equality were championed by 
both citizens and legislators; and  
(4) the impact of contingent economic circumstances. 
 
Firstly, this study finds that political institutions play a determinant role in 
structuring the power of different actors and shaping their strategies. During the 
colonial era, the democratization reforms introduced since 1985 changed the political 
system of Hong Kong from an elite-consensual polity to a consultative democracy, 
and the colonial government had difficulty in securing a guaranteed majority support 
from the Legco members when implementing the 1993 healthcare financing reform, 
because the latter were active to gather and reflect public opinions. In the 
post-colonial era, the disjointed political system caused by the legitimacy crisis of the 
Tung Administration, the tense Exco-Legco relationship and the disunity within the 
Exco acted as an impediment for the government to gather political support and reach 
a consensus on policy decisions for implementing healthcare financing reforms. 
Policy feedback as a result of the democratization reforms led to the emergence of 
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different political actors and interest groups, which challenged the government’s 
monopoly of decision-making powers both inside and outside the establishment. 
These actors made the government’s policy environment more crowded, turbulent and 
uncertain. Political consultations, confrontations and negotiations became the rule of 
the game between the HKSAR government and these political actors. Since the 
citizens thought that the mandatory and voluntary health insurance schemes proposed 
by the government would hurt their interests, by asking them to be responsible for 
their own medical expenses, they strongly resisted the implementation of healthcare 
financing reforms. Elected legislators who represented citizens’ interests also opposed 
the government’s healthcare financing options proposed in the reforms. In brief, a 
more democratic political system in the colonial era and a disjointed political system 
in the HKSAR era weakened the government’s capacity of implementing healthcare 
financing reforms. 
 
 Secondly, this study finds that history counts. The importance of history is 
reflected in how policy feedback from previous policy choices affects interest group 
formation and shapes stakeholders’ and public attitudes toward the government’s 
proposals for health insurance reform. Positive feedback effects which flowed from 
the government’s previous commitment to provide and finance medical services 
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through a public healthcare system established since the early 1960s and later the HA 
established in 1990 had continuously increased public demand for the government’s 
involvement in providing and financing healthcare services. The general public as 
anticipated in the exposure and experience models of policy feedback had been 
strongly and widely supported the public healthcare system over the past two decades. 
They had become strong defenders of their interests and opponents of healthcare 
financing reforms. Besides, doctors working in public hospitals were strong defenders 
of the existing free healthcare system. They opposed both the 1999 and 2000 
mandatory schemes because they feared for the HA losing government funding, the 
problem of moral hazard from both the supply and demand sides, and heavy 
workload.  
 
Thirdly, this study finds that ideas matter in shaping healthcare financing reforms. 
The old ideas of free healthcare, universal access to healthcare, equality and 
healthcare as a welfare benefit were deeply entrenched in the public healthcare system 
since the early 1960s. The establishment of the HA further institutionalized these old 
ideas that created framing effects. These ideas became societal beliefs and were 
widely accepted and endorsed by the public and greatly reduced the government’s 
capacity of persuading the legislators and the community to accept and support new 
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programmatic ideas proposed in the 1993 Rainbow Report and the ideas of mandatory 
contributions proposed in 1999 and 2000 healthcare financing reports. 
 
This study finds that there was a substantive contradiction between the 
government’s thinking and the public’s thinking on healthcare financing. The 
ideology embedded in the economic system shaped the government’s proposals for 
healthcare financing reforms. The ideas of laissez-faire and free market were 
embedded in the economic system of Hong Kong. Both the colonial government and 
the HKSAR government adhered to the principle of ‘small government, big market’ 
and maintained a simple and low tax system to attract investment. In order to maintain 
economic competiveness and a friendly investment environment, the Hong Kong 
government did not propose any tax options such as widening the tax base or 
increasing tax rates to reform the healthcare financing system. The government 
adopted demand-side strategies that emphasized individual responsibility and the 
principle of ‘those who had the means paid more’ when proposing financing options. 
However, the government’s thinking was contrary to widespread public belief that 
healthcare was a basic right and healthcare service was a welfare service that the 
government was morally obligated to provide. The ideas of healthcare being a 
fundamental right and legal entitlement for all were entrenched in the HA. In brief, 
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both the ideas embedded in the economic system and public healthcare system were 
institutional values that were difficult to alter. While the ideas embedded in the 
economic system shaped the government’s logic in proposing healthcare financing 
options, the ideas embedded in the public healthcare system shaped the public 
perception of healthcare. The substantive contradiction between the government’s 
thinking and the public’s thinking on healthcare financing created an obstacle to 
reform the healthcare financing system. 
 
Fourthly, this study finds that contingent economic circumstances in Hong Kong 
did not provide any windows of opportunity for the current healthcare financing 
policy to move onto a new trajectory. In the colonial era, a robust economy did not 
justify the government’s claim that it was under any financial pressure to implement 
healthcare financing reform. Then in the HKSAR era, a severe economic downturn 
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 was regarded by legislators, political parties 
and the public as an inappropriate time for the government to propose the mandatory 
schemes for healthcare when most of the citizens suffered wage decline, asset 
deflation and unemployment. The government failed to break from its original path of 
healthcare funding and the status quo was remained. 
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In brief, the case of Hong Kong is an example of path dependency because the 
government’s repeated attempts to implement healthcare financing reforms faced 
severe oppositions and ended in failure. The government’s effort proved in vain 
because of a complex interplay of forces, with the more democratic and later 
somewhat ‘disjointed’ political system being the most powerful constraints on 
government’s ability to implement healthcare financing reforms. As a result, no major 
change in the funding structure of healthcare occurred in Hong Kong. 
 
(c) Comparing the Empirical Findings of the Case Studies in Shanghai and Hong 
Kong:  
 
This study shows that the divergent results of health insurance reform in Shanghai and 
Hong Kong can be understood through a common theoretical lens of historical 
institutionalism. This lens stresses the importance of the role of political institutions 
and history in shaping the development trajectory of health insurance reform in these 
two places. Implementing health insurance reform is a complicated issue and its 
success or failure is not confined to a monocausal explanation but a constellation of 
factors. This study illuminates that whilst factors such as the role of ideas, actors and 
contextual conditions have shaped the health insurance reform process, their effects 
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largely depend upon the structure of the political institutions through which healthcare 
policy must pass.  
 
 Comparing the empirical findings of Shanghai and Hong Kong, this study finds 
that the role of political institutions is the most influential factor determining the 
outcome of health insurance reform. The success of health insurance reform 
implementation in Shanghai can be attributed to the strong and highly centralized 
political institutions that gave the central government leverage to implement a new 
health insurance model without any political impediments. The closed policy-making 
process was confined to a small circle of senior government officials and provided no 
veto opportunities stakeholders outside government to affect the process of health 
insurance reform. By contrast, the failure of health insurance reform implementation 
in Hong Kong was due to a more democratic and later disjointed political institution 
weakening the government’s ability to gather political support and reach a consensus 
on implementing health insurance reform. The consultative democracy implemented 
since the mid-1980s had made legislators and different stakeholders more vocal and 
the government implement health insurance reform extremely difficult. Thereafter, the 
disjointed politics of the SAR government era continued to make reform difficult. 
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 Policy feedback from previous policy choices is another important factor 
determining the outcome of health insurance reform. It can affect the outcome of 
health insurance reform by two ways: by affecting interest group formation and 
shaping stakeholders’ and public attitudes toward the government’s policies. In both 
cases, previous health policies fed back to affect the implementation of health 
insurance reform. In Shanghai, both the LIS and GIS induced negative feedback 
effects, which undermined the fiscal and social sustainability of the free healthcare 
system and generated pressure for path changes. The government searched for new 
alternatives to fund healthcare, leading to the success of health insurance reform 
implementation. By contrast, in Hong Kong, the free healthcare policy implemented 
since the 1960s had induced positive feedback effects, which reinforced the status quo. 
Citizens and legislators favored the maintenance of the free healthcare and opposed 
the implementation of health insurance reforms. 
 
 In both cases, the role of ideas played a role in shaping health insurance reform. 
Yet the impact of new ideas and old ideas on health insurance reform differs in 
Shanghai and Hong Kong. In Shanghai, new ideas such as individual MSA, the SPF 
and individual responsibility were endorsed by the central government and were 
adopted to design the new health insurance system. However, old ideas of free 
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healthcare and egalitarianism accelerated the collapse of the healthcare system and 
were perceived as an impediment to further economic reform. Therefore, they were 
abandoned by the central government in the 1980s. By contrast, in Hong Kong, new 
ideas of voluntary and mandatory contribution towards healthcare failed to get public 
and political support because old ideas of free healthcare, universal access and 
equality were institutionalized and became societal beliefs that were widely accepted 
and endorsed by the public. As a result, the implementation of health insurance reform 
was repeatedly shelved in Hong Kong. 
 
 In both cases, changing contextual conditions also affected the implementation 
of health insurance reform. In Shanghai, changing political and economic conditions 
that had been initiated by elites facilitated the implementation of health insurance 
reform. By contrast, in Hong Kong, contingent economic conditions did not provide 
any window of opportunity for the government to implement health insurance reform. 
However, the importance of economic conditions in affecting the implementation of 
health insurance reform is blurred because both a robust economic situation and poor 
economic situation were used at different times by legislators and the public as a 
reason to oppose the government’s proposals for health insurance reform. Therefore, 
the role of contingent economic conditions is relevant but as the economic argument 
 454 
can be made in diametrically opposing ways it has less plausibility in explaining the 
failure of health insurance reform implementation.  
 
Through the case studies of Shanghai and Hong Kong, this study contributes to 
the scholarly debate over convergence and divergence of healthcare reform. It shows 
that healthcare systems in both places do not convergence when facing the similar 
pressures of limited funding and rapid healthcare cost escalation caused by ageing 
population, heightened healthcare demands, and technological advancement. This 
study argues that divergent reform results in Shanghai and Hong Kong can be 
explained through the lens of historical institutionalism, which stressed the 
importance of the role of political institutions and history in shaping the development 
trajectories of health insurance reform in both places.  
 
9.4 Historical Institutionalism: the Limitations of the Revised Approach 
 
Historical institutionalism examines the development trajectory of politics and 
policies, the ways in which institutions shape and structure political behavior and 
outcomes, and how elites and masses understand their circumstances, make their 
decisions and take actions. Applying this approach to any polity can generate a 
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substantive explanation, but it is inevitably a limited and restricted statement in debate. 
This study notes that there is the challenge of adopting the theory of historical 
institutionalism to examine health insurance reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong 
because the theory takes ideas created in the Western context and deploys them in a 
quite different situation. But this study demonstrates that the theory can be applied in 
a context sensitive manner by paying attention to how the political, economic and 
social contexts are at play in Shanghai and Hong Kong. However, the utility of 
explanation made by the theory of historical institutionalism in this study is limited by 
studying two cases only. Recalling Chapter Six on Shanghai health insurance reform, 
this study shows that the successful implementation of health insurance reform in 
Shanghai was compatible with the second source of institutional dynamism identified 
by Thelen and Steinmo (1992), that the change in the political or socioeconomic 
context led to existing institutions performing new tasks because new political actors 
emerged to pursue new goals through the existing institutions (p.16). If the theory is 
applied to examine healthcare reforms in other countries, the research results may 
identify other sources of institutional dynamism because of the particular contextual 
differences.  
 
 Another challenge of adopting the theory of historical institutionalism to 
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examine health insurance reform in Shanghai and Hong Kong is how to gather a 
comprehensive set of data to answer the research question. Since historical 
institutionalism examines health insurance reform in a place over time rather than a 
snapshot of time, the process of data collection can be time-consuming, expensive and 
difficult. Data related to the past may be difficult to collect because of the lack of 
historical or written record or being subject to the limits of interviewees’ memory and 
knowledge. And of course, insufficient data can compromise the explanatory power of 
historical institutionalism.  
 
In order to overcome this challenge, this study collected data through different 
sources, including semi-structured interviews, documents, and archival records. Data 
triangulation not only provides a cross check on information, it also overcomes the 
challenge of collecting data through semi-structured interviews. Since data are 
collected for a smaller sample size through interviews than most surveys, this 
unavoidably raises the question on how representative the data are. This study does 
not claim that the sample sizes of semi-structured interviews are representative. But it 
has given particular care to the sample selection for ensuring that key actors and 
different stakeholders related to health insurance reform are interviewed in Shanghai 
and Hong Kong. In fact, this study finds that some of the interviewees were helpful in 
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providing the insiders’ views and the most updated information about healthcare 
while others helped identify relevant and useful information that would be otherwise 
be overlooked, especially in the case study of Shanghai.  
 
9.5 Future Studies 
The research findings of the case studies of Shanghai and Hong Kong have four 
implications, which can inform future studies. Firstly, historical institutionalism is 
very helpful in explaining the divergent development trajectory of healthcare or 
healthcare reform paths. It shows that the success and failure of health insurance 
reform is not confined to a monocausal explanation but the complex interplay of 
forces, including political institutions, policy feedback and contextual conditions.  
 
Secondly, this study shows the roles of ideas and actors can be brought into 
historical-institutional analysis without undermining the important role played by 
institutions in affecting political outcomes. Instead, adding these elements makes the 
impact of institutions on policy outcomes more distinct. It is because institutions 
define the channels for absorbing and diffusing ideas and shape the strategies and 
goals of political actors. 
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Thirdly, historical institutionalism is useful for explaining change when the 
approach of institutional dynamism was brought into the theory to identify the sources 
of institutional change. Historical institutionalism is no longer restricted to explain 
path dependency. 
 
Fourthly, this study shows that the Western theory of historical institutionalism 
can also apply into the non-Western context to explain the distinct healthcare reform 
path in welfare states in the East. The theory can be applied in a context sensitive 
manner by paying crucial attention to how the political, economic and social contexts 
are at play in a country. 
 
This study has made a theoretical contribution that the approach of institutional 
dynamism, the roles of ideas and actors were brought into the theory of historical 
institutionalism. It shows that a refined version of historical institutionalism has a 
stronger analytical and explanatory power when examining path dependency and path 
change. Besides, it had made the original contribution to empirical knowledge that the 
success and failure of health insurance reform implementation in Shanghai and Hong 
Kong could be understood and explained by the complex interplay of forces, namely 
political institutions, policy feedback and contextual conditions. It has also filled the 
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current research gap of the lack of study of healthcare financing reforms in Asia.  
 
Nevertheless, this study has limitations in terms of the number of case studies, 
generalization and data collection. Firstly, there are only two case studies. They only 
represent two welfare regimes in the East. Future studies can examine another trading 
city in Asia such as Singapore. Similar to Shanghai and Hong Kong, Singapore also 
experienced colonial rule in the nineteenth century and fell to the Japanese occupation 
during the Second World War. When Singapore gained independence in 1965, it 
underwent rapid transformation. In the aspect of healthcare financing, Singapore 
implemented a mandatory medical savings scheme in 1984. It would be interesting to 
examine how the roles of political institutions and history shape the development 
trajectory of healthcare financing reform in Singapore. Besides, future studies can 
examine health insurance system in other welfare regimes in the East, such as Taiwan 
and Japan, in a comparative perspective. According to Holliday (2000), Taiwan and 
Japan belong to developmental-universalist welfare regime in which there are limited 
social rights and the state underpins market and families with some universal 
programmes. In the aspect of healthcare financing, both Japan and Taiwan implement 
social insurance system. However, social insurance systems in these two places differ 
in terms of the pace of achieving universal coverage. While Japan was the first Asian 
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country implementing a universal social insurance system in 1961, Taiwan 
implemented a universal social insurance system in 1995. It would be interesting to 
provide a comparative assessment of the social health insurance experience in these 
two places through the lens of historical institutionalism. It can contribute to the 
empirical knowledge about welfare regimes in Asia and further contribute to the 
intellectual debate over the convergence or divergence of healthcare financing system.  
 
Secondly, Shanghai is just one part of China. There are limitations to generalize 
the healthcare reform result to other parts of China. Future studies can examine health 
insurance reform in other parts of China. For example, they can conduct a 
comparative case study on development, implementation and outcome of healthcare 
financing reform in four directly controlled municipalities in China, namely Beijing, 
Shanghai, Chongqing and Tianjin. Since health insurance reform in China is 
implemented in a decentralized manner, it would be interesting to examine whether 
local governments in different jurisdictions implements different health insurance 
models and whether citizens in different places share similar or different views 
towards health insurance reform. Besides, it would be interesting to conduct 
comparative study on development, strength and weakness of healthcare systems 
between urban and rural areas in China through the lens of historical institutionalism. 
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The in-depth investigation of the similarities and differences of development 
trajectories and outcomes of healthcare systems in different parts of China is helpful 
in generating empirical knowledge for policy formulation and lesson drawing. 
 
Thirdly, this study adopts a qualitative case study approach to examine health 
insurance reform experience in Shanghai and Hong Kong. Future studies can adopt a 
quantitative approach to examine the issue. For example, they can conduct its own 
opinion survey based on the research questions or make use of secondary materials 
that report opinion survey findings. They can examine how the public view about 
health insurance reform in different places. Opinion survey can systematically collect 
large and representative samples and provide wide range of quantitative data for 
making generalizations to the larger populated.  
 
This study has used historical institutionalism to investigate situation in 
Shanghai and Hong Kong and found that the two trajectories revealed different 
institutional responses to similar problems caused by ageing population, the continued 
proliferation of advanced medical technologies and the public’s increased 
expectations and demands. It is not clear how further changes will unfold but the 
further work mentioned above would contribute to this explanatory agenda.  
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Appendices 
Diagram 1  
The Map of Foreign Settlements in Shanghai in 1907 
 
Source: The University of Texas Libraries 
       http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shanghai_1907.jpg 
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Diagram 2  
Three-tiered Medical Institution Network in Urban China 
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Diagram 3  
The “two-jiang” Model in the Zhengjiang and Jiujiang Cities in 1994 
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Diagram 4  
The Funding Structure of the Basic Medical Insurance System and the Local 
Additional Medical Insurance Fund in Shanghai 
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Diagram 5  
The Operation of the Basic Medical Insurance System in Shanghai 
 
 
Source: Xu et al. (2008), p.3.  
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Diagram 6 
The Process of Drug Distribution in the Drug Distribution Channel in China 
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Diagram 7 
The Map of Hong Kong (1915) 
 
Source: Jarman (1996), Hong Kong Annual Administration Reports, 1841-1941 (volume 3), p.331 
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Table 1 
Social Legislation in OECD Countries 
 
 Industrial 
accident 
Health Pension Unemployment Family 
Allowance 
Belgium 1903 1894 1900 1920 1930 
The 
Netherlands 
1901 1929 1913 1916 1940 
France 1898 1898 1895 1905 1932 
Italy 1898 1886 1898 1919 1936 
Germany 1871 1883 1889 1927 1954 
Ireland 1897 1911 1908 1911 1944 
The UK 1897 1911 1908 1911 1945 
Denmark 1898 1892 1891 1907 1952 
Norway 1894 1909 1936 1906 1946 
Sweden 1901 1891 1913 1934 1947 
Finland 1895 1963 1937 1917 1948 
Austria 1887 1888 1927 1920 1921 
Switzerland 1881 1911 1946 1924 1952 
Australia 1902 1945 1909 1945 1941 
New 
Zealand 
1900 1938 1898 1938 1926 
Canada 1930 1971 1927 1940 1944 
The U.S. 1930 --- 1935 1935 --- 
Source:  Pierson (1998). Beyond The Welfare State: The New Political Economy of Welfare, p. 104. 
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Table 2 
The Growth of Social Expenditure in OECD Countries 
 
 Social Expenditure 
3% + GDP 
Social Expenditure 
5% + GDP 
Belgium 1923 1933 
The Netherlands 1920 1934 
France 1921 1931 
Italy 1923 1940 
Germany 1900 1915 
Ireland 1905 1920 
The UK 1905 1920 
Denmark 1908 1918 
Norway 1917 1926 
Sweden 1905 1921 
Finland 1926 1947 
Austria 1926 1932 
Switzerland By 1900 1920 
Australia 1922 1932 
New Zealand 1911 1920 
Canada 1921 1931 
The U.S. 1920 1931 
Source:  Pierson (1998). Beyond The Welfare State: The New Political Economy of Welfare, p. 107. 
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Table 3 
Retrenchment of Benefits in OECD Countries 
 
Type of Benefit Change Examples 
Old Age Pensions  Raising retirement age  
 
 Increase in qualifying 
period for a full pension 
 Lowered basis for 
upgrading of benefits in 
line with inflation 
 Income testing of 
pension 
 The UK, New Zealand, 
Italy, and Japan 
 France, Portugal, Ireland, 
and Finland 
 The UK, France, and 
Spain 
 
 
 Austria, Denmark, and 
Australia 
Disability  Stricter test of incapacity 
 
 New time limits, reduced 
benefits 
 The UK, the U.S., the 
Netherlands, and Norway 
 The UK, the U.S., and 
the Netherlands 
Unemployment  Reduction in the 
duration of benefits 
 Reduction in the level of 
benefits 
 Reduced eligibility 
 Belgium, the UK, 
Denmark, and the U.S. 
 Germany, Ireland, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland 
 The Netherlands, the UK, 
and Belgium 
Family Allowances  Declining real value or 
decreasing eligibility 
 The UK, Spain, and the 
Netherlands 
Source: Pierson (1998). Beyond The Welfare State: The New Political Economy of Welfare, p. 164. 
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Table 4 
 
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 
 Liberal Conservative Social Democratic 
Social Rights (1) Minimal; 
(2) Entitlement rules 
are strict and 
often associated 
with stigma; 
benefits are 
typically modest. 
(1) The granting of 
social rights is 
hardly ever a 
seriously 
contested issue;  
(2) Attached to 
class and 
status. 
(1) Extensive;  
(2) Eligibility rests 
on being a 
citizen or 
long-time 
resident of the 
country. 
Stratification 
Effects 
A blend of a relative 
equality of poverty 
among state-welfare 
recipients, 
market-differentiated 
welfare among the 
majorities, and a 
class-political 
dualism between the 
two. 
The preservation 
of status 
differentials. 
(1) Universal 
benefits;  
(2) All are 
dependents and 
all will 
presumably 
feel obliged to 
pay. 
  
Welfare Mix (1) Citizens bear the 
main 
responsibility for 
their own 
welfare; 
(2) The state only 
has residual duty 
to help the 
needy; 
(3) The state 
encourages 
market provision 
either passively 
or actively. 
(1) The 
preservation of 
traditional 
familyhood; 
(2) The state only 
interferes when 
the family’s 
capacity to 
serve its 
members is 
exhausted. 
(1) The market is 
crowded out;  
(2) Traditional 
family 
responsibilities 
are socialized; 
(3) The state is the 
principal 
means of 
realizing the 
social rights of 
all its citizens 
and takes direct 
responsibility 
of caring for 
children, the 
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aged, and the 
helpless. 
Examples The U.S., Canada, 
and Australia 
Austria, France, 
German, and Italy 
Scandinavian 
countries such as 
Sweden and 
Norway 
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Table 5 
The Productivist World of Welfare Capitalism 
 Social 
Policy 
Social 
Rights 
Stratification 
Effects 
State-market
-family 
Relationship 
Examples 
Facilitative Subordinate 
to economic 
policy 
Minimal Limited Market 
prioritized 
Hong 
Kong 
Developmental
-universalist 
Subordinate 
to economic 
policy 
Limited; 
extensions 
linked to 
productive 
activity 
Reinforcement 
of the position 
of productive 
elements 
State 
underpins 
market and 
families with 
some 
universal 
programmes 
Japan, 
South 
Korea, and 
Taiwan 
Developmental
-particularist 
Subordinate 
to economic 
policy 
Minimal; 
forced 
individual 
provision 
linked to 
productive 
activity 
Reinforcement 
of the position 
of productive 
elements 
State directs 
social welfare 
activities of 
families 
Singapore 
Source: Holliday (2000). Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia. Political Studies, 
vol.48 (4), p.710. 
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Table 6 
Total Health Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP and Annual Percentage 
Growth in Real Terms in OCED Countries from 1962 to 1992 
 
 1960 1992 Annual 
percentage 
growth in real 
terms 
1960-1992 
Constant prices, health deflator 
Australia 4.9 8.8 4.1 
Austria 4.4 8.8 3.2 
Belgium 3.4 8.2 5.2 
Canada 5.5 10.1 4.8 
Denmark 3.6 6.5 4.7 
Finland 3.9 9.4 6.2 
France 4.2 9.4 6.8 
Germany 4.8 8.7 4.3 
Greece 2.9 5.4 6.6 
Iceland 3.5 8.5 6.5 
Ireland 4.0 7.1 5.5 
Italy 3.6 8.5 5.9 
Japan 3.0 6.9 8.5 
Luxembourg --- 7.4 5.8629 
The Netherlands 3.9 8.6 4.1 
New Zealand 4.3 7.7 --- 
Norway 3.3 8.3 5.1 
Portugal --- 6.0 --- 
Spain 1.5 7.0 9.4 
Sweden 4.7 7.9 4.1 
Switzerland 3.3 9.3 4.6 
Turkey --- 4.1 --- 
The UK 3.9 7.1 4.0 
The U.S. 5.3 14.0 4.8 
Source: OECD (1996), Health Care Reform: The Will to Change, p.18. 
 
                                                 
629 Data are for the period 1970-92. 
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Table 7 
Public Health Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP in OCED Countries from 
1962 to 1992 
 
 1960 1992 
Australia 2.4 5.7 
Austria 3.1 5.9 
Belgium 2.1 7.2 
Canada 2.3 7.5 
Denmark 3.2 5.5 
Finland 2.1 7.4 
France 2.4 7.0 
Germany 3.2 6.2 
Greece 1.9 4.2 
Iceland 2.4 7.0 
Ireland 3.0 5.2 
Italy 3.0 6.5 
Japan 1.8 5.0 
Luxembourg --- 6.1 
The Netherlands 1.3 6.5 
New Zealand 3.5 5.9 
Norway 2.6 7.8 
Portugal 0.9 4.0 
Spain 0.9 5.7 
Sweden 3.4 6.5 
Switzerland 2.0 6.6 
Turkey --- 1.4 
The UK 3.3 5.9 
The U.S. 1.3 6.0 
Source: OECD (1996), Health Care Reform: The Will to Change, p.19. 
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Table 8 
Schematic Overview of Healthcare Reform Instruments Adopted by the Policy 
Makers in Different Countries in the 1990s 
 
Finance Allocation Mechanisms Production 
Competitive mechanisms 
between private insurers 
Negotiated contracts Quasi-autonomous 
management of public 
hospitals 
Increased private 
insurance 
Patient choice Competitive mechanisms 
between hospitals and 
physicians 
Increased social insurance Giving hospital budgets to 
primary care providers 
and/or boards 
Decentralizing service 
delivery 
 Mixture of capitated with 
other GP payment 
arrangements 
GP as gatekeeper 
 Reference pricing for 
pharmaceuticals 
Privatizing service 
providers 
 Positive lists for 
pharmaceuticals 
Improved coordination 
between health and social 
services, especially for 
elderly 
 Co-payments and 
deductibles 
Quality improvement 
 Cross-cutting initiatives  
 Improved information 
systems 
 
 Enhanced preventive 
services 
 
 Patient rights  
Source: Saltman (1994). A Conceptual Overview of Recent Health Care Reforms. European Journal of 
Public Health, vol. 4 (4), p.289. 
 
 
 
 
 
 478 
Table 9 
 
Key Features of Historical Institutionalism 
Origin: emerged in the early 1980s as a response to both the behavioral and rational 
choice perspectives, arguing that political action could not be reduced to 
individual behavior without taking political institutions and history into 
account.  
Definition of Institutions: Institutions are “formal or informal procedures, routines, 
norms, and conventions intrinsic to the organizational 
structure of the polity” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.938) 
that shape the goals political actors pursue and structure 
power relations that favor some groups while 
demobilizing others (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.2; 
Oliver and Massialos, 2005, p.10). 
Key Features 
1. Institutions matter: Institutions play a determinant role in distributing power 
among political actors in a given polity and shaping their strategies and goals in 
the decision-making process that in turn shape the political outcomes 
2. Institutions can affect individual behaviors through both the calculus and cultural 
approach. 
3. History matters: It takes history or time seriously, specifying sequences, tracing 
and analyzing processes over substantial stretch of years to explain important 
political outcomes. 
4. The emphasis on path dependency: early stages in a sequence can place particular 
aspects of political systems onto distinct tracks, which are then reinforced through 
time. 
5. The importance of policy feedback: provides resources and creates incentives that 
can facilitate or inhibit the formation or expansion of interest groups (Pierson, 
1994, pp.40-1); provides information for interest groups and the public that affect 
their mind-sets and cognitive processes (Pierson, 1994).  
6. The use of in-depth case studies as the research strategy to “find interesting 
patterns to explain and to test the plausibility of causal hypotheses” (Skocpol, 
1995, p.104). 
Key Concepts 
1. Political institutions 
2. History, timing and sequence 
3. Path dependency  
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Table 10 
The Rise of Case Study Research in Health Policy 
 
Year Number of Hits 
Zetoc Google Scholar 
1980-84 0 35,200 
1985-89 1 76,200 
1990-94 11 150,000 
1995-99 61 356,000 
2000-04 61 410,000 
2005-10 354 417,000 
Source: Exworthy and Powell (2012), Case Study in Health Policy: An Introduction, p.8. 
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Table 11 
The List of Interviewees about Shanghai Health Insurance Reform 
 
 Interviewee Date  Time  Place  
1.  Government 
Official 1: a female 
government official 
from the Shanghai 
Municipal Human 
Resources and 
Social Security 
Bureau 
6th July 2010 8:00p.m. -10:00p.m. Phone 
interview 
2. Professor 1: an 
expert in urban 
health insurance 
reform in China 
1st July 2010 11:00am-1:00p.m. A restaurant at 
a research 
institute in 
Shanghai 
3. Professor 2: an 
expert in urban 
health insurance 
reform in China 
1st July 2010 3:00p.m.-6:00p.m. A medical 
college in 
Shanghai 
4. Professor 3: 
an expert in urban 
health insurance 
reform in China 
2nd July 2010 11:00am -1:30p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Shanghai 
5. Professor 4: an 
expert in political 
science and 
international 
relations 
16th July 2010 2:30p.m.-4:30p.m. A café in 
Shanghai  
6. Professor 5: 
an expert in 
comparative health 
insurance 
19th July 2010 2:00p.m.-4:00p.m. A university 
office in 
Shanghai 
7. Professor 6: 
an expert in 
comparative health 
insurance, and a 
member of 
1st August 2010 11:00a.m.-2:00p.m. A restaurant 
in Shanghai 
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Shanghai Insurance 
Society 
8. Researcher 1: 
an expert in rural 
health insurance in 
China 
1st July 2010 11:00am-1:00p.m. A restaurant at 
a research 
institute in 
Shanghai 
9. Researcher 2: a 
researcher at a 
research institute 
6th July 2010 2:00p.m.-5:00p.m. A hotel café 
in Shanghai 
10. Doctor 1: 
a specialist at a 
municipal hospital 
in Shanghai 
1st July 2010 6:45p.m.-9:00p.m. A Taiwan 
restaurant in 
Shanghai 
11. Doctor 2: 
a specialist at a 
municipal hospital 
in Shanghai 
5th July 2010 5:45p.m. -7:00p.m. A restaurant at 
a subway 
station in 
Shanghai 
12. Pharmaceutical 
Company Manager 
1: General Manager 
of a foreign 
pharmaceutical 
company in 
Shanghai 
21st July 2010 7:00p.m.-9:30p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Shanghai  
13. Pharmaceutical 
Company Manager 
2: General Manager 
of a foreign 
pharmaceutical 
company in 
Shanghai 
1st August 2010 3:00p.m.-5:00p.m. A coffee shop 
in a subway 
station in 
Shanghai 
14. Insurance Company 
Manager 1: 
Regional Manager 
of a 
Chinese-foreign 
insurance company 
20th July 2010 1:00p.m.-1:30p.m. Phone 
interview 
15. Insurance Company 20th July 2010 7:00p.m.-9:30p.m. A western 
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Manager 2: 
Assistant General 
Manager of a health 
insurance company 
restaurant at a 
subway 
station in 
Shanghai 
16. Insurance Director 
1: Director of a 
Chinese-foreign 
insurance company 
29th July 2010 2:00p.m.-3:00p.m. An office of 
the insurance 
company in 
Shanghai 
17. Citizen 1: Senior 
consultant of a 
state-owned 
business consulting 
company 
26th June 2010 1:00p.m.-3:00p.m. A restaurant at 
a shopping 
mall in 
Shanghai  
 
18. Citizen 2: a 
manager working at 
a private marketing 
company 
27th June 2010 10:00am -12:00p.m. A university 
café in 
Shanghai 
19. Citizen 3: a retired 
lady who used to 
work at a research 
institute 
27th June 2010 6:00p.m.-8:35p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Shanghai 
20. Citizen 4: a lady 
who worked at a 
state-owned bank 
29th June 2010 6:30p.m. -9:30p.m. An Italian 
restaurant in 
Shanghai 
21. Citizen 5: a 
software developer 
of a foreign 
company, 
responsible for 
developing a 
medical insurance 
software for 
hospitals in China 
29th June 2010 6:30p.m. -9:30p.m. An Italian 
restaurant in 
Shanghai 
22. Citizen 6: Supplier 
quality engineer at 
a joint venture 
vehicle accessories 
company 
30th June 2010 6:30p.m. -9:00p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Shanghai 
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23. Citizen 7: a 
supervisor of a 
foreign clothing 
company in 
Shanghai 
23rd July 2010 6:30p.m.-8:30p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Shanghai 
24. Hong Kong Citizen 
1: Director of a 
market research and 
consultancy 
company in 
Shanghai 
12th July 2010 11:30a.m.-1:00p.m. A Taiwan café 
in Hong Kong 
25. Armed Police 
Officer 1 
23rd July 2010 8:00p.m.-8:30p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Shanghai 
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Table 12 
The List of Interviewees about Hong Kong Health Insurance Reform 
 
 Interviewee Date  Time  Place  
1.  Government 
Official 1: a male 
government official 
from the Food and 
Health Bureau 
27th October 2010 3:00p.m.-5:00p.m. A café in a 
shopping mall 
in Hong Kong 
2. Former Legislative 
Council (Legco) 
Member 1 
18th October 2010 10:45a.m.-11:45a.m. A private 
clinic in 
Kowloon 
3. Former member of 
the Public 
Complaints 
Committee of the 
Hospital Authority 
4th October 2010 & 
11th November 2010 
11:30a.m.-12:30p.m. 
11:00a.m.-12:00p.m. 
A Church in 
Hong Kong 
4. Professor 1: 
an expert in 
healthcare 
financing reform 
21st September 2010 10:50a.m.-12:10p.m. A college 
office in Hong 
Kong  
5. Professor 2: 
an expert in social 
and welfare policies 
18th October 2010 3:30p.m.-4:15p.m. A university 
office in Hong 
Kong 
6. Professor 3: an 
expert in 
biochemistry and 
Chinese medicine 
4th October 2010 4:00p.m.-5:15 p.m. A university 
office in Hong 
Kong 
7. Doctor 1: 
a male specialist  
at a public hospital 
9th October 2010 3:30p.m.-5:30p.m. A café in a 
shopping mall 
in Kowloon 
8. Doctor 2: 
a male specialist 
having working 
experience in both 
the public and 
private hospitals 
30th October 2010 4:00p.m.-6:15 p.m. A private 
clinic in 
Kowloon 
9. Nurse 1: 23rd August 2010 &  6:30p.m.-8:30p.m. Café in New 
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a female nurse 
having working 
experience in both 
the public and 
private hospitals 
 
 
7th October 2010 
 
 
3:30p.m.-5:30p.m. 
Territories 
  
Café in 
Tsim Sha Tsui 
10. Social worker 1:  
a female social 
worker of the 
Social Welfare 
Department 
25th September 2010 2:00p.m.-5:30p.m. A Japanese 
restaurant in 
New 
Territories 
11. Social worker 2: a 
female medical 
social worker at a 
public hospital 
3rd October 2010 5:00p.m.-7:00 p.m. A coffee shop 
in a railway 
station 
12. Insurance 
consultant 1:  
male 
5th October 2010 & 
28th October 2010 
3:00 p.m.-4:30p.m. 
3:30p.m.-4:30p.m. 
A restaurant 
in Kowloon 
13. Insurance 
consultant 2: 
female 
11th October 2010 11:30a.m.-1:30p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
New 
Territories 
14. Civil Servant 1: 
a young female 
civil servant 
 
14th August 2010 
 
18th February 2011 
2:00p.m.-3:00p.m. 
 
6:30p.m.-7:00p.m. 
A coffee shop 
in Kowloon 
A Western 
restaurant in 
Kowloon 
15. Civil Servant 2:  
a middle-aged 
female civil servant 
26th September 2010 
 
 
20th February 2010 
1:00p.m.-3:00p.m 
 
 
2:20p.m.-2:40p.m. 
A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Kowloon 
Phone 
Interview 
16. Civil Servant 3: 
a male senior police 
officer 
7th October 2010 11:30a.m.-2:00 p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Kowloon 
17. Civil Servant 4: 
a female inspector 
of police  
10th October 2010 11:00p.m.-1:30p.m. A café in 
Kowloon 
18. Citizen 1:  18th September 2010 1:00p.m.-4:35p.m. A café in 
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a female university 
student  
 
20th February 2011 
 
9:30p.m.-10:00p.m. 
Kowloon 
Phone 
Interview 
19. Citizen 2: 
a cleaning lady at 
the university 
23rd September 2010 
 
 
19th February 2011 
2:00p.m.-3:30p.m. 
 
 
8:30p.m.-9:00p.m. 
A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Kowloon 
Phone 
interview 
20. Citizen 3: 
a female staff 
working at a bank 
24th September 2010 
 
 
2nd March 2011 
7:00p.m.-9:00 p.m. 
 
 
8:45p.m.-9:00p.m. 
A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Kowloon 
Phone 
Interview 
21. Citizen 4: 
a male manager at a 
finance institution 
26th September 2010 
 
 
20th February 2011 
1:00p.m.-3:00p.m. 
 
 
10:00a.m.-10:15a.m. 
A Chinese 
restaurant in 
Kowloon 
Phone 
Interview 
22. Citizen 5: 
a male firm owner 
28th September 2010 10:00a.m.-12:00p.m. A Chinese 
restaurant in 
New 
Territories 
23. Citizen 6: 
a male manager in a 
private investment 
bank 
2nd October 2010 
 
 
20th February 2011 
2:00p.m.-3:40p.m. 
 
 
12:00p.m.-12:15p.m. 
A restaurant 
in Kowloon 
 
Phone 
Interview 
24. Citizen 7: 
a female 
middle-aged 
part-time worker at 
a laundry shop 
2nd October 2010 
 
 
 
20th February, 2011 
2:00p.m.-3:40p.m. 
 
 
 
3:10p.m. -3: 25p.m. 
A restaurant 
in Kowloon 
 
 
Phone 
Interview 
25. Citizen 8: 
a female secondary 
school teacher 
24th October 2010 10:30a.m.-11:30a.m. Phone 
Interview 
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Table 13 
Employees’ Individual Savings Account in Basic Medical Insurance in Shanghai 
 
Age (Years) % of EAASSP* % of Employees’ Contribution 
Above 75 4.5 Not Applicable 
Retirement to Under 74 4 Not Applicable 
45 to retirement 1.5 2 
35 to 44 1 2 
Under 34 0.5 2 
* EAASSP: Employees’ Average Annual Salary of Shanghai in the Previous Year 
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Table 14 
The Degree of Medical Coverage of Basic Medical Insurance Urban Employees 
 
Date of Birth of 
employees and 
employment date 
General outpatient and emergency 
medical expenses 
Medical 
expenses 
of serious 
outpatient 
illnesses 
Medical 
expenses 
of home 
care beds 
Medical expenses of 
hospitalization and emergency 
room stay 
1st tier: 
MSA 
2nd tier: 
self-payment 
3rd tier: 
covered 
by the 
LAMI 
fund*  
Covered by the social 
pooling funds (SPFs) 
Payment 
threshold of 
the SPFs 
Above the 
payment 
threshold and 
below the ceiling 
of the SPFs**  
Born before  
December 31, 1955 
and being employed 
before December 31, 
2000  
used 10% of the 
premium 
base*** 
70% 85% 80% 10% of 
premium base 
85% covered by 
the SPFs 
Born between 
January 1, 1956 and  
December 31, 1965, 
and being employed 
before December 31, 
2000 
used 10% of the 
premium 
base 
60% 85% 80% 10% of 
premium base 
85% covered by 
the SPFs 
Born after 
January 1, 1966, and 
being employed 
before December 31, 
2000 
used 10% of the 
premium 
base 
50% 85% 80% 10% of 
premium base 
85% covered by 
the SPFs 
Being employed 
after January 1, 2001 
used Self-payment, 
Cannot enjoy LAMI 
85% 80% 10% of 
premium base 
85% covered by 
the SPFs 
Remarks: The LAMI fund*: The local additional medical insurance fund 
The ceiling of the SPFs** : it is capped at four times of employees’ average annual salary of Shanghai in the previous year 
(EAASSP) 
Premium base***: EAASSP 
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Table 15 
The Degree of Medical Coverage of Basic Medical Insurance for Retired 
Employees 
 
Date of Birth of 
retirees, employment 
date and retirement 
date 
General outpatient and emergency medical 
expenses 
Medical expenses of serious 
outpatient illnesses 
Medical expenses of hospitalization 
and emergency room stay 
1st tier: 
MSA 
2nd tier: 
self-payment 
3rd tier: covered 
by the LAMI 
fund* in public 
hospitals 
Covered by the social pooling 
funds (SPFs) 
Payment 
threshold of the 
SPFs 
Above the 
payment 
threshold and 
below the 
ceiling of the 
SPFs**  
Retired before 
December 31, 2000 
used 2% of the 
premium 
base*** 
Grade I:90% 
Grade II: 85% 
Grade III: 80% 
92% 5% of premium 
base 
92% covered by 
the SPFs 
Being employed 
before December 31, 
2000, and retired after 
January 1, 2001, but 
were 
 
(i)  born before 
December 31, 1955 
used 5% of the 
premium base 
Grade I:85% 
Grade II: 80% 
Grade III: 75% 
 
 
 
 
 
92% 
8% of premium 
base 
92% covered by 
the SPFs 
(ii)  born between 
January 1, 1956 and 
December 31, 1965 
used 5% of the 
premium base 
Grade I:70% 
Grade II: 65% 
Grade III: 60% 
8% of premium 
base 
92% covered by 
the SPFs 
(iii) born after January 
1, 1966 
used 5% of the 
premium base 
Grade I:55% 
Grade II: 50% 
Grade III: 45% 
8% of premium 
base 
92% covered by 
the SPFs 
Retirees who were 
employed after 
January 1, 2001 and 
retires afterwards 
used 10% of the 
premium base 
Grade I:55% 
Grade II: 50% 
Grade III: 45% 
10% of premium 
base 
92% covered by 
the SPFs 
Remarks: The LAMI fund*: The local additional medical insurance fund 
The ceiling of the SPFs ** : it is capped at four times of employees’ average annual salary of Shanghai in the previous year (EAASSP) 
Premium base***: EAASSP 
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Table 16 
Advanced Medical Equipment in Municipal, District, and Street-level Hospitals 
in Shanghai in 1986 
 
Municipal Hospital 
Medical Equipment  
(Grade I) 
District Hospital 
Medical Equipment 
(Grade II) 
Street-level Hospital 
Medical Equipment 
(Grade III) 
X-ray machine  
(800 milliamperes and above)  
X-ray machine  
(400-750 milliamperes) 
X-ray machine  
(200 milliamperes) 
Electrocardiogram (ECG) ECG ECG 
Intensive Care Monitor Heart Monitor B-mode Ultrasonic Apparatus 
Head Computed Tomography 
(CT) 
Multi-channel Physiological 
Instrument 
Gastroscopy 
Whole-body CT M-mode Ultrasonic Diagnostic 
Apparatus 
Apple Computer II 
Linear Accelerator (LINAC) RU-mode Ultrasonic 
Diagnostic Apparatus 
Personal Computers with 
different models 
Co-treatment Machine Fibre-optic Endoscopy Electric Dental Chair 
Mini Electronic Calculator Duodenoscopy 1/10,000 Optical Analytical 
Balance 
Multi-function Mechanical 
Ventilator 
Colonoscopy 721 Spectrophotometer 
Liver Function Test Bronchoscope Short-wave Therapy Machine 
Hemodialysis Apparatus Apple II Computer Laser Treatment Machine 
Automatic Biochemical 
Analyzer 
Mechanical Ventilator  
Surgical Microscope  Pathology Testing Equipment  
Surgical X-ray Machine Blood Gas Analyzer   
 Foetal Monitor  
 Isotope Diagnostic Apparatus  
Source: Zhang and Shao (1998), Shanghai Health Records (Chinese Version), p.110. 
* Remarks: The medical equipment level was divided into three levels. Grade I was the highest medical 
equipment level, which was followed by Grade II, and Grade III. The medical equipment in the table 
was equipment reaching the Grade I to III level. 
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Table 17 
The Average Medical Expenses among the BMI Participants in Shanghai 
(2001-2005) 
                                                           Unit: RMB 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Employees 381.70 696.34 757.94 869.57 1,016.6
7 
Retirees 3,297.4
2 
3,818.5
8 
3,943.9
9 
4,136.8
8 
4,564.3
7 
Retired 
Veteran 
Cadres 
14,122.1
6 
17,437.2
4 
19,316.4
2 
22,848.5
3 
26,104.1
1 
Source: Wang (2008). The Empirical Study of the Control of Medical Insurance Expenses in Shanghai, 
p.302. 
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Table 18 
The Operating Statistics of Insurance Industry from January 2009 to December 
2009 
 
  Source: Shanghai Bureau of China Insurance Regulatory Commission (2010) 
       http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site7/tab377/i120554.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Premium Income Amount (RMB 10,000) Percentage 
(%) 
1. Life Insurance 4583951.63 69% 
2. Property Insurance 1518069.76 23% 
3. Medical Insurance 416669.93 6% 
4. Personal Accident Insurance 131567.45 2% 
Total 6650258.77 100% 
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Table 19 
The Balance of the BMI Fund in Shanghai (2002-2009) 
 
Year  Revenues of the BMI Fund 
(billion RMB) 
Expenses of the BMI Fund 
(billion RMB) 
2002 9.04 7.23 
2003 12.15 11.70 
2004 13.42 11.94 
2005 15.10 14.64 
2006 17.05 15.61 
2007 20.28 17.96 
2008 23.65 21.20 
2009 26.85 23.11 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2003-2010). 
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Table 20 
The Degree of Coverage of Basic Medical Insurance for Individual Businessmen 
and Professionals (Effective since 1st August 2002) 
 
Contributor(s) Contribution# General outpatient 
and emergency 
medical expenses 
Medical 
expenses 
of serious 
outpatient 
illnesses 
Medical 
expenses of 
home care 
beds 
Medical expenses of hospitalization 
and emergency room stay 
 Payment 
Threshold 
Above payment 
threshold and 
below the ceiling 
of the social 
pooling funds 
(SPFs)** 
individual 
businessmen 
and 
professionals 
8% of EAASSP* ; 
(included an 
individual medical 
savings account for 
the contributors) 
Self-payment 85% 
covered by 
the SPFs 
80% 
covered by 
the SPFs 
10% of EAASSP 85% covered by 
the SPFs 
Retirees do not need to pay any 
premiums but have individual medical 
savings account. Medical insurance 
fund*** injects money which is equal 
to 4% of EAASSP into the individual 
medical savings account of retirees 
aged below 74, and money which is 
equal to 4.5% of EAASSP into the 
individual medical savings account of 
retirees aged above 75. 
Retirees: 
1st tier: individual 
medical savings 
account 
2nd tier: self-payment 
i.e. 10% of EAASSP 
3rd: tier: covered by 
social pooling fund: 
Grade I:55% 
Grade II: 50% 
Grade III: 45% 
Retirees: 
92% 
covered by 
the SPFs 
Retirees: 
80% 
covered by 
the SPFs 
10% of EAASSP Retirees: 
92% covered by 
the SPFs 
Remarks: Contribution#: individual businessmen and professionals can only enjoy the health insurance coverage after paying premium 
for consecutive six months; retirees also have to wait for six months before they can enjoy any medical 
coverage from the health insurance. 
EAASSP*: Employees’ Average Annual Salary of Shanghai in the Previous Year 
The ceiling of the SPFs **: it is capped at four times of EAASSP 
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Medical insurance fund***: it is formed by the premiums contributed by individual businessmen and professionals. It is divided into 
retirees’ individual medical savings accounts and social pooling fund.  
Table 21 
Basic Medical Insurance for Urban Residents in Shanghai  
(Effective since January 2008) 
 
 Infants, children, 
primary and 
secondary school 
students 
Urban residents 
aged above 18 but 
under 60 
Urban residents 
aged above 60 but 
under 70 
Urban 
residents aged 
above 70 
A. The Standard of Fundraising for Basic Medical Insurance for Urban Residents 
Amount of 
Fundraising (RMB) 
(per capita per year) 
260 700 1,200 1,500 
Amount of Personal 
Payment in 
Fundraising (RMB) 
60 480 360 240 
The Remaining Part 
of Funds After 
Personal Payment 
Shall be underwritten by financial subsidy from the government 
B. The Degree of Coverage of Resident Medical Insurance Fund 
Medical Expenses of 
Hospitalization (%) 
50% 50% 60% 70% 
Medical Expenses of 
Clinic Emergency 
Treatment (%) 
50% 50% of the part of 
clinic emergency 
treatment costs in 
excess of RMB 
1,000 that is 
accumulated 
annually 
50% 50% 
Medical Expenses at 
Grade I Medical 
Institutions (%) 
60% for all insurance participants 
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Table 22 
The Degree of Medical Coverage by the Comprehensive Insurance of Migrant 
Workers in Shanghai (Effective since September 2002) 
 
Contributor(s) Premium base of 
the 
comprehensive 
insurance 
Contribution* Medical Coverage 
(1) Employers or 60% of EAASSP# 12.5% of the premium base; 
7.5% of the premium base if 
the employers are overseas 
construction enterprises 
A. No coverage for 
(1) General outpatient and emergency medical 
expenses; 
(2) Medical expenses of serious outpatient 
illnesses; and  
(3) Medical expenses of home care beds 
(2) Migrant 
workers without 
work units 
12.5% of the premium base B. Medical coverage is provided for 
hospitalization; 
(1) payment threshold is 10% of EAASSP; 
(2) the comprehensive insurance fund covers 
80% of medical expense which is above 
payment threshold and below the ceiling; 
(3) the ceiling is capped at  
(i) EAASSP if the insurance premium is paid 
for three months;  
(ii) two times of EAASSP if the insurance 
premium is paid for six months;  
(iii) three time of EAASSP if the insurance 
premium is paid for nine months; and  
(iv) four times of EAASSP if the insurance 
premium is paid for more than a year 
Remarks: Contribution*: the premium contribution includes three insurance benefits: industrial injuries, hospitalization, and 
old-age allowance. 
EAASSP#: Employees’ Average Annual Salary of Shanghai in the Previous Year 
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Table 23 
The Degree of Medical Coverage of Small Town Social Insurance  
(Effective since 20th October 2003)  
 
Contributor(s) Premium 
base 
Contribution* General 
outpatient 
and 
emergency 
medical 
expenses 
Medical 
expenses of 
serious 
outpatient 
illnesses 
Medical 
expenses 
of home 
care beds 
Medical expenses of 
hospitalization and emergency 
room stay 
 No payment 
threshold 
 Payment 
Threshold 
Above payment 
threshold and 
below the 
ceiling of the 
medical 
insurance 
fund** 
(1) Employers 
of suburban 
employees or  
60% of 
EAASSP# 
5% of the 
premium base 
for health 
insurance 
Self-payment Employees: 
70% covered 
by medical 
insurance 
fund 
Not 
applicable  
1st 
hospitalization: 
10% of 
premium base;  
2nd 
hospitalization 
or above: 5% of 
premium base 
Employees: 
70% covered by 
medical 
insurance fund 
(2) Companies 
which 
appropriate 
lands of farmers 
Retirees: 
80% covered 
by medical 
insurance 
fund 
Not 
applicable 
Retirees: 80% 
covered by 
medical 
insurance fund 
Remarks:  Contribution*: Small Town Social Insurance requires every contributors to pay 24% of the premium base in which 17% is 
for old-age insurance, 5% for health insurance, and 2% for unemployment insurance. 
The ceiling of the medical insurance fund **: it is capped at four times of the premium base 
EAASSP#: Employees’ Average Annual Salary of Shanghai in the Previous Year 
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Table 24 
The Evaluation of Five Healthcare Financing Options in the Harvard Report 
 
 Maintaining 
the Status Quo 
Capping 
Government 
Budget On 
Health 
Raising User 
Fees at 
Public 
Hospitals 
and Clinics 
Health Security 
Plan (HSP) and 
Saving Accounts 
for Long Term 
Care 
(MEDISAGE) 
Competitive 
Integrated 
Healthcare 
Objectives  
1. Equity Very Good Worsen Worsen Moderately 
improved 
Moderately 
Improved 
 
2. Quality Variable Fair Worsen Unchanged Significantly 
improved 
Significantly 
improved 
3. Efficiency Variable Fair Unchanged Slightly 
improved 
Significantly 
improved 
Significantly 
improved 
4. Financial 
Sustainability: 
(a) managing 
government 
budget for 
health 
(b) better 
targeting 
government 
subsidies 
 
 
Poor 
 
 
 
Poor 
 
 
Significantly 
improved 
 
 
Slightly 
improved 
 
 
Moderately 
Improved 
 
 
Slightly 
improved 
 
 
Significantly 
improved 
 
 
Significantly 
improved 
 
 
Significantly 
improved 
 
 
Significantly 
improved 
5. Meeting future 
needs of the 
population 
Poor Unchanged Unchanged Moderately 
Improved 
 
Significantly 
improved 
6. Managing 
overall cost 
inflation 
Fair Unchanged Slightly 
improved 
Moderately 
Improved 
 
Moderately 
Improved 
 
Source: The Harvard Team (1999). Improving Hong Kong’s Health Care System: Why and For Whom? 
p.115.  
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